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ABSTRACT.
This Thesis sets out to consider the effects of law on the 
status of a political party, namely the United National Independence 
Party in Zambia, and to determine the extent and nature of its role. 
There is no doubt that political parties are important social and 
political institutions although not much has been written about their 
legal origins, status and role. Constitutional lawyers prefer to avoid 
any reference to political parties if they can.
This thesis examines some legal aspects of the evolution and 
role of the United National Independence Party. The study consists of 
eleven Chapters. Chapter I traces the historical development of 
political parties in the Commonwealth and looks at some definitions of 
'political party'. Chapter II sets out the historical background to the 
constitutional development of the Republic of Zambia. Chapter III sets 
out the legal framework within which the United National Independence 
Party emerged and operates to-day. Chapter IV examines some changes 
in the Constitution of Zambia that brought about the central role of the 
United National Independence Party. The Chapter looks also at the mode 
the Party is organized and its top leadership is chosen.
Chapter V examines the role of the United National Independence 
Party in public administration and Chapter VI looks at Public Law under 
a One-Party system. The relationship between the Party and Parliament 
is considered in Chapter VII. The relationship between the Party and 
Local Authorities is considered in Chapter VIII.
The relationship between the United National Independence 
Party and the labour movement (trade unions) is considered in 
Chapter IX. The role of the Party in the formulation and implementation 
of foreign policy is considered in Chapter X. Chapter XI contains the 
Conclusion.
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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.
THIS S1UDY sets out to consider the legal aspects of the central role 
of UNIP in Zambia's One-Party system. It sets out to analyse, from a 
legal stand point, some aspects of the role of the Party. The main
focus of the study is to demonstrate at least three factors on the role
of UNIP, namely that
(a) Zambia is governed through law and through institutions 
one of which is UNIP, but that there is ambiguity in the 
law on the legal capacity of the Party and that has at 
times adversely affected the role of the Party or the 
interests of persons who felt injured by some acts of 
functionaries of the Party;
(b) notwithstanding its ambiguous legal capacity, UNIP has
utilized the law in asserting its authority; and
(c) although UNIP operates within the framework of its own
Constitution in particular and the Constitution of 
Zambia in general, its role is shaped and dominated by 
the President of the Party and the Republic.
The study is, therefore, an analysis of the role of UNIP in the
government of Zambia. It provides a practical guide on the role of the Party
in the constitution of its own organs and election of leadership and the 
Party's relationship with the Executive, the Legislature, the Judiciary 
and other public institutions. Some outstanding features of UNIP need to 
be stated, for instance, it is not a 'chief's party', that is, like the 
Kabaka Yekka in Uganda, one formed to serve a chief's personal political 
interests; in fact UNIP organizers were sometimes goaled by chiefs.^
1. Chitambala v. The Queen (1957) NR LR Vol. IV, 29. Chitambala was an
organizer of the NRANC and later of UNIP and he was
goaled by a Chief for calling a political meeting 
without the Chief's permission* infra, p. 98.
UNIP has had no link with a religious sect. The Lumpa Church of the
self-proclaimed prophetess Alice Lenshina Mulenga,^ which was involved
in violent clashes with the security forces on the eve of Zambia's
Independence, was suspected to have had acted in league with certain
political organizations, but the commission of inquiry into the
disturbances found that "there was no direct evidence of any link
2
between the Church and any political party." UNIP is not a 'tribal
party', that is, one formed exclusively to serve the interests of a
particular ethnic group in the community. The Action Group in the
former Western Region of Nigeria, was described as a 'tribal party'
in that it was formed under the nucleus of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa
which was an organization founded to 'unite the various clans and
3
tribes of Yorubaland', although it was also described as a cultural 
4
organization.
Although. African political organizations' in NR waged a
5
freedom struggle' against. British colonial rule, that did not lead 
to an armed struggle and consequently, UNIP is not a 'soldiersr party'. 
The description 'soldiers' party' could be applied to at least two 
types of organization, first, a political party formed by a former 
guerrilla movement after achieving independence such as FRELIMO, the 
MPLA-WP and PAIGC, and, second, a political organization formed by 
soldiers following the over-throw of a civilian administration, for
1. Zambia: on her detention and application for habeas corpus
see: In re Alice Lenshina Mulenga (1969) ZR 243.
2. Report of the Commission of inquiry into the Former
Lumpa Church, 1965, p. 7; Government Printer, 
Lusaka. (Chairman: Mr Justice Whelan).
3. Hodgkin, T., African Political Parties; Penguin Books, 1961, p. 20.
4. Achike, 0. , Military Law and Military Rule in Nigeria, Fourth
Dimension, Unugu, 1978, p. 96
5. Infra, p. 73.
instance, the MPR, formed by General (now Marshal) Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku
wa Banga of Zaire^ and the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, formed by Colonel
2
Mangistu Haile Mariam. UNIP is not a 'transplant party' similar to those 
political parties modelled mostly on the UK's political parties formed 
in the British dominions such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand. These 
political organizations were to a great extent based on the British political 
system, traditions, class distinctions and freedom of organization, assembly 
and expression. Although UNIP was, from its inception, modelled on the 
European settlers' political parties, e.g. its organization being based 
on a written constitution and elected leaders, it was a 'mass organization' 
devoid of class distinctions; hence the Party's claim that: '"The Party is 
the militant organization of revolutionary peasants, workers, students and
progressive intellectuals and shall exercise supreme authority over all
3 4
State organs". Membership in UNIP is open to all Zambians.
The Origins of Political Parties in the UK.
The European political parties in NR were modelled on the UK 
political parties. The origins of political parties in the UK are traceable 
in the relationship between the monarchy, the aristocracy and the common 
people. Although by the 1680's the tag 'Whig' had acquired a national 
currency in describing the people who supported the respective influenctial 
personalities, political organization was in the main carried out by and 
around powerful aristocratic families and personalities who wrestled
1. Zaire:
2. Ethiopia:
3. UNIP:
4.
MPR was founded on 20th May, 1967: Histoire du 
Mouvement de la Revolution? Fprcad Mikanda, 
Kinshasa, 1971, p. 1.
Ethiopia Workers' Party officially launched on 
the 7th September, 1984.
Constitution, 1988, Art. 3. UNIP has had a written 
Constitution since 2nd August, 1959. In this study 
reference is mainly to the Constitution adopted by 
the 7th General Conference (16th August, 1973), the 
8th General Conference (9th September, 1978), the 
9th General Conference (22nd August, 1983) and the 
loth Party Congress (21st August, 1988) which also 
converted General Conference into Party Congress.
Infra, p. 380 et seq.
ministerial posts from each other and sought favourable relationship
with the Crown. By the beginning of the 1700's there had developed
a Whig and Tory party, each held together not only by a set of
political and religious attitudes, but also by ambition to hold office
and a rudimentary party organization based on territorial power of
the aristocracy and the gentry"^ or as they have been referred to as
2
'territorial magnates'. It has, however, been contended that the 
old Whig leaders had no conception of a "party government unconnected 
with the King, and hence of a constitutional Parliamentary opposition.
The Monarchy on the other hand, resisted recognition of the House of 
Commons as divided into political parties, or, to regard a 'Ministry' 
as a 'party ministry' or government. After the defeat of Lord North in 
1782 by Lord Rockingham, it became clear that a constitutional point 
had been made when a group of men identified as a party, with a 
leadership, political politicies and programmes, had ousted a ministry 
and itself assumed office. Hence-forth, the monarchy had to be accustomed 
to a party government.
4
The reform legislation of 1832 gave the vote to additional 
persons and encouraged the growth of political awareness and political 
organzation which initially took the form of voter registration 
associations. A link between the Parliamentary and provincial leadership 
was provided by political clubs: the Carlton Club was founded by the 
Tory party in 1831 and the Reform Club by the Whig party in 1836. In 
1861 the Liberal Party (the Whig party) in Parliament set up the 
Liberal Registration Association and in 1870 the Tory Party set up 
the Conservative Central Office with its leader, Benjamin Disraeli
1. O'Gorman, F., The Rise of Party in England: The Rockingham Whigs
1760-80; George Allen & Unwin, 1975, p. 34.
2. Keir, D.L., The Constitutional History of M o d e m  Britain Since 1485;
Adam Charles Black, 9th ed. 1969, p. 285.
3. O'Goman, F. , loc. cit. , p. 51.
4. UK: Representation of the People Acts, 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4,
c. 45, c. 65 and c. 88.
(later Lord Beaconsfield) contending that the Conservative party was 
the national party of England.^- He propounded three main principles 
of the party: "the maintenance of our institutions, the preservation
2
of our empire,, and, the improvement of the conditions of the people."
At the time of the Berlin Conference on the Partition of
Africa in 1885, the newly enfranchised voters in the UK had elected a
Liberal party government into office and was in office when the BSAC
3
was granted its Charter in 1889. In 1893 the Independent Labour party
was launched by James Keir Hardie to unite for the common action the
various socialist organizations in England. A written constitution was
adopted spelling out the aims and objectives of the organization:
collective ownership and control of the means of production,
distribution and exchange. The method by which these were to be
realised was through representation of the people in the House of
Commons, by men and women in favour of the objectives.
Trade unions which had in 1864 formed the TUC had, since
1874 secured representation in the House of Commons through the Liberal
Party. In 1888 a Labour Electoral Association was formed with the aim
of securing some representation of workers in Parliament. In 1899 a
Labour Representative Committee was formed at a congress of the
Independent Labour Party, the TUC and co-operatives. In 1906 the
4
Committee changed its name to the Labour Party. Thus, by 1906 the 
present multi-party system had emerged; each party with its own 
leadership, policies, programme and membership (except for the
1. Holland, F. (Ed.) May's Constitutional History of England 1860-1911;
Vol. Ill, Longman, 1912, p. 67.
2. ibid. p. 80, quoting Kebbel's Selected Speeches
of Lord Beaconsfield, p. 488.
3. UK: The BSAC was incorporated on 29th October, 1889:
BFSP, 1889, Vol. LXXXI
4. Neumann, S., M o d e m  Political Parties: Approaches to Competitive
Politics; Chicago UP, 1967 f p. 35.
Conservative Party which had no enrolled membership except through 
the constituencies. Individual membership of the National Union of 
the Conservative Association, as the whole party is called, was 
introduced in 1975.^) The Labour and Liberal parties adopted a 
written constitution in 1906 and 1952, respectively. Their formal
2
organization is based on party membership and a Parliamentary party.
The Liberal Party disappeared in 1988 through amalgamation with other
political organizations.
Freedom of Association and Assembly.
Since 1918 the UK has had a multi-party system dominated by
the Conservative and Labour parties. The party system has been influenced
by two main factors, first, an electoral system based on single-member
Parliamentary constituencies and majority voting system, 'first past 
3
the post' favours a two-party system and penalizes the third and 
subsequent parties, and, second, although a homogeneous society, the 
UK has class distinctions; hence, social class favours and develops 
class-based political system. These two factors were important in 
the importation of political party system from the UK into, for e.g. 
an African society. In addition to considering whether the UK party 
system was exportable to or emulatable in an African society, it 
should be mentioned that political parties in the UK developed under 
circumstances where there was freedom of association and assembly; 
which has resulted with the political party's legal capacity remaining 
unsettled. According to Walter Bagehot, nobody would understand political 
parties' status or "Parliamentary government who fancies it an easy
1. Conservative and Unionist Central Office v. Burrell (Inspector of
Taxes) /1982/ 1 WLR 522, at p. 526.
2. For a detailed analysis of UK political parties,
see: Chrimes, S.B., "The Evolution of Parties and 
Party System", PA, 1951-52, Vol. V, pp. 1-120.
3. de Smith, S.A., Constitutional and Administrative Law; Fifth ed.,
Penguin Books, 1985, p. 260.
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thing, a natural thing not needing explanation. You have not a
perception of the first elements in this matter till you know that
government by a club is a standing wonder".^ In the UK political
parties are not as such recognised by the law except indirectly,
for instance, by providing salaries to the Prime Minister, members
2
of the Cabinet and the Leader of the Opposition. Parliament has
had opportunity to legislate on the status of political parties, for
instance when it enacted the Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt
3
Practices Act, 1879 and the numerous Representation of the People
Acts, 1832 to 1948. It could be argued that such legislation dealt
with the prohibition of corrupt practices of parliamentary candidates
and/or their agents and not with, political parties, which, however,
cannot commit an electoral offence. If legislators saw it fit to pass
legislation on companies and their status and liabilities of their
directors and employees, it is feasable that legislation could have
been enacted on the status of political parties. Political leaders
are probably against legal formalisation of political activity and
being out-ward-looking, they might have felt that legislation was
necessary only in the control of 'mischief' in society and the
pursuit of politics was not viewed as- such to require legal control.
This want of a definite law on the status of political
organization was a second element in the question posed earlier whether
the UK political party system was exportable to an African country. A
study of the political organizations' origins in the UK gives the 
impression that the task in the constitutional evolution was- to
settle or sort out the relations among the principal institutions',
mainly the monarchy, the aristocracy, the Commons' and the Courts' of
1. Bagehot, W., The 'English Constitution; Fontana, 1867, Tenth Impression,
1973, p. 156; emphasis supplied.
2. UK: Consolidated Fund (Ministers' of the Crown) Act, 1937,
1 Edvr. 8/1 Geo. 6. c. 38 sec. 5(1), now Ministerial
and Other Salaries Act, 1972, c. 3, sec. 1(5).
3. 42 & 43 Vic. c. 75.
Law. Political parties did not and still do not feature among these 
important 'institutions'.
Political Organization in the Commonwealth.
There was a successful exportation from the UK of the British 
multi-party system and ideas of a parliamentary democracy to the older 
Commonwealth countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand. There 
are two possible explanations for that; first, the people who migrated 
from the UK and settled in these territories were nurtured within the 
British traditions including the freedom of assembly, organization and 
expression, and, secondly, the Imperial Power allowed the settlers to 
establish their system of government on the British model with all the 
British trappings including the British monarchy being also the Head 
of State of the settled territory and a political party system. Hence, 
in Australia the first political party to appear was the Labour Party 
in the 1850's which took office in 1891, the year that the first political 
party in New Zealand, the Liberal Party, also took office. In Canada the 
political parties resembled more the political parties in the United 
States of America than those of the UK; "they are great holding companies, 
incorporating conflicting interests and maintaining their cohension 
through the struggle for political power rather than through principle 
or class interests.”^ The first political party there, the Liberal- 
Conservative, took office in 1867.
The emergence of the 'political party * in British-ruled African 
territories could be considered in respect to the period before and after 
the advent of colonial rule. In explaining African concepts of government 
before the advent of colonial rule, African societies have been divided into 
two main groups. First, societies which had a centralized authority
1. Neumann, S., op. cit. , p. 13.
well-defined administrative machinery and established judicial 
institutions. Such centralized authorities were referred to as kingly or 
chiefly systems, for instance, the Barotse, the Baganda and Tswana and 
were ruled directly by the King (or Chief) in Council. The second group 
consisted of those societies in which authority was dispersed through a 
number of counter-balancing segments: these were referred to as chiefless 
societies, ruled through councils of elders usually chosen by virtue of 
their being titular heads of their families.
Although it has been said that "the African concept of 
government is not essentially dissimilar from the European, it is 
hardly to be wondered at that the emergence of African States in 
contemporary world politics is proving so successful and exciting,"^ there 
is no evidence that African political systems either under the so-called 
chiefly or chiefless rule were based on European political parties, the 
vote, regular elections or elected representative institutions. Instead, 
these were conservative systems, limited government with restricted public 
debate. To-day's political party, the vote, periodic elections (where they 
exist) and elected representative bodies, were introduced by European 
colonialism, laws and practices and were planted in an African environment.
In West Africa political organization appeared early but 
within the colonial context, for instance, in Ghana, then the Gold Coast, 
the Fanti Confederation was formed in 1868 followed by the Aborigines'
Rights Protection Society in 1897, the Congress of British West Africa
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in 1918 and the United Gold Coast Convention. Kwame Nkrumah's CPP, which
became a model of a number of African political organization, was a splinter
group from the United Gold Coast Convention. In Central Africa, that is
1. Elias, T.O., Government and Politics in Africa? Asia Publishing House,
London, 1961, p. 22.
2. For a detailed analysis of political parties in
French West Africa, see: Morgenthau, R.S.,
Political Parties in French West Africa; Clarendon
3.
Press, Oxford, 1964. 
Founded in February, 1949.
Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia, the origins of political organization are 
traceable in the incorporation of the BSAC and its activities in 
southern Africa. The creation of the Union of South Africa and the
establishment of a Senate of thirtytwo members and a House of Assembly 
of onehundred and twentyone members who had to be, and who were to be 
elected by, persons described as 'British subjects of European descent', 
stimulated political organization among white settlers in the Union in 
particular, and, sub-Sahara Africa, in general. The settlers' political 
mobilization triggered African political organization to protect their 
indigenous rights. The former President of Tanzania's premise of the 
origins of African political parties, was that
The European and American parties came into being as 
the result of existing social and economic divisions 
the second party being formed to challenge the 
monopoly of power by some aristocratic or capitalist 
group. Our parties had a different origin. They were 
not formed to challenge any ruling group of our own 
people; they were formed to challenge foreigners who 
ruled over us. They were, therefore, not political 
'parties' - i.e. factions - but nationalist 
movements. And from the outset they represented the 
interests and aspirations of the whole nation.^
African political organization came into being as a result of 
social and economic pressures exerted by colonial rule and the division 
between the white settlers and the natives. African political parties 
were 'political parties' in that they were formed to assume political 
power from the colonial rulers, and, to resist political domination of 
the natives by the white settlers. But these were 'European' form of 
political organization imported into the African society. Max Webber's 
view of the evolution of political parties was that it followed three
1. UK: South Africa Act, 1909, 9 Edw. 7, c. 9, secs.
26(d) and 44(c).
2. Nyerere, J.K., "Democracy and the party system", Tanganyika Standard;
January, 16-18, 1963.
stages; first when political parties were pure followings of the 
aristocracy, changing their allegiance as the great noble families 
which led them, changed theirs. Ihe second stage was the parties of 
nobles. These arose with the rising power of the bourgeois and 
consisted of formal local associations of the propertied and cultural 
circles, held together not by a party machine, but members of the party 
with seats in the legislature. The third stage was of formally organized 
national parties whose power did not rest with the parliamentary party 
or formal local associations or assemblies, but by party bureaucrats, 
organizers and especially a party leader who had shown the capacity 
to win support of a mass electorate. This stage Webber described at 
'plebiscitarian democracy'.^
The emergence of African political organization in Zambia 
began at the plebiscitarian i stage in that it was aimed at mass 
mobilization against the prevailing political system. The traditional 
African systems of government had no notion of 'political party' either 
as an instrument of government or opposition. Although the struggle for 
self-government which prompted African political organization was wedged 
as a 'national struggle', no political party emerged that was wholly 
identified with the 'nation'. They remained political movements and 
could be included in the definition of 'political party'.
Definitions of 'Political Party'.
Definitions are useful in the delimitation of the subject being 
studied. There is no general or standard definition of 'political party' 
Definitions of 'political party' are, therefore, legion. It has been 
said that to be a 'party' to something means identification with one 
group and a differentiation from another or other groups. In that sense
1. Neumann, S ., o p . cit., quoting Max Webber.
every political party is a group separated from another or other
groups: "A one-party system (le parte unique) is a contradiction in
itself. Only the existence of at least one other competitive group
makes a political system real."^ Although this is description of a
political system and not a definition of a political party, it does
shed some light on the role of political parties - competiting with
each other for political power. A rather detailed definition of a
political party is one in which the essential elements are continuity
in organization, regularized relationship between local and national
units, determination of the leaders to capture and hold power alone
2
or in coalition with others and membership.
For the purposes of this study, the following is adopted
as the appropriate definition of a 'political party', viz
Political parties are associations formally organized 
with the explicit and declared purpose of acquiring 
and/or maintaining legal control, either singly or 
in coalition or electoral competition, with other 
similar associations, over the personnel and the 
policy of the government of an actual or 
prospective state.3
One of the important elements in this definition is that
which affords the status of 'political party' to political organizations
formed to wrestle political power from a colonial power in the pursuit
of founding a future sovereign state. The African political movements
that fought for self-government would qualify as 'political parties'
under this definition. The definition also accords the status of a
'political party' to the only one political party allowed to operate
under a One-Party system (le parte unique). During colonial rule in NR
because of electoral restrictions, African political organizations did
1. Neumann, S., op. cit., p. 359 (Brackets supplied).
2. LaPalombara, J., and Weiner, M . , Political Parties and Political
Development; Princeton, 1966, p. 6.
3. Coleman, J.S. and Rosberg, C.G., Political Parties and National
Integration in Tropical Africa; Berkeley UP,
1966, p. 2.
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not participate in elections until 1959. Hie above definition includes
such organizations as 'political parties' committed to assumption of
political control of what was then a prospective sovereign state.
Although political commentators have produced a legion of
definitions of 'political p a r t y t h e  law has been lacking in this
respect. In most African territories administered by the British, the
administrators confronted by militant nationalist political organizations
2
demanding self-government, introduced legislation aimed at not giving
the organizations some legal status, but to provide the administrators
with legal powers to deal with the activities of the organizations.
The legislation did not define 'political parties' but 'socities', to
mean associations of individuals and not companies, cooperative socities,
or trade unions. This definition found its way into some Constitutions,
for instance, that of Nigeria of 1978 which provided that Association'
means a body of persons corporate or incorporate "who agree together for
any common purpose, and includes an association formed for any ethnic,
social, cultural, occupational or religous purposes", and Apolitical
party' meant any "association whose activities include canvassing for
votes in support of a candidate for election to the office of
President .... membership of a legislative house or local government 
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council". There was, however, a divergence between what the law defined
1. Lawson, K., The Comperatlve Study of Political Parties; St. Martin's-
Press, N.Y., 1976, p. 3; Price, J.H., Political
Institutions ofT'West Africa; Hutchinson, 1978, p. 14 . , ■ . . . — ■ ■■■■«■
2. Tanganyika: Societies Ordinance, 1954, No. 11, Cap. 337 and NR,
Societies Ordinance, 1955, No. 43, Cap. 105, sec. 2.
3. Nigerlai Constitution of Nigeria Act, 1978, No. 25, Art* 209.
Article 201 required that before a political party
engaged In any activities i-t should register with the 
Federal Electoral Commission, on the implementation of 
these provisions see: Nwanko, G.O.,, "Political Parties' 
and their Role in the Electoral Process-: The Nigerian 
Experiment with the Presidential System of Government", 
Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies';
Vol. XVII, Nos. 3 and 4, July-December, 1983, p. 4.
as 'political parties' and other organizations that also participated 
in politics, for instance, affluent members of various communities,
'home town'-based social clubs, youth and women organizations as well 
as the town unions and age-grade associations could sponsor candidates 
of their choice for nomination by parties which they perceived as 
likely to win most of the votes of people in their various constituencies. 
The problem was that definition and/or status of political party was 
arbitrarily determined by registration.
The One-Party Constitutions adopted by some African States
do not define the political party preserved by the system; that is
left to be regulated by (former colonial) legislation and the common
law. At common law a 'political party' has recently been described as
an association between two or more persons bound together 
for one or more purposes, not being business purposes, by 
mutual undertaking each having mutual duties and 
obligations, and was an organisation which had rules 
Identifying where its control rested and the terms on 
which it could be joined or left; that the bond of union 
between the members of such, association had to be 
contractual and the agreement which brought the contract 
about should have been made on some identifiable 
occasion or in some identifiable circumstances. ^
This definition accords the status of 'political party' to a
political organization under colonial rule or in an independent state,
or under a multi-party or one-party system. The view that one-party
3
states in Africa have "become in many places no-party state", is a 
contradiction in terms. The point purported to be made is however, 
discernible, namely that the integration of the party and government 
and state institutions might result In the withering away of the party.
1. Nwanko, G.O., op. cit., p. 5.
2. Conservative and Unionist Central Office v. Burrell (Inspector of
Taxes) /1982/ 1 WLR 522, per Lawton LJ at p. 525.
3. Wallerstein, I., "The Decline of the Party' in Single Party African
States" in LaPalombara, J., and Weiner, M., loc. cit., 
p. 214, supra, p. 29.
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Some writers have, on the other hand, contended that a state ruled by 
a 'communist party1 (often a one-party state), is a 'police state' or 
a 'party state'.^ Except in those situations in which all political 
parties or organizations have been proscribed and political activity 
prohibited by law, does a state become or could be described as a 
'non-party state'. A One-Party system retains one political party 
which functions as an entity on its own separate from the Government.
This study, therefore, is a study of the legal aspects of a political 
party's status and role in a One-Party State.
CONCLUSION.
The origins and development of political parties in the UK show 
a steady progressive shift in the political leadership from the aristocrats 
to the common people and from a non-political party system to a multi-party 
system. Political organization was and still is based on the laissez-faire 
principle - uninhibited freedom of expression, assembly and association, 
of forming and belonging to political parties etc. which was imported 
to the older Commonwealth countries such as Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand. In these countries political organization emerged unhampered by 
legal constraints. In African countries, the position was different. The 
African traditional system of government and political organization revolved 
around the institution of chieftaincy which did not develop an institution 
known as 'political party1, either as an instrument of government or opposition 
to government. On the other hand, colonial administrators did not allow 
the policy of lais9ez faire to apply to African political organization. 
Accordingly, they introduced legislation to control political organization 
in general and African parties in particular. However, the politically organized
1. Loeber, D.A. (Ed.), Ruling Communist Parties and Their Status Under 
Law; Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1986, 
a number of such writers cited at p. (xviii).
masses emerged supreme; their 'party' replacing both the traditional 
rule and colonial administration as the machinery of government. The 
argument advanced in justifying a one-party system of government in 
some African countries that that system was more consonant with the 
African traditional rule than a form of government based on a two or 
multi-party system, is used to conceal the political party's successful 
coup d'etat of traditional rule. There are no similarities between the 
two systems of government. The political party is a European political 
institution whose origins, status and role are not determined by any 
African customary rules or customs, but by the common law and statutory 
rules
It is not easy to understand the system of government of any 
country without some knowledge of the country's history. Much of the 
explanations of any political system depend on an explanation of the 
past or how the past affects the present. In order to facilitate the 
understanding of the role of UNIP to-day, the following Chapter looks 
at the emergence of institutions of government and political party 
system before and after UNIP was formed. During the colonial era in NR 
political parties had no clear legal status. The reason for that was 
not hard to see. In the metropolitan country (UK) whose laws and 
political ideals the settlers in NR emulated, the Crown, government 
departments, local authorities and public corporations had legal 
personality. Political parties had neither legal personality nor capacity; 
they were taken for granted. In the post-independence era, the political 
party in Zambiaf although not yet dressed in full legal dress, has 
assumed an important role. This important role, however, cannot be 
understood except in the context in which the Party emerged, assumed political 
power and has changed the Constitution of Zambia to become the supreme 
institution of the government of the Republic.
1. Infra, p. 90.
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CHAPTER II.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
IN NR (ZAMBIA) FROM 1900 to 1964.
From Colonial Non-Political Party System to an Interlude of a
Multi-Party System.
Introduction.
The Constitutional development of Zambia, vis-a-vis the 
evolution of its laws, governmental institutions and political system, 
could be divided, allowing for some over-laps, into the following five 
major periods; viz
(a) the non-political party system, 1890 to 1918; that is the 
period during which the regions which later became NR and 
Zambia were being acquired, delimited and amalgamated under 
the administration of the BSAC;^
(b) the European-only political organization, 1918 to 1958; 
when quasi-political organizations and political parties 
participated in the election of members of the Advisory 
Council and Legco, though African political organization 
had also began during the period;
(c) the European and African political organization, 1958 to 
1968; when an interlude of multi-partism emerged and 
parties competed for seats in the Legco, Legislative Assembly 
and the National Assembly;
(d) the African political parties only, from 1968 to 1972; when,
following the demise of settler political parties, the
political arena was left to African political parties only; 
and,
1. For a brief but comprehensive history of Zambia before this period, 
See: Langsworthy, H.W., Zambia before 1890: Aspects of 
Pre-Colonial Histcry; Longman, London, 1972.
(e) the One-Party system, commencing 1972, and in operation 
at the time of writing (1989) .
The constitutional development of Zambia progressed on precarious 
grounds and through difficult times due to the presence of plural societies 
comprising of Africans, white settlers and others. Territorial acquisitions 
and re-arrangements, governmental institutions and public organizations 
such as trade unions and political parties, emerged under colonial system
of administration.^ To sane extent, UNIP's relationship or role in public
2 3 4
administration or with Parliament and the labour movement and the
5
formation of its foreign policy are matters shaped more by the past than 
by the present. On the other hand, law in its nature is a product not of 
the present but of the past. The institutions of democracy - such as a 
representative political system, freedom of speech, assembly and association, 
the right to form and/or belong to a political party or parties - constituted 
important segments in the administration of Australia, Canada and New
r">
Zealand following their occupatioii, my; European settlers. In NR it was the 
absence of these institutions of democracy that shaped the origins of 
Zambia on one hand and of UNIP on the other hand. A study of the legal 
aspects of the role of UNIP in Zambia which omitted that history, would 
be incomplete. This Section, therefore, traces the territorial acquisition 
and re-arrangements that gave birth to NR, the evolution of its governmental 
institutions and laws and the African political mobilization that led to 
the emergence of UNIP. The British who migrated to North America and other 
places which they occupied as terra nullius, imported English law and 
form of governments into those lands and participated in elections as 
early as 1776 fought between the Federal Party ('the party of the wise, 
the rich and the well-born'), and the Republican Party ('the party of 
the small farmers'.)6 No such social classes emerged in NR.
1. Infra, p. 60
2. Infra, p. 186
3. Infra, p. 282
4. Infra, p. 404
5. Infra, p. 446
6. Commager, H.S. "American Political Parties"; PA, Vol. Ill, 1950, p. 214.
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With regard to conquered territories, the rules defining the 
application of English law and the form of government, were different 
since it was assumed that such territories had their own laws and 
forms of government. In the Protectorates, British 'protection' was 
said to have been based on capitulation, treaty, grant, usage, 
sufferance and other lawful means.^ Most protectorates because they 
had established native population, could not be seized and occupied as
IV
terra nullius. Notwithstanding the presence of such population, such
territories could not be governed wholly in accordance with the laws
and customs of the natives, but through partly English law and partly native
customary laws. But what might have been suitable in the English law
or English Constitution was not necessarily expedient in the protectorates,
and that was particularly the case when consideration was given to the
circumstances of the tropical African dependencies. In most cases,
however, there were more examples of deviation from English law and
practices than with compliance particularly when it came to freedom
2
of assembly, organization, expression and conscience. The freedom of 
assembly and association which existed under the common law in England, 
was not automatically applied in NR. Native law and customs were devoid 
of any rules on freedom of association and assembly.
In effect the difference between colonies and protectorates 
was very little. The development of the Constitution and political systems 
in both colonies and protectorates were matters which fell within the 
ambit of English law and ideals. The following Sections look at the 
application of such laws and ideals in the delimitation of Zambia and 
the development of its Constitution and laws.
1. UK: Preamble; Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890,
53 & 54 Vic. c. 30.
2. See for instance, the views of Farewell L.J. in Rex, v. Crewe, ex
parte Sekgome /1910/ 2 KB at p. 616 and Francis, J., 
in Petrus Johannes de Jager v. R. (1935) NR LR 
(1931-1937) 13, at p. 23.
Section 1. The Establishment of NR - 1900 to 1911.
The origins of NR were closely tied up with the activities
of the BSAC in southern Africa. The Africa Order in Council, 1889,^
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made under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1843, provided, inter alia, 
that it was lawful for H.M. to hold, exercise and enjoy any power or 
jurisdiction which H.M. then had or might at any time thereafter have 
within any country or place out of H.M.'s dominions in the same and 
ample a manner as if H.M. had acquired such power or jurisdiction by 
cessation or conquest of territory. The Charter of the BSAC on the 
other hand, had provided that the principle field of the operations
of the Company were the regions immediately to the north and west of
3
the South African Republic and the west of the Portuguese dominions.
In 1891 a Supplemental agreement was entered into between the Crown
and the BSAC which extended the jurisdiction of the Company across 
4
the Zambezi River, (from which Zambia derives its name) to the regions
which later became NR and Zambia.
(a) The BSAC and King Lewanika.
The BSAC's penetration into the region was through the Lozi 
kingdom of Lewanika who in 1889 had, through a French missionary, M. 
Coillard, written asking that H.M.'s protection be extended to his 
country. In 1890 armed with the Charter and British legislation, an 
agent of the BSAC, F.E. Lochner, who was an officer in the British 
Bechuanaland Border Police,"* entered into an agreement with Lewanika
1. UK: BFSP, 1889, Vol. LXXXI, p. 301.
2. now 1890, 53 & 54 Vic. c. 37.
3. Art. 1, BSAC Charter, 1889, as amended, 1891.
4. Hertslett, E., Map of Africa by Treaty; HMSO, 1894, Vol. 1, p. 272.
5. Williams, H.M., The Mining Law of Northern^ Rhodesia; BSAC, London,
1963, p. 23.
"and his heir Litia, his prime minister and all councillors and
provincial representatives, to number about forty, affixed marks to a
document giving the company the sole mineral and commercial rights
over the whole of the ba-Rotse dominion."^ As a consequence of the
letter of 1889 and the agreement of 1890, the High Commissioner for
South Africa was instructed by H.M.'s Government to inform Lewanika
2
that he was under the protection of H.M.'s Government. An agreement
was later entered into on 24th November, 1894, between the CO (UK)
and the BSAC by which the Company undertook the responsibility of
administering the region which was under British sphere of influence
north of the Zambezi river. The first British administrator reached
the Lozi kingdom in October, 1897. He, however, had no administrative
rights but he attended to some judicial matters.
The Lozi kingdom was based on a fuedal system with the King
as the head. Authority was concentrated at the centre and the executive
had no separate existence from the legislature and the judiciary. The
King and his councillors were bound by the law and had to act by
regular procedures. Lozi law held that the king could be sued by his
subjects in courts. To avoid this ambarassment, the king could only
act though his councillors and attendants, who then became liable
3
and might not plead his orders in defence. Although reference was 
and is still made to the office of the prime minister (the Ngambela),
the system was not based on a political party system. It was a
a non--political party system operating under the King who was an 
absolute autocrat and supreme legislative authority. The Barotse
1. Hole, H.M., Passing of the Black King; Allen, 1932, p. 295.
2. UK: Memorandum of Barotseland, 1932, CO, Section
III, pp. 4 and 5. See also Muyungo v. Induna 
Nalubutu (1960) R & N LR 677 at p. 682.
3. Gluckman, M ., Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Northern
Rhodesia; Manchester UP, 1955, p. 6.
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Native system of government although well developed, did not evolve a
political party system mainly because political power was vested in
the King. Also the institution of political parties did not exist and
it was unknown.
In all, four concessional agreements were entered into
between Lewanika and the agents of the BSAC: 17th October, 1900, the
8th March, 1905, the 23rd January, 1906 and the 11th August, 1909.
These agreements did not affect the native system of givernment in
Lewanika1s kingdom. The main concession of 17th October, 1900, dealt
mainly with economic matters such as manufacturing, mining, banking,
currency, communications and judicial functions assigned to the BSAC.
The judicial functions assigned to the BSAC were restricted to
"adjudicate on all cases between whitemen and natives"^ and these were
matters pertaining to commercial activities of whitemen. Matters
between and among natives were left to be dealt with by the King and
his Council or courts.
Lewanika's territory to which these agreements applied
was not precisely delimited and his jurisdiction was kept extended by
white settlers who engaged Lewanika's impis (armies) in their drive
2
into the interior of the region. UNIP's leaders contended that these 
agreements were concerned with only Lewanika's traditional kingdom 
and not with NR as a whole.^ That stand is supported by the contents 
of the agreements themselves which referred to Lewanika's kingdom 
although they also referred to 'dependent territories'? A  reference
1. Gluckman, M., op. cit., p. 2.
2. Val Gielgud and Anderson Papers, KTH/2 (188-1902), p. 2; NAZ-L.
3. Zambia: British South Africa Company's Claims to
Mineral Royalties in Northern Rhodesia; 
Government Printer, Lusaka, 1964, p. 8.
probably intended to include neighbouring territories under Lewanika's
subjugation. But those could not be bound by agreements to which they
were not parties. Even Lewanika himself it is doubtful if the agreements,
some of which were 'signed' by forty or so people, was bound by them. On
the other hand, Lewanika did not understand the Queen's language in which
the agreements were written. One of the early British administrators who
was sent in 1922 by the Administrator of SR to go and draft 'simple laws
and start some system of courts in North-Western Rhodesia', wrote of his
encounter with Lewanika in a Bulawayo store,^ as follows:-
The Chief was accompanied by his Prime Minister and a 
very fine pair of native gentlemen they were. He did
not speak any English and his perfect manners - for
they were perfect under all circumstances - were the 
result of his contact with Coillard of the Zambezi, 
the Protestant French Missionary who was head of the 
mission in Barotse country.^
The Lewanika-BSAC agreements were not treaties but commercial
concessions which facilitated British colonial expansionism in central
Africa. They paved the way for British rule in the region which was later
confirmed by the provisions to the effect that any part of Africa north
of the Zambezi River and under the protection of H.H.'s Government, should
3
be included within the limits of the Order. That legislation signalled
4
the beginning of the opening of the region to European settlement.
1. UNIP: Lewanika was at the time banished to SR by his people
accused of mismanagement of puhlic affairs; Programme 
(1979-1989) Transition from Capitalism to Socialism; 
1978, p. 6.
2. Henry Rangeley (1874-1953) Unpublished Memoirs; HM/20, p. 19, NAZ-L.
3. UK: Barotzeland,North-Western Rhodesia Order in Council,
1899, sec. 4(1).
4. North-Western
Rhodesia: Lands and Deeds Registry Proclamation, 1910, No. 57;
Statute Law of North-Western, North-Eastern Rhodesia 
and Northern Rhodesia, 1971; Livingstone, 1917, to 
be referred to hereinafter simply at the Statute Law 
of NR, 1917; p. 71.
(b) Barotzeland-North-Western Rhodesia.
This Region was bounded by the river Zambezi, the Germany
South West Africa, the Portuguese Possessions, the Congo Free State
and the Kafukwe (Kafue) river, and the "territory within the limits
of this Order shall be known as Barotzeland,North-Western Rhodesia."^
The name 'Rhodesia' was derived from the name of one of the founders
of the BSAC, Cecil John Rhodes. Although the Order joined Lewanika1s
' Barotzeland' to 'North-Western Rhodesia', the former existed as a
•protectorate' separate from the latter. The BSAC agents had to enter
into separate agreements with local chiefs to establish the Company's
2
administration in North-Western Rhodesia. Legislation for the Region was
3
in the form of Proclamation issued by H.M. Ivs High Commissioner, who 
was stationed in South Africa. The legislation provided for the 
administration of justice, the raising of revenue through taxes, levies 
and custom duties and generally for the peace, order and good government 
of all the persons within the Region.
(c) North-Eastern Rhodesia.
This Region shared boundaries with the British Central Africa 
Protectorate (later Nyasaland Protectorate) , the Germany East Africa, the 
Barotzeland-North-Westem Rhodesia and the Congo Free State. The Region 
was acquired by the BSAC through concessions and agreements negotiated 
between 1890 and 1891 with local chiefs by Joseph Thompson and Alfred 
Sharpe, both employees of the Company. The BSAC administered the Region
1. UK: Barotzeland,North-Western Rhodesia Order in
Council, 1899, sec. 3; BFSP, 1899, Vol. 9, p. 1134.
2. Makasa, K. , Zambia's March to Political Freedom; Heinemann, Nairobi,
Second ed. 1985; says that in 1953 the Africa 
Bureau in London collected 21 'treaties' between 
NR chiefs and agents of the BSAC or UK Government 
concluded during this period, p. 47.
3. UK: Barotzeland,North-Western Rhodesia Order in
Council, loc. cit., sec. 8.
in accordance with the provisions of the North-Eastern Rhodesia Order
in Council, 1900^ and its Charter. The Region was placed under an
Administrator appointed by the BSAC who worked under H.M.'s Consul-
General and the Commissioner for British Central Africa Protectorate.
When the British Central Africa Protectorate was declared Nyasaland
2
Protectorate in 1907, and a Governor was appointed to administer the
Protectorate, the North-Eastern Rhodesia was placed under the Governor.^
The Region remained placed under the Governor until in 1909 when the
legislative functions of the Governor were taken over by the High
4
Commissioner stationed in South Africa.
The legislation for the Region was in the form of the Queen's 
Regulations (made by the Governor or High Commissioner) and Regulations 
(made by the Administrator) for the administration of justice, the 
raising of revenue and generally for the peace, order and good government 
of all persons within the Region.^ Such legislation could be disallowed 
by H.M. through a Secretary of State and upon such disallowance being 
published in the Gazette, the provisions so disallowed would cease to 
have effect but without prejudice to anything hitherto lawfully done
g
thereunder. The North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council formed the 
basis of Zambia's constitutional development and three aspects of the 
form of administration established by the Order deserve brief mention.
(i) Land Occupation.
The Region's administration was entrusted to the BSAC. All 
land in the Region was wholly vested in the BSAC and the Company was 
obligated to assign to natives land sufficient for their occupation
1. UK: North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1900, Art. 4;
BFSP, 1900, Vol. 92, p. 502; Statute Law of NR, 1917, 
p. 39.
2. British Central Africa Order in Council, 1907, Art. 3;
BFSP, Vol. 100, 1907, p. 94.
3. North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1907, Art. 3
4. North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1909, Art. 4
5. North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1900, Art. 17.
6. ibid. Art. 17.
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and agricultural and pastoral requirements. Land was also vested in 
the BSAC in North-Western Rhodesia. In Barotseland - which was formally 
and separately declared a 'Protectorate' - land was not vested in the 
BSAC but remained vested in the Paramount Chief, except that the BSAC 
claimed mineral rights in the land in accordance with its agreements 
with Lewanika.
(ii) Maintenance of Law and Order.
For the maintenance of law and order, a military police force was
2
formed under the direct control and authority of the High Commissioner. A
prisons system was constituted to handle a prison population which was on
the increase as a result of the creation of new offences such as failure
to report for work, pay taxes or remain in tribal areas. A court system was
established with a High Court with full jurisdiction in civil and criminal 
3
matters. The law - civil and criminal - applied in the Courts was, and
the procedure and practice to be observed and followed were, those obtaining
4
before the Courts of Justice and Justices of the Peace in England. The 
Courts in the Region were required to apply English law and observe and 
follow English procedures and practices so far as local circumstances 
permitted. In addition to the imported English law, the locally made 
Queen's Regulations were also used in the maintenance of law and order and 
these were required to "respect any native laws and customs by which the 
civil relations of any native chief, tribe or population under Her Majesty's 
protection are now regulated, except so far as the same may be incompatible 
with the due exercise of Her Majesty's power and jurisdiction."'*
The BSAC did not enjoy sovereignty over the Regions but merely 
acted as the agent for the UK Government under whose protection and 
authority (its Charter) it operated. The administration was, therefore,
1. UK: North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1900, Art. 40.
2. ibid. Art. 20> infra, p. 392.
3. ibid. Art. 21(1); infra, p. 90.
4. ibid. Art. 21(2).
5. ibid. Art. 17.
subject of control by the Imperial Power, H.M.'s Government in the UK.
(iii) Political Activities.
Although the Order of 1900 treated the Region more as a 'colony',
e.g. by vesting all land in the BSAC, than as a 'protectorate', it did not
give the settlers political power. The point of view of English settlers
in 'colonies' was said to be that they could not settle abroad without
carrying "the King and the duty of allegiance to the King, neither could
they settle without carrying a Parliament and the right to assemble and
vote taxes in that Parliament Although the Order provided that
the Company by resolution of its Board of Director could establish a
Council to assist the Administrator composed of the Administrator, a
senior judge, ex officio, and less than three other members appointed by
the Company with the approval of a Secretary of State to hold office for 
2
three years, it was premature for political party organization and/or 
establishment of an elected representative body.
(d) Amalgamation of Barotzeland-North Western and North-Eastern 
Rhodesia : Creation of NR.
The BSAC's view was that the two regions to be effectively and
efficiently administered, should be amalgamated. A letter from Downing
Street, the official residence of the British Prime Minister, to the
Treasury, stated as follows;-
I am directed by Mr Secretary Harcourt to transmit for 
the information of the Lords Commissioner of the 
Treasury a draft Order in Council (Northern Rhodesia 
Order in Council, 1910) the purpose of which is the
1. Barker, Sir Ernest, "The Ideals of the Commonwealth", in Parliamentary
Government in the Commonwealth? by Bailey, S.D. (Ed.), 
(1951) cited in "Government in the Colonies", PA ,
Vol. 6, 1952-53, p. 58.
2. UK: North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1900, Art. 12;
Statute Law of NR, 1917, p. 37.
amalgamation of the territories of North Western 
and North Eastern Rhodesia, a measure which has been 
asked for by the British South Africa Company on 
grounds of economy and efficiency for the past and 
which should in the opinion of Mr Harcourt now be 
carried out.l
It is pertinent to notice that the letter did not make any
mention of Barotseland; paradoxically although there is no record
showing that the native chiefs and people of the two Regions were
consulted on the amalgamation, there is a record that Lewanika was
consulted on the amalgamation exercise. There is a letter from L.A.
Wallace, the then Acting Administrator for the North-Western Rhodesia,
Livingstone, to the Secretary of the BSAC in London, informing him of a
meeting between King Lewanika and a Colonel Fair, representing the
High Commissioner, at which the provisions of the draft Order, 1911,
were explained to Lewanika, who was recorded to have objected to Clause 42
of the Order which purported to allow- natives to buy, hold and sell 
2
land. The NR Order in Council, 1911, delimited the new territory's
borders to be with SR, Germany South West and East Africa, Portuguese
East and West Africa, the Congo Free State, Nyasaland and Bechuanaland
Protectorates, and
The Territory within the limits- of this Order shall 
be known as Northern Rhodesia.
The combined territory had a population of 818,529 Africans
4
(379,055 in the foamier North-Eastern and 439,529 in the North-Western). 
Barotseland population figure was not given in 1911, but in 1938 it was 
estimated at 296,741 Africans.'* There were 1,487 Europeans (.1,238 in the 
former North-Western and 259 in the North-Eastern, Rhodesia).
BSAC Administration Report; BS/2/264 (1907-1911)
Letter dated 14th November, 1910: NAZ—L. 
ibid. vide letter No. 32/3, 9th December,. 1910, p. 32
The Northern Rhodesia Order-in Gouncil, 1911, Art. 4. 
Memorandum by the Administrator on the Six Months' of 
Northern Rhodesia, 1st April — 3Qth September, 1911; 
BS/2/134, p. 3; NAZ-L.
5. Gluckman, M., Economy of the Central Barotse? Plan? Rhodes^-Livingstone 
Institute, Livingstone, 1941, p. 13.
1. NR:
2.
3. UK:
4. NR:
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The NR Order in Council, 1911, was made under the provisions 
of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, whose main object was to grant
H.M. jurisdiction over H.M.'s subjects for the time being resident in 
or resorting to foreign lands.^ The Order did not introduce any new
ideas except extending the provisions of the North-Eastern Rhodesia Order,
1900 to the combined territory. The legislation for the territory was to
2
be made by the High Commissioner's Proclamations published in the Gazette
3
under his authority. The land remained vested in the BSAC which retained
the universal right in all land assigned to natives and that if the
Company wanted such land for purposes of mineral development or as sites
for townships (that is European settlements) or for railways or other
public works, the Administrator with the approval of the High Commissioner
4
could order the natives to move. In Barotseland, however, land could not 
be alienated from the Paramount Chief and his people; though this restriction
was confined to land covered in the BSAC»Lewanika agreement of 17th
•5October, 1900 and 11th August., 1909.
The provisions of Art. 12 of the North-Eastern Rhodesia 
Order in Council, 1900 was reproduced in the 19L1 Order in to to with 
consequential changes: the Council was to be composed of the Administrator, 
appointed by the High Commissioner, a senior judge, the Resident 
Commissioner, who could attend, speak thereat but without a vote, and 
not less than three other members appointed by the BSAC with the approval 
of a Secretary of State. This provision could not stimulate political 
organization: it perceived the establishment of a non-political party
1. UK: 1890, 54 & 55 Vic. 37, sec. 2, see also Morris, H.F.
and Read, J»S., indirect Rule'and the Search for 
Justice ^ Essays in East African Legal System; Oxford, 
1972, in particular Chapter 2.
2. Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1911, Art.17.
3. ibid. Art. 3.
4. ibid. Art. 43.
5. ibid. Art. 40.
6. ibid. Art. 13.
administration, based on nomination or appointment. Although by 1911 
territorial acquisitions and re-adjustments had come to an end in 
Central Africa, it was still premature for emergence of political 
parties formed either by the settlers or Africans aimed at challenging 
colonial rule or to complement colonial administration.
Party organization in its origin was in its core, a social 
formation; a body of persons coming together in the pursuit of a set
of ideas and forming a social group in the area of society. For
political organizations to emerge, the people in the society should be 
free to discuss and clarify their common ideas among themselves, 
formulate their goals and programmes and should be free to publicly 
defend such ideas, goals and programmes in discussions against other 
similar groups. Eventually, the groups acquire their own tags, leaders 
and policies, and, finally seek support from the members of the public. 
The provisions of Art. 13 of the 1911 Order were not aimed at stimulating 
that sort of political evolution and they were not formulated in 
contemplation of political activities among the majority of the people 
in the population, the Africans, who lived under their respective 
chiefly rule and were not yet ready or capable of exercising any of
the political rights and duties of the kind anticipated by those
provisions.
On the other hand, the handful white settlers, although not
posed to oust colonial rule, perceived government in the context of
democratic institutions in which they could participate on the basis
1
of universal (male) adult suffrage. The provisions of Art. 13 of the 
1911 Order did not sanction the establishment of such a democratically 
elected representative assembly probably because of NR's status of 
being a ‘protectorate1 and not a 'colony' in which settlers could 
constitute a 'parliament' elected by universal suffrage. The provisions
1. Infra, p . 50
however, acknowledged the need for a machinery through which the
settlers' views could be channeled to the authorities. In as far as
native aspirations were concerned, the 1911 Order empowered the
Administrator to appoint, with the approval of the High Commissioner,
a Secretary for Native Affairs and his officials sytled Native Commissioner
and Assistant Native Commissioners and Magistrate to administer 'native
affairs'-^  a device to establish both central control and 'indirect rule'
of the natives in that centrally appointed colonial officials were
assisted by native chiefs in the administration of natives. The Order
provided against discrimination by enacting that no conditions,
disabilities or restrictions were to be imposed upon natives without
the previous consent of a Secretary of State, save in respect of
fire-arms, ammunition, liquor or any matter authorized by the Secretary 
2
of State. This was an important provision in that, if properly
construed and applied, it meant that the nearly one million indigenous
people still living under a tribal form of organization could compete
or work side by side with the thousand of settlers, highly educated,
politically mature and economically powerful. For instance, if the
settlers were free to form and belong to political parties or being
granted universal suffrage, the natives should enjoy the same right
without any condition, disability or restriction since that did not concern
fire-arms, ammunition or liquor. There was divergence, however,
between law and practice in that condition, disability or restriction
was placed on the natives which was not correspondingly placed on the 
3
non-natives. Some of such restrictions etc., will be considered in the
4
context of the establishment of governemntal institutions.
1. UK: Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1911. Art. 38(1).
2. ibid. Art. 39.
3. See for instance Reg. 5 of the Natives in the
Townships Regulations, 1909, No. 4 which restricted 
native residence, presence and movements in townships,
i.e. European-settled areas.
4. Infra, p. 49.
Section 2. The Establishment of Governmental Institutions.
The notion that Englishmen carried with them a right to a 
'parliament' existed among the settlers of NR. However, in the early 
years of British electoral systems in settled territories, 'parliaments' 
were elected by an elite minority because the vote was available only to 
British males. In NR the British administration was reluctant to introduce 
a Legco or the vote or a political party system; for either the settlers 
or the natives. Instead, an advisory council was constituted.
(a) The Advisory Council.
In an attempt to implement Art. 13 of the NR Order, 1911, the
BSAC Board in London wrote to the Administrator in Livingstone, then the
capital of NR, stating as follows, viz
The Board will therefore be glad if you now take up the 
question of the appointment of a small advisory council 
chosen among the white settlers or Northern Rhodesia in 
the manner contemplated in the letter to the Colonial 
Office of 13th March (1913). As indicated in that letter, 
it hardly appears necessary to do more than ask the 
Northern Rhodesia Farmers' Association to nominate two 
or three persons to form an advisory council, the 
appointment of which might be notified for general 
information in the Gazette.
The council would be in a position to discuss with 
the Administrator any question affecting the white settlers 
of the territory and draft legislation affecting white 
inhabitants the promulgation of which was not urgent in 
point of time, could be submitted to it for its observation.^
There was in this instruction a clear divergence or departure
from the provisions of Art. 13 of the 1911 Order and the advisory council 
2
being advocated; which proposed a body composed of settlers and not of 
ex-officio members and three others appointed by the BSAC and approved by 
a Secretary of State. Settlers' demands precipitated the change. On the 
18th August, 1917, the North-Western Rhodesia Farmers' Association
1. NR: Letter dated 2nd June, 1917, from A.M. Millar, Assistant
Secretary, BSAC, London, to His Honour the Administrator, 
Livingstone: BS/3/146, Advisory Council (1917-1924)y 
p. 1; NAZ-L. Brackets supplied by the writer.
2. ibid. Letter No. 41/5/33 dated 11th December, 1913,
from Harry Lambert, for Under Secretary of State, CO,
to the Secretary, BSAC, London, required that provisions 
of Art. 13 of the 1911 Order be implemented; p. 1/7.
met and passed a number of resolutions thanking the BSAC for "the
offer that settlers could form an Advisory Committee". But the 
settlers had different ideas from those contained in Art. 13 of the 
Order of 1911, in that they advocated for an advisory 'committee' 
composed of five members elected by voters registered on a general 
voters' roll. Accordingly, on 24th January, 1918, the Farmers' 
Associations^ sent to the Administrator the following proposals, 
inter alia, that -
2. The Advisory Committee shall consist of five members 
who shall continue in office until the 31st of 
December, 1919.
3. Hie territory shall be divided into two Districts,
i.e. (a) the North-Western District comprising the 
territory formerly known as North-Western Rhodesia, 
and (b) the North-Eastern District, comprising the 
territory formerly known as North-Eastern Rhodesia.
4. Every male British subject of European descent over 
21 years of age, shall be entitled to vote in the 
district in which he resides provided that at the time 
of applying for voting paper he has for a period of 
six months immediately preceding such application:-
(a) occupied premises in the territory of the value 
of not less than £150 or has been in receipt of 
a salary of not less than £150 per annum, and
(b) can write and without criminal record.
European women were by implication excluded from the vote. The
Africans, males and females, were excluded because they were not of
'European descent' and by the fact that they were not 'British subjects'
but 'British Protected Persons'. The vote was based on the Cape of Good
3
Hope Colony's Parliamentary Voters' Registration Act, 1887, and the
4
Franchise and Ballot Act, 1892. The latter granted the vote to British 
males, aged above 21 years, in receipt of not less than £50 salary 
per annum, or occupier of a house or a warehouse or a shop of the
1. NR: These were the North-Eastern Rhodesia Farmers'
Association, the North-Wtestern Farmers' 
Association and the Co-operative Society.
2. Letter signed by L.F. Moore, to the Administrator;
24th January, 1918; BS/3/146, Advisory Council,
(1917-1924), p. 24; NAZ-L.
3. Cape Colony: 1887, No. 14, see. 8, Schedules A and B
4. 1892, No. 9; sec. 6, Schedule E.
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value of more them £75, able to sign his name and address unaided
and a natural born or naturalized subject of H.M. the Oueen, of
sound mind and without a criminal record.^- Ihe principle that a franchise
should be based on income, property ownership and/or education, was
adopted quite early in English constitutional law system, in fact as
early as 1430 when the franchise was restricted to freeholders having
tenements to the annual value of forty shillings. The vote remained
restricted to very few people until it was broadened by the Representation
2
of the People Acts, 1832. In 1918 when the Farmers' Associations in NR
were making their franchise proposals, the UK Parliament had just enacted
3
the Representation of the People Act, 1918, which gave the vote to males
above the age of 21 years and females above the age of 30 years, and, the
4
Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act, 1918, which provided, inter alia, 
that a woman should not be disqualified by sex or marriage from being 
elected or sitting or voting as a member of the House of Commons. It was, 
however, not until 1928 when the Representation of the People (Equal 
Franchise) Act, 1 9 2 8 , provided that Parliamentary franchise should be 
the same for men and women. The requirement for income and property was 
replaced by mere residence in the parliamentary constituency.
The divergence between the law (Art. 13 of the NR Order,
1911) and the proposals of the settlers was caused by the contradiction 
colonial rule encountered in plural societies in Africa. The settlers 
always craved for a representative legislative body, but such a body 
could only be constituted with native participation. Universal suffrage 
for all the people of NR would not have resulted in the establishment
\  N
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1. Cape Colony: Franchise and Ballot Act, 1892, Schedule E, sec. 6.
2. UK: 2 & 3 Will 4, c. 45, c. 65 and c. 88, see also
Keir, D.L., The Constitutional History of Modern 
Britain Since 1485? Adam Charles Black, 1975,
9th ed., p . 416.
3. 7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 47, secs 1(1) and 4, respectively.
4. 8 & 9 Geo. 5, c. 64
5. 18 & 19 Geo. 5, c. 12
of governmental institutions committed to the preservation of settler
ideals, values, traditions and interests. The Administrator conceded
that there was a divergence from the law and that the council being
devised was not the same as the council provided for under Art. 13 of
the 1911 Order in Council. The one the settlers were^^ivising
is an advisory council without Legislative or Executive 
Power, members to be nominated or elected by the Farmers' 
Association or elected on a broad basis in some simpler 
manner. The members so elected or nominated will be 
accepted by the Administrator as a Council, not 
constituted on any legal enactment, with whom he would 
discuss matters of importance affecting the white 
settlers, except in cases which are too urgent to admit 
of advice being taken.1
The Farmers' Associations accordingly on 1st July, 1918, held
the elections. In the North-Western District, 1,391 persons registered
as voters. Seven candidates stood for the four seats allotted to the
District. In the North-Eastern District only one candidate who stood
for the one seat allotted to the District, John Lindsay Bruce, was
2
duly declared elected unopposed. The advisory council so constituted
was composed of the High Commissioner, the Administrator, the
Resident Commissioner and the five elected members'. Minutes of the
council show that Government officials also attended. As a matter of
fact the advisory council was the Council as envisaged by Art. 13 of
the NR Order in Council, 1911 except for the presence of elected
members. The Imperial Power acquiesced in the settlers' contrivance
in establishing a quasi-elected governmental body in an African
protectorate and not a settler territory. Later the advisory council
demanded that native view should be expressed through a body of
3
settlers, that is, representatives of African interests.
1. Livingstone Mail, 18th March, 1918; being a portion of the Administrator
'Letter to the Editor' on the nature of the council.
2. NR: BS/3/146, Advisory Council (1917-1924) op. cit. , pp. 26-27
3. ibid. Advisory Council, 'Native Policy', disoussed by 
the Council on 19th July, 1921; p. 1/67.
The establishment of the Advisory Council did not generate any 
political organization among the settlers mainly because the Council 
was devoid of legal basis and had a small electorate. The Farmers' 
associations were loose aggregations concerned not with politics, but 
the agricultural industry although some of their leaders held some 
political opinions particularly on such matters as 'native policy' and 
the role of the BSAC in NR. The importance in the establishment of the 
Advisory Council lay in the fact that it preceded the emergence of 
formal political parties but was based on the principle of election; 
an acknowledgement that democratic representation was depended on 
explicable people's choice. The settlers' rejection of the letter but 
the acceptance of the spirit of Art. 13 of the 1911 NR Order, was 
probably based on their desire to see that the constitutional evolution 
of NR followed the patterns of SR and South Africa: 'responsible 
government' for the settlers.^
(b) Formation of the Legco.
The Advisory Council gave settlers a limited say in the 
legislative matters before the Administrator and High Commissioner but 
no say in executive matters or native affairs. These fell within the 
prerogative of the Administrator and the High Commissioner, acting 
either alone or on the advice of the BSAC Board. The settlers pressed 
for a 'representative body1 to replace the Advisory Council. British 
jurisdiction in foreign lands was based on the provisions of the 
Africa Order in Council, 1889, made under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 
1843. The gist of this legislation was to the effect that within a 
local jurisdiction, constituted under the Order, H.M. had power and
UK: Southern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1898,
Art. 13(1) constituted an Advisory Council 
consisting of the Administrator, as President, 
the Resident Commissioner and not more than four 
members appointed for three years by the BSAC.
A Legislative Council was established in 1911.
authority over British subjects.This was the legal framework within 
which British administrators worked in NR. The Buxton Committee which 
was appointed on the 7th March, 1921, to advise H.M.'s Government on 
a number of issues raised in a petition presented by settlers in NR, 
expressed the view that settlers' claim to be more associated with 
the government of NR, was reasonable and that the BSAC should, in 
order to meet that demand, establish a Legco.'*' Nothing was said about 
African association with the government of their country.
The Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1924, terminated the
BSAC administration of NR and established direct CO administration
2 3headed by a Governor, who assumed office on 1st April, 1924. The
establishment of the Legco expanded and extended the jurisdiction of
the Crown and stimulated political activity among settlers. The Legco
so established was composed of the Governor (as President), five
ex-officio members (the Chief Secretary, Attorney-General, Financial
Secretary, Secretary for Native Affairs and Principal Medical Officer),
4
four Nominated Official members and five elected members. For the 
purposes of transitionally constituting the Legco, the five members of 
the Advisory Council, which was abolished following the establishment 
of the Legco, were co-opted as the five elected members of the Legco.
The establishment of the Legco was obviously intended to constitute 
a legislative body composed of CO officials and settlers but excluding 
the indigenous people. That was made clear by its composition and the 
franchise adopted which was an elaboration of the franchise devised by
1. UK: Report of the Committee on Rhodesia; Cmnd.
1921/1471, p. 55.
2. Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1924, Art. 6;
BFSP, 1924, Vol. 119, p. 41.
3. NR: Gazette, 8th May, 1924, Proclamation No. 3, 1924.
4. UK: Northern Rhodesia (Legislative Council) Order
in Council, 1924, S.I. 1924/324, Arts, 3, 4 and 
5; BFSP, Vol. 119, p. 377. The Legislative Council 
Ordinance, 1925, No. 25, Cap. 19, sec. 3 increased 
the number of elected members from 5 to 8.
by the Farmers' associations in 1918 for the purposes of election of 
the members of the Advisory Council. The qualifications for voters and 
candidates for election to the Legco were as follows, viz
(a) British subject (male or female);
(b) Occupation of property in NR valued at over £250;
(c) Ownership of a registered mining location or olluvial 
claim in NR;
(d) Income or salary of over £200 per annum;
(e) 21 years of age and over;
(f) Ability to complete a voter application form unaided;
(g) Without a criminal record and not declared of unsound 
mind or bankcrupt.^
Through these constitutional innovations the settlers had succeeded 
in converting the Advisory Council into the Legco and their franchise into 
a legal instrument. Africans in NR did not participate in the creation of
2
the Legco or its membership and it was said that "their lose was not great".
The establishment of the Legco, however, did not stimulate political
3
organization among the settlers until 1941 when the NRLP was formed. The 
elected members stood as 1 independants' and their role was mainly not to 
oppose but influence Government policy. The franchise discouraged African 
political organization aimed at the registration of African voters since 
at that time there were about ten Africans registered as British subjects.
The denial of the vote and the exclusion of Africans from the membership 
of the Legco were in themselves sufficient stimulants for African political 
mobilization. If African political organization had appeared at that stage, 
it was likely that its aim would have been to influence colonial policies 
and not to oppose the colonial government because the concept of self-rule 
or independence had not yet appeared in the African society. The settlers 
had not opposed colonial rule because they were identified with it. Initially 
the Africans would have preferred to influence colonial rule from within 
than opposing it from outside. The settlers only in the later stage when the
1. NR: Legislative Council Ordinance, 1925, No. 25,
Cap. 19, secs. 9, 11, 12 and 13.
2. Gann, L .H ., A History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953;
Humanities Press, N.Y., 1969, p. 179.
2 , Northern Rhodesia Labour Party.
elected members of the Legco had doubled, behaved as if they were
an opposition to the Government in which some of them held departmental
posts. The Executive Council established under the 1924 Order in Council
was composed of the Governor, as Chairman, the five ex-officio members
of the Legco and such other members not holding office in the Public
Service of the territory as the Governor in pursuance with H.M.'s
Instructions, might appoint.^" Africans were not included in the Executive
Council. The exclusion of Africans from both the Legco and the Executive
Council denied them of an opportunity to utilize these institutions of
Government as training ground for self-government. The 1924 Order in
Council, however, contained some provisions protecting some African
interests, for instance, the approval of the Secretary of State was
required to be obtained before a native could be removed from a native 
2
reserve, except in the execution of the process of a competent court.
The Order in Council establishing the Legco provided that the Governor
3
could declare that a Bill not passed by the Legco enter into force, 
provided that wherever he exercised this power, he should report the 
same to the Secretary of State, and Art. 25 of the same Order in Council 
reserved the approval of certain categories of Bill relating to natives 
to H.M. unless the Governor had been authorized by the Secretary of 
State to consent thereto. Under Art. 26 H.M. could through the Secretary 
of State disallow any law enacted by the Legco and assented to by the
4
Governor. Only two Ordinances were disallowed between 1924 and 1964.
1. UK: Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1924, Art. 15. An 
ex-officio member resigned from Legco through a letter 
to the Governor: M.A. Baldock, MBE, letter to the Chief 
Secretary, Livingstone, 16th Janaury, 1925; NR/b/l/lA671 
Legislative Council (1924); NAZ>L.
2. ibid. Art. 43(1) as amended by Art. 9 of the Northern 
Rhodesia (Crown Lands and Native Reserves) Order in 
Council, 1929, S.I. 1929/246.
Art. 24(1) Northern Rhodesia (Legislative Council) Order 
in Council,. 1924 as amended by Art. 24(2) of the Northern 
Rhodesia (Legislative Council)(Amendment) Order in 
Council, 1959, S.I. 1959/105.
The Village Management (Amendment) Ordinance, 1925, No. 6 
and the Imperial Acts Extension Ordinance, 1929, No. 9.
3.
4. NR:
Following the establishment of the Legco, settlers pressed for more
elected members in both the Legco and the Executive Council and resisted
the application of the policy of the 'paramountcy of African interests' to
NR.^ The formation of the first European political party in NR, the NRLP
in 1941, was opposed by Colonel Stewart Gore-Browne, the first European to
be appointed an Unofficial Nominated member representating African interests
in the Legco, who felt that it was premature to introduce party politics in 
2
the country. The founder of the NRLP, Roy Welensky's reply was that he was 
not introducing party politics, but merely wished to achieve an unofficial 
members' unanimity by having a dominant party in the Legco.^ The following
4
shows that the composition of the Legco had changed considerably by 1948:-
Speaker
Ex-Officio members 6
Nominated Official members 3
Nominated Unofficial members 2
(representing African interests) 
Elected members 10
African members 2
If the situation in 1941 was considered premature for European 
political parties, the introduction of African political parties during 
that period was out of the question altogether. Consequently, although 
African political organization had emerged between 1941 and 1948, the two 
African members of the Legco were excluded from the process of popular 
election by the general voters, instead they were selected by an electoral 
college, the ARC. The increase in the number of elected members in the 
Legco and settler political mobilization and the denial of the vote and 
direct elected representation to the Africans, led to Africans to begin to 
organize politically to unitedly demand that these rights be extended to them.
1. UK: Correspondence with regard to Native Policy in
Northern Rhodesia; Cmnd. 1930/3731, pp. 2 - 3.
2. Clegg, E., Race and Politics? Partnership in the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland; Oxford, 1960, p. 74.
3. UK: ibid. p. 75. First European representative of
African interests was appointed under Art. 3, 
Northern Rhodesia (Legislative Council)(Amendment) 
Order in Council, 1938; BFSP , 1938, Vol. 142, p. 39.
4. Northern Rhodesia (Legislative Council) (Amendment)
Order in Council, 1948, S.I. 1948/340, Art. 3.
Section 3. The Emergence of African Political Organization.
The description 'African political party' or 'organization' 
refers to a political organization formed by Africans for the acquisition 
and/or protection of African interests although its membership might have 
been left open to non-Africans. The importance or relevance to this study 
of the historical background of African political organization lies in 
two factors, first, the early organizations magnanimously laid the 
foundation upon which is based the present central role of UNIP, and, 
secondly, they were the objects or subjects of the legislation that 
determines the present status of UNIP. This Section is therefore, mainly 
concerned with these two factors of the emergence and role of African 
political organizations, and, their fight for self-government.
The origins of political organization among Africans in NR 
were in the native welfare associations formed at local level mainly in 
urban areas and along the line of rail although the first to appear was 
in a rural area# a mission centre known as Mwenso, in 1923, where the 
minister in charge was Rev David Kaunda, the father of the first 
President of Zambia, Kenneth David Kaunda.
(a) The Native Welfare Associations.1 1 ‘ - ............
The Mwenso-type native welfare socities appeared at 
Livingstone,^ at Ndola,^ at Mazabuka,^ at Kabwe,^ at Lusaka,** and at
g
Choma. These associations were basically concerned with social and 
cultural affairs of the Africans but they also provided a link between 
the Africans and the colonial administrators, local government
1. NR; SEC. 2/442, April, 1930, Livingstone Native Welfare
As^coaition , NAZ-L.
2. SEC. 2/443, October, 1930, Ndola Native Welfare Society
3. SEC. 2/444, October, 1^30, Mazabuka Native Welfare Society
4. SEC. 2/4^5, November, 1930, Kabwe Native Welfare Society
5. SEC. 2/452, April> 1931, Lusaka Native Welfare Society
6. SEC. 2/454, May, 1§31, Choma Native Welfare Society
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authorities and mining companies. The native welfare societies were loyal
to the Government and minutes of a meeting of the Livingstone association
held on 15th March, 1932, contain a statement made by the chairman of the
association, one Rankin Isaac Nyirenda, to the effect that "Some people
think we want to chase white people from this country, or we are against
the Government. We do not intend to be in unagreeable terms with the
British Government. We are, to this Government,as children are to their
parents. This Association is our mouth-piece to the Government."^ The
Administrators' view was that native welfare associations were useful
means through which Africans articulated their grievances andvgive /
2
constructive suggestions. The authorities, however, were opposed to
a combination of all the associations on the ground that it was premature
and that some organization to represent the interests of all the natives
in the territory could "best be obtained by a further grouping of the
native authorities in the different districts and members of the Welfare
Associations can keep on best each in his own tribe by trying to overcome
tribal jealousies. They might also consider that in the organisations set
up amongst Europeans the Legislative Council is not an amalgamation of
3
Tdwn Councils and Management Boards".
Although English law did not burden itself with a sharp division or 
dichotomy between public and private law that is such an important 
feature of French, law, the colonial administrators did evolve a form of
4
administrative law in NR through the administration of natives legislation,
enforced by the Secretary for Native Affairs and his Native Commissioners
5
and Assistant Native Commissioners, Magistrates and Chiefs. There was no
1. N R : Native Welfare Association,- Livingstone, (1931-34)
ZA 1/9 45/1; p. 5(1): NAZ-- L «
2. ibid. p. 7
3. ibid. p. 11, and Native Welfare Association, NAT.
M/3/2, letter of the Chief Secretary, 27th. July, 1932, 
to Provincial Commissioner, Livingstone.
4 t Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1911, Art. 38.
5. Northern Rhodesia Administration of Natives Proclamation,
1916, No. 8 of 1916: Statute Law of NR, 1917, p. 631.
room or role for a country-wide native political organization. Although
in 1932 the authorities appeared reluctant to sanction the amalgamation
of all native welfare associations/ the initial reaction of the
authorities was for such a union. The first application of the
Livingstone association to the authorities for recognition, was headed
'Northern Rhodesia Native Welfare Association' and dated 27th May, 1929.
In response to this application, the Assistant Secretary for Native
Affairs informed the Association to delete the name 'Northern Rhodesia'
and replace it with 'Livingstone' and ended his letter saying:
6. The Association can rest assured that so long as its 
aim and object is to introduce civilization among the 
native people of the Territory and to instruct them to 
live as good African subjects of His Majesty the Kirjg, it 
will have the support of the Native Affairs Department.
If the Association does well, no doubt other 
associations will start to work in other places. Then 
when you have several Associations, it might be possible 
to join them all into one large Association.
The constitution of the 'Northern Rhodesia' Native Association
lodged with the authorities together with the application of 27th May,
1929, had included among its aims, and objects the promotion of brotherly
cooperation and feeling among the native people of NR, the representation
of native opinion to the authorities t the spread of civilization by
education, industrial and agricultural development among the natives of NR,
Two reasons were given to the Association for the authorities'
opposition to the formation of a country-wide native welfare association:
first, that Chiefs had been given local control of their parochial
2
affairs by the Native Authority Ordinance, 1929 and Native Courts 
3
Ordinance, 1929 and that native welfare associations were not the medium
4
through which natives should submit grievances to the Government.
1. NR: Letter Ref. 37-45/1930r 11th, February, 1930, signed by
J.W. Sharratt: ZA/1/9 45/1(1), op. cit., p. 11.
2. 1929, No. 32* secs. 3 and 4.
3. 1929, No. 33* secs. 8 and 14.
4. Letter No. 37-45, 7th July, 1930, signed J. Moffat
Thompson, Secretary for Native Affairs^ to the Chief 
Secretary; Native We1fare Association, ZA/1/9 45/1(1)
loc. cit., p. 11.
There were two other reasons contained on the files
which were not communicated to the Association, first, that the Association
had engaged in political issues by criticising the sentencing policies of
the High Court on native offenders and by expressing disappointment with
the Government's failure to implement British 'fundamental principles
of justice expected after the Territory was taken over in 1924 from the
BSAC. ' The second undisclosed reason was that some officials of the
Association were in touch with Marcus Garvey of the 'Back to Africa'
Association who had asked them to collect evidence in Northern Rhodesia
of cases of injustice to natives.'*'
During the period 1934 and the outbreak of the Second World
War, the native welfare associations' role was nearly taken over by
country-wide organizations of African workers, for instance, the strikes
in 1935 gave the impression that there was emerging a more radical
2African leadership outside the native welfare associations. In 1937, one 
John Michelo, launched the first national organisation, the African 
Congress, which, having been refused permission to operate, disappeared. 
During the war years, the native welfare associations' activities were 
suspended but soon after the war, a conference was called on 18th May,
1946, where a country-wide Federation of Native Welfare Association was
3
formed. The objects of the Federation were those contained in the 
NR Native Welfare Association constitution of 27th May, 1929 - brotherly 
cooperation, interpretation to the Government of native opinion and the 
spread of civilization.
(b) The First African Political Party, NRAC is Formed.
The Federation of Native Welfare Association at its 
annual conference held between 9th. and 11th July, 1948, resolved that
1. NR: Native Welfare Association, ZA/1/9 45/1(1), p. 45.
2. UK: Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into
the Disturbances in the Copperbelt, Northern Rhodesia;
Cmnd. 1935/5009. (Chairman: Sir William Alison Russell).
3. Northern Rhodesia Federation of Native Welfare Association,
Constitution, 1946, Art. 34 (a) to (d): Native Welfare 
Association, Livingstone, ZA/1/9 45/1(1), p. 10(B).
the Association be converted into a congress and that resulted in the
formation of the NRAC under the leadership of Godwin Mbikusita Lewanika.
In the absence of legislation expressly providing for political parties,
the Congress like the welfare associations, the Federation and Michelo's
Congress, required Government approval before they could function. The
NRAC applied for 'recognition1 of the Government. In 1948 the Government
was confronted by two obstacles if it purported to refuse the NRAC to
function, first, unlike the Congress in 1937 which was restricted to the
southern province of NR only, the NRAC, being formed by the country-wide
Federation of Native Welfare Association, could not be easily suppressed.
Secondly, the NANC had in 1945 applied to the NR Government to form and
operate branches in NR. The Government of NR had sought clarification
'on the origins and status of the NANC' from the Government of Nyasaland,
and which had replied as follows:
4. The organisation is recognised by Government as 
representing the various African Associations in Nyasaland, 
but it is entirely an unofficial body responsible for its 
own organisation and finances- which do not come under the 
supervision of Government.2
The first application to recognize a NANC branch in NR was made
in January, 1945, in Luanshya, on the Copperbelt, where a large number
of workers from Nyasaland (to-day's Malawi) were employed in the copper
mining industries. The Western (now: Copperbelt) Provincial Commissioner,
writing to the Chief Secretary regarding this application, observed:
In my opinion alien Natives living in this Territory should 
content themselves with the existing organisations such as 
Urban Advisory Council and African Provincial Councils.3
He accordingly reserved his approval of the recognition of the 
NANC branches on the Copperbelt. In the colonial usage, an 'alien native'
1. NR: Nyasaland African Congress (1945-47) SEC. 2/1271/NAT
M/5, 23rd January, 1945; p. 8: NAZ-L.
2. ibid. Letter 13th February, 1945; p. 8.
3. ibid. Letter 8-A/Y/2, 16th. April, 1945; p. 27.
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meant a native of Africa who was not a native of NR, for instance, a native 
of Nyasaland working in NR. Notwithstanding the reservation, the Government 
of NR having given permission to a political organization of alien natives 
to operate in NR in 1945, it could not find any justifiable ground on which 
to base its refusal to permit 'its own natives' political organization to 
operate in the Territory. The NRAC was accordingly recognized.^" Three years 
later at a conference of the NRAC held on 22nd July, 1951, the name of the 
NRAC was changed to NRANC and Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula took over its leadership 
until the party was proscribed in 1972 to give way to the establishment of a 
one-party system. During the period 1951 and 1958 no other African political party 
emerged. The Constitution of the NRANC contained sixteen Clauses on the aims 
and objects of the organization and among these were the following, viz
(a) To promote, guard and protect the political, economic, 
educational, material, social interests, advancement 
and well-being of all Africans of Northern Rhodesia;
(e) To foster and encourage a spirit of loyalty to the 
British Crown and the British Commonwealth;
(f) To work for broadening of citizenship and for universal 
adult suffrage based on one man one vote leading to 
self-government and independence;
(g) To promote the candidature of Congress members or 
sympathisers for the Legislative Council or any 
other public office in the Territory.2
The importance in the emergence of the native welfare associations, 
the Federation of Native Welfare Associations, the NRAC and the NRANC lay 
in the fact that under a rudimentaiy indirect-rule system then being tried 
in NR, these organizations did not appear as provincial organizations but 
as national bodies. Their relevance to the study of the legal aspects of 
the role of UNIP in Zambia lies in the fact that they laid the foundation 
for a one-party system in that at a time when the concept of a NR nation 
was inconceivable, they organized nationally, and thereby provided the 
African people with a national forum through which they, as a group,
1. NR: Letter of authority dated 17th May, 1945; Native
Welfare Association, NAT/M/25, p. 28; NAZ-L.
2. NRANC: Constitution, 1952, Art. 2
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could achieve political advancement. The Governor was required "to
the most of his power, to promote religion and education among the
native inhabitants of the Territory" and he was especially to
take care to protect them in their person and in the enjoyment of
their possessions and by all lawful means to prevent and restrain all
violence and injustice which might be practised or attempted against
them.^ The Africans in NR had no (and still to-day do not have) a common
native customary law for the whole society.. They had no overall national
political organization. The numerous customary laws did not provide for
political organization either nationally or locally. Although law is
conceived as the property of a society as a whole, the Common Law, though it
was supposed to have been imported to apply to NR as a whole, it was
basically imported to regulate the affairs of the settlers. Consequently,
the emergence of African political parties was not left to be regulated
by the Common Law, but by administrative intervention. The Governor was
not obliged to promote 'politics among the native inhabitants' of NR, nor
was the Common Law expected to protect political organization among
Africans, particularly in the face of such legislation which provided,
inter alia, as follows:
The Administrator exercises over all natives all political 
power and authority, subject to such powers as may be 
reserved by the Order in Council or Proclamation to the 
Secretary of State or to the High Commissioner.^
Consequently, NR produced political parties which, in spite 
of their well-phrased aims and objects, hardly promoted any social or 
economic or educational projects for their members in particular and 
members of the public in general. They did not publish party newspapers 
or books. They did not organize any self-reliance projects. Their role
1. UK: Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1924, Royal
Instructions, 1924, Clause 23.
2. NR: Proclamation of His Excellency the High Commissioner,
NR, No. 8 of 1916: Statute Law of NR, 1917, p. 631.
as can be gathered from correspondence between the native welfare 
associations and the NRANC, was often in the nature of constant appeals 
tg._the authorities for equitable distribution of social facilities and 
■ humnane' enforcement of legislation concerned with the control and/or the
presence of Africans in urban areas mainly the Municipal Corporation
1 2 
Ordinance, 1927, the Townships Ordinance, 1929, and the Mine Townships
3
Ordinance, 1932, This legislation made Africans aliens in urban areas.
The amalgamation of the native welfare associations into the
Federation did not produce any tangible results showing the indigenous
people's worthy of advancement through their own combined self-improvement
effort in social, economic and political spheres. The Federation was not
a mass organization and its leadership was composed of elite chiefs,
4
teachers, clerks, social workers and the like. The Federation, however, 
for the time-being provided an organization with a national outlook in 
that although its leadership was composed of town dwellers, these had 
been drawn from most of the regions of the territory. That national 
outlook was the important legacy it gave the NRAC and NRANC whose leadership 
was not different from that of the Federation. Like the Federation, both 
the NRAC and the NRANC although they promoted brotherly cooperation and 
feeling among the African people of NR, had no means of spreading any 
civilization through education, industrial and agricultural development 
because they lacked funds and educated manpower. Only the government and 
industrial and commercial corporations had such means. These organizations 
could, therefore, only appeal to the authorities for social improvement 
among Africans. The view that if African social, economic and political 
developments were to move fast the Africans must rule themselves, 
followed later, partly as a result of frustration with colonial inequalities.
1. NR: 1927, No. 16, Cap. 470.
2. 1929, No. 53, Cap. 471.
3. 1932, No. 11, Cap. 472.
4. Epstein, A.L., Politics in an Urban African Community; Manchester UP,
1958, p. 67 and p. 159ff. See also Henderson,
I., and Warhurst, P., Revision in Central 
African History to 1953; Central African History 
Association, Pamphlet No. 15, 1965, p. 27.
Section 4. Mass Organization and Legislation Controlling Political
Parties.
The emergence of the NRANC coincided with the creation of the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.^ Africans in NR and Nyasaland were
opposed to the Federation mainly for two reasons, first, they saw the
Federation as an indirect means of terminating the protectorate status
of their countries and converting them into European-settled territories
and, secondly, while Europeans were granted the vote on the basis of
adult universal suffrage in the election of European members of the Legco
and the Federal Parliament, African representation in these institutions
2
were through selection by specially constituted bodies. In Nyasaland
3
the designated body was the Nyasaland African Protectorate Council and 
4
in NR the ARC. The Federation had a population of 8 million people of
which 7 million were Africans, 297,000 Europeans, 25,000 Asians and
13,000 Coloureds. At its inception the Federation's Parliament was composed 
of thirtyfive members > increased in 1957 to SR 24, NR 14 and
Nyasaland 6 elected by the Common Roll, that is European members elected 
by European electors; Africans, SR 2, NR 2 and Nyasaland 2 returned on a 
Specially Elected franchise. There were three European representatives of 
African interests one each from SR, NR and Nyasaland. While European 
representation was open to political party contest, that of Africans was 
based on a non-political party system; that frustrated African political 
party organization.
In NR at the time of the creation of the Federation in 1953 
the Legco was composed of the Speaker, 8 ex-officio members, 6 Unofficial 
Nominated members appointed by the Governor, two of whom were representatives
1. UK; Rhodesia and Nyasaland Federation Act, 1953,
1 & 2 2 Eli. c. 30; BFSP Vol. 160, p. 30.
2. Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Constitution) Order in
Council, 1953, S.I. 1953/1199, Art. 13.
3. Nyasaland: General Notice No. 180, 23rd October, 1953,
Nyasaland Government Gazette.
4. NR; General Notice No. 309, 30th October, 1953,
Northern Rhodesia Government Gazettef infra, p.. 75.
of African interests, four Africans, selected by the ARC and nominated
by the Governor, and 12 Europeans elected by Europeans: the franchise
as devised by the Advisory Council in 1918 and confirmed with the
establishment of the Legco in 1924.^ The NRANC's attitude to the
Federation and the constitutional position in NR was stated in its
detailed Memorandum to the Government in which it laid down seven major
areas of African discontent in the Territory. These areas were, first,
discriminatory legislation and practices against Africans, second,
administrative proscription of some NRANC Branches, third, restrictive
legislation against political organization, fourth, lack of freedom of
movement, association and assembly, fifth, official obstacles to
cooperation between the NRANC and the African labour movement, sixth,
official reprisals against African civil servants and chiefs who joined
or sympathised with the NRANC, and, seventh., the franchise law and the
2
imposition of the Federation. All these seven subjects could be 
summarized in into one sentence, namely, discontent with discriminatory 
legislation and practices.
The CO's view of discriminatory legislation in the dependencies 
of Britain could be gathered from a circular letter dated 8th January, 1947, 
addressed to Governors and Officers Administering the Governments of 
British Protectorates and Colonies informing them that in pursuance to 
the provisions of Art. 1(3) and Art. 68 of the Charter of UNO, 1945, 
racial discrimination had been specially remitted for examination by 
the UNO's Commission of Human Rights with the terms of reference to 
draft an international Bill of Rights, and, to consider racial 
discrimination in general. The Colonial acbninistrators were, thereby
1. NR: Legislative Council Ordinance, 1925, No. 25, sec. 3.
2. NRANC letter dated 8th. September, 1954, signed by 
General Secretary, K.D. Kaunda, addressed to the 
Secretary for Native Affairs: African National Congress, 
B/5-291, NR. 11/158; NAZ-L; infra, p. 209.
required to undertake factual surveys of legislation considered to be
discriminatory and to indicate what steps, if any, were being taken against
such legislation.^ Discriminatory legislation, wrote the Secretary of
State (for the Colonies), was necessary in certain circumstances: -
Some may be required in the interest of the local 
non-European races. Some might be defended of being 
necessary for the protection of the health and living 
conditions of the sections of the community who have 
at present widely differing standards in these matters.
Some may be incapable on broad political grounds of any 
immediate change. The purpose of this survey would be 
to list the provisions of the law which are, or can be 
susceptible to modification or repeal, and, in cases 
in which repeal is not considered possible, to state 
the reason.2
Although NR's reply contained seven pages of titles and brief 
analyses of legislation considered discriminatory, the exercise did not 
result in any changes in discriminatory legislation or practices. This 
Section, however, is concerned with legislation regulating political 
organization and freedom of assembly and association.
(a) Legislation Controlling Political Organization.
British colonial administration in some parts of Africa sometimes
encountered native opposition and in some cases even uprisings. In such
situations general administrative measures were used to contain the crisis
and/or special legislation was enacted to control persons or organizations.
In Nyasaland (now Malawi) , the Rev. John Chilembwe uprisings led to the
3
enactment of the Seditious and Dangerous Societies Ordinance, 1927 which 
empowered the Governor in Council, when satisfied that a society, which 
included a political party, or body of persons, whether corporate or 
incorporate, established in the Protectorate, had doctrines or disseminated
1. NR: Discriminatory Legislation: European and Non-European;
SEC./2/298, NAT./D/1I (1947); CO Letter No. DC 7923/1, 
dated 8th January, 1947, p. 1; NAZ-L.
2. ibid. p. 1.
3. Nyasaland: 1927, No. 9, Cap. 50: every order made by the Governor
in Council under sec. 2 of the Ordinance was required 
to be reported to the Secretary of State together with 
the reasons for making it: sec. 4. See also, infra, 
p. 452.
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seditious information detrimental or dangerous to the maintenance of
public security or public order, order that the society, organization
or body of persons cease to operate in the Protectorate.'*’ In Tanganyika
(now Tanzania) the British administrators, faced by a peaceful political
2
mobilization by Africans, enacted the Societies Ordinance, 1954, which 
defined the 'society' to include any club, company, partnership or 
association of ten or more persons whatever its nature or object but to 
exclude the following, viz
(a) any company registered under the Companies Ordinance 
(Cap. 212) or any company which had complied with sec.
321 being an exempt company, or
(b) any company, council, authority, association, board
or committee lawfully constituted or established under 
a Royal Charter, or Royal Letters Patent, or any 
Imperial Act, or any law for the time being in force in 
the Terriry.3
Trade unions (registered under the Trade Union Ordinance, Cap. 84)
and cooperatives (registered under the Coperatives Ordinance, Cap. 212)
were also excluded. Political parties were not mentioned by name either
among the organizations included or excluded from the definition of
'society'. The Governor in Council was empowered to declare a society
unlawful if satisfied that it was used for purposes prejudicial to, or
incompatible with, the maintenance of peace, order and good government 
4
in the territory. Both, the Nyasaland and Tanganyika societies legislation 
vested the power to declare a society unlawful in the Governor in Council, 
which meant that the exercise of the power could be a subject of debate not 
in the Legislative Council but at least in the Executive Council. Since 
Executive Councils were advisory, the decision was that of the Governor.
1. Nyasaland: 1927, No. 9, Cap. 50, sec. 2. On the Rev. John
4.
3.
2. Tanganyika:
Chilembwe uprisings see: Williams, T.D. Malawi,the 
Politics of Despair; Cornell, UP, 1978, pp. 110-118.
1954, No. 11, Cap. 337, later amended by the 
Societies (Amendment) Act, 1962, No. 76.
ibid. sec. 2.
ibid. sec. 6.
In Nigeria the criminal law was used in the control of political
organization, e.g. the Governor in Council was empowered to declare any
society^ - a term which included a political party - as an unlawful
2
society if considered dangerous to the government of Nigeria. In NR
although European political organization had appeared in the early 1940's,
no legislation, other than the Penal Code, 1930^, was enacted to control
political parties until the NRANC intensified its opposition to the
Central African Federation and its demands for constitutional changes in
4
NR, that the Societies Ordinance, 1955 was passed based on the Tanganyika 
Societies Ordinance, 1954, aforesaid. The fact that the Societies Ordinance 
was intended to control the NRANC's activities can be gathered from some of 
its provisions, e.g. on the utilization of party funds. The NRANC launched 
a country-wide fund-raising campaign to send a delegation to London to 
protest against the imposition of the Federation. The Ordinance required 
that every society"* should furnish the Chief Secretary with its Constitution, 
a list of its office-bearers and of its objects for which donations and 
subscriptions solicited by the society would be used. Each society was
required to furnish the Chief Secretary with a financial statement certified
by a responsible officer of the society, showing the assets and liabilities, 
receipts and expenditure of the society and a report of an auditor approved
g
by the Chief Secretary.
1. Nigeria: Criminal Code, 1916, No. 15, Cap. 42, sec. 62(a) (ii).
See also Aguda, A. and Aguda, 0., "Judicial Protection 
of Some Fundamental Rights in Nigeria and the Sudan 
Before and During Military Rule", JAL, 1972, p. 136.
Unlawful Societies Order, No. 19, 1950: "The society
known as 'Zikist Movement' is declared for the 
purposes of Chapter IX of the Criminal Code to be 
dangerous to the good government of Nigeria." Laws 
of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos; 1958,
Vol. VII, Cap. 42, p. 154.
1930, No. 42, Cap. 146.
1955, No. 43, Cap. 105.
ibid., sec. 2, definition of 'society' included a 
branch of a society.
ibid. sec. 5, similar to sec. 16 of the Societies 
Ordinance of Tanganyika.
3. NR:
4.
5.
6 .
There were penalties against every society and every officer
of the society for false reports or entry or statement and omissions
regarding the matters to be lodged with the authorities.^ In addition
to that, a failure to comply with the law could result in the society
2
being wound-up upon an application of the Attorney-General. The civil
capacity of the society was as follows:
7. (1) The person or persons controlling the income, expenditure
or funds of a society may sue or be sued in his or their 
representative capacity on behalf of the society.
(2) Any judgement or order of any court obtained by or 
against the persons mentioned in sub-section (1) of this 
section shall be enforced for the benefit of or against the 
society, and any moneys required to be paid under such 
judgement or order shall be paid into or satisfied out of, 
as the case may be, the funds of the society.
These provisions equated political organization to commercial
activity and could not therefore satisfactorily cope with the increased
political agitation of the NRANC. In 1957 the Ordinance was repealed,
the functions of the Chief Secretary were vested in a Registrar of 
3
Societies. the power to cancel any registration of a society was,
however, retained by the Governor in Council, and that power could be
used, inter alia, on the ground that the society concerned had in his
opinion among its objects, or was, in his opinion, likely to pursue, or
to be used for unlawful purpose or any purpose prejudicial to or
incompatible with, the peace, welfare or good government or order in 
4
the territory. The NRANC was a mild political organization and the 
enforcement of these provisions followed a split in NRANC and ZANC was 
formed; the latter was militant. The point of conflict in central 
Africa during this period was fear: the settlers were afraid that if 
political power was shared with or given to the indigenous people, that
1. NR: Societies Ordinance, 1955, sec. 6, similar to sec. 30(3)
of the Tanganyika Socities Ordinance, 1954.
2. ibid. sec. 9
3. Societies Ordinance, 1957, No. 65, came into force on
2nd June, 1958.
4. ibid. sec. 23, similar to sec. 21 of the Tanganyika
Societies Ordinance, 1954.
would bring to an end the system of government they were accustomed,
and, the Africans were afraid that if power was transferred to the 
settlers, they would lose the right to ever rule themselves.
(b) Split in NRANC; ZANC Formed.
The split in NRANC occured over the new constitutional 
provisions for NR which extended the Federal franchise to NR^ and 
proposed a Legco composed as follows:
Speaker 1
Ex-Officio members 4
Nominated Official members 2
Nominated Unofficial members 2
Elected members:
Ordinary Constituencies 12
Special Constituencies 6
Reserved (European) 2
Reserved (African) 2
The NRANC had put forward its own proposals that the Legco
should be composed of a Speaker, 35 elected members (21 Africans and 14
Europeans) and seven nominated members,and, the Executive Council
composed of Governor, three ex officio members, three Africans and 
2
three Europeans. These proposals were rejected. The leader of the 
NRANC, Harry Nkumbula agreed with the Government proposals, while those 
opposed to the proposals broke from his leadership to form the ZANC 
which applied for registration to the Registrar of Societies on 1st 
December, 1958, under Rule 5(i) of the Societies Rules made under the 
Societies Ordinance, 195 7, stating in paragraph 4 Of the application
that it had working relationship with the PAFMESCA and the British
3 4
Labour Party. It was registered on the 9th February, 1958.
1. NR: Proposals, for Constitutional Change in Northern
Rhodesia, 28th March, 1958; Government Printer,
Lusaka, 1958, p. 3.
2. Kenneth David Kaunda, HM/35; NAZ-L.
. ■ —  ■ 1 — - ■■■ —  -    .
3. Krishnamurthy, B.S., Cha Cha Cha, Zambia's Struggle for Independence;
Oxford UP, Lusaka, 1972, File 2 Doc./16
4. NR: Report of Inquiry into Circumstances which gave rise
to the making of the Safeguard of Elections and Public
Safety Regulations, 1958; p. 7. Government Printer, 
Lusaka. (Chairman: N.C.A. Ridley); infra, p. 457.
73.
ZANC launched an opposition campaign against the holding of 
the election under the 1958 Constitution. It put forward its own proposals: 
adult suffrage for both men and women above the age of 21 years, a Legco 
composed of 59 members elected directly by the people, three ex-officio
members (i.e. the Attorney-General, the Chief Secretary and the Financial
1 2 
Secretary). It also proposed a House of Chiefs. All these proposals were
rejected by the Government. ZANC organized country-wide disturbances, held
unauthorized public meetings and processions and called for the boycott of
3
shops and beerhalls. Consequently, the authorities banned ZANC under the
4
provisions of the Societies Ordinance, 1957 and placed its entire leadership 
under restrictions orders under Reg. 3 of the Safeguard of Elections and
Public Safety Regulations, 1959, made under the Emergency Powers Ordinance,
5 6
1927 as amended by the Emergency Powers (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959. The
colonial administrators justified the invocation of these legal powers on
the ground that ZANC leadership had vowed to defy the law and had made it
known that unauthorized public meetings would be held to protect against
\
the 1958 Constitution, e.g. the ZANC leader was reported to have told an
unauthorized ZANC rally that such rallies would continue to be held:
We shall do this whenever permission is refused to us and 
granted to all other political parties in the Territory.^
Kaunda was detained at Kabompo, North-Western Province of NR.
1. UNIP: ZANC Proposals for Constitutional Reform for the
Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia as Submitted by 
Zambia to the British Imperial Government u.f.s. the 
Governor of the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, 
4th February, 1959; signed K.D. Kaunda, President.
2. ibid. Arts. 2 and 3.
3. Infra, p. 96.
4. NR: 1957, No. 65, secs. 9 and 10, as amended by the
Societies (Amendment) Ordinance, 1958, No. 46, which 
vested the control of societies in the Governor in 
Council, sec. 3.
5. 1927, No. 9, Cap. 400.
6. 1959, No. 9, supra, p. 457.
7. Central African Post, 9th March, 1959: 'Kaunda's Congressmen Defy
NR Police', p. 1.
His view of his detention and his colleagues/ restrictions and
prosecution was expressed in a letter he wrote on his 35th birthday
(28th April, 1959) 'C/o Detainee Camp, District Commissioner, Kabompo'
in which he said, inter alia:
Your know Comrades, that the British will always put 
slogans at their backs but at the bottom of their hearts 
it is tough guys they both respect and give consideration 
for. They will put in jail, they will prosecute them, but 
all these are tests to see if they are ready to rule 
because to govern is no small job and need to be handed 
over to people who can stand the ups and downs of life. 
British colonialists do not send fools to political 
prisons - only those they want to try for the job of 
governing others do they send to political prisons. So 
you are being tested comrades. I have no doubt that you 
will pass.1
Although this was a pep-talk, an exhortation to more courage 
and activity upon release from restriction, it contains the element 
that power would be handed over to those who fought for it and not to 
the people as a whole. This perception of the devolution of governmental 
power from the Imperial Government to the formerly colonized peoples, 
have contributed towards the establishment of the One-Party system 
and certain electoral devices which guarantee political power in the 
hands of the ’freedom fighters' of the party which 'won' independence. 
The 1959 Legco Election: Party Participation.
The NRANC view of the proscription of ZANC and itself left
to participate in the 1959 Legco election, was that the Colonial
Government had declared a preference and approval of the NRANC. But
Nkumbula was not happy with that and felt that by doing so the Governor
of NR was trying to kill two birds, with, one stone "banning ZANC, and at
the same time making Nkumbula appear like a political stooge in the eyes
2
of the general public." The 1959 election was the first in which an
1. Zambia: Kenneth David Kaunda HM/35; the five-page letter
dated 28th April, 1959, was deposited in the 
NAZ-L by E.H. SUcazwe on 19th. April, 1985.
2. ANC Freedom — Voice of ANC, June, 1959, p. 1; UNIP
Library and Archives, Freedom House, Lusaka. On some
social aspects of the split, see infra, pp. 346-350.
African political party (the NRANC) participated in NR. The composition 
of the Legco after the 1959 Election was, UFP (13 members), the Liberal 
Party (3), the Dominion Party (1), the NRANC (1, its President, Nkumbula) 
and Independants (4).
(d) UNIP is Formed.
Following the proscription of ZANC, several African political 
organizations appeared in NR; the following being the major ones, viz
(a) African United Congress (AUC),
(b) African National Freedom Movement (ANFM),
(c) African National Independence Party (ANIP),
(d) Convention People's Party (CPP),
(e) African National Democratic Union (ANDU), and
(f) Zambia African Democratic Union (ZANDU).
The AUC was founded by Dixon Nkokola, then the Vice-President 
of the NRAMU. The ANFM was founded by Dauti Lawton Yamba, who in the 
1930's had formed the Luanshya native welfare society and he was one
of the founders of the Federation of Native Welfare Associations and
1 2 
the NRAC in 1946 and 1948, respectively. He was a member of the ARC ,
the Legco and the Federal Parliament. The AUC and the ANFM merged to
form the United National Freedom Party (UNFP). The ANIP was founded by
one Paul Kalichini. The UNFP and ANIP merged to form the United National
Independence Party (UNIP) on 2nd August, 1959. Graphically, the
emergence of UNIP was as: follows:-
AUC..............)
A N F M ............)
ANIP .............
CPP ............. .
ANDU .............
ZANDU ............
1. Supra, pp. 5 8 - 6 4 .
2. African Representative Council, a non-statutory body
constituted by the Governor in July, 1946, composed of
29 ‘ members from the then nine Provinces to advise
the Governor on matters affecting Africans: The ARC 
Constitution, 1946, Clause 11(b). The ARC selected the 
African members of the Legco and the Federal Parliament.
U N F P ------- ]
) = = = = = =  UNIP
It is, therefore, not accurate to say that "The Zambia African
National Congress which changed its name to United National Independence
Party in 1960"^ because as can be seen from the previous page, UNIP was
a merger of several African political organizations. The only tangible
link between ZANC and UNIP was that on his release from restriction on
31st January, 1960, Kenneth David Kaunda, the former President of ZANC, was
on the same day elected President of UNIP.
The Government of NR acting from the experiences of 1958 - 59
2
enacted the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance, 1960 which empowered 
the Governor to prohibit the publication or dissemination of matters 
considered by him to be prejudicial to public security, the control of
3
assemblies, the restriction of the movements and detention of persons.
The registration and management of 'societies' was tightened by the
requirement that more names and information of office-bearers of societies
should be supplied to the Registrar of Societies who was empowered to
4
reject any application for the registration of a society, e.g. a branch 
of a society such as UNIP.
In 1960 it had become clear that the ultimate political 
objective of the African people of NR was self-government. Before the 
Federation there were changes which showed that the CO intended Africans 
to participate in the administration of their country, for instance, the 
introduction of direct African representation in the L e g c o B u t  the
introduction of the Federation appeared to most Africans as evidence that
African advancement was going to be either interfered with or altogether 
sabotaged. Paradoxically, the Federation hastened Zambia's independence:
1. Zimba, L.S., The Constitutional Protection of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms in Zambia: An Historical Cofaper&tive Study;
Ph.D Thesis, University of London, 19;Z9L^ /p. 74.
2. NR: 1960, No. 5, Cap. 106, sec. 4.
3. ibid. secs. 3(2) and 4(2) (b) .
4. Societies (Amendment) Ordinance, I960, No. 26, sec. 15
inserting a new sec. 32A in the Societies Ordinance, 1957.
5. Supra, p. 57.
local and international pressure to break it, led the Monckton
Commission to recommend that
We have reached the conclusion that Her Majesty's 
Government should make a declaration of intention 
to consider a request from the Government of a 
Territory to secede from the Federation.1
That in effect spelt the beginning of the end of the Federation.
The role of UNIP from 1960 to Independence involved the dissolution of the
Federation and freedom of association and assembly in the struggle to end
colonial rule in NR.
(e ) Freedom of Association and Assembly.
The enactment of the Societies Ordinance and the Preservation
of Public Security Ordinancesbetween 1955 and 1960 and the proscription of
ZANC in 1959, did not only demonstrate that there was no freedom of
association and assembly in NR during that period, but it also showed the
African politicians the government's methods of dealing with political
2
opposition. Under the provisions of the Societies Ordinance, the
3
Governor could declare any society as unlawful organization, and in any 
area in which a society was declared an unlawful society, it was lawful 
for any authorized police officer to enter, with or without assistance 
or using reasonable force for that purpose if necessary, into any place 
in which he had any reasonable grounds to believe that a meeting of an 
unlawful society or of persons who were members of an unlawful society 
was being held or that books of accounts, writings, list of members, 
banners, seals, insigns, firearms, weapons or other articles which he 
might have reasonable cause to believe belonged to an unlawful society 
or to be in any way connected therewith. This legislation showed that
1. UK: Report of the Advisory Commission of the Review
of the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland,
1960? Cmnd. 1960/1148, p. 101, par. 300. 
(Chairman: Viscount Monckton of Brenchley.
2.NR: 1957, No. 65, cap. 262, now CaP* lo9*
3. ibid. Sec. 28(2); see Government Notice
Nos. 176, 183 and 184 of 1961 declaring UNIP
Branches in the Northern Province as unlawful
societies.
the authorities considered African political organization as 'secret' 
societies warranting constant investigations and searches. Thus in 
Attorney-General v. Mutemba,^ the accused was charged with assisting an 
unlawful society, namely the divisional headquarters, Northern Province, 
of UNIP following the proscription of the society in the Province. The 
Federal Supreme Court held that although he was not inside his house 
when police searches were conducted, he was nevertheless 'found in 
possession' of the documents seized from his home, whose possession was 
forbidden by law; the provisions of the Societies Ordinance.
procession or meeting was held, was not intended to merely inform the 
authorities of such a gathering, but to enable police to attend and
that all such gatherings were subversive hence the requirement that
police should be present at all political meetings. In some cases the
courts did uphold the right to meet for social purposes, notwithstanding
2
the presence of politicians, without a police permit. Criticism of the
police tactics or the administration of justice, was, however, regarded
as a criminal offence if made for purposes of advancing the cause of a
3
political party, in that case UNIP: R.. v. Chona. In all these cases 
what was said, written or done was in the furtherance of political 
agitation for constitutional reforms in NR in particular, and, for the 
dissolution of the Federation, in general.
(f) Constitutional Changes: Coalition Government.
which retained the franchise based on income, education and property.
1. (1962) R & N LR 88.
2. Bulawayo v. R. (1962) R & N LR 2.
3. (1962) R & N LR 344.
The requirement for a police permit before any political rally,
record and observe what tra] }d at the meeting. The assumption was
The UK Government announced constitutional changes in 1961
4
4. UK: Northern Rhodesia, Proposals for Constitutional 
Change; Cmnd. 1961/1295, Annextures II and III
p. 11.
The 1961 constitutional reforms and the subsequent Order in Council,^
provided for a Legco composed as follows, viz
Speaker 1
Ex-Officio members 4
Elected members:
Higher Franchise (Europeans) 15
Lower Franchise (Africans) 15
National Seats 7
Special National 1
The territory was divided into fifteen higher franchise and
fifteen lower franchise constituencies for Europeans and Africans,
respectively, each returning one member. Secondly, the territory was divided
into seven national-seat constituencies, each returning one member elected
by voters registered under the higher or lower franchise in every electoral
area that was within or coterminous with that constituency who declared
that they wished to vote in the national constituencies.^ ^ i ^ l y *  the
territory was formed into one national constituency in which, higher and
3
lower franchise voters, who were Asians, or Coloured, voted. A 'Coloured'
person was defined as a 'person who is- not ordinarfl-y accepted as either
4
a European, an African or an Asian*. The franchise which was based on 
income, property, education and holding of public office,^ was the
g
Federal franchise; which, caused the split in NRANC, the proscription of 
ZANC and the birth of UNIP. The only real change in 1962 was the increase 
in the seats for Africans. UNIP unlike ZANC, decided to participate in 
the 1962 election. Six political parties put up candidates and there were 
four independants. The results were UNIP 14 (2 on the higher roll and 12 
on the lower roll), UFP, 17 (13 on higher roll and 4 National), and 
NRANC 7 (3 lower roll and 4 National). The Liberal Party, Rhodesia 
Republican Party, Barotse National Party and four independants were
1. UK: Northern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order in Council, 1962,
S.I. 1962/1874.
2. ibid. sec. 34(1)(c).
3. ibid. sec. 34(1)(d).
4. ibid. sec. 40
5. ibid. sec. 2, Schedule 2 to the Order.
6. ibid. sec. 35.
eliminated. However, neither UNIP nor the UFP could form the Government
without the support of the NRANC: "The Europeans were delighted, UNIP,
they thought, had well and trully if ailed and the way was now open for
a proper coalition between UFP and ANC."'*' This optimism was based on
some information that the leader of the NRANC, Nkumbula, had, " 'agreed'
'off the record', but firmly - to a pact, as long as everything was
kept as dark as possible. During the discussion, which took place in
greatest 'secrecy', Nkumbula never troubled to hide his dislike of 
2
UNIP." Notwithstanding such alleged pact, the NRANC went into coalition 
with UNIP, it appears without expressing some.regret or apology to the 
UFP:
Harry did not say sorry to the UFP. He was full of 
reproaches. It was the UFP's fault that he had failed to 
win more seats; the UFP had made him unpopular amongst 
his cwn people. None of the UFP's great services to the
ANC - in money and know-how - were even remotely mentioned.
The Liberal Party's view of the election result was that NR had
moved straight from white supremacy to black supremacy without a period
4
of transition from Colonial rule to African government. The Nkumbula's
move to go into coalition with UNIP has been used as evidence that the
people of Zambia always wanted to organize one national party However, 
in those days of struggle for independence - with public intimidation 
and violence - Nkumbula could not have gone into coalition with a 
European political party that had brought the Federation which he was 
publicly fighting against; UNIP was the better devil that the ANC knew.
1. Eeden, Guy van, Ihe Crime of Being White; Nasionale Boekhandel
Bekep, Johannesburg/ 1965, p. 106.
2. ibid. p . 102.
3 ibid. p. 108■
4. Gerald Percy, MSS. Afri . S. 1577 (1958-1962); Northern Rhodesia
Liberal Party Newsletter, 8th December, 1962, p. 1;
teodleian Library, Rhodes House, Oxford.
5. Infra, p. 130.
Thus moved into office an African administration^ dominated
2
by the Governor and his ex-officio members. The coalition government - with
the UFP in Opposition - was said to have been 'torn by dissentions and 
3
squabbles' . however, UNIP and the NRANC, were agreed on two important 
policies, namely, dissolution of the Federation and self-government for 
NR. The coalition government was born out of the masses' revolutionary 
mobilization whose watch-slogan was 'one-man-one-vote' . Constitutional 
reforms for all British African territories were made in the UK and they 
were supposed to be based on the basic principle upon which the British 
Empire stood, 'democracy * and 'freedom'. Although Africans were denied 
representation in the Legco for so long, the coalition government was
evidence that there was freedom in NR. The difficult for the British in
\  /
Central Africa was that they had to resist the emergence of white 
supremacist rule on one hand, and/or African elite domination, on the
r
other hand. When the UK Prime Minister's 'wind of change' blew so 
strongly in 1960 that 'one-man-one-vote* demand could no longer be 
resisted, British policy bent to accommodate it. The African nationalists 
so long scorned became the designated heirs of British power. The problem 
was how to ensure that self-government did not become a facade for the 
exploitation of the very masses, that fought for one-man-one-vote and 
freedom: for instance by incorporating the new African rulers into the 
existing power structures - government decision-making and economic 
institutions. These problems were left to future constitutional reforms.
1. NR: UNIP: K.D. Kaunda - Local Government
S.M. Kapwepwe - African Agriculture
R.C. Kamanga - Labour and Mines
-sNRANC: H.M. Nkumbula - African Education
F.N. Stubbs - Transport and Works
C.E. Counsins - Lands and Natural Resources
2. Ex-Officio: Chief Secretary, Justice, Finance and
Native Affairs: sec. 6(1) (b) Northern 
Rhodesia (Constitution) Order in Council, 
1962.
3. Krishnamurthy, B .S ., Cha Cha Cha, Zambia*^ Struggle for Independence? 
op. cit., File 2, Doc. 1, p. 5.
Dissolution of the Federation: Independent Zambia.
The Monckton Commission's recommendation that a Government of
any of the territories of the Federation could request to secede from the
Federation had a condition attached to it, namely that such a request for
secession should be related to the attainment of a certain stage of
constitutional advance in the Territory itself in order that the secession
was thereby linked to an expression of the wishes of the inhabitants made
through a proper constitutional machinery.^ That was in accordance with
the British democracy. The assumption of office in Nyasaland and NR by
African political parties in 1962 signalled the possibility of applications
for secession being lodged with H^M. Government by the Governments of these
two Territories. The UK Government, however, on the 8th May, 1963,
announced its intention to dissolve the Federation. Accordingly, the
2
Rhodesia and Nyasaland Act, 1963, provided that H.M. may by Order in
Council provide for the dissolution of the Federation with consequential
distribution of the functions of the Federal Government among the
legislatures of the previously federated territories. Most of these functions
were those concerned with 'European affairs' because most of the 'African
affairs' were retained by the territorial governments * The Federation of
3
Rhodesia and Nyasaland Order in Council, 1963, provided that in pursuance
with the provisions of sec. 1 of the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Act, 1963,
aforesaid, the power of the legislature of the Federation to make laws
would cease on the appointed date with respect to matters described in
the Second Schedule to the Constitution of the Federation and that these
4
would revert to the Territorial Governments.
The 'appointed day* covered a number of dates beginning
1. UK: Report of the Advisory Commission on the Review of the
Constitution of Rhodesia end Nyasaland, 1960, Cmnd.
1960/1148, P : 101.
2. 1963 c. 34.
3. S.I. 1963/1635> infra' P- 146‘
4. ibid. sec. 1.
83.
with the 1st of October, 1963, the coming into force of the Order, and,
ending with the dissolution of the Federation effected by the Federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Dissolution) Order in Council, 1963,^ which
provided, inter alia, that the Federation should be dissolved before
1st January, 1964, and that the Constitution of the Federation would
2
then cease to have effect, except for the continuation and adaptation 
3
of existing laws, the liquidation agency, constituted by the Inter-
4
Government Committee and its functions, and, the conclusion of pending
legal proceedings.
The phrases 'paramountcy of African interests' and 'racial
partnership' went to the root of the problems of the Federation. The
6
former was formulated in 1922 and applied mainly to Kenya. The policy 
that when interests of the natives and of those of the immigrant races 
were in conflict, those of the natives should prevail, could only have 
worked well if H.M.'s Government in the exercise of her trust on behalf 
of the African populations, refused to delegate or share that trust to 
or with the settlers. 'Racial partnership' had an element of H.M.'s 
Government surrender of her trust to the settlers who were supposed to 
run the country in partnership with the natives. In the 1950's with 
the emergence of legislatures dominated by settlers in East and Central 
Africa, the 'paramountcy of African interests' and 'racial partnership' 
were considered 'dead'. The dissolution of the Federation, however, 
showed that 'paramountcy of African interests'' was still alive and kicking
1. UK: 1963, S. I . 1963/2085.
2. ibid. sec. 1.
3. ibid. sec. 2.
4. ibid. sec. 3, repealed (in Zambia) by
sec. 3, Zambezi River Authority Act, 1987, No. 17, 
replacing the Central African Power Corporation 
by the Zambezi River Authority.
5. ibid. loc. cit., sec. 18.
6. Memorandum on Indians in Kenya, 1922, Cmnd,
1922/2904r Memorandum on Native Policy in East 
Africa, 1930, Cmnd. 1930/3573, and Correspondence 
regard to Native Policy in Northern Rhodesia;
Cmnd. 1930/3731, p. 2.
Although African political parties had to wage prolonged freedom
struggles against colonial rule, particularly in East and Central Africa, 
the concept of 'paramountcy of African interests' contained an element of 
decolonization and self-rule for the colonial peoples. Accordingly, H.M.' 
Government at the same time they were orderly dismantling the Federation, 
announced a new Constitution for NR,^ with a Legislative Assembly composed 
as follows, viz -
Speaker
Main Roll Constituencies 65
Reserved Roll Constituencies 10
Her Majesty's Government's view was that a 'Bill of Rights' was
necessary to protect minority interests particularly in the event of the
establishment of a One-Party system in NR (Zambia) :
Whereas in a developed homogeneous country such as Britain 
the protection of minority interests is maintained by 
certain recognised and traditional conventions, in 
under-developed and mixed communities special provisions 
are needed for this purpose, and it has been usual in 
Commonwealth countries to enact by law safeguards which 
in Britain are a matter of custom only. Without such 
safeguards a mass electorate, dominated by a single party, 
might control all the organs of Government, and minority 
interests could be completely disregarded.^
In a country which is not fully developed and a society which is
not homogeneous, a Bill of Rights is essential to safeguard sectional
and individual rights and interests. The Bill of Rights was not, however,
tailored for the particular situation in NR, but based on European ideas
3
as tried in West Africa. The Bill of Rights provided for the protection 
of fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, which included 
the freedom to form and/or belong to, political parties.
1. UK: Northern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order in Council,
1963, S.I. 1963/2088, came into force on 3rd 
January, 1964.
2. Northern Rhodesia; Proposals for Constitutional
Change; Cmnd. 1961/1295? Colonial Secretary Iain 
Macloed, opening NR Constitutional Conference in 
London, 19th December, 1960; p. 3.
3. Aihe, D.O., "Neo-Nigerian Human Rights in Zambia", ZLJ, Vol. 3 & 4,
1971 and 1972, No. 1 & 2, p. 43.
The inclusion of the Bill of Rights was in line with UNIP's
declared policy to the effect that the future Constitution of NR "shall
contain fundamental safeguards guaranteeing the freedom of the individual
and providing against abuse of power by the Executive."^ That policy of
the Party was influenced by the Africans' experiences under colonial rule.
The other outstanding features of the Constitution were the office
of the Prime Minister and a Constitutional Council. The Constitutional
Council's main functions included the determination whether any draft
Bill or S.I., if enacted or made, might be inconsistent with the provisions
2
of the Bill of Rights as contained in the Constitution. It was in this
regard that the Constitution made reference to political parties by providing
that the Constitutional Council should be composed of representatives from
3
all parties represented in the Legislative Assembly. The vote for the
purposes of the election of the Main Constituencies' representatives, was
granted to all citizens of NR above the age of twenty-one years; thus ending
the episode of the fight for 'one-man-one-vote' which began in earnest in
1948. The election of the ten Reserved Roll members of the Legislative
Assembly was left mainly to European voters and political parties.
In the election for the Legislative Assembly held in January, 1964,
UNIP secured 55 seats and the NRANC 10 seats. Twenty-four of UNIP's 55 seats
4
were gained unopposed. All the ten Reserved Roll seats were won by the 
NPP, the former UFP. Following this victory, Kenneth David Kaunda, leader 
of UNIP, was sworn-in as the first Prime Minister of NR. On the 5th of 
May, 1964, the final constitutional conference on NR opened in London 
attended by the Governor, Sir Evelyn David Hone, a UNIP delegation led 
by the Prime Minister (K.D. Kaunda), a NRANC delegation led
1. UNIP: When UNIP become Government; 1960, p. 5.
2. UK: Northern Rhodesia (Constitution) Order in Council,
1963, op. cit., sec. 17(1).
3. ibid. sec. 17(2).
4. Northern News, 30th December, 1963.
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by H.M. Nkumbula and a NPP delegation led by John Roberts. That
conference agreed on a new Constitution for a Republic of Zambia,
the continuation of the Legislative Assembly and the election of the
first President of Zambia. Notwithstanding the adoption of a new
Constitution, persons elected under the 1963 Constitution were deemed
to have been elected under the 1964 Constitution and continued as
members of the National Assembly.'*' In pursuance with the Regulations
made by the Governor under sec. 4 of the Zambia (Election of the First
2
President) Order in Council, 1964, the Prime Minister was elected by 
members of the Legislative Assembly, as the first President of Zambia.
The name 'Northern Rhodesia* given legal recognition by Art. 4 of the 
Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1911, was dropped and it was 
provided that
The territories which immediately, before the appointed 
day are comprised in Northern Rhodesia shall cease to be 
a protectorate and shall together become an Independent 
Republic under the name of Zambia, and after that day 
Her Majesty shall have no jurisdiction over those 
territories.3
Kenneth David Kaunda was accordingly named as the First President
4
of Zambia in and by the Constitution. The last Ordinance of NR signed by the 
last Governor of NR was the Acts, of Parliament Ordinance, 1964,^ on the 
19th October, 1964, which came into force on the 22nd of that month, 
that was two days before Independence. Thus, at midnight of the 
appointed day, 24th October, 1964, the Princess Royal, handed the 
Instrument of Independence of the Republic of Zambia, to Kenneth David 
Kaunda, the President of UNIP and of the Republic of Zambia. Thus ended 
British rule which began in 1890rs.
1. UK: Zambia Independence Order, 1964, S.I. 1964/1652,
sec. 10(1) (a) and Cb) .
2. S.I. 1964/1283, 15th August, 1964.
3. Zambia Independence Act, 1964, c. 65, sec. 1; see
also Preamble to the Zambia (Election of the First
President) Order in Council, 1964r loc. cit.
4. Zambia Constitution Order, 1964, loc. cit. sec. 8(1)
5. NR: 1964, No. 64.
CONCLUSION.
This Chapter has shown that many factors were involved in
the delimitation of the region of central Africa which became Zambia,
and, in the evolution of its laws and constitution. One of these
factors was the importation, first, of English law, and second, of
English ideals of a political system. An eminent English jurist has
commented that
British administration in overseas countries has 
conferred no greater benefit than English law and 
justice. That may be a trite observation, but I offer 
no apology. It has been said so often by so many people - 
as many laymen, as lawyers and perhaps by more Africans
than Englishmen - that it must be assumed to be true.l
r
There was an importation of English law into NR through Orders
2
Council and local Regulations, Proclamations and Ordinances. There were 
two major objects of the importation of English law into those parts of 
Africa under British colonial administration; first, the extension of 
common law, the doctrines of equity and statutes which were in force 
in England on the date the African territory received its legislature.
In NR, however, the date of reception of English law was fixed as 
17th August, 1911, that was the date when North-Western Rhodesia (and 
Barotseland) and North-Eastern Rhodesia were amalgamated to form NR.
The legislature for NR was established on 1st April, 1924. The 
legislation for NR between 17th August, 1911 and 1st April, 1924, was 
in the form of Proclamations of the BSAC High Commissioner who was 
stationed in South Africa. The law: extended to NR was mainly 
concerned with, commercial and personal matters of the English, hence 
the view that Englishmen took their law with them wherever they 
went and settled. Secondly, the law was imported for the maintenance
1. Roberts-Wray, "The Adaptation of Imported Law; in Africa",
4 JAL, 196.0, p. 66.
2. Infra, p. 90.
of order and the establishment of governmental institutions. English law 
on some aspects of democracy, such as the Representation of the People 
Acts which provided for a representative political system, did not form 
a segment of the imported law. Such omission contributed partly to the
settlers' rejection in 1918 of the provisions of Art. 13 of the NR Order,
1911, which provided for the constitution of an advisory council composed 
of wholly nominated officials in preference to an advisory council composed 
partly of nominated, elected and ex-officio members. The franchise the 
settlers devised for the election of members of the advisory council in 
1918 and which was adopted for the election of members of the Legco in and 
after 1924, was restrictive in line with the law and practices in the UK
and other settled territories. Consequently, few people in Britain could
have questioned the rightness or otherwise of restricting the vote to the 
settlers and denying it to the Africans in NR. The prevailing view was 
that time was not opportune for either direct African representation or 
indirect representation through (European) members nominated to represent 
African interests in the Legco.^
The termination of BSAC rule in NR in 1924 and the 
establishment of direct British administration regularized and perfected 
British jurisdiction but did not lead into a British-type of political 
party system. The Legco was dominated by nominated and ex^officio members. 
The vote was not granted to the majority of the inhabitants. The Executive 
Council was dominated by servants of the Crown. All these factors created 
some political stresses and strains and provided a basis for political 
organization. But colonial administration was designed to operate 
without political parties. The holding of high office in government was 
secured not through winning an election, but either through employment
1. UK: Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the
Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa;
January, 1929, Qnnd. 1929/3234, p. 287.
(Chairman: Sir Hilton Young) .
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in the civil service or nomination by the Governor. In addition to that, 
ex-officio and nominated members were assigned the most important 
government departments such as that of the Chief Secretary, or the 
Attorney-General or Secretary for Native Affairs or Finance or of the 
representation of African Interests, while 'inferior' departments were 
allocated to elected members. That had an adverse effect on the early 
development of party organization or of a political party system.
followed the proscription of ZANC in 1959, was indicative of African 
political awakening. The formation of the coalition government of UNIP 
and the NRANC in 1962 and of UNIP's Government in 1964, give the impression 
that there was freedom of speech, organization and assembly during the 
colonial period, otherwise how did these political parties conduct their 
election campaigns. In most African countries more political parties 
were formed and registered during the colonial era than in the post­
independence period. Colonial 'liberalism' towards African political
organization, however, only emerged during the lg days of colonial
rule. During the peak-hour of colonial rule, lack of freedom of expression,
organization and assembly was the rule and not the exception?" The colonial
rulers' refusal to recognize political parties as 'opposition' or as
constituting alternative government, was, to some extent, the catalyst
to the One-Party system adopted in a number of African states immediately
after achieving independence. The Bill of Rights included in some of the
Independence Constitutions, guaranteeing, among other rights, the right
to assembly freely and associate with others and in particular to form 
2
political parties, was a weak safeguard of a multi-party system as it 
came too late and lacked a historical background: historical experience 
was that of a non-political party system.
1. NR: Societies Ordinance, 1957, No. 48, sec. 13.
2. UK: Zambia Independence Order, 1964, S.I. 1964/1652,
The proliferation of African political organizations which
Schedule, Sec. 23.
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CHAPTER III.
THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT WITHIN WHICH UNIP OPERATES.
Law and Political Change in Zambia.
Introduction.
A study of the legal aspects of the role of UNIP in Zambia calls 
for a brief reference to the background of the legal environment within 
which the Party emerged and operates to-day. English law was introduced in 
NR through Orders in Council which required, inter alia, that courts of 
law established in the Region, in their criminal and civil jurisdiction 
should operate upon the principles of and in conformity with the substance 
of the law for the time being in force in and for England, and with powers 
vested in and according to the course of procedure and practices observed 
by and before Courts of Justice and Justices of the Peace in England 
according to their respective jurisdiction and authorities, except so far 
as such law might be modified by an Order in Council, Regulation or the 
Queen's Regulations.^" Such provisions were based on the H.M.'s imperial 
policy that the basic law to be applied in any region settled by the English 
people, should be English law. That policy was applied to NR.
(a) Application of English Law in NR: Statutes.
During the period between 1900 and 1924 English statutes were
extended to North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia and NR through the
2
Imperial Acts Extension Proclamations of the High Commissioner. The NR
3
Legco also extended English statutes to NR. Although in some British
administered territories the date of the reception of English laws was
determined when a Legco was established, the NR Order, 1911, determined
4
the date of reception as 17th August, 1911, although the NR Legco
1. UK: North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1900, Art. 21(2).
2. NR: 1912, No. 11, application of the Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2
Geo. 5 c. 46 and No. 4 of 1913, application of the 
Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881, 44 & 45 Vic. c. 69.
3. Imperial Acts Extension Ordinance, 1924, No. 4, Cap. 5.
4. UK: Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1911, Art. 21(2).
was not established until 1924. The English statutes extended to NR 
dealt mainly with such matters as conveyancing, forgery, industrial and 
provident societies, larceny, bills of exchange, gaming, inheritance, 
enforcement of contracts and the limitation period. The statutes did not 
include those dealing with constitutional matters such as the numerous 
Representation of the People Acts, 1832-1948. Constitutional matters were 
dealt with through Orders in Council. Consequently, no English statute
was extended to NR of a constitutional nature.
1 2 
The High Court Proclamation and later the High Court Ordinance
provided that all statutes of the Parliament of the UK applied to NR
"shall be in force so far as the limits of the local jurisdiction and
3
local circumstances permit" but that it was lawful for the courts to
construe the same with such verbal alteration, not affecting the substance,
as might be necessary to make them applicable to the proceedings before
the court. The High Court of NR had full jurisdiction, e.g. in all
bankcruptcy matters. In order to ascertain the extent of that particular
jurisdiction, one was. referred to the Imperial Acts Extension Ordinance,
4
1924. In terms of sec. 2 of that Ordinance, the UK Bankcruptcy Act, 1914,
5
was deemed to be of full force and effect in NR. However, the phrase 
that English statutes would apply 'as far as circumstances admit', meant 
in effect that in certain cases or circumstances statutes of the Parliament 
of the UK could not be applied in NR in toto without some modification
1. NR: 1913, No. 1.
2. 1933, No. 13, amended by No. 41 of 1960 and No. 25
of 1964, Cap. 50.
3. ibid. sec. 12(1); similar provisions was contained
in sec. 14 of the Subordinate Courts Ordinance, 
1933, No. 36, Cap, 45.
4. Supra, p. 90
5. In re Alfred Basil Ward (1944) (1943-1944) NR LR 33, per Law, CJ at
p. 33.
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and that the modification would be decided on the merits of each
case.^ Commenting in a Kenyan case involving the application of
such provisions, Lord Denning expressed the view that such provisions
should be construed liberally to avoid the application of English law
with its refinements, subtleties and technicalities not suited to the 
2
local conditions. English statutes applied to NR did not play any
role in the development of political parties mainly because of want of
statutes dealing with political organization and political organization
was not encouraged anyway. The last NR Legco Ordinance to re-state the
3
law of NR, the English haw (Extent of Application) Ordinance, 1963, 
provided that the following were the sources of the laws of NR, viz:
(a) the common law; and
(b) the doctrines of equity; and
(c) the statutes which were in force in England on the 
17th August, 1911 (being the commencement of the 
Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1911); and
(d) any statute of later date than mentioned in 
paragraph (c) in force in England, applied to 
Northern Rhodesia.^
5
Ihe Zambia Independence Order, 1964, provided that 
notwithstanding the establishment of the Republic of Zambia and the 
revocation of the Orders, in Council, the existing laws would continue, 
with such modifications, adaptation, qualifications and exceptions as 
might be necessary to bring them into conformity with the changed
g
political situation. But it has been observed that African judges have 
not taken up the challenge of adapting the received law to the needs 
of their countries; instead they have followed the received law with
1. Kaye la v. Botes. (1945) (1945-48) NR LR Vol. 1, 183
2. Nyali v. Attorney—General /1955/ 1 All ER 646 and /1957/ AC 253.
3. NR: 1963, No. 4, Cap. 4
4. ibid. sec. 2.
5. UK: 1964 S.I. 1964/1652.
6. ibid. sac. 4, repealed hy secs. 3 and 6 of the
Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, No. 27.
little or no modification at all.
1
In_theory, it is plausible to say that
courts should turn increasingly to\explicit concern with the social, economic
and political policies that lie behind all laws as the source of their
legal reasoning and as the unifying explanation of the legal principles
they apply. In practice, however, it is sometimes difficult for courts to
2
act against the letter of the law. For instance, in The People v. Nkhoma
the accused was charged with bigamy contrary to sec. 16 of the Penal Code
3
and sec. 38 of the Marriage Act, 1918. The English law of bigamy was 
introduced in NR to regulate the marital affairs of the settlers and the 
'potentially bigamous' natives were not allowed to contract a marriage under 
the Marriage Ordinance, aforesaid. After Independence, although the social, 
economic and political circumstances of the Africans still favoured bigamous 
marriages, Zambians were allowed to marry under the Marriage Act. Upholding 
the conviction of the accused, the Court of Appeal observed:
enabling Act in that it is only in the absence of any Zambian legislation
on any subject that the pre-17th August, 1911 English statutes might be
applied in Zambia. There is, prima facie, no likelihood of an English statute
dating before 1911 being applied in Zambia dealing with political parties because
no such statute exists, or if it existed, it could not be applied in Zambia
because of the presence of Zambian legislation regulating political parties;
5
the Societies Act. The control of political organization through 'societies'
1. Gower, L.C.B., Independent Africa; The Challenge to the Legal
A villager in some remote part of Zambia may be astonished 
to hear that a Zambian man was punished for marrying two 
women, but as I have said those who adopt the English law 
will be dealt accordingly.4
Ihe English Law (Extent of Application) Act, is, however, only an
Profession; Harvard UP, 1967, p. 96.
2. (1978) ZR 4
4.
5. NR:
3. NR: 1918, No. 10, Cap. 211.
loc. cit. , per Ngulube, DCJ at p . 6.
1957, No. 65, Cap. 105; supra, p. 70.
was introduced by British administrators in Africa, e.g. in Tanganyika 
2
and NR. After Independence such legislation was retained or fresh one
3 4
enacted, e.g. in Kenya and The Gambia. Political organization is an area 
in which English statutes played no role during the colonial era and in 
which they will not be envoked to-day or in the future.
(b) The Application of Common Law and Equity.
The English Law (Extent of Application) Act, provides that common
law and equity in force on the 17th August, 1911, shall be applicable in
Zambia; that is that the date of reception applies to statutes, common law
5 6
and doctrines of equity. The Interpretation Act, 1964 defines common law to
7
mean 'the Common Law of England' and this is judge-made law, that is the 
substantive rules and rules of procedure developed and administered by the 
English common law courts of Common Pleas, of Exchequer and King's Bench.
The rules administered by these Courts were derived from the general 
law and customs of the Realm of England. As regards the common law referred
to in sec. 2(a) of the English Law (Extent of Application) Act and sec. 3 of
the Interpretation Act may mean judge-made law as described above, and/or
residuary concepts constituting the real essence of the common law edifice:
the right to present one's case in an open court, or freedom of contract, 
or of assembly and association. In NR, however, the question was not of
1. Tanganyika: Societies Ordinance, 1954, No. 11. Cap. 337.
2. NR: Societies Ordinance, 1955, No. 43, Cap. 105.
3. Kenya: Societies Act, 1968, No. 4.
4. The Gambia: Societies Act, 1971, No. 5.
5. Allott, A.N., "Authority of English Decisions in Colonial Courts"
JAL, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1957, p. 25.
6. Zambia: 1964, No. 60.
7. ibid. sec. 3. Article 138 of the Constitution
of Zambia Act, 1973, contains some definitions, 
however, these do not include such words or 
phrases as 'law', 'common law' or 'equity. 
Similarily Art. 2(1) of Cap. 1, Applied Laws, 
which defines 'existing law' does not define 
'common law' or 'equity'.
the content of common law, but to whom it applied. Did it, for instance, 
apply to natives? In Rex, v. Petrus Johannes de Jager,^ the appellant 
was convicted under sec. 53A of the Penal Code, 1930, for being in 
possession of prohibited religous books. He contended that under Art. XXI 
of the NR Order in Council, 1924, the law of NR was to be enforced in 
conformity with the substance of the common law, the doctrines of equity 
and the statutes of general application in the UK. He contended further
that the prohibition of the books in issue had the effect of denying
the natives of NR freedom of conscience and thus repugnant to English 
law on religious freedom. The judge hearing the appeal observed, 
inter alia, that
I gather that the case for the Appellant is concerned 
not so much- with, its effect on the European element 
of the population, as with, the consequences on the 
Native inhabitants, and here I pause in uncertainity
as to the number of British subjects among them.....
Be that as it may, the question arises, what is the 
statute law of England relating to freedom of 
religion which may be said to apply by express words 
or necessary intendment to His Majesty's subjects 
resident in, or resorting, to this Territory?2
His Lordship made reference to "mass of law bearing generally
on the subject of religion" and went on to say that in such matters,
it might be taken that, subject to such, qualifications as local
circumstances might render necessary, "the general effect of these
statutes applies by necessary intendment to individuals being His Majesty's
3
subjects' in this: country." The natives of NR were not British 
subjects or as alternatively put, His Majesty's subjects; they were 
British Protected Persons:. According to the above reasoning, English 
statutes protecting freedom of religion were not applicable to them; 
mutatis mutandis was the common law applicable to them? Unlike the 
the statute law which was required to be applied subject to modification
1. (1935) NR LR 13.
2. ibid. per Francis, J., at p. 22.
3. ibid. at p. 23.
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or qualification, there was neither a rule of the common law itself 
or of statute which required that the common law should be applied
in NR subject to local conditions. Accordingly, European political
parties emerged and operated without statutory regulation but under 
common law rules of freedom of expression, association and assembly. 
Africans also began to organize and form political organization under 
the common law, that is, without statutory regulation, until 1955 when 
the Societies Ordinance was enacted: prima facie, that legislation 
qualified the common law freedom of association for both the natives 
and the settlers although it was apparently used mainly in controlling 
African political organization.
One of the difficulties encountered in trying to assess the 
effect of common law on Africans in NR arises from the fact that a
number of common law rules were embodied in legislation. For instance,
1 2 
in R. v. Zulu & Others, the accused, members of the ZANC, were
■ ^  . — — ... ,K , m , l ■ ■ ■ ■
charged with conspiracy to injure the Ndola Municipal Council in its 
trade, contrary to sec. 358(4) of the Penal Code, 1930, by urging 
other people to boycott its beerhalls as protest, against the refusal 
by the Police authorities to allow: ZANC to hold a public meeting. 
Applying the common law, the Magisrtrate held that the Crown had to 
prove that the principal object of the accused was to cause the injury 
complained of, since the evidence disclosed that their intention was 
to protest against the refusal to hold the meeting and accordingly the 
accused had no case to answer. On appeal the Federal Court of Appeal 
held that the law relating to conspiracy to injure a person in his 
trade was to be found in sec. 358(4) of the Penal Code of NR, that 
while the principle of legal interpretation of English law applied
1. (1961) R & N LR 645.
2. supra, p. 72.
(as required by sec. 4 of the Penal Code), the substance of the law 
laid down in the Ordinance was not affected thereby, and, that the 
immediate purpose of the actions of the accused was to injure the 
beerhall trade and therefore their ultimate purpose was irrelevant.
The case was directed to be remitted to the Magistrate with a direction 
that the Crown had made out a case sufficient for the accused to answer.
Consequently, political organizations in NR did not enjoy
the same freedom 'under the law' as that enjoyed by political parties
under the common law in the UK. The view was that the bulk of English
law introduced in NR was intended to regulate the affairs of the white
settlers, while local legislation was mainly for African administration.^"
Ihe law regulating political organization was, however, unique in that
the 'political party' was originally a white settlers' institution,
regulated by the common law. It was only when militant African political
organization turned the 'political party' into an African institution,
that legislation intervened to regulate how that institution should
be operated by the Africans. The foundation of the political party in
Zambia was the common law. The doctrines, of equity cited in sec. 2 of
the English Law (Extent of Application) Act, mean in practical terms,
the availability in the High. Court of equitable remedies such, as
specific performance, rescission, ratification, injunction.Although
doctrines of equity did not play any role in the emergence of political
parties in NR, some of these remedies are relevant to political party
organization, for instance, an application could be made for an injunction
to stop a political party acting illegally or arbitrarily towards the 
2
applicant. The law of Zambia on political organization is a combination 
of statute law, common law and doctrines of equity. The following 
section looks at customary law and political parties or organizations.
1. Melland, F.H., In WitGh-Bound Africa; Barnes & Boble, 1967, p. 307...... . .k ...
2. Infra, p. 251.
(c) Customary Law and Political Organization.
According to John Austin, law is a rule laid for the guidance
of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him.'*’
This definition of law implies the existence of a political sovereign who
the people in a centrally organized society are in the habit of obeying in
fear of sanctions. It is, therefore, not broad enough because it covers
mainly penal laws which are backed by sanctions and does not accommodate
laws not promulgated by a parliament and/or not backed by sanctions. In
order to broaden the definition of law to include law not enacted by a
parliament, law has been defined to embrace 'traditional rule of the
community; and it is enforced not by sanction prescribed ad hoc by a
sovereign, but one that is involved in the beliefs and practices of the 
2
community'. That definition embraces a rule made by a chief in a non-
centrally organized political system. Such rules and courts to enforce them
3
existed and still exist in Zambia before and after Independence. An all- 
embracing definition of 'law' is probably that given by A.L. Goodhart:
4
"Law is any rule of human conduct which is recognised as being obligatory".
The Orders in Council which introduced English law and procedures’* 
in NR also provided for the observance of laws and customs of the indigenous 
peoples unless such laws or customs were repugnant to natural justice or 
morality, or to any Order made by H.M. in Council, or to any Proclamation
g
made under an Order. Local legislation was also required to respect
7
native laws or customs. The term 'customary law' is used to mean a number
1. Austin, J. , Lectures on Jurisprudence or Philosophy of Positive Law;
Murray, London, 1885, 5th ed., p. 86.
2. Hartland, E.D., Primitive Law; Metheun, 1924, p. 137.
3. Gluckman, M . , Judicial Process Among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia;
Manchester UP, 1966, p. 2. See also Wallace, L. , "Native 
Administration in Northern Rhodesia", JMAS, 1922.
4. Goodhart, A.L., "The Importance of Definition of Law"; JAA, Vol. 3,
No. 3, 1951.
5. UK: Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1911, Art. 21(2).
6. Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1924, Art. 36.
7. ibid. Art. 22; BFSP, 1924, Vol. 119, p. 41.
of different things. Often customary law is associated with pre-colonial 
legal forms and with the modified and/or distorted versions that survived 
colonial rule. These rules are viewed as 'customary law/ for two reasons 
which, though theoretically independent, are often erh]Derically connected. 
First, these rules are predominantly oral although some have been reduced
to written text. Second, they derive ultimately from social relations and
from sources of authority that are not those of the colonial or the
neo-colonial state. Accordingly, customary law is a body of rules which
are obligatory to or recognized as obligatory by, members of a society.
This perception of customary law implies historical continuity.
There are several theories of the origins of customary law. One
of these argues that customary law implies historical continuity but that
its origins are actually relatively recent and generally accompanied and
formed part of colonial domination.^- The other view sees customary law
simply as 'folk law in the process of reception' of ethnic groups allowed
to operate under a colonial state after those groups had been incorporated
2
within a larger caltural and social whole. This view postulates customary 
law not originating before, but during the colonial era, which is tantamount 
to implying that Africans had no indigenous laws before the advent of 
colonialism. The provisions of the Orders in Council cited on the previous 
page give a clear indication that native laws and customs existed before 
the advent of colonial rule; hence the requirement that the Courts 
established by the colonial administrators could obtain the assistance of 
one or two native assessors, to advise them upon native law and custom
3
although the decision of the Court was given by the Judge or Magistrate.
1. Snyder, F.G., "Colonialism and Legal Form: The Creation of 'Customary
Law' in Senegal"; Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law, No. 19, 1981, p. 49.
2. Chanock, M., Law, Custom and Social Order: the Colonial Experience in
Malawi and Zambia; Cambridge, 1985, p. 4.
3. UK: Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1911, Art. 35;
BFSP, 1913, Vo. 106, p. 463.
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A distinction should drawn between 'customary law' and rules
enforced by Chiefs and Headmen as agents of the colonial administration,
for instance, the control of political organization in their areas. The
fact that chiefs were empowered to administer their areas and, consequently,
controlled the activities of persons, did not convert such power into rules
of native law or custom. The colonial rulers at times confused the situation
by e.g., charging those who acted contrary to such administrative rules, as
disobeying native authority contrary to native custom.^ Such 'disobedience'
was, in fact, disobedience not of native authority as such, but of colonial
authority as exercised by and through the chiefs. Political leaders who
appeared before native authority courts charged with the offence of
'showing disrespect or contempt of native authority contrary to native
custom' by holding political party meetings without a permit from a Native
Authority, were charged under an offence unknown to native law or custom
because political party activities were activities of an institution not
known to native law: political activities were regulated by legislation,
e.g. the Penal Code and the Societies Ordinance.
2
In Mbowela v. R. the appellant was convicted by the Sikufela
Native Court for summoning an unlawful meeting of UNIP at Sachikutu
Village without a permit of the Manyinga Native Authority. A Subordinate
Court which re-tried the case, sentenced him to two months imprisonment 
3
with hard labour. The High Court dismissed his appeal for want of
jurisdiction to hear it. The Federal Appeal Court stated that the Subordinate
Court had no jurisdiction to try offences against native law or custom
4
under the provisions of the Subordinate Courts Ordinance, and
1. Chitambala v. The Queen (1957) NR LR Vol. TV, 29.
2. (1962) R. & N LR 112.
3. On recent role of Local Courts see: Singer, N.J., "The
Subtlety of legal change: a lesson from Northern Zambia" 
in Allott, A. and Woodman, G.R., People's Law end State
Law: The Bellagio Papers; Foris Publications, Dordrecht,
1985, pp. 109 - 252.
4. NR: 1933, No. 36, Cap. 4, sec. 35(1) $> )  * now Cap. 45.
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that "unwritten native customary law which is not law in the strict
s e n s e c o u l d  not be the basis for a criminal trial in the subordinate
court. The Court accordingly, held that the proceedings in the subordinate
court and by the Provincial Commissioner (who had exercised an appellate
jurisdiction in the matter) were a nullity. The accused was 'advised' to
apply to the High Court for an order of certiorari or a simpler statutory
remedy by revision.^
The 'political party' like the 'Christian church' although
it quickly took root in the African society, was of foreign import to be
regulated not by customary rules, but by common law and statute. If,
therefore, African customary rules did not derive their origins and
legitimacy from immemorial times but emerged during colonial subjugation,
surely the 'political party' should have become an institution known to
customary law. After all, both African form of government and colonial
rule were hierarchical, restrictive, authoritarian, unchangeable and
not subject to alternative government or opposition. Ihat similarity
should have made it quite easy to convert the political party into one
of those institutions known to customary law. The fact that that did
not happen shows that customary rules vis-k-vis political organization
are lacking because that institution emerged during the colonial era
when most of customary rules had already crystallized.
Customary rules are part and parcel of the law of Zambia
although they are assigned a secondary role while the primary roles are
allotted to statutory and common laws. Customary rules are not applied
3
to override but to guide how the common law should be applied; "in my 
view Native law is more or less in the same position as foreign law and
4
it must be established by an expert before the courts other than Native Courts".
1. Mbowela v. R. op. cit., per Francis Biggs, FJ, at p. 115(E)
2. ibid. latter procedure provided under Sec. 307,
of the NR Criminal Procedure Code, 1936, No. 23,
3. Cap. 7 at trial, now Cap. 160.
3. Komo and Laboho v. Holmes N.O. (1935) SRLR 92
4. Chitambala v. The Queen o p . cit., per Somerhough, J. , at p. 39.
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These views should be contrasted with those expressed by
Lord Wright in Laoye and Others v. Oyetunde^ in which he said, inter alia,
that the British Governments policy with regard to African laws and
customs was to use them for the purposes of the administration of the
country (in this case, Nigeria) in so far as they had not been varied or
suspended by statute. The courts established by the British Government
had the duty of enforcing native laws and customs so far as they were not
'barbarous', as part of the laws of the land.
In Zambia although a political party system has taken root,
if two or more natives had a dispute over the holding of office in UNIP
or with regard to property involving the Party, such a dispute would not
be settled through customary law but common law. If a native and a
non-native had a similar dispute (it was possible, e.g. the former Chief
Justice of Zambia, James Skinner, an Irish-Zambian lawyer, was a staunch
UNIP member who had won Lusaka East Constituency on the Ordinary Roll in
the 1963 Legislative Assembly election to become the Attorney-General at 
2
Independence), the dispute could not be settled through customary law but
the common law. Customary law did and does not play any role in the
3
political activities of UNIP.
(d) The Law of Zambia to-day.
After the achievement of Independence there were changes in
the administration of justice in Zambia. There was established a Court of 
4
Appeal and the Judicial Service Commission under the chairmanship of the 
Chief Justice, to handle the appointment of judicial officers other than 
Justices of Appeal who were to be appointed by the President. The law
1. /I944/ A.C. 170
2. Supra, p. 85.
3. Infra, p, 391.
4. UK: The Zambia Independence Order, 1964, S.I. 1964/1652,
sec. 102 empowered the President to declare the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council as the final court of appeal 
for Zambia but the President never exercised that power 
until the Order was repealed by the Constitution of Zambia 
Act, 1973, No. 27, App. 1, Art. 3.
the Supreme Court, the High Court and the Subordinate Courts are required
to enforce is the law developed during the colonial era, referred to as
the 'existing law' of Zambia and this includes all law, whether a rule of
law or a provision of an Act of Parliament or any other enactment or a S.I.
whatsover (including any Act of Parliament of the UK or Order of H.M.'s in
Council) having effect as part of the law of Zambia or part thereof
immediately before the commencement of the 1973 Act.^ The Courts enforce
also the Acts of the Parliament of Zambia.
The High Court has an unlimited jurisdiction, except for matters 
2
reserved for the IRC to hear and determine any civil and criminal matter
3
brought under any Act or common law but not customary law except in appeal 
proceedings. Customary law is administered primarily by the Local Courts 
which also enforce any written laws as are specified by relevant statutory
4
instruments. Local Courts do not enforce foreign written laws but can apply
customary laws of non-Zambian Africans resident in Zambia, e.g. a Zambian
court ruled that a non-Zambian (Zimbabwian) resident in Zambia had retained
and continued to live by his country's customary law after migrating to
5
and settling in Zambia.
Matters pertaining to the role of UNIP in Zambia have been raised
g
in the High Court, e.g. the torious liability of the Party or judicial review
7
of the Party's activities. There has been one major prosecution of UNIP's 
functionaries - the 'special constables' - for assault commenced in the
q
Subordinate Court. Local Courts and customary law have so far not been 
resorted to or envoked, respectively, in the role of UNIP or its leaders.
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, No. 27, Cap. 1,
Applied Laws, Art. 2(1).
2. ibid. Art. 109(1).
3. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, No. 36, sec. 92.
4. Local Courts Act, 1966, No. 20, Cap. 45, sec. 12(b).
5. Munalo v. Vengesai (1974) ZR 191.
6. Infra, p. 249.
7. Infra, p. 251.
8. The People v. Njanji & Others (1981) Sub./CL/137 (unreported). On the
role of the 'Special Constables', infra, p. 392.
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CONCLUSION.
The English law and the political party system are among the most
outstanding legacies - the other being the English language - of the past
colonial era in Zambia. The BSAC Charter initiated a differentian in the
administration of justice in the region by providing that
In the administration of justice to the said people and 
inhabitants, careful regard shall always be had to the customs 
and laws of the class or tribe or nation to which the parties 
respectively belong, especially with regard to holding, 
possession, transfer or disposition of lands and goods, and 
testate or intestate succession thereto, marriages, divorces, 
legitimacy and other rights of property and personal rights, 
but subject to any British laws which may be in force in any 
of the territories aforesaid and applicable to the peoples 
or inhabitants thereof.^
Although that provision made no reference to 'political rights' of
the inhabitants of the territories referred to, which included to-day's
Zambia, it was wide enough to allow for the careful regard being made to
any native system of government, including political organization where
it existed. The representation in the Legco, following its establishment
in 1924 and the emergence of political organization in 1940's were confined
to settlers, conducted under Common Law. African political organization
did not emerge under customary law; it necessiated the enactment of special
2
legislation to deal with mass mobilization. Although there was a definition
3 4
'Common Law', there was no definition of 'customary law'. The development
of parallel legal and party systems for settlers and for the Africans, did
not create a dichotomy in the law regulating political parties because both
systems were governed by statute and common law. Customary law was irrelevant.
1. UK: BSAC Charter, 29th October, 1889, sec. 14; BFSP,
1889, Vol. LXXXI, p. 301.
2. Supra, p. 68.
3. Supra, p. 94.
4. Ghana: "Customary law as comprised in the laws of Ghana consists
of rules of law which by custom are applicable to 
particular communities in Ghana, not being rules 
included in the Common Law under any enactment providing 
for the assimilation of such rules of customary law as 
are suitable for general application"; Interpretation 
Act, 1964, CA No. 4, sec. 18(1).
Within the African society, the political organization did
not emerge in accordance with any customary or tribal or ethnic rules
or laws. Although the African societies were subject to their own
customs and laws, the political parties transcended such tribal customs
and laws. The political party was a European institution under an
African management. It blurred all customary distinctions and differences.
It was therefore, inevitable that the appropriate law for the regulation
of political organization should be the common law and statute law and
not customary law. That was the appropriate arrangement; after all, the
African political party in Zambia was b o m  out of the 'detribalized'
African town-dwellers'mobilization of their fellow countrymen and women
conducted on the pattern of the European political parties.^" In any case,
with, so many different customary laws in the country, it would have
proved difficult to organize a national political movement based on and
regulated by customary rules.
After achieving Independence,\the Zambian society is now
divided between the masses in rural areas who depend on traditional
subsistence economy and customary laws and cultures in the management
of their welfare, and, the commercial-industrial westernized urban
dwellers whose personal and economic affairs are in the main regulated
by the inherited English law. The applicable law to the central role of
UNIP is not the fragmented customary rules, but the common law and
statutory law7 consequently, the role of the Party cannot be questioned
in context of customary law., traditional ethics, ethnic morality, but
on grounds provided by English, law: common law damages or equitable 
2
remedies-. The environment within which, the Party operates is. therefore, 
devoid of indigenous: checks and balances and accountability.
1. Supra, p. 58.
2. Infra, p. 251.
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CHAPTER IV.
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN PARTY ORGANIZATION : ELECTION OF NATIONAL
LEADERSHIP IN UNIP.
Constitutional Changes to Provide for the Party's Central Role. 
Introduction.
It could be contended that at independence Africans inherited 
a state machinery which was completely alien to the masses and slightly 
understood by the majority of those in the leadership. After achieving 
self-rule the freed people were at liberty either to continue the system 
inherited and legitimize it and make it cease being viewed as a foreign 
system, or, replace it with their own devised system. In most African 
countries the Independence Constitution was either repealed or amended: 
the major changes involved the replacement of a Governor-General and a 
Parliamentary executive system by a Parliamentary Presidential system, 
and/or the replacement of a multi-party system by a single-party system.
The Constitutions replaced or amended were in a sense, 
'imposed' Constitutions in that in most cases the departing Imperial Power 
simply asked the decolonized people to 'take or leave it'. The frequent 
tact of Colonial Secretaries faced with some fundamental disagreements 
between or among factions represented at a constitutional conference, was 
to threaten that independence as a whole would be delayed unless agreement
or a certain indicated solution was reached. Such threats appear to have
been sufficient to achieve at least paper consensus.^ Majority leaders 
might have agreed to certain provisions (e.g. entrenched clauses) not out
of inner conviction but merely so as to get the independence preliminaries 
over as quickly as possible, reserving mentally to themselves the right to 
abandon as soon as possible after Independence those constitutional 
features which they disliked.
1. Allott, A.N., "Constitutional Change and Political Pressure in some
Commonwealth African States: Some Random Reflections", 
Collected Seminar Papers on Post-independence Changes, 
1967-1969, No. 5, p. 7. See Chand, H. "Sociological 
Approach to the Study of Constitutional Law" Journal
of Indian Law Institute; 1977, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 5.
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The Westminster 'model' of constitution maintains a duality at
the apex with one person as Head of State, enjoying no real political power
and another as Head of Government, usually called the Prime Minister, wielding
the real authority. At independence often the Governor (e.g. Sir Richard
Turnbull in Tanganyika) became the Governor-General and as such, the Head
of State, representing the Queen and acting on her behalf. The post of
Head of Government being assumed by a native (e.g. Julius Nyerere, again,
in the case of Tanganyika). Thereafter the political leadership taking the
cue from Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana^ discovered that the British Monarchy was
an alien institution and that the Westminster system did not fit in with the
2
African traditions, decided to have an autochthonous Republican Constitution
with an Executive President. Accordingly, in many countries the Independence
Constitution was replaced by a Republican Constitution.
The Independence Constitution of Zambia provided for an Executive
3
President who was the Head of State and Government. There was a Vice-
President, appointed by the President from among members of the National 
4
Assembly. The Cabinet was composed of Ministers appointed by the President 
who also appointed Junior Ministers from among the members of the National 
Assembly.^ The office of Prime Minister which had existed before Independence 
(the office existed between January, 1963 and October, 1964), was abolished 
at Independence. In the absence of the President from the country or during 
his illness, the Vice-President performed the functions of the President.
The Republican Constitutions - including that of Zambia - did 
not expressly incorporate the doctrines of the separation of powers
1. Nwabueze, B.O., Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa; C. Hurst & Co.,
1974, p. 16.
2. Nyerere, J.K., letter to the Observer, London, July, 1962, extract
reproduced in Nwabueze, B.O., loc. cit., p. 65.
3. UK: Zambia Independence Order, 1964, S.I. 1652, sec. 31.
4. ibid. sec. 41(1).
5. ibid. sec. 44(1).
6. ibid. secs. 37 and 38.
but its functional principles are enshrined in the creation of the three 
organs of government, namely the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary. 
Zambia, even before the introduction of the One-Party system, did not have 
a Westminster type of 'Parliamentary System' of government nor did it have 
a 'Presidential system' of the American type because, inter alia, of the 
Cabinet system based on elected or nominated members of the ruling party. 
The Zambian President is not constrained by any principles of checks and 
balances. The President checks and balances the role of the Party.
There is no evidence that at any independence conference there 
was disagreement on the role of political parties after independence. The 
role of political parties after independence was one of those matters 
taken for granted. Seven years after the collapse of political party 
system in Ghana it was observed that the party was a "novel concept 
introduced into African public life to meet the needs of modern times 
cannot be allowed to cause divisions where many divisive factors already 
e x i s t . I n  the context of this perception, there were three main systems 
of government an independent state could adopt: a reversion to the 
pre-colonial non-political party system, or a full-fledged competitive 
party system, or, a one-party system. Each of these systems is being 
tried in one or the other of the African states. The Kingdom of Swaziland 
opted for a constitutional monarchy and a non-political party system.
The Independence Constitution which had provided for a typical model of 
Westminster system of government based on the monarchy, a Parliamentary 
and political party system, was suspended and political parties banned. 
While 'tiny' Swaziland might succeed without political organization, it 
is difficult for 'populous' Nigeria or Tanzania to be democratically 
governed without a form of political organization. Nigeria, accordingly,
1. Otuteye, S.C., "Constitutional Innovations in French West Africa -
the Experience of Guinea and the Ivory Coast",
UGLJ, Vol. X, 1973, pp. 33^34.
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opted for a multi-party system contending that
Single party - nothing needs to be said about this. Our 
society is too heterogeneous and the apparent necessity 
for the creation of a successful one party state is too 
ill developed for this to be a viable option.1
Tanzania, on the other hand, opted for a one-party system of
government because
Where there is one party and that party is identified 
with the nation as a whole, the foundations of 
democracy are firmer than they can be where you have 
two or more political parties each representing one 
section of the community.2
Following the suspension of the multi-party Constitution of
Nigeria on the 31st December, 1983, it was reported that the Nigerian
, military rulers had set up a committee to consider the introduction of
a one-party in Nigeria when the country returns to civilian rule in the 
3
i' 1990's. On the other hand, Nyerere after retiring as President of
Tanzania though continuing as Chairman of CCM, expressed some doubts of
the one-party system accusing it of encouraging complacency in the
4 1
leadership. This dramatic switch in the positions between the Nigerians'
and the Tanzanians, reveals an African dilemma with regard the role of
political party or parties in government. The difficult does not lie in
the fact that the political party is a foreign importation into Africa,
but that it has been used as a tool of undemocratic rule by those in its
leadership. The political party, like the motor vehicle, has become part
and parcel of the African culture: both imported from abroad.
1. Nigeria: Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee,
Vol. II, 1976; p. 176. Federal Government 
Information Ministry, Lagos, 1976.
(Chairman: Chief F.R.A. Williams).
2. Nyerere, J.K.,"Democracy and the Party System", being a speech by
Nyerere delivered on 14th January, 1963, and 
published in Tanganyika Standard, 16th-18th 
January, 1963.
3. The Times (of London), 5th March, 1986: "Now Nigeria looks for an
African answer", report by Andrew Jaspan.
4. The Guardian (UK), 11th June, 1986: "Nyerere doubts on one-party
system", p. 7. Doubts expressed during a visit 
to Lusaka, Zambia.
5• In May, 1989, it was announced that only two parties
will be allowed in Nigeria when the country returns 
to civilian rule.
The origins of rule by one dominant political party are traceable 
in the communist countries. Notwithstanding the African countries' claim 
that the Westminster 'model' with its multi-party system, was alien to 
Africa, the one-party system is also an alien system as its origin shows.
(i) Party System in Communist Countries.
The origins of the single dominant party system in communist
countries are traceable to Art. 126 of the 1936 Constitution of the USSR 
which guaranteed to the Soviet citizens the right to unite in the Communist
Party which was defined as the 'leading core of all organisations of the
working people, both governmental and non-governmental'. Similar provisions
naming the local community party as the'leading core of the working people1
appeared in the Constitutions of the satellite states of the USSR: e.g.
Mongolia (Art. 82, 1940), Rumania (Art. 86, 1952), Albania (Art. 21, 1964),
Bulgaria (Art. 80, 1971), Yugoslavia (Art. 314, 1974) Germany Democratic
Republic (Art. 65, 1968), Poland (Art. 3, 1976), and Vietnam (Art. 4, 1980).^
Although these provisions show that the presence of the communist
party in each of these countries is institutionalized (under the 1977 USSR
Constitution, the Communist Party is recognized under Art. 6), the one-party
system in Commonwealth African countries is different from those countries,
for instance, most of the communist countries allow other political parties
or organizations in addition to the communist party. Thus, the Czechoslovak
Constitution refers to the Communist Party as the vanguard of the working
people (Art. 4, 1978) and as the leader of the National Front of Czechs and
Slovaks (Art. 6) in which social organizations (including the communist
2
party) are united. In Bulgaria the Agrarian Party, plays a national role
1. Loeber, D.A. (Ed.), Ruling Communist Parties and Their Status Under Law;
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1986, p. 439.
2. Bozhkov, L., and Ninov, S., Hie Historical Path of the Bulgarian
Agrarian Party; B.A.P. Publishing House, Sofia,
1982, p. 28 on the relationship between the Agrarian 
Party and the Communist Party of Bulgaria.
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similar to that of the Fatherland Front of Czechoslavakia. Secondly, while 
the communist party is a 'vanguard' party, that is, its membership is 
selective and restricted, the African one-party system is based on mass 
membership: unrestricted membership open to all citizens. By the early 
1980's Marxist-Leninist parties claiming to be vanguard parties, existed 
in only ten African states,^" and none of these was in a Commonwealth state.
The introduction of the one-party system in Commonwealth African States had 
some influence from the Eastern Europeans' one dominant party system; however, 
the African system is literally a single-party one which does not allow any 
political organization except through the preserved party: 'the Party'.
(ii) French West African States' Influence.
Almost all Independence Constitutions granted by France to
her former African territories contained provisions to the effect that political
parties or formations should participate in electoral process; that they
were created and they exercised their activities in conformity with the 
2
law. However, by mid-1960's, with the exception of the Ivory Coast and 
Senegal, the rest of the French-speaking countries of West Africa had 
become de facto single-party systems. By the mid-1970's most of these 
states were reverting to a controlled multi-party system? only a fixed 
number of parties - usually three - were allowed in the country, known 
as tri-partism. At the time that the single-party was first introduced 
in a Commonwealth African state (in Ghana in 1964), the Central African 
Republic (1962) and Congo (Brazzavile) (1963) had already institutionalized 
the one-party system. In some of these States a single-party system was
1. Gromyko, A ., Africa Today, Difficulties and Perspectives; African
Studies by Soviet Scholars, USSR Academy of 
Sciences, Moscow, 1983, p. 43.
2. Reyntjens, F., "Recent Development in the Public Law of Francophone
African States"; JAL, Autumn, 1986, Vol. 30,
No. 2, p. 77.
imposed de jure by the military returning the country to a civilian 
administration. Since some of these countries had a de jure single-party 
system before the military seized power, it was possible that their 
electoral system had some influence on some Commonwealth African states 
of West Africa, notably Ghana though not Nigeria. Perhaps the most 
advisable approach to the study of the introduction of the one-party 
system in any state is to treat each case as unique, though not totally 
exclusive from outside influence.
At least one thing is certain namely that, with very few 
exceptions, for instance Botswana, most African countries which achieved 
Independence after 1960 modified the system of government established 
at independence. In most cases the changes were introduced in the name 
of more and meaningful 'democracy'. That did not mean that the Independence 
Constitution had established undemocratic system of government, but that 
the 'new' democracy should be a democracy that allowed the people to run 
their affairs for the benefit of the country as a whole and not for the 
service of a few who pretended to represent the majority. The One-Party 
system was resorted to on the assumption that that system of government 
was more identified with the people 'as a whole' than the multi-party 
system which was seen as divisive. Paradoxically, the justification for 
the One-Party system that it resembled African concept of government, 
that is that in African society the traditional method of conducting 
affairs was by free discussion, supported more the multi-party system 
than the One-Party system. In restropective, it would appear that African 
nationalist leaders were merely opposed to legitimizing the system 
imposed by the Imperial powers. The One-Party system although it had 
emerged in Eastern Europe in the 1940's was to Africa something new. The 
key idea was that that system of government was to be introduced by the 
Africans: themselves and not imposed by a foreign power. The One-Party 
system is, therefore, a transitional measure.
Section 1. Mode of Adoption of a One-Party System: Constitutional 
Changes in some Commonwealth African Countries.
In a number of Commonwealth African countries the Independence 
Constitution was amended and in some cases repealed altogether to achieve 
one or a combination of the following! zivj the abolition of regions and 
regional assemblies, to establish a republican form of goverenrtent, where 
that was not granted at independence, to adopt an autochthonous constitution, 
that is, a constitution without any legal links with any external authority, 
and, the introduction of a one-party system. This Section is concerned with 
constitutional changes intended to establish a one-party system. Only brief 
references will be made to constitutional changes in West, East and Central 
Africa before considering constitutional changes which brought about UNIP's 
central role in Zambia.
It is pertinent to point out that while Independence Constitutions
of French West African states contained provisions recognizing political
parties or formations which were required to operate in accordance with the
law, respect the principles of democracy, sovereignty and national unity,^
Independence Constitutions of Commonwealth African States did not contain
similar provisions. The existence and role of political parties was left to
2
be regulated by special statutory provisions and the common law. 
Consequently, the mode of adopting a one-party system in the Commonwealth 
African states meant the insertion of provisions in the Constitution on the 
lines of Eastern European or French West African states. The amendment or 
the adoption of a new Constitution providing for a one-party system, was 
not intended to guarantee respect the principles of democracy, e.g. freedom 
of assembly and expression, but to restrict all political organization
1. Reyntjens, F., "Recent Development in the Public Law of Francophone
African States", JAL, Autumn, 1986, Vol. 30, No. 2, p. 75.
2. NR: Societies Ordinance, 1957, No. 65, Cap. 105; supra, p. 77.
only through the political party designated in and by the Constitution.
The establishment of a de jure one-party system was said to 
be intended to achieve national unity, more freedom of expression and 
less opposition. These were secondary objects, the primary objectives 
were to eliminate contemporary political parties and to frustrate future 
political opposition. Above all, a de j ure one-party system protects the 
ruling party from disintegration through spj-iting into smaller political 
parties.
(a) West Africa.
Ghana was the first among the West African Commonwealth
countries to formally adopt a de jure one party system in January, 1964;
that was before Zambia became independent. UNIP had strong links with
Kwame Nkrumah's CPP in that it had stationed some of its leading cadres,
including General Secretary Munukayumbwa Sipalo, in the Bureau of African
Affairs in Accra from 1960 to 1962. Ghana's establishment of a one-party
system came about following a referendum organized in accordance with the
Constitution of Ghana, 1960,^which, inter alia, established the Republic,
2
adopted by a Constituent Assembly. UNIP leadership closely monitored
political developments in Ghana, including the overwhelming vote for the
3
introduction of the one-party system. The legislation establishing the
one-party system clearly shows that the system was intended to eliminate
contemporary and future opposition to the CPP:
1A. (1) In conformity with the interests, welfare and
aspiration of the people, and in order to develop the 
organisation and initiative and the political activity 
of the people, there shall be one national party which 
shall be the vanguard of the people in their struggle 
to build a socialist society and which shall be the 
leading core of all organisations of the people.
(2) The National Party shall be the Convention 
People's Party.^
1. Ghana: Constitution of Ghana Act, 1960, No. CA 1.
2. Constituent Assembly and Plebiscite Act, 1960, No.
3. Rubin, L., The Constitution and Government of Ghana; Sweet & Maxwell,
1964, pp. 9-9A for the voting result.
4. Ghana: Constitution Act, 1960, Art. 1A as amended by the
Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1964, Art. 2.
The language of this provision was obviously borrowed
from the Eastern European constitutions, but, the CPP was not a
vanguard but mass organization. The Independence Constitution of Ghana,^
and the Republican constitution adopted in 1960, aforementioned, unlike
2
the Independence Constitution of Zambia, did not contain Fundamental
rights and freedoms of the Individual (Bill of Rights) provisions
guaranteeing, inter alia, freedom to assembly and association and in
particular to form and/or belong to political parties. Instead, a person
upon assuming the office of President of Ghana was required to undertake
his responsiblity to the people by making a solemn declaration 'before 
3
the people1'. The declaration was not a limitation on the powers of the
President or Parliament which consisted of the President and the National
Assembly. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Ghana held in In re Bafour 
4
Osei Akoto, that the President's declaration affirming his adherence to 
certain fundamental principles, imposed merely moral obligations on the 
President and did not restrict his (detention)powers or the legislature' 
legal powers.
In the absence of a Bill of Rights, and opposition political 
parties, the President of Ghana, through the only allowed political 
party, the CPP "gathered to himself the supreme power in the state, 
erecting himself ahove the legislature and the party, and had then 
proceeded to use this absolute power to tyrannize and oppress people by 
a systematic desecration of their civil liberties."^ Although it might 
be said that it was partly due to the absence of adequate constitutional 
and other safeguards on the resultant power structure under the One^Party
1. UK: Ghana (Constitution) Order in Council, 1957, S.I.1957/277
2. Zambia Independence Order, 1964, S.I. 1964/1652
3. Ghana: Constitution of Ghana Act, 1960, Art. 13(1).
4. (1961) GLR 523.
5. Nwabueze, B.O., Presidential ism in Commonwealth Africa; C. Hurst & Co.
London, 1974, p. 92.
Constitution of 1964 that accounted <for the rule of terror and oppression
in Ghana, though in those situations where there are safeguards, the
dominant position of the president under a one-party rule could result
in abuse of power particularly in detention matters. The dominant role
of both the CPP and the President in Ghana ended when the Constitution
was suspended,'*’ and was declared that "the party known as the 'Convention
People's Party' is dissolved and the membership of that party is 
2
prohibited." A subsequent multiparty Constitution was also suspended 
by the armed forces who have continued to rule the country.
(b) East Africa.
/ ’>1
Tanzania's TANU and letter CCM have had close links
\
with UNIPj the latter's leading cadres were also stationed in Tanganyika
during Zambia's struggle for independence. Because Tanzania's mode of
the establishment of a one-party system had some influence on Zambia, a
more detailed analysis of its constitutional development is given.
Tanganyika was granted a 'Charter of Protection' by the
Imperial Germany Government in 1886 as a result of an agreement between
that Government and the UK Government over their respective spheres of
3
territorial influence in the region. After the First World War, as a
Mandated territory, Tanganyika was placed under the UK Government
administration which continued under the UN trusteeship system after
the Second World War. The UK Government granted Tanganyika independence 
4
in 1961. The Tanganyika Independence Act, 1961 fi provided that the 
legislature of Tanganyika could amend the Constitution of Tanganyika 
in accordance with the provisions of that Constitution.^ The manner 
provided was by means of votes., on both the second and third reading of
1. Ghana: Proclamation for the Constitution of a National
Liberation Council for the Administration Ghana,
26th February, 1966.
2. ibid. Clause 2(2).
3. Cole, J.SVR., Tanganyika, the Development of its Laws and
Constjtution; Stevens & Sons, 1964, p. 6.
4. UK: Tanganyika (Constitution) Order in Council, 1961, S.I.
1961/2274
5. 1961, 10 & 11 Eli. 2, c. l f sec. 30(2)
the relevant bill and of two-thirds support of all the members of the
National Assembly. The procedure adopted in the establishment of the
Republic in Ghana was followed in Tanganyika for the same purpose. The
Constituent Assembly Act, 1962^ established the Constituent Assembly
whose powers were to be exercised through Bills and any Bill passed by
the Constituent Assembly "shall become law notwithstanding that the
Governor-General has not assented thereto on behalf of Her Majesty, and
2
may be cited as the Act of the Constituent Assembly". The Assembly enacted
3
the Constitution of Tanganyika Act, 1962 which provided that "Tanganyika 
4
is a Republic". The Republic of Tanganyika (Consequential Provisions) Act, 
1962^ provided, inter alia, that the National Assembly established by the 
Tanganyika (National Assembly) and the Tanganyika (Constitution) Orders in 
Council, 1961 , of the UK, was to be the National Assembly for the purposes
g
of the Republican Constitution.
Tanganyika changed its name to Tanzania following its union with 
7
Zanzibar. In the implementation of the treaty of union, Tanganyika enacted
g
the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar Act, 1964 and the United Republic of
9
Tanzania (Declaration of Name) Act, 1964 which declared the name of the 
union to be United Republic of Tanzania. These legislative activities show 
that TANU and ASP leadership clearly wanted to change the system of government 
to something not necessarily of their imagination and liking, but appropriate 
to their geographical position and political development of their people. On 
28th January, 1964, the President of Tanzania (Julius K. Nyerere) appointed 
a Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One Party 
State in Tanzania. In his guidelines President Nyerere required or directed
1. Tanganyika: 1962, No. 66, Cap. 492.
2. ibid. sec. 2(3).
3. 1962, No. CA 1, Cap. 499.
4. ibid. sec. 1.
5. 1962, No. CA 2, Cap. 500.
6. ibid. sec. 19(1).
7. 26th April, 1964.
8. Tanzania: 1964, No. 22, Cap. 557 (26th April, 1964).
9. 1964, No. 61, Cap. 573, sec. 2(1). (11th December,
1964).
the Commission to take into account 'the national ethical' principles
in their recommendations on the nature of the one-party state system and
these included, inter alia, the maintenance of freedom of membership of
the one political party to all Tanzanian citizens without regard to
opinions on any issue, character or any other matter.^- A Government
Paper No. 1 of 1965 set out the recommendations of the Commission accepted
by the Government. The National Committee of TANU and ASP on 5th May, 1965,
set up a Committee which drew up election rules and a TANU Constitution.
An Interim Constitution of the United Republic was enacted
2
which replaced the Independence Constitution., This provided that there
should be one political party in Tanzania and that pending the union of
TANU and ASP (which party would constitute the Party), meanwhile the Party
was, for Tanganyika, TANU, and for Zanzibar, ASP. The constitution of
TANU but not of ASP was set in the First Schedule to the Interim Constitution
3
with the proviso that it could be amended in accordance with its provisions.
4
TANU and ASP were united on 5th February, 1977 to form CCM. The enactment
of the Constitution (Consequential, Transitional and Temporary Provisions)
5
Act, 1977, followed the establishment of CCM and provided that "there 
shall be one party in Tanzania, and that Party is the Chama Cha
g
Mapinduzi". Some major changes were made to the Constitution of
Tanzania in 1984 which included a Bill of Rights. The one-party system,
however, was retained and consolidated. The Constitution now provides
that Tanzania is a Democratic Socialist One Party State and that the
Party is the CCM which shall have "under this and the constitution of Chama"
7
- Katiba hii-na Katiba ya Chama -"a final say on all matters."
1. Tanzania: Reporh. of the Presidential Commission on the
Establishment of a Democratic: One Party State;
1965, Appendix TV, Part One, 13 ~ 15.
2. 1965, No. 43, Cap. 596 (10th. July, 1965).
3. ibid. Art. 3(1).
4. CCM constitution, 1977, Preambles (a) and (b) , now
Preambles (1) and (2) Katiba ya Chama Cha Mapinduzi,
1984: (Constitution of Chama Cha Mapinduzi, 1984).
5. 1977, No. 2
6. ibid. sec. 3(1)
7. Fifth Constitution Amendment Act, 1984, No. 15, Art. 3(2)
The view often expressed that in Tanzania the decision to
introduce a one-party state was ostensibly taken because there was no
real competitive party system,^" ignores the fact that there were several
political parties in Tanzania which were forced out of existence which
if they had been allowed to continue, would have gathered support and
strength and provide alternative leadership to CCM's. A number of parties
which appeared in the 1960*s were harassed out of existence, their
leadership was detained or deported and their right to register under the
2
Societies Act, severely restricted. In fact Tanzania had developed a
3
number of political parties, for instance, there were the United
Tanganyika Party (UPT) formed in 1958, People's Democratic Party, led by
Kasanga Tumbo, the People's Convention Party, led by Samson Mshala, the
Nationalist Enterprise Party formed by Hussein Yahaya, the All Muslim (Union)
Nationalist Party and the African National Congress led by Zuberi Mtemvu.
On 22nd January, 1963, Mtemvu dissolved the Congress and he joined TANU,
while Tumbu's People's Democratic Party disintegrated after he "fled
to Kenya and his party though not officially struck from the register,
4
became morubound. " It is conceivable that if the one-party state were 
not established de jure, some of these organizations should have provided 
opposition to CCM. In fact some had began to merge, for instance, a merger 
between Mshala's PCP and Yahaya's NEP had resulted in the formation of 
African Independence Movement. The Presidential Commission accordingly 
recommended that in a one-party state the threat, actual or potential, 
from opposition group or groups should disappear, and, no opposition to 
the ruling political party would be permitted.’’
1. Howard, R.E., Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa; Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, New Jersey, 1986, p. 140.
2. Pratt, C., The Critical Phase in Tanzania I9l45-1966; Nyerere and the
Emergence of Socialist Strategy; Cambridge, 1974, p. 187.
3. Shiwi, I.G., The State and the Working People in Tanzania; (Ed.)
Codesria Book Series, Dakar, Senegal, 1985, p. 62.
4. Maguire, G.A., Towards 'Uhuru' in Tanzania; Cambridge UP, 1969, p. 338.
5. Tanzania: Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a
Democratic One Party State, o p . cit., Part Ttoo, Vlll, 36.
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Bills of Rights are often linked with the Rule of Law concepts
such as the separation of powers, the supremacy of Parliament and the
independence of the judiciary, in other words, with a liberal democratic
system of government. Tanzanian leaders resisted the inclusion of a
Bill of Rights in the Independence Constitution of 1961, the Republican
Constitution of 1962 and the Interim Constitution of Tanzania of 1965.
The inclusion of a Bill of Rights in any of these Constitutions might
not have stopped the implementation of some of the undemocractic decisions
such as the introduction of a one-party system which qualified freedom
of association and assembly often guaranteed by a Bill of Rights. A Bill
of Rights has, however, been introduced by the Fifth Constitutional
Amendment Act, 1984;^ the Bill of Rights itself came into force on the
2
15th of March, 1988. The Fifth Amendment's Art. 20(1) provides that
Every person shall be entitled to be free, according to law, 
to assemble freely and peacefully, to associate with others, 
to hold and express opinions publicly, and in particular to 
form or join organizations or associations for the purposes 
of promoting his or her opinion or interests.
This provision should not be read in isolation but in conjuction 
with other provisions of the Constitution in particular those of Art. 3 
which, provides that Tanzania is a One-Party State; accordingly, the 
provisions of the Fifth Constitutional amendments do not encompass any 
freedom to form political party or parties other than the designated 
Party, the CCM. The introduction of the Bill of Rights in Tanzania might 
be indicative that there are strong social tensions in society brought
3
about either by the one-party system or economic divisions into classes,
1. Tanzania: 1984, No. 15, to be read together with the
Constitution (Consequential, Transitional and 
Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, No. 16.
2. ibid. sec. 3(2) which provides that the Bill
of Rights should come into force three years
from the commencement of the Act; 15th March, 1985.
3. Daily News, Wednesday, November 6, 1985 contained a special Julius
Nyerere *s Retirement Supplement and in his
farewell to the nation, said; "We^aie^ all
members of one tribe or another; (they j are said
to be 123 African tribes in Tanzania*/ as well as
groups of people with ancestry in other countries.
But you have never allowed this to matter politically
to our economic development."
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which probably do not look to the Party in pursuit of their interests. The
forces that established the one-party state in 1965 are probably no longer
capable of looking after the interests of all the sections of the society,
hence, the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution to safeguard
the citizens' rights from enchroachment by institutionalized power. It has
been contended that the contemporary question is not whether the one-party
system was consonant with the African traditional form of government or
Whether or not the government is subordinate to the Party is a 
non-issue. The primary question is what class controls the party 
and/or government. An analysis of the class nature in the 
Tanzanian Society has been undetaken and it is there stated 
that it is the Petty-bourgeoisie that dominates both the 
party and the government.!
This concurs with the hypothesis made at the beginning of this Section 
that the one-party system was devised to eliminate existing opposition, 
frustrate future political organization and to ensure continuous domination 
by the leaders of the party in power. In Tanzania the one-party system was 
expected to work smoothly because it was assumed that there were no economic 
divisions or classes which needed party control or organization to further 
their interests. The introduction of the Bill of Rights might be indicative 
of the emergence of social classes in Tanzania and a decline in the effective 
role of CCM in balancing conflicting interests in society. There is no doubt 
that if the Bill of Rights had granted the right to form and belong to other 
political parties, political parties in opposition to CCM would have emerged 
in Tanzania during and after the 1984 National Assembly General Election.
(c) Central Africa.
In this region the only Commonwealth country to establish a
one-party system before Zambia, was Malawi. Unlike Ghana and Tanzania, the
2
Independence Constitution of Malawi, 1964 contained a Bill of Rights which, 
inter alia, guaranteed freedom to form and belong to political parties. At
1. Fimbo, G.M., "Land, Socialism and the Law in Tanzania", in Ruhumbika, G.,
(Ed.) Toward Ujamaa - 20 Years of TANU Leadership?
East African Literature Bureau, Nairobi, 1974, p. 215.
2. UK: Malawi (Constitution) Order in Council, 1964, S.I. 916.
independence Malawi was a de facto one-party state with the MCP holding most
of the African seats in the National Assembly. The Government Committee which
considered the establishment of a Republic was also asked to consider the
question whether Malawi should have a one-party system. The Committee answered
the question in the affirmative. The Bill of Rights was excluded from the
Republican Constitution on the ground that it were intended to protect the
interests of the settler minorities. In Zambia the Bill of Rights was said
to be necessary to protect the interests of minorities?^however, by 1973
2
about 32 formerly British administered territories had Bills of Rights. That
shows that a Bill of Rights is a useful instrument in safeguarding human rights
in general and not the interests of minorities in particular.
Under the Republican Constitution it is stated that the power of the
Republic (declared on the 6th July, 1966) derives from the people of Malawi,
and shall, subject to and in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution,
3
be vested in the persons elected by and responsible to the people of Malawi.
Being a one-party system, the 'supreme' power is vested in the MCP leadership.
In the place of the Bill of Rights there were included 1 fundamental principles
of government' which included the principle that the paramount duty of the
government was to safeguard and advance the interests and welfare of the people
and that the Government of Malawi 'recognise the sanctity of the personal
4
liberties set out in the United Nations' Charter of Human Rights'. As regards
the party system, the Constitution adopted the standard provisions that
4. (1) There shall be in the Republic of Malawi after the 
appointed day only one National Party. 5
(2) The National Party shall be the Malawi Congress Party.
1. Supra, p. 84.
2. Read, J.S., "Bills of Rights in the Third World, Some Commonwealth Experience"
Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee, 6 (1973) p. 21. With the 
adoption of a Bill of Rights in Zimbabwe (Constitution of 
Zimbabwe Order, 1979, S.I. 1600, secs. 11-25) and Tanzania, 
supra, p. 120, bring the number to 34 states.
3. Malawi: Constitution, 1966, No. 23, Art. 1(2).
4. ibid. Art. 2(1) (iii)
5. ibid. Art. 4. On the Government
Committee's Report See: Government 
Paper No. 002 of 1965.
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The effect of this provision is to debar any freedom of
association and assembly except in and by the MCP. Any rights granted
by the UN Charter of Human Rights cited in the Constitution do not
become enacted by their being so mentioned that they could be enforced
under the Constitution. In other words, no Malawian citizen could,
for instance, bring a complaint in the Courts of Malawi alleging that
any of those rights as enumerated in the Charter of Human Rights was
being violated or is likely to be contravened in relation to him. 'I^ie 
MCP although it is a 'mass party' the one-party system in Malawi was
not instituted after consultation with the masses. No provision is made
for policy matters to be democratically and openly considered by all the
members of the Party, with information, direction and even selection of
leaders flowing from the masses to the leadership at the top. Instead
policy and leaders are imposed from the top. The notion appears to be that
the people have to be 'led' by the MCP and not participate in its
leadership; hence the view that MCP leadership means leadership of the
President of the MCP and Malawi.
Section 2. Constitutional Changes in Zambia; Establishment of One-Party 
Participatory Democracy.
The method by which the one-party system originated in 
Zambia closely followed the mode adopted in Tanzania. On the 25th of 
February, 1972, President Kaunda announced at a press conference that the 
Central Committee of UNIP had decided in favour of a change in the 
Constitution and directed Government to take appropriate measures and 
accordingly Cabinet had decided to appoint a National Commission on the 
establishment of a One-Party Democracy.^ He also stated that the Central 
Committee in its study of the subject noted that the public's demand for 
the establishment of a one-party state "is the fundamental need to preserve 
unity, strengthen peace and accelerate development in freedom and justice."
1. Zambia; NCEOPPDZ, Report, 1972, Appendix I, p. 67.
2. ibid. p. 67.
The NCEOPPDZ was duly appointed on the 1st of March, 1972, and
among its general terms of reference were to consider changes in
(a) the Constitution of Zambia;
(b) the practices and procedures of the Government of the 
Republic of Zambia; and
(c) the Constitution of UNIP necessary to bring about a 
one-party participatory democracy in Zambia.1
In his terms of reference to the Presidential Commission on the
establishment of a one-cparty state in Tanzania, President Nyerere had stated
that it was not the task of the Commission to consider whether Tanzania
2
should be a One-Party State. That decision had already been taken. The 
NCEOPPDZ was also told that its terms of reference did not include any 
discussion of whether or not there ought to be a one-party system in 
Zambia."^ The role of the Commission was to determine what form of one-party 
system should be introduced. In Zambia it could not have been claimed that 
the one-party system was inevitable because of lack of opposition to UNIP, 
rather, it was said that the detention of opposition leaders and the banning 
of all political parties other than UNIP was a kind of pre-emptive 'coup' 
and adroit
The establishment of a One-Party system in Zambia was not 
easily accomplished as in Tanzania because, unlike Tanzania, Zambia had 
an active opposition to UNIP, and, the Constitution of Zambia contained a 
Bill of Rights which, inter alia, protected and guaranteed the right to 
form or belong to, political parties. First, a brief reference should be 
made to UNIP and its opposition parties.
(a) UNIP and its Opposition Parties.
Although the subject of the opposition in African systems 
of government is worn out by constant repetition, a brief reference should
1. Zambia: NCEOPPDZ, Report, 1972, Appendix I, p. 68.
2. Tanzania; Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a
Democratic Cue Party State, 1965, p. 2.
3. Zambia; NCEOPPDZ, Report, 1972, Appendix I, p. 67.
4. Mubako, S.V., "Zambia's Single-Party Constitution - a Search for Unity
and Development", ZLJ, 5 (1973), p. 69 and also 
"Human Rights in a One-Party State", international 
Commission of Jurists, (1973) p. 48.
buy time by a UNIP Government beset by many problems,
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be made to UNIP's attitude towards its opposition parties. The general
view is that the whole conception of a standing 'Loyal Opposition' is
totally alien to African experience:
I do not mean by this that indigeneous African institutions 
do not countenance opposition and criticism. They do. Nor 
do I mean that they are necessarily autocratic in the sense 
that traditional ruler does not have to consult his people 
and retain their confidence. He generally does. What I mean 
is that they do not recognise a particular role as to oppose. 
Nor is this surprising. It is, after all, a very strange 
notion.1
Some African leaders accuse African opposition political parties
of being 'unconstructive' in their role:
I have risen, Sir, because one point should be placed on 
record. If there is any justification why opposition parties 
are regarded as a nuisance in Africa, is that you hardly find 
a single example of a constructive opposition.2
The gist of the problem, however, is not whether African political
leaders can tolerate opposition and criticism or whether opposition parties
are 'destructive' or 'destructive', but whether they can tolerate an
alternative government. It is the threat of being ousted from office,
and not mere verbal opposition peruse, that is the main factor for the
proscription of opposition political parties. Hence, in Zambia, a threat
of combined opposition from the UP and ANC on the eve of the 1968 General
Election, led to the proscription of the UP under the provisions, of
3
sec. 21(1) of the Societies Act. A combination of the former UP supporters 
and ANC enabled ANC to increase its seats in Parliament to twenty three.
The European political party, the NPP (former UFP) which was not in 
direct opposition to UNIP since sec. 9C2) of the Zambia Independence Order, 
1964, had reserved ten seats in Parliament for European lentil 10th March, 
1969, or sooner Parliament was. dissolvedwas not proscribed but disbanded
1. Gower, L.C.B., Independent Africa; Harvard UP, 1967, p. 61.
2. Zambia: J.M. Mwanakatwe (UNIP) (Kawambwa), Parliamentary
Debates, 12th March, 1969, No. 17, p. 1782.
3. Government Supplement Gazette, 14th. August,1968,
p . '492.
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on its own. In as far as the African opposition political parties were
concerned, UNIP had hoped that these could disappear without legislating
against them.^ But such hopes were dashed in 1971 when the former Vice-
President of Zambia, Simon M. Kapwepwe, formed the UPP, composed of some
men who had played a leading role in the struggle for Independence. Because
the party's main support came from one ethnic groups, the Bemba, the party
was accused of being 'tribalist' and Kapwepwe who had played a 'national'
role in the struggle, was seen as engaged in double-dealing, namely
2
claiming national leadership while leading a 'tribal' party. The UPP, if 
it were allowed to continue and consolidate, would have provided not only 
opposition to UNIP, but an alternative government of Zambia. Consequently, 
the political scene in Zambia was tense with UNIP supporters calling for 
detention of UPP leaders, proscription of that party and the introduction 
of a one^arty state.
The competitive political party system developed essentially 
from liberal-democratic principles. The provisions of Part II (the Bill of 
Rights) in the Constitution of Zambia was a formal confirmation of those 
liberal principles. The emergence of the UPP was. in accordance with, the 
letter and spirit of the Constitution: it was a legitimate exercise of a 
democratic right guaranteed by the Constitution. In the context of the 
developing countries, however, the issue was not the exercise of a democratic 
right, but the ultimate consequences of the exercise of that right.If the 
UPP was viewed as a threat to law and order, then the right to form and 
belong to that party and that party's right to exist, ceased. Accordingly, 
the UPP on 4th February , 1972, was declared an unlawful organization under 
the provisions of the Societies Act and a week, later Kapwepwe and his
1. UNIP: President K.D. Kaunda, opening UNIP General Conference,
Mulungushi, 14th.-20th August:, 1967.
2. The Two Faces of Kapwepwe; 1972, p. 5.
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fellow leaders were placed under restriction orders made under the
provisions of the Public Security Regulations, made under the Preservation
of Public Security Act.^ After the UPP experience, the UNIP Government had
at least two alternative approaches to adopt towards opposition parties;
either to retain the right to form and belong to political organizations
provided for and guaranteed by the Constitution of Zambia, or, legislate
against formation of political organizations other than UNIP itself.
Proscription of political organizations under the provisions of the
Societies Act ' is a clumsy method of dealing with political opposition as
colonial experience had shown that banned organizations often re-emerged
under same leadership but different names. The announcement by President
Kaunda that the Central Committee of UNIP had decided to change the
provisions of the Constitution which allowed freedom to form and/or belong
to political organizations, showed that the Party opted to bring the One-Party
system through legislation as well as proscription. The legislation was,
therefore, to achieve two things, first, to eliminate existing political
opposition to UNIP, mainly from the ANC, and, second, to frustrate any
future emergence of political opposition.
The leader of the ANC, Nkumbula, and his deputy, Nalumino Mundia,
were appointed to serve on the National Commission on the Establishment of
a One-Party Participatory Democracy but both declined to take their seats
on the Commission because they were opposed to the One-Party system. Instead,
they instituted legal proceedings against the scheme. In Nkumbula v.
2
Attorney-General, the petitioner contended that his freedom of expression (i)
guaranteed under secs. 13, 22 and 25 (Part III, Fundamental Rights and
3
Freedom of the Individual) of the Constitution of Zambia was likely to be 
hindered under the One-Party system and was incompatible therewith and 
could no longer
1. Zambia; I960, No. 5, Cap. 106,sec. 4(2) (a).
2. (1972) ZR 111.
3. UK: Constitution of Zambia Order, 1964, S.I. 1964/1652
be expected to exist, (ii) the petitioner might not express in evidence 
or in the Commission's deliberations (were he to take his seat upon it) 
contrary view to the establishment of a one-party system, and, (iii) the 
appointment of the Commission with terms of reference not to hear 
expressions of opinion contrary to the introduction of the One-Party
system, was in contravention of secs. 13, 22 and 25 of the Constitution.
The High Court dismissed the application. On appeal, the matter was 
narrowed down to the following contentions, viz
1. That the appointment by the President of the Commission 
under sec. 2 of the Inquiries Act, 1967,1 was ultra 
vires and null and void because the matters to be
inquired into could not be 'for the Public Welfare'
within the meaning of those words as used in the section.
2. That if a One Party State were introduced, the 
appellant's rights under sec. 23 (freedom of association) 
were likely to be infringed.
The Court of Appeal in rejecting the first contention, took
the view that the power to set up a commission of inquiry if in the opinion
of the President it would be for the public welfare, made the matter one
for subjective decision of the President. A decision made under a power
expressed in such terms is, however, not put beyond challenge; it could be
shown that the person vested with the power acted in bad faith or from
improper motive or on extraneous considerations or misdirected himself in 
2
fact or in law. The Court found that the President acted within the powers 
vested in him in setting up the Commission of Inquiry.
On the second contention, the Court referred to sec. 28(1)
which stated that if any person alleged that any of the provisions of
secs. 13 to 25 (inclusive) had been, was being or was likely to be contravened 
in relation to him, that person might apply to the High Court for redress.
The Court observed that it was not part of the functions of the courts
1. Zambia: 1967, No. 45, Cap. 181.
2. Employment Secretary^v. ASLEF (No. 2) /1972/ 2 WLR 1370, per Lord
Denning, MR at p. 1390.
3. Zambia: Specified in S.I. No. 46 of 1972, issued under
sec. 2, Inquiries Act, 1967, loc. cit.
to issue warnings to the government as to the legality of its proposed
actions. The President of the Court of Appeal went on to say:
In my judgement therefore s. 28(1) has no application to 
legislation of any kind, far less to a proposal to amend 
Chapter 111 itself. I entertain no doubt whatever that 
this section applies only to executive or administrative 
action, (or, exceptionally, action by a private individual) 
and that this is so is underlined by the existence of the 
word "in relation to him".1
The Court concluded that since no executive or administrative
action had been taken in relation to the appellant and that it was not
alleged that any such action was threatened, sec. 28 could not be invoked.
This decision was in accord with a decision the court
arrived at in a Sierra Leone case. In its 1965-1966 Session, the Parliament
of Sierra Leone passed a Resolution to the effect that a one-party system
of government be introduced in the country. Consequently, the Government
issued a White Paper on the "Proposed Introduction of a Democratic One Party
State in Sierra Leone", in which it set down its views about the subject
and appointed a one-party committee with, the duty of collecting public
opinions or views on the type of the one party system.
2
In Steele and Others v. Attorney-General, the applicants
3
brought their action under sec. 24(1) 6f the Sierra Leone Constitution, 
which was worded mutatis mutandis, as sec. 28(1) of the Constitution of 
Zambia referred to earlier. The petitioners' claim was that the 
appointment of the one-party committee constituted and was a threat to, 
infringement of, secs. 12 to 23 (inclusive) (viz the Bill of Rights 
provisions) of the Constitution, and was specifically in breach of sec. 22 
guaranteeing freedom of association and assembly including the right to 
form and belong to any political party. Unlike in the Zambian case, in
1. Nkumbula v. Attorney-General (1972) ZR 111, per Baron, JP, at p. 214.
2. (1967) African Law Reports, SLI^ 1.
3. UK: Sierra Leone (Constitution) Order in Council, 1961,
S.I. 1961/741, Second Schedule, whose sec. 16 provided: 
"Parliament may alter any of the provisions of this 
Order including this section in the same manner iy may
alter the provisions of the Sierra Leone Independence 
Act, 1961." ( 9 & 10 Eli. c. 16).
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the Sierra Leone case the petitioners did not allege infringement of
their freedom of expression since the Government had not prohibited
people from expressing their views for or against the proposal. The
Court's view was expressed by Cole, CJ as follows:
What does s. 24(1) of the Constitution mean? This question 
is relevant because it is my view that on proper reading 
of s. 24(1) of the Constitution, the plantiffs/respondents 
must allege material facts on which they rely to show that 
any of the provisions of Ss. 12 to 23 (inclusive) of the 
Constitution has been, or is being, or is likely to be, 
contravened in relation to them. In ray considered opinion, 
what that section means is this: To entitle a person to 
invoke the judicial power of this court, that person must 
show by allegations of material fact in his pleadings (that) 
as a result of the legislative or executive acts complained 
of he has sustained, or is sustaining, or is immediately in 
danger of sustaining, a direct injury, and this injury is not 
one of a general nature common to all members of the public.
The decisions in these two cases show how little protection the
Bill of Rights provisions afford the citizens in the enjoyment of the
freedom of expression, association and assembly. In the Nkumbula Case
even if the Court had ruled in favour of Nkumbula (which was unlikely in
the face of the provisions of the Constitution), a one-party system could
still had been achieved by proscribing the ANC and refusing registration
of any other political organization under the provisions of the Societies
Act. This could have been a costly and inconvenient way of achieving and
running a one-party system in that political organizations refused
registration could challenge the decision of the Registrar of Societies
2
or the Minister (of Home Affairs) in the High Court. The convenient way 
was that of amending the Constitution and introduce a de jure one-party 
system.
The Constitution (Amendment) (No. 5) Bill, 1972, was moved in 
Parliament by the then Vice-President, Mainza Chon a, who traced the 
history of African political organization in Zambia from the native 
welfare societies in 1930's, the formation of NRANC and UNIP-NRANC
1. Steele & Others v. Attorney-General (1967) African Law Reports, SLI, 1
per Cole, CJ, at p. 13.
2. See infra, p. 239, et seq.
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coalition Government of 1962-63 and said that the Bill "is designed
to bring us all into one nation, one party and one leader".^ At the
time the Bill was being debated, the National Assembly was composed
of UNIP (83 members), the ANC (17 members) and 2 independants. The
ANC members initially voted against the Bill on the second reading
but withdrew from the House on the third reading. On the 13th of
December, 1972, President Kaunda ceremoniously assented to the
Constitution (Amendment) (No. 5) Act, 1972, on the steps of the High
Court Buildings in Lusaka. The amendment provided as follows:-
12. (1) There shall be one and only one political party 
in Zambia, namely the United National Independence 
Party (in this Constitution referred to as 'the Party').
(2) Every citizen who complies with the requirements 
laid down, from time to time, by the constitution of the 
Party, shall be entitled to become a member of the Party.
(3) Nothing contained in this Constitution shall be
construed as to entitle any person to lawfully form or
attempt to form any political party or to belong to, or 
associate, express opinion or to do any other thing in 
sympathy with such political party or organisation.
In early January, 1973, the Minister of Home Affairs, who is
responsible for internal affairs, issued an order in exercise of the
powers vested in him by the Societies Act, to the effect that
I have on the 12th January, 1973, cancelled the 
registration of the ANC headquarters, Lusaka, together 
with all and singular of its branches in Zambia and 
whatever name description known on the ground that the 
society concerned has in my opinion amongst its objects 
or is in my opinion, likely to pursue or to be used for 
unlawful purposes.^
UNIP was not the only political party in the post-Independence 
era to use the law to control or eliminate opposition. In The Gambia, 
for instance, although a multi-party system has been maintained, law 
was used by Alhaji Sir Dawda Kairada Jawara's People's Progressive 
Party (PPP) to control the activities of the National Convention Party
1. Zambia: Parliamentary Debates; 6th December, 1972, No. 31,
p. 59.
2. Government Notice, No. 130, 1973, issued under
sec. 21(1), Societies Act, 1957, No. 65, Cap. 105# 
as amended by the Societies (Amendment)- Ordinance, 
1958, No. 46.
(NCP) and the United Party (UP). During the colonial period, the
British used the Penal Code (secs. 63 to 68) in controlling political
organizations. Following Independence in 1965,^ and a Republic in 
2
1970, the Societies Act, 1971, was passed which defined a 'society' to
include any club, company, partnership or association of seven or more
3
persons, whatever its nature or object or temporary or permanent. The 
President was empowered to declare any society - a term which includes 
political parties - by order in the Gazette, to be an unlawful society 
or a branch thereof or a class or description of any society which in 
his opinion was, or, was being used for purposes prejudicial to or 
incompatible with the interests of the defence of the Republic, public 
order, public safety, public morality or public health or which was, or
was being used for interfering with the rights and freedoms of other
4
persons. Although the provisions of the Societies Act have been used 
against opposition parties, the PPP has maintained a multi-party system.
Although the Societies Act of The Gambia, like the Societies 
Act of Zambia, empowers the President and the Minister, respectively, 
to declare any society as. an unlawful society which in his opinion was 
used or likely to be used for purposes prejudicial to the interests of 
the State, the former Act spells out the grounds upon which a society 
should be declared an unlawful society. An unlawful society is one 
formed for carrying out any of the following activities, viz encouraging 
or assisting any person to levy war on the Government or inhabitants of 
of the Gambia, killing or injuring of any person, destroying of property, 
subverting or promotion of the subversion of Government officials, or
1. UK: The Gambia Independence Act, 1964 13 Eli. 2 c. 93
and the Gambia Independence Order, 1965, S.I. 135.
2. IJie Gambia? The Constitution of the Republic of The Gambia
Act, 1970, No. 1, sec. 1, repealing the Gambia 
Independence Act, 1964 of the UK (sec. 118).
3. 1971, No. 5, sec. 3 amended by the Societies
(Amendment) Act, 1984, No. 19, which reduced the 
number of persons to two; sec. 2.
4. 1971, No. 5, sec. 3.
committing or inciting the commission of acts of violence or intimidation,
interfering with or resisting or inciting resistence to the administration
of law, and promoting and inciting racial hatred.^ Any court trying an
offence under the Act may order the suspension of the society or prohibit
its officers and members from engaging in any of its activities. The
Court may also, where it finds that the society was formed for unlawful
purposes, make an order declaring any such society to be unlawful, which
2
order it submits to the Minister. The Minister acting on such a court
3
order, may by order in the Gazette, proscribe such a society.
Although the Zambian law is not as detailed as the Gambian law,
the proscription of the UPP in Zambia could be defended on the ground that
that party did incite tribal conflict. The ANC, however, although it was
reduced to a provincial party, l ^ d i d  not advocate tribal politics. Its
proscription was effected for the elimination of opposition to UNIP. The
view of the Chairman of the NCEOPPDZ, Mr Chona, is that the ANC and UNIP
were one 'party' and that the two had not differed on principle or policy
and that external enemies fostered the rise and activity of the opposition
parties in Zambia in an attempt to undermine the unity of the Zambian 
4
people. The truth of the matter, however, was that UNIP simply wanted to 
eliminate all opposition including that from the ANC. Although principles 
of democracy - freedom of speech, the right to criticise and propagate 
against the government and freedom of association and assembly - can be 
adopted by any nation that chooses to do so,~* denial of these rights and 
freedoms can also be institutionalized. In Zambia the institutionalization 
of a one-party system was finally effected by the Constitution of Zambia
g
Act, 1973 which President Kaunda ceremoniously assented before 7 , 0 0 0  
delegates at UNIP's 7th General Conference. The Zambia Independence Order
1. The Gambia: Societies (Amendment) Act, 1984, No. 19. sec. 3(4)
2. ibid. sec. 3(2) and (3).
3. ibid.. sec. 3(4).
4. Chona, M.M., Appendix 'A', Answer to Queen No. 1; infra, p. 538.
5. Busia, K.A., The Challenge of Africa; Frederick Praeger, NY, 1962, p. 142
6. Zambia: 1973, No, 27.
was repealed. The provisions of sec. 12A of the repealed Constitution are
now contained in Art. 4 of the 1973 Constitution but without those of 
sec. 12A(3) which had provided that every Zambian citizen who complied 
with the requirements of the Constitution of the Party, could join the 
Party. In its place a new Clause was inserted which provides that
(3) Where any reference to the constitution of the Party is 
necessary for the purpose of interpreting or construing any 
provision of this Constitution or any written law or for any 
other purpose, the text of the constitution of the Party 
annexed hereto, together with such amendments as may from 
time to time be made thereto by the Party and published in 
the Gazette, shall be taken to be the sole authentic text of 
the constitution of the Party.1
The provisions contained in the Constitution of Ghana, Tanzania,
Malawi and Zambia establishing a one-party system did not establish the
one party recognized by such provisions. Often the party is registered
under appropriate legislation, for instance, the Societies Act. Secondly,
although such provisions expressly prohibit any person to lawfully form
or attempt to form a political party or organization, those provisions are
not penal provisions: no person who formed or purported to form a political
party or organization could be prosecuted under such provisions. However,
an interested party could ask the Court for an injunction or a declaration
to restrain or to declare such an organization 'unconstitutional'. Accordingly,
in Zambia separate legislation had to be enacted to make it unlawful for
any person to form or attempt to form a political party or organization
other than the Party:
22A. Every society (other than the United National Independence 
Party) which is a political party or has for its objects or 
purposes political activity of any kind or assembling, 
associating, expressing opinion or doing any thing in sympathy 
with any political party or organisation other than the 
United National Independence Party, shall be an unlawful
society.2
Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 4 as 
amended by the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 
1975, No. 22.
Societies (Amendment) Act, 1974, No. 9, sec. 3, 
inserting a new sec. 22A in the Societies Act 
(1958, No. 65) Cap. 105.
1. Zambia:
2.
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(b) The Effect of Status on the Functions of UNIP.
The word 'status' means, inter alia, rank, relation to others,
importance or superior social position. Does the status of UNIP - that of
a 'society' - affect its functions? Could it be argued, for instance, that
its status - legal status - is irrelevant to its functions? The status of
UNIP affects its role. Such questions as whether a decision of the Central
Committee of the Party should prevail over a decision of Cabinet"or whether
the courts of law should review the activities of organs of the Party, e.g.
2
the Central Committee's vetting of prospective Parliamentary candidates,
are tied up with or only arise because of the status of the Party. The Party
cannot perform governmental functions, e.g. register its own Branches, though
it is closely identified with the Government administration. That can only
be done by a Government official, the Registrar of Societies.
It is important to constantly bear in mind in the study of the
role of UNIP the important point that the position of UNIP, its Constitution
or functionaries is not the same as, say, those of the parties, constitution
or officials under a multi-party system which or who remain outside the
administration of the State. In Zambia the Party's functionaries perform
both Party and governmental functions, e.g. Provincial MCCs and DGs in local
administration. The effect of the status of UNIP on the work of some of its
functionaries becomes relevant, e.g. on whether their actions can be investigated
by the ombudsman or might be open to judicial review. On the other hand,
Party organs might not perform certain functions because of the status of
3
the Party, e.g. sub-Committees' control of parastatal organizations.
This study is, to a great extent, concerned with the effect
of the status of UNIP on the Party's functions. If the legal status of UNIP
were a straight-forward matter similar to that of a company registered under
4
the Companies Act, most of the problems discussed in this study would 
probably not arise.
1. infra, p. 190.
2. Infra, p. 280.
3. Infra, p. 367.
4. Zambia: Cap. 868.
Section 3. The Constitution of UNIP's National Organs.
This Section looks at the internal organization of UNIP's
organs at the national level and tries to answer the question whether
they are democratically constituted. 'Democratically constituted1 in
this sense means whether Party members effectively participate in the
1 2
decision-making of these organs. Although in both Tanzania and Zambia
there was substantial assessment of the views of the citizens about
the form the One-Party system should take, neither TANU (now the CCM)
nor UNIP countenanced any questioning the decision to move from a
multi-party to a one-party system. In both countries it could safely
be said that the one-party system was imposed by the ruling party.
In most countries democracy is perceived in the context of
the presence or the absence of the number of political parties freely
operating in the electoral system. There is an assumption that in a
democracy, that is a society in which there are several political parties,
members of such parties effectively participate in the decision-making
of their organizations. In other words, it is assumed that parties in
democratic societies are democratically constituted and run. There is
also an assumption that the multi-party system, common among the Western 
European countries, also provides alternative policies and leadership.
The single-party system adopted in the Communist countries of Eastern
European countries is also regarded there as the basis of a true and
popular democracy based upon the people acting for the people. Each of
these systems is open to exaggeration as to its merits or demerits.
The One-Party system adopted in Zambia, notwithstanding
the absence of opposition political groups, is a coherent system in which
discussions and elections are regularly carried out. This Section looks
at the mode of the election of the President of the Party and MCCs and
safeguards for members' participation in Party activities.
1. Tanzania: Report of the Presidential Commission on the
Establishment of a Democratic One Party Statei1965, 
Part I,
2. Zambia: NCEOPPDZ, Report, 1972; p. 68, Appendix I.
(i) Election of the President of the Party.
UNIP is organized hierarchically, that is, from the Section at 
the grassroots level to the Party Congress, at the top. A Section should
have a minimum of five members and ten Sections or fifty members make up
1 2 
a Branch. An average of ten Branches constitute a Ward. The number of
Wards that make up a District is not stipulated in the Party Constitution
3
because the Party Ward is also the civic ward of the District Council.
Eight of the nine Provinces were delimited by the British Colonial rulers.
The nineth province, Lusaka, was ^ curvfed from the Central Province after
Independence. At the national level, the smallest Party organ, the Party
Control Commission, is composed of eleven members under an MCC's 
4
Chairmanship. The Central Committee, which meets twice a year, is
composed of sixtye^ght members.^ The National Council, which meets once
a year, is the highest policy-making body composed of about fiveliUndred
members, most of whom are full-time Party functionaries. The Party Congress
is the supreme policy-making body which meets once in five years in
7
ordinary session and attended by about seventhousand delegates
The NCEOPPDZ explicitly recommended that the election of the
8
President should be open to contest, and that recommendation was accepted 
9
by the Government. Although that principle is enshrined in the Party 
Constitution,^0 Kaunda has since 1960 been elected unopposed as President 
of UNIP. Opposition has been frustrated in many ways. The President has 
consistently demanded that he be popularly elected and resisted UNIP's
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Arts. 26 and 31, respectively.
2. ibid. Art. 37. The delimitation is done by UNIP's
Electoral Commission, administratively.
3. Zambia: Local Administration Act, 1980, No. 15, sec. 2.
4. UNIP: Constitution, loc. cit., Art. 67(1) (b)
5. i b i d Art. 56
6. ibid. Art. 55
7. ibid. Art. 51
8. Zambia: NCEOPPDZ, Report, 1972, p. 11
9. NCEOPPDZ-ERAG, 1972, p. 4
10. UNIP: Constitution, loc. cit., Art. 73(7)
'militants1' pressures that he be declared a 'Life-President' on the same
pattern as Malawi's and MCP's Life-President, Dr. Ngwazi Kamuzu Banda.^
Mr Mainza Chona's view is that the suppression of opposition to Kaunda's
leadership of UNIP and the Republic of Zambia, is deliberate and is based
on the desire that President Kaunda should be treated as a 'father figure'
whose leadership should last the first decades of Zambia's post-colonial 
2
era. That view is supported by some of the resolutions of the Party, for
instance, the following which stated that
This Council specifically declares as an article of faith 
the fact that the process of nation building, especially 
in its early stages, calls for a firm captain at the helm
of the ship of state ...............Our inherent political
problems and the nature of our geography do not permit us 
the luxury of either changing the boats or captains in 
mid-stream.3
Apparently the ship of state is still in mid-stream and the Party
has not yet seen it opportune to change the leadership of President Kaunda,
His nomination as President of the Party and through that of the Republic,
has gone unchallenged since 1960,. The purported challenge in 1978 was
aborted by a constitutional amendment at the 8th General Conference of
the Party. At the 1983 and 1988 General Conference and Party Congress,
respectively, Kaunda's nomination as President of UNIP went unchallenged.
A person is not qualified to be elected President of UNIP unless he is a
fully paid up member for at least five years and he is qualified under
the Constitution of Zambia to be elected to the office of President of 
4
Zambia. The Constitution of Zambia requires that a candidate for election 
to the office of President of Zambia should be
(a) a citizen of Zambia;
(b) a member of the Party;
(c) thirty-five years old or over; and
(d) otherwise qualified to be elected as a member of the 
National Assembly.^
The Constitution of the Party requires further that the
1. Malawi: Constitution (Amendment) (No. 3) Act, 1970, sec. 2.
2. Chona, M.M.f Appendix 'A', Answer to Question 8, p. 546.
3. UNIP: National Council, 4th-^th March, 1972, Res. 1.
4. Constitution, 1988, Art. 73(9).
5. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 38(3).
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candidature for the office of President of the Party should be supported
by twenty delegates from each Province of Zambia attending the Party
Congress. The choice of the presidential candidate is surrounded with
some mystery in the sense that it is difficult to determine who actually
'kicks the ball rolling'; whether the presidential candidate himself by
asking those around him to nominate him, or an MCC nominates him without
such request. Prior to the 1983 presidential election, President Kaunda
was reported to have said that
If my colleagues in the leadership of the party and the 
nation as a whole think I should help, I will help as 
long as they need my services. But at the moment when
they say they do not need my services, I will be happy
to go back home. I am a peasant and when I retire I shall 
go back heme to cultivate my fields and grow maize. ^
So far there have been three prominant African Presidents who have
retired from office, namely Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Siaka Stevens of
Sierra Leone and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. Stevens and Nyerere, after
ceasing to be Presidents of the State, remained Chairmen of the only
ruling party in the country, namely the All People's Congress and CCM,
respectively. Asked whether he would follow suit and retire from the
presidency of the State but retain that of the Party, President Kaunda's
reply was that "Tanzania and Zambia are two different countries with
2
different methods", and that he would only step down from the Presidency 
if the people asked him to do so and that everyone was free to challenge 
him at the election. There are two major ways through which the people 
can 'ask the President to step down', either by voting 'No' in the national 
presidential election, or, the Central Committee not supporting his
3
candidature. Both are remote possibilities because as Mainza Chona says, 
Kaunda is a father-figure and he is also not closely associated with any 
tribe in Zambia, the mood in the country has favoured his continued
1. Africa Now; September, 1983, p. 52; interview with Peter Enahoro.
2. Times of Zambia; 22nd July, 1988; 'KK Goes On', p. 1.
3. See Appendix 'A', Answer to Question No. 8, p. 547.
leadership, consequently he has had no difficult in securing the selection 
by the Committee of Chairmen as the Presidential Candidate or obtaining the 
support of twenty delegates from each of the Provinces at the Party Congress.
President to remain in office for as long as he receives the support of the
2
people. For example, the Zimbabwe Independence Constitution has been amended
to provide for an Executive President who shall be elected by voters registered
3
on the common roll. The first President (Robert Mugabe) was elected by the
4
members of the Senate and the House of Assembly. The term of office for the 
President is six years.^ There is no limitation as to the number of terms 
the President may serve. The omission must be deliberate to allow at least 
the first President to remain in office for as long as he receives the 
support of the people. The projected merger of ZANU-PF and ZAPU and the
establishment of a One-Party system in or after 1990, will also facilitate 
the entrenchment of the leadership of the President.
the Constitution now provides that the President shall serve a maximum of two
g
five-year terms. The mode of the election of the President and the duration 
of his term of office have some bearing on the dominance of the President.
be closely watched in Zambia and will probably be emulated.
(ii) Election of the MCCs.
Persons wanting to become MCCs indicate their intention to the President 
who presents their names to the Party Congress after their candidature
Ihe tendency in most African States has been to allow the first
In Tanzania after the retirement of the first President Julius Nyerere
7
1. UNIP:
2. UK:
Constitution, 1988, Art. 73(6)
Zimbabwe Constitution Order, 1979, S.I. 1979/1600 made 
under the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1979, c. 52
4.
5.
3. Zimbabwe: Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment) (No. 7) Act, 1987, 
No. 23, sec. 28(2). 
ibid. sec. 21 
ibid. sec.^ 29(1)
6. Tanzania: Fifth Constitution Amendment, 1984, No. 15, sec. 40(1)
7. See M.M. Chona's view, infra, Appendix 'A', p. 546
had been approved by the National Council. Before the 1983 General 
Conference the out-going Central Committee approved the twenty candidates.^" 
That system was criticised as it amounted to the Central Committee 
members choosing themselves. During and after the 1983 Conference, the 
President presented and presents 'his' list of candidates direct to the 
National Council for approval. The candidate for the office of MCC should
f " )
be a Zambian citizen, a paid up member of the Party, has attained the age 
of twentyone years, /literate in and conversant with the official language
2
and should be a disciplined person without a criminal record. In addition
to that, every candidate is required to declare his assets and liabilities
3
under the Leadership Code. The National Council in approving the
candidature of the MCCs is required to have regard to the merits of the
candidates and the desire to have all parts of Zambia represented in the
4
Central Committee as far as possible. Prima facie, it is the National 
Council and not the President that is required to ensure that there is 
'tribal balancing' in the Central Committee, though in practice it is 
the President who is responsible for the composition of the Committee.
The National Council can reject the President's nomination, which did 
occur at the 1973 General Conference when the National Council rejected 
the inclusion of a woman nominee on 'moral grounds'.
The President presents 'his' list of candidates, including his 
nominated members and another list of persons who had indicated to him 
their willingness to serve on the Central Committee but whose candidature 
he did not support. One of the obvious questions is why not allow the 
National Council select the candidates to be formally elected by the 
Party Congress? That would be one method of participatory democracy and 
a logical thing to do since in any case the Party Congress in reality
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1973, Art. 53(3)(a)
2. Constitution, 1978, Art. 50(6), now Art.60(8)
(a) to (3) of the 1988 Constitution.
3. Constitution, 1988, Art. 18(2) (b)
4. ibid. Art. 60(4)
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hardly elects the MCCs but merely endorses what the National Council 
has approved. The reasons for that are that election by the National 
Council might result in two elections; one in the National Council and 
the other at the Party Congress, and, secondly, that any contest in 
the National Council might upset the President's considered and a 
'tribally balanced' list, with the consequence that a Province or 
Provinces might end up without representation on the Central Committee. 
Consequently, the President's list goes unchallenged.
The Party Congress since it is presented with a compact 
ready-made Central Committee simply endorses the President's selection: 
the delegates' vote, expressed by show of hands, is more a show or an 
expression of their confidence in the President. When the Central Committee 
was small (25 members) 'tribal balancing' was possible as the composition 
of the Central Committee elected at the 1983 General Conference shows:
TABLE A: Central Committee Result, 1983.
Province Sq. Kl. Metres Population Old MCCs New MCCs Total
Central 94,000 513,835 1 0 1
Copperbelt 31,000 1,248,888 2 0 2
Eastern 69,000 656,381 3 1 4
Luapula 51,000 412,798 1 1 2
Lusaka 22,000 693,894 2 1 3
Northern 148,000 677,894 2 1 3
No r t h- We s te m 126,000 301,677 2 1 3
Southern 85,000 686,469 3 0 3
Western 126,000 487,988 2 1* 3
9 752,000 5,679,808 18 6 24
Of the twentyfour MCCs elected or nominated at the Party ' s
General Conference in 1983 - the President is the twentyfifth member - 
four were women, one lawyer, two senior chiefs, two university gratuades, 
one trade unionist and the rest were ''freedom fighters'. Since there is 
no fixed terms a person might serve on the Central Committee, the freedom 
fighters have been in the Committee since Independence in 1964 and some 
even before that date.
* includes the Prime Minister who is an MCC, ex officio.
During the 1988 Party Congress the Central Committee was
enlarged from 25 to 68 members }" The enlargement did not affect the
mode of the election of MCCs as described in this section: of the 68
members, 40 were elected by the Party Congress. The number of the
2
President's nominated members has been increased from 3 to 7. The 
President appoints not more than 20 Cabinet Ministers to the Central
3 CCommittee. At the end of a four-and-half hour sworing-in ceremony of
the new MCCs and other public officers, President Kaunda explained that
all the 68 MCCs were equal and that there was no question of being a
permanent or full-time or part-time or co-opted or half-member of the
Central Committee: "All are 100 per cent members and each would share
equally with the others the collective responsibility of belonging to
4
that organ of the Party". The enlarged Central Committee which should 
meet at least twice a year,~* now includes the Service Chiefs (the Army 
Commander, the Air Force Commander and the Inspector-General of Police), 
trade unionists, parastatal organizations executives and businessmen. The
'old* Central Committee has been converted into the Committee of Chairmen
6 7
of Committees? i.e. the ten sub-Committees of the Party.
The election, nomination and appointment to the Central
Committee ace matters wholly determined by the President. The major
role of both the Party Congress and the National Council in the election
of the MCCs is a facade designed to legitimatize Presidential designs.
The enlarged Central Committee entrenches the personal dominance of the
President while at the same time spreading responsibility for the
failure (or success) of the system to all those in the leadership
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 57; Daily Mail, 20th
August, 1988: 'New MCCs picked: Four Left Out', 
p. 1.
2. ibid. Art. 58 (.11 (c)
3. ibid. Art. 58 a) (d)
4. Times of Zambia, 14th. September, 1988; 'All MCCs equal'; p. 1.
5. UNIP: Constitution, loc. cit., Art. 58(2)
6 . ibid. Art. 61
7. Infra, pp. 217-219.
of the community. The election of the MCCs falls short of both popular
candidature and voter participation. The enlarged Central Committee is
no longer UNIP's policy-formulating body but a broad-based national
convocation. Before the One-Party system was established in Zambia, the
perception of a one-party system was as follows, viz
The single party, with few exceptions, has been the end
product of a succession of amalgamations in which
pre-existing pluralism and competition were not
necessarily extinguished, but merely subsumed under a 
more inclusive organisational label. In effect competing 
parties within an emergent state often become competing 
factions within a one-party state.^
The selection and election of MCCs show that there are no competing
'factions' within UNIP, instead, the President alone balances sectional
representation in the Party's top leadership. Consequently, although the
Party is a 'mass party', the masses hardly influence the selection of the
leaders or the formulation of policies. Under such a system a person is
assured of a seat on the Central Committee if he enjoyed the confidence
of those in the top leadership, or los^e his seat if he lost the support
of the same people although he might still enjoy the support of the masses.
Although the need to contain ethnic competition was one of the factors in
2
the introduction of the One-Party system in Zambia, brokerage politics 
through 'tribal balancing' or institutional representation curtails the 
emergence of creative leadership and encourages superficial loyalty by the 
chosen few in the President, Consequently, the system's weaknesses and 
shortcomings are shielded from scrutiny and criticism lest one loses 
favours of those in the top leadership.
(iii) Election of the President of the Republic.
The President of the Party in order to become the President 
of the State requires an affirmative vote of the general electorate. If
1. Coleman, J.S. and Rosberg, C.G., Political Parties and National
Integration in Tropical Africa; Berkeley, 1966, p. 674.
2. Zambia: NCEOPPDZ, Report, 1972, Appendix I, the One-Party system
was expected to preserve unity, strengthen peace and 
accelerate development in freedom and justice; p. 67.
the electorate votes in favour of the Candidate (’Yes'), he is declared
duly elected, or, the electorate votes against him ('No') / in which case
he is not declared duly elected. This system can be termed presidential
referendum. So far there has been no case of an African Presidential
Candidate subjected to such a form of election failing to secure the
required 'Yes' votes: the Party goes all the way to ensure a 'Yes' vote.
Under the Zambian system there can be no Presidential election contest
because the Party Congress elects only one President of the Party.
The subjection of the Presidential Candidate to the 'Yes' or
'No' vote by all the citizens^- irrespective of their membership of the
Party, although it does not provide an alternative choice, affords the
people a form of participation in the political life of the country. The
election gives the President a sense of legitimacy in his election and
term of office. With the decline in the influence of the Party, it is
feasible for the electorate to vote against a Presidential Candidate, in
which case he ceases to be the President of the Party and the Secretary-
2
General acts as the President, and the Central Committee appoints one
of its members as acting Secretary-General until a new President is 
3
elected. According to the Constitution of Zambia, however, the office Qf
President of Zambia becomes vacant when the President is removed for a
violation of the Constitution or gross misconduct or incapacity or by
4
reason of death or resignation. In practice, there should either be a 
President in office or the Presidential Candidate is also the President 
whenever a Presidential election is held. There is no possibility of the 
Secretary-General becoming acting President as a consequence of a 
Presidential Candidate failing being elected President of Zambia. Four 
Presidential elections have been held in Zambia since Independence.^
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 38(6)
2. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 73(10).
3. ibid. Art. 73(11).
4. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Arts. 40 and 41.
5. excluding the election of the first President by
the Legislative Assembly under sec. 4 of the Zambia 
(Election of the First President) Order, 1964,
S.I. 1964/1283.
In the first of the four Presidential elections, Kaunda (UNIP) was 
challenged by Nkumbula (ANC) under the provision which provided that every 
valid vote cast in favour of a Parliamentary candidate should be reckoned 
as a vote for the candidate for President which that Parliamentary candidate 
supported.'*’ That was a classic example of legislation deliberately designed 
to refuse to give recognition to political parties; otherwise, the contest 
was between UNIP and ANC Presidential Candidates. Kaunda and UNIP went into 
the 1964 Parliamentary election with a number of factors in their favour: 
they were popular and regarded as rightful victors of the dissolution of 
the Federation and the achievement of independence. The leadership in UNIP 
was also united in the face of coming independence. The ANC faced a number 
of disadvantages; reduced to a provincial party and accused of connivance 
with European political parties. The ANC, however, provided a basis for a 
competitive election of the President of Zambia in 1964 and in 1968.
The 'Yes* or 'No' election of the President has been used in 1973, 
1978, 1983 and 1988. The voter is given two votes (and in the booth there 
are two ballot boxes), one for or against the Presidential Candidate and the 
other for the Parliamentary candidate of his choice. Voting is not compulsory: 
a registered voter can abstain from voting, or vote for or against the 
Presidential Candidate only, or for the Parliamentary candidate only.
The results in Presidential elections between 1968 and 1983 have been as 
shown in the Table below.
2
TABLE B: Presidential Election: For or Against Kaunda, 1968 - 1983.
Year Registered Voters 'Yes' Votes 'No ' Votes Invalid Yes %
1968 1,587,966 1,079,972 240,017 63,490 68
1973 1,736,107 581,249 72,995 34,464 86
1978 1,971,883 1,024,954 248,539 45,543 80
1983 2 f377,610 1,453,029 70,355 35,670 93
1. UK: Zambia Independence Order, 1964, S.I. 1964/1652,
sec. 33 (4) (e).
2. Zambia: Compiled from figures contained in Appendix B, of the
Presidential and Parliamentary General Election Results, 
1983; Elections Office, Lusaka, 1983.
In Tanzania in 1974 Julius Nyerere, as the presidential candidate
under a similar system as that followed in Zambia, received 3,462,573
'yes' votes and 109,828 'no' votes and there were 74,388 invalid votes.^
In 1985 Nyerere's successor as President of Tanzania, Ali Hassan Mwinyi,
received 4,778,114 'yes' votes and 215,626 'no* votes and there were
2
188,125 invalid votes. The Zambian and Tanzanian presidential results
give the impression that the referendum form of election of the Head of
State was gaining acceptance by the electorate. In practice, however, the
electorate's participation is as a result of massive 'Vote Yes' campaign,
rallies and publicity by the Party leadership which is aware of the fact
that its own survival and continuinty is depended on the presidential
candidate obtaining a 'yes' vote. A 'no' vote for the presidential
candidate would be a vote of no confidence in the Party as a whole.
Recent constitutional changes in Tanzania which have already
spread to other African states, show that the one-party system is still
in a transitional formation. The Constitution of CCM provides that the
National Conference, which is the equivalent of UNIP's Party Congress,
elects the Party Chairman and Vice-Chairman and nominates the presidential
3
candidate for election to the office of President of Tanzania. In
the past the National Conference elected one person (Nyerere) as the
Party Chairman and Presidential Candidate. In 1984 the Conference elected
Nyerere as the Party Chairman and Mwinyi, afore-mentionedf was nominated
4
as the presidential candidate. Accordingly, Nyerere ceased being the
President of Tanzania but continued as Chairman of CCM^ He was re-elected
Chairman of CCM on 1st November, 1987 for another three-year term of 
£
office. This development shows that CCM leadership is being enlarged
1. Read, J.S., "Tanzania", ASAL, Vol. IV, 1976, p. 130
2. Figures supplied to the writer by the Tanzanian
High Commission. London, 1986.
3. Tanzania: CCM Constitution,, Art. 59(6)
4. Presidential election held under secs. 30—35 of
Electoral Act, 1984, No. 1, Cap. 111.
5. Ceased being President on 5th November, 1985.
6. The Times (of London), 2nd November, 1987: 'Nyerere Vote', p. 11;
elected by 1,878 out of 1,910 votes cast.
and decentralized and, therefore, more open to criticism. Ordinary 
members of an African political party are often afraid of critizing 
party policies or leadership when it is led by the Head of State: in 
the same manner simple villagers would refrain from criticizing a 
traditional ruler, at least, in his presence.
In Sierra Leone the once dominant Sierra Leone People1s Party 
(SLPP) lost power to the All People's Congress (APC) in 1967. In June,
1978, a referendum was held whose "result was foregone conclusion, with 
a massive majority in favour of a one-party system of government. It 
was clearly rigged, especially in the north, where there were no 'No'
1
votes and 22,864 'Yes' votes more than those actually registered to vote".
Seeing that the one-party system was envitable, SLPP MPs crossed the
floor and became members of the 'Recognised Party' , the APC and the
2
one-party Constitution was adopted. President Siaka Stevens became the
President under the one-party Constitution. In 1985 he retired as the
President of Sierra Leone but remained as Chairman of APC. The APC National
Delegates' Conference, the equivalent of CCM's National Conference and
UNIP's Party Congress, chose Major-General Joseph Momoh, head of the
military, as the Presidential Candidate and he was duly elected the
President of Sierra Leone on a 'Yes' or 'No' basis and took office on
28th November, 1985. Stevens remained Chairman of the APC. The 10th APC
held between 27th-30th January, 1989, abolished the post of party chairman
on the ground that the post had been specially created for Stevens who
3
died in June, 1988.
In Zambia Kaunda has led UNIP since 1960 although his title 
has had a chequered history. Before Independence the leader of UNIP was 
called President and soon after Independence, General Secretary. Following 
the introduction of the One-Party system, he reverted to the title
1. Riley, S. and Parfitt, T.W., "Party or Masquerade? The All People's
Congress of Sierra Leone", JCCP, Vol. XXV, July,
1987, No. 2, p. 172.
2. Sierra Leone: On control of opposition parties, see Electoral
Provisions (Political Parties) Acts, 1971 No. 15,
1972, No. 24 and 1973, No. 27.
3. Zambia Daily Mail, 1st February, 1989, 'Party chairmanship post abolished,
p. 1.
of President. Between 1959 and 1973 the General Conference elected a 
chairman who chaired both the General Conference and the National 
Council. He was, however, subordinate to the General Secretary of the 
Party. In and after 1973 the General Conference elected the President 
of the Party who was not chairman of either the General Conference or 
the National Council. Instead, the National Council elected an ad hoc 
chairman who presided over the National Council which elected him or 
any General Conference held during that year of his election.^" He was, 
of course, subordinate to the President of the Party. The system worked 
well and it provided an opportunity to those persons aiming at national 
leadership to test their popularity by contesting the chairmanship of 
each of the sessions of the National Council. It also provided the 
delegates with an opportunity to elect a chairman of their choice. Above 
all, delegates spoke freely before a conference chaired by one of their 
own number and choice. The system, however, had some weaknesses, for 
instance, the ad hoc chairman had no further national or Party duties 
after the conference. It can, therefore, be argued that UNIP had in fact 
no chairman. The affairs of the Party were managed by the President and 
the Secretary-General and Chairmen of sub-Committees.
The 1988 Party Constitution now provides for a standing 
2
chairman of the Party, and President Kaunda assumed both the Presidency 
and chairmanship of the Party. On the face of it, this was a retrogressive 
development. The separation in the chairmanship of CCM and the Presidency 
in Tanzania re-establishes the dichotomy between the Party and the 
Government. That extenuated the centralization of power in one person 
as President of the State and Chairman of the Party. The chairmanship of 
UNIP by the President means further concentration of more power in the 
President at the expense of the 'supremacy of the Party'.
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1973, Art. 30(1) and Constitution,
1978, Reg* 76 (h) .
2. Constitution, 1988, Art. 74(b); he chairs the Party
Congress, the National Council, the Central Committee
and Committee of Chairmen of Committees.
The 1988 constitutional changes in UNIP might be indicative
of pending retirement of President Kaunda and to facilitate his remaining 
Chairman of the Party after relinguishing the presidency of the State 
on the Tanzanian and Sierra Leonian fashions. There is merit in securing 
and maintaining a separation of the leadership of the Party and the 
Government even under a one-party system. There is simply too much
concentration of power in the presidency, for instance, all executive
1 2 
power is vested in the President, and he is a component of Parliament.
He is also vested with powers under the Constitution of the Party. There
are no checks and balances under the One-Party in as far as internal
organization of the Party is concerned. Ideally, there should be room
for constructive ctiticism of the Party by the Government and vice versa.
Concentration of power in the President results in a personalized
leadership which becomes, difficult to criticize or dislodge. With most
of the African States failing to run a successful two or multi-party
system, a few managing only a one-party system, and the majority going
without any form of political organization, at least some effort should
be made by those in the leadership to democratize the internal
organization of the Party by allowing competitive election, genuine
voting system and diversification of the leadership at all levels.
Government, or, an age-limlt beyond which- a person should not hold the
office of President of a party or Government. Although Tanzania has taken
a lead by restricting the President of Tanzania to a maximum of two 
3
five-year terms, Zimbabwe's Constitution is devoid of any provision on
The emerging 'gimmick^ whereby former Presidents retain the
the number of terras a person may serve as President of "ar'party or a
chairmanship of the ruling party, justifies putting feerms—limit on
terms-limit or age-limit for the President of the State.
4
1. Zambia:
2.
Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 53 
ibid. Art. 63
3. Tanzania:
4. Zimbabwe:
Fifth-Constitution Amendment Act, 1984, sec. 40(2)
Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment) Act, 1987,
No. 7, secs. 28 and 29; supra, p. 140.
Section 4. Safeguards of Members* Right to Participate in Party
Activities.
Mostof UNIP's activities are conducted under the provisions of
\ /
the Party's Constitution. The formal source of the Party's central role,
however, is Art. 4 of the Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, which legally
establishes the Cne-Party system and directs that all political activity
in the country should be conducted under and through this sole political
organization. The Party's central role is, therefore, exercised within
the ambit of the One-Party State which is governed under its supreme law,
the Constitution of Zambia. Although the NCEOPPDZ took time to make its
recommendations, the legislation establishing the one-party system, was
hurriedly passed.^ Consequently, there are many aspects of the central
role of UNIP that remain unclear and among these are the relationship between
the Party organs and public (Government and parastatal) institutions and
the safeguards of members' right to participate in Party activities.
Although UNIP holds public meetings and rallies, most of the
activities of the Party organs are of a private nature. The proceedings of
the Committee of Chairmen and the Central Committee are not open to members
of the public. Meetings of the Party Congress and the National Council are
also held in camera; members of the public, including the press, are allowed
to attend only the formal opening or closing sessions. It is, therefore,
difficult to know precisely how much freedom of speech or the right to
participate in voting or contesting elections, exists in the central organs
of the Party. The Constitution of the Party, however, guarantees members of
2
the Party certain rights and privileges. This Section considers the question 
whether the courts of law can review the activities of the Party Congress or 
the National Council in a bid to safeguard the members' right to participate 
in Party activities, including standing for election to any office.
1. Zambia: The NCEOPPDZ was appointed on 1st March, 1972, commenced
work on 14th March (two weeks later), completed inquiry 
on 16th June (three months) , reported on 15th October 
(four months); Government accepted recommendations on 
14th November (one month) and Bill establishing One-Party
system assented to on 13th December, 1972 (one month).
2. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 24; infra, p. 166.
The legal status of political parties in English-speaking Africa 
was initially determined by the common law and later by statute, mainly the 
Penal Code and the Societies Ordinance. The legal effect of registration of 
a political organization was to make it a 'lawful society' in contradistinction 
to an unregistered organization which was an unlawful society.^" In most 
African states the post-independence upheavals have so far centred around 
political movements, in particular the ruling political party. On the other 
hand, it is the political party in power that entrenches itself, for example, 
through the establishment of a one-party system.
In Zambia although the establishment of the one-party system
2
was challenged in Courts of law, the challenge did not question the right 
of the people of Zambia to live under a political system of their own choice. 
The role of the review of the activities of the Party at its Congress, is 
not to question whether the one-party system is fair or just, but to ensure 
that the system once constituted operated in a democratic manner in 
accordance with its own laid down rules. The function of the courts is 
often said to be concerned with statutory interpretation and determining 
whether a person's rights in dispute between him and an administrative 
organ, exist or do not exist, or have been infringed or not infringed.
Although the Constitution of UNIP is not a statutory instrument but merely 
a 'political document', under the One-Party system it is a little more 
than a 'political document'; it determines persons' rights to become MPs,
MCCs and President of the Party and the Republic. For that reason, the 
courts' intervention in Party activities is justified. Although courts are 
bound by statute and must apply any rule under the authority of an Act of 
Parliament, that does not deter them from applying such important common 
law ^ r^sumptioi^ as the rules of natural justice. Consequently, under
a written Constitution like that of Zambia, with a Bill of Rights,
1. NR: Societies (Amendment) Ordinance, 1958, No. 46,
sec. 12A (4).
2. Supra. pp. 127-128.
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the right to personal liberty or the right to participate in the 
activities of a private organization such as UNIP, can be 3 matter for a 
judicial review. The Constitution of Zambia assigns the Party Congress 
with the duty of electing the President of the Party who becomes the 
sole Presidential Candidate;^" prima facie, that provision gives the 
Party Congress the status and role of a State institution whose function 
in that regard should be open to review by the courts of law. But this 
statement should not be construed widely; in fact, the Party remains a 
'club' registered under the Societies Act. The courts' intervention may 
be invoked on the allegation that a Party organ had exceeded its powers 
or failed to follow a laid down procedure or made an error in application 
of its regulations or that it had made an unreasonable decision. In the 
main, however, there should be some identifiable legal fault in the 
activity of the Party that is in dispute.
2
In Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. UNIP, three major issues emerged. 
The first was whether the Attomey-rGeneral of Zambia could act as Counsel 
for UNIP, a political party, which under the One-Party system was said to 
be synonymous with the Government. The second issue was whether UNIP 
could be cited in litigation by name. The third was whether Party rules 
adopted by the Party Congress could over-ride provisions of the 
Constitution of Zambia. What was in issue in this case was whether the 
applicants who were dissatisfied with the proceedings at the Party Congress 
could ask the courts to review the deliberations of the Party. The two 
applicants were former Presidents of the ANC and UPP who had joined UNIP 
in 1973 and 1977, respectively. Having failed to contest the presidency 
of UNIP at the Party's 8th General Conference held in August, 1978, they 
sought court orders declaring that UNIP Constitution adopted at that 
Conference was not validly adopted and was null and void, and, that the
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 38(3).
2. (1978) ZR 378.
election of the President of the Party and the sole Presidential
Candidate and MCCs held thereunder, were also null and void. Consequnetly,
the subsequent election of the President of the Republic was null and
void. Although the Constitution of UNIP allows a contest in the election
of the President of the Party, UNIP leadership is opposed to any contest
for fear of dividing both the Party and the nation. Accordingly, in 1978
a number of devices were resorted to to frustrate the applicants' attempt
to contest the election of President. Their application developed into
three separate cases.
In the first case,^ counsel for the applicants objected to
UNIP being represented by the Attorney-General, contending that being a
2
constitutional appointee, the Attorney-General could not represent a 
political party, UNIP. He contended that the Party was not established 
by a legislative enactment and that it was merely a political party, 
accordingly, it was not proper for the Attorney-General who was employed 
by the public, paid from public funds, to appear on behalf of UNIP. The 
decision that UNIP should be represented by the Attorney-General was 
made by the Party and was well defended by the Attorney-General who 
contended that under the One-Party system, the Party and the Government 
were virtually inseparable in identity and that Party identity permeated 
into the Republican Constitution: the Party and Government could not be 
separated because if they were, then, the other would not exist. Although 
the court disagreed with the Attorney-General on this point,^ it decided 
that the fact that Zambia is a One-Party State, the services of the 
Attorney-General in certain cases have to be extended to the Party and 
that the paramount consideration in any such certain cases
1. Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. UNIP (1978) ZR 378
2. Zambia: appointed by the President under Art. 57(1) of
the Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, in
consultation with the Secretary-General of the Party.
3. "But I am not certain that they cannot be legally
although they may not appear to be so politically," 
per Sakala, J., loc. cit., at p. 387.
for the Attorney-General' s representation of the Party in any proceedings 
was State interest. The objection was over-ruled on the ground that the 
State had an interest in those proceedings since the outcome, should the 
applicants succeed, would lead to a constitutional crisis. However, it is 
submitted that the Attorney-General is empowered to intervene in any court 
proceedings whose possible outcome in his view, might affect State rights, 
property or interests.^- That would have been the correct procedure and 
not to act as counsel for the Party because there were two distinct issues 
in the proceedings, first, the election of the President of the Party and 
MCCs at the General Conference, and, second, the election of the President 
of Zambia by the general electorate. The first was a matter of interest 
to the Party and the second a matter of interest to the Government. The 
Attorney-General's interest, strictly speaking, was in the second issue.
that the Constitution of Zambia requires the Party Congress to produce the 
sole presidential candidate; to that extent it could be argued that the 
Party Congress acts under the provisions of the Constitutions of both the 
Party and the Republic and the Attorney-General is therefore, interested 
in the election of the President of the Party at the Party Congress. These 
are some of the effects of the one-party system. In a multi-party system 
when a party wins an election and forms the Government, the internal 
organization of the ruling party remains separate from the Government 
administration. Under the One-Party system constitutional devices are 
provided which tend to blur the distinction between the Party and the 
Government. The Attorney-General, however, should remain the chief legal 
adviser to the Government and not the Party as that would be tantamount 
to converting the Party into a department of the Government.
The diffic /in this case, however, arose from the fact
■)
/i
In the second case, there was objection to UNIP, not a legal
1, Zambia: State Proceedings Act, 1965, No. 27, Cap. 92, 
sec. 31(1) (a), formerly Crown Proceedings Ordinance, 
1951, No. 1 4 f secs. 3 and 4.
2. Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. UNIP (1978) ZR 388
entity being 'sued'in its name. The applicants' contention was that 
they were not suing the Party in the sense that they were seeking damages 
but merely cited the Party as respondent. The question whether the courts 
could 'review' the activities of the Party held at its general 
conference was not raised: the view being that UNIP is merely a registered 
society under the Socities Act, a members' club, and as such its activities 
were amenable to judicial scrutiny. The Court held that it is a settled 
principle of common law that an unincorporated body has no legal entity 
capable of suing or being sued, accordingly, UNIP could not be sued in its 
name, but legal proceedings could be instituted against such a body of 
persons through representatives. Having noted that the principles of 
representative proceedings were not rigid but flexible tools in the 
administration of justice, the Court made the Attorney-General the 
respondent in a representative (of UNIP) capacity.
This again was a difficult decision. In January of each
year UNIP files with, the Registrar of Societies eight names of its national
leaders, that is, the President, Secretary-General and six others, often
MCCs. These are persons that can sue or be sued in a representative
capacity. The Court while on one hand holding that UNIP was a members'
club, was at the same time clinging to the notion that the Party and the
Government were unseparable, for instance, it was observed that
With, greatest respect therefore, it would appear to me 
that the United National Independence Party cannot be 
strictly equated with the members' club; granted that 
it is not incorporated. Meaning no disrespect, I have 
n6t come across a members' club which forms a Government 
of a sovereign republic. ^
The question of who is cited in a representative capacity is very 
important and should not depend on the role the Party and its officials 
are willing or unwilling to play in that regard. The people cited should
1. Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. UNIP (1978) ZR 388. Following this decision 
the case record was amended and the. parties became 
Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. Attorney-General. The quotation 
is per Sakala, J., at p. 391.
be in a position to enforce the Court's order, decision or directive, for 
instance, suppose the Court had nullified the proceedings of the General 
Conference and had ordered that the Party re-convei(e^)the 8th General 
Conference. The Attorney-General could not have carried out such an 
order because he has no legal power to call a Party Congress. The Party, 
on the other hand, might have felt not bound by an order directed at the 
Attorney-General. This shows that in certain circumstances representative 
proceedings are more than flexible tools of comvenience in the administration 
of justice. These proceedings are intended to bind a body of persons 
that is otherwise beyond the reach of the law. The diffic^" xhowever,
remains, namely that the common law principles of representative capacity 
or proceedings were not devised to regulate the role of political parties 
in a one-party regime. In fact as the Malaysian case of Mohd Noor bin 
Othman and Others v. Mohd Yusof Jaafarf Secretary of UMNQ Tanjung Division, 
Penang and Others,^ shows, the law on status of political parties as laid 
down under common law and statute , is in need of reform.
of Art. 38(3) of the Constitution of Zambia which provides that members 
of the General Conference of the Party shall elect the President of the
conference, the Constitution of the Party provided that any qualified
3
member of the Party could stand as: a Presidential Candidate. The
Constitution adopted at the 1978 General Conference provided that a person
was not qualified as a candidate for the office of President unless, in
addition to other general qualifications, he had been a member of the
4
Party for at least five years. This provision was not among the proposed 
amendments circulated prior to the meeting of the General Conference as 
required by the Constitution of the Party.
The circumstances of the main case arose out of the provisions
2
Party who become the Presidential Candidate. Prior to the 1978 Party
1. (.1988) MLJ R8—22-^29, infra pp. 162-163 i  infra, p. 162.
2. supra, p. 137, at seg.
3. UNIP: Constitution^ 1973, Art. 8
4. Constitution, 1978, Art. 50(9)
The first applicant was qualified to contest the presidency 
having joined UNIP more than five years before 1978 but his attempts to 
lodge his nomination at the general conference which he attended, met with 
intimidation and obstruction. Hie second applicant, who had joined UNIP 
only the previous year, was disqualified from contesting the presidency 
and did not attend the general conference. The trial court refused to 
grant any of the declarations sought by the applicants. On appeal, it was 
contended that the method used by the Central Committee of the Party in 
amending the constitution at the general conference showed mala fides 
in that such amendments were intended to exclude the second applicant and 
were ultra vires the Constitution of Zambia. On whether the courts have 
jurisdiction to intervene in matters pertaining to internal organization 
of the Party, the Supreme Court's view could be gathered from its 
observation that the purpose of the Party promulgating a constitution to 
which it was expected that every member of the Party would adhere, ought 
to be taken by the law as meaning that if any member of the Party did not 
adhere to the constitution, or if rules as to notice or any other matter 
were not observed, any court was bound to acknowledge that such rules had 
not been observed. In the same way, if the Party failed to abide by its 
constitution, any court was bound to make an appropriate finding to that 
effect. The Court j thus, found that the general law relating to the 
necessity for associations of any kind to observe their own regulations 
applied to UNIP and that the failure to circulate the controversial 
amendment was a breach, of the Party's own rules.^
On the second ground of appeal f the Court noted that the 
Constitution of Zambia sets out in Art. 3 8 C2) qualifications for the 
presidential candidate and Art. 38(31 requires that such, candidate be 
elected by the General Conference of the Party under the provisions: of
1. Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. Attorney-General (.1979) ZR 267, per Gardner,.
Ag. CJ., at p. 277.
the Constitution of the Party:-
It is clear therefore that the Republican Constitution 
itself insists that the Presidential Candidate must be 
ejected by the Party and for the Party to impose 
additional restrictions on candidates is a matter entirely 
for the Party in its own jurisdiction to decide. The 
wording of the Republican Constitution clearly indicates 
that the Party is the sole arbiter as to who shall be 
Presidential candidate, and for the Party to impose its 
own restrictions can in no way be said to be usurping the 
functions of the Republican Constitution.1
This observation did not mean that the courts cannot apply the
ultra vires doctrine to rules of the Party that contravenes the provisions
of the Republican Constitution. Ihe opinion of the Court should therefore,
be restricted to saying that the additional requirement that a Presidential
Candidate should have been a member of the Party for a minimum of five years,
did not introduce a new element to the already existing requirement that
he should be a member of the Party. Suppose the amendment were to the
effect that the Presidential Candidate should be elected by male members
of the Party only. Chapter II of this study has shown that there was a time
in the UK and NR when the vote for members of Parliament and the Advisory
Council was restricted to male voters only. Probably the courts would hold
that such a provision although primitive and undemocratic, was an internal
matter for the Party to decide and adopt in accordance with its policy.
If, however, the Party Constitution were to provide that the Presidential
Candidate could be either a citizen or non-citizen of Zambia, the courts
would hold such a provision ultra vires the Constitution which expressly
2
provides that the Presidential Candidate should be a Zambian citizen.
Of importance in this decision was the fact that the Courts 
reviewed Party rules vis-a-vis their application to members of the Party 
and their relationship with the Constitution of Zambia, which is the 
supreme law and instrument which sets down both the rules for the
1. Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. Attorney-General (1979) ZR 267, per Gardner,
Ag. CJ, at p. 277.
2. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 32(2) (a).
exercise of political authority in Zambia and the limits of that authority. 
But concepts such as mala fides or ultra vires as they apply to Party rules 
or activities of Party organs, are hardly in the contemplation of or 
understood by the organizers of an African political party who regard 
their movement simply as a political mobilization of the people for 
political ends. Judicial intervention in such cases might not prove helpful 
in remectying injustice or irregularity in a particular case; it does, 
however alert the party to some serious consequences should it not follow 
its laid down rules. On the other hand, the attitude of the Supreme Court 
in this case seems to indicate some short-comings in invoking judicial 
intervention in party matters. The Court found that the Party was in breach 
of its rules, but because the delegates had adopted the new Party rules 
and there was no evidence showing that if a further conference were held 
there would be any change in the unanimous adoption of the rules and the 
elections held thereunder; "I would hold that this is not a proper case for 
this court to make the declarations asked for. I would dismiss this appeal".^ 
The Court could not have nullified the proceedings of the 
Party Congress without plunging the country into a serious constitutional 
crisis. Such nullification would have resulted in the dissolution of 
Parliament and the Central Committee and rendered void numerous appointments 
made by the President. Between the two evils - of plunging the country into 
a constitutional crisis and not safeguarding the interests of the two 
applicants out-manoeuvred by their political opponents - the Court settled 
for the maintenance of bhe status quo. That was not a sign of want of 
judicial assertiveness, but judicial realism. Nullification probably would 
have resulted in the nullification of the appointment of some of the judges 
who were actually hearing and deciding the very case itself. In a recent 
Malaysian case the court did not only declare proceedings at a party 
conference as null and void, but that the party itself was 'null and void' .
1. Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. Attorney-General , op. cit., per Gardner,
Ag. CJ, at p. 278.
The law in Malaysia on the legal status of political parties is
based on the Societies Ordinance, 1949, which was repealed and replaced
by the Societies Act, 1966, which provides that a society of seven or more
persons whatever its nature or object, should be registered under the Act
with the Registrar of Societies.^" By definition, a 'society' includes a
political party. The Act requires that a local society, that is a branch of
a society, and the national organization, that is the headquarters, should
2
be registered before it can function and any society which purported to
3
function prior to such registration, was an unlawful society. It is an offence
4 5
to organise an unlawful society or to attend a meeting of an unlawful society.
The United Malays National Organization (UMNO) had dominated the
political scene in Malaysia since 1955. It played a dominant role in the
struggle for Merdeka (Independence); providing the Prime Minister and the
Deputy Prime Minister after achieving Merdeka. These were often the President
and Vice-President of UMNO, elected at the Party's General Assembly which met
once in three years. The General Assembly - the equivalent of UNIP's Party
Congress - forms the top of the pyramid structure of UMNO whose lowest organ
were branches, over 8,000 of them and more than one million members.
The (June) 1987 election of the President and the Vice-President
f N
and tweii^yseven members of the Supreme Council of UMNO - the equivalent of 
UNIP's Committee of Chairmen - attracted more attention than usual because 
for the first time there was a serious challenge to the top leadership of the 
party. The President and Vice-President were in fact elected with narrow margins 
of 43 and 40 votes, respectively. It was then alleged that some of the voters 
(delegates) who participated in the proceedings of the General Assembly had 
come from societies not registered with the Registrar of Societies as required 
by the provisions of the Societies Act, aforementioned.
1. Malaysia: Societies Act, 1966, sec. 7(1).
2. ibid. sec. 6(2).
3. ibid. sec. 12.
4. ibid. secs.41(c) to 47 prescribe offences
5. ibid. sec. 43
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In Mohd No or bin Othman and Others v. Mohd Yusof Jaafar,
Secretary of UMNO Tanjung Division, Penang and Others,^ the twelve
plaintiffs included officials and ordinary members of UMNO whose complaint
was that the President, Vice-President and Council members were elected
by delegates which included persons not entitled to vote at the conference
having come from unregistered 'branches' or 'divisions' of the Party. The
eight defendants included the Secretary-General of the MNO. The allegation
having been proved beyond all reasonable doubt that persons from unlawful
societies attended and voted at the General Assembly meeting, the Court
decided that since up to the time of the trial the unregistered societies
remained In existence as unapproved branches of UMNO, UMNO, its Divisions
2
and Branches "are deemed by the Act to be unlawful societies." The
provisions of sec. 12 and 41 (i.e. a society which establishes a branch
without the prior approval of the Registrar of Societies) were said to be
clear and unambiguous and it would be doing violence to the language of
the statute if only the unapproved Branches were declared unlawful
societies: but the parent body was not:-
In ray judgment as UMNO was an unlawful society at the 
material time, persons who took part in the elections in 
1987 at Branch, Division and the General Assembly levels 
committed an offence (section 43 of the Act) and therefore 
the elections were null and void and the office-bearers 
elected at all levels were not office-bearers at all. The 
entire series of elections were a nullity all the way.^
Accordingly, the plaintiffs as members of UMNO could not acquire
any right founded upon that which was unlawful; the Court would therefore,
not lend its aid to the reliefs sought. At the end of the judgement the
judge made what he called obiter observation, that the Societies Act was
originally intended to eradicate secret societies:. It still does. But
that legislation was, in his view, not suitable to regulate political
1. C1988) MLJ 22-28, Kuala Lumpur High Court Civil Suit.
2. ibid. per Harun, J., R8-22-88, at p. 14.
3. ibid. at p. 15.
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parties. In Malaysia legislation was passed in 1981 which specifically 
dealt with political parties. That legislation was in the form of an 
amendment to the Societies Act (an insertion of a Part IA) . In 1983 
that provision was repealed and not replaced. The judge expressed the
view that perhaps time had once again come for Parliament to pass a
special law on the status and role of political parties as it had done
with regard to trade unions and co-operative societies. The Court felt
that mere amendments to the Societies Act would be nibbling at the 
problem; what was required was a fresh definition and role of political
parties that were in line with a responsible party system.
The only point to be made between this case and the Zambian 
cases considered in this Chapter, is that the former arose within the 
context of a multi-party system and the Court had less serious inhibitions 
in declaring the UMNO as a whole, an unlawful society for want of 
registration. Such a finding would result in serious constitutional crisis 
under a one-party system. In as far as internal organization of the
UMNO was concerned, there should be no difference between the internal
administration of UNIP and UMNO: both ought to be democratically run in 
accordance with the law of the land and their own Constitutions. The 
evidence tendered in the UMNO Case, however, showed flagrant violation 
of both the law of the land, e.g. the failure to register branches, and 
its own constitution, e.g. by the presence and participation of delegates 
from unregistered branches in the proceedings of the General Assembly.
The chief cause of UMNO's conflict with the law, was that local leaders 
formed branches of the Party on the eve of elections to use them as 
tools for their election to Parliament.
The case shows that judicial review of activities of 
political parties is essential lest some of these institutions, if left 
unchecked, might be turned into personal organizations or become secret 
and unlawful societies. Ideally, in a free and democratic society, political 
parties should go about their business free from judicial scrunity.
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Section 5. The Presidency and the Organs of the Party.
Although political parties do not feature in the traditional
doctrine of the separation of powers, the development of parties has had
effect on the old political categories inspired by Aristotle and
Montesquieu. The degree of separation of powers is much more dependent on
the party system than on the provisions of the Constitution.^- Thus a
single party system brings in a very close concentration of power particularly
in the President. On the other hand, a two-party system also tends to
concentrate power through its absolute majority in Parliament form of
government: a majority governing party holds in its hands the essential
prerogatives of the Legislature and the Executive. Parliament and Government
are like machines driven by the same motor, the party. The regime is not so
2
very different, in this respect, from the single-party system. The
concentration, however, is in the party and not in any one organ of the
party. Of the single-party system, it has been said that the "one party
government is intended in almost every case to produce one-man rule" and that
a one-party government with, its corollary of one^inan rule not only negates
freedom of the individual, but also erodes the supporting mechanism of
3
constitutional government. On Malawi, it has been said that Dr Kamuzu Banda,
the Life—President of both the MCP and the Republic of Malawi, referred to
his Ministers as 'my boys' , and that he occupied the position in which he
4
was virtually the president of the party and the party itself.
In Zambia the political party system introduced in 1973 theK
presidency is politically nearly omnipotent. The incumbent of the office 
of President derives his primary authority from the Party, by virtue of
1. Duverger, M ., Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the
Modern State; Methuen & Co. London, 3rd ed. 1978, p. 393.
2. ibid. p. 394.
3. Nwabueze, B.O., Constitutionalism in Emergent States; C. Hurst & Co.,
1973, p. 159.
4. Williams, T.D., Malawi., the Politics of Despair; Cornell UP, 1978,
pp. 196-198.
being the President of the Party. As President he is the head of the
Party and its principal spokesman on Party, national and international
affairs.^" All Party organs and personnel are literally at his personal
disposal. In the exercise of his power, he presides over all national
Party organs and he uses his discretion in determining items to be
included on agenda for discussion, and, he has power to delete any item
2
from an agenda of the Central Committee and the National Council.
Although the office of the President of the Party is part and 
parcel of 'the Party1, for purposes of analysis, it could be isolated 
and considered either individually or in connection with other organs 
of the Party. The previous Sections have shown that UNIP is at law a 
society, a body of men and women combined together in pursuit of politics, 
devoid of legal entity or capacity. As such, its central role is 
performed by its leading officials, one of whom is its President. This 
Section looks at the dominant role of the President within the Party 
and the nation. The analysis, however, is confined to the relationship 
between the President and the Party Congress, the National Council and 
the Central Committee.
(i) The President and the Party Congress.
In the past, besides delivering his five-year speech and ensuring 
the election of the MCCs, the President did not make much use of the
General Conference. Now that the President is the Chairman of the Party
3 ( ^
Congress he is likely to use this organ of the Party to his entrenchment /
4
and influence. Parliament is often dissolved at the Party Congress.— "
(ii) The President and the National Council.
The National Council is the forum for Presidential announcements, 
directives and changes in Party and Government leadership. It meets once a
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 74.
2. ibid. Art. 74(d).
3. ibid. Art. 74(b).
4. Zambia: "Given under my hand and the Public Seal of the
Republic of Zambia at Mulungushi this 22nd day of 
August, 1988", Proclamation No. 1, 1988, S.I. No. 
112 of 1988.
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year in an ordinary session. Although MCCs are elected by the Party Congress,
in the event of an MCC resigning (which has occured three times between 1973
and 1989), or incapacitated (nil) , dying (two during the stated period) or
otherwise ceasing through removal by the President (several), the National
Council fills the vacancy. The President is thereby in a position to change
the composition of the Central Committee through replacements. That has been
the source of discontent in UNIP circles particularly at the removal of an
MCC 'elected' at the Party Congress. The holding of office in the Party is
on the fundamental principle contained in the Constitution of the Party that
2
"all organs of the Party shall ordinarily be elective". There is, therefore,
a presumption that once elected to an office, the officer would continue in
office until the expiration of his term of office, or he dies or is otherwise
removed on disciplinary grounds, or he resigns.
Following the removal on 24th April, 1985, from the Central
Committee as well as from the office of Secretary-General of UNIP and Prime
3
Minister, of Humphrey Mulemba and Nalumino Mindia, respectively, the former 
having been elected MCC at the 1983 Party Congress while the latter was a 
nominee of the Presidentf President Kaunda told a National Council meeting 
that such changes were routine reshuffles. Earlier in 1981 after removing 
Mainza Chona and Daniel Lisulo from the office of Secretary-General and 
Prime Minister, respectively (the former was removed from the Central Committee 
as well in which he was a nominee of the President and the latter remained 
in the Central Committee in which, he was an elected member) the President had 
stated that "these positions are honourable only in the sense that one 
recognizes the trus
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 54(2).
2. ibid. Art. 24(1) (a).
3. Times of Zambia, 25th April, 1985: 'KK Bombshell', p. 1. (KK stands
for Kenneth Kaunda)
4. UNIP: 1st Extraordinary National Council, 21st-29th
April, 1981.
^ bost^wed on him by the nation.
For the purposes of this study, the views of the Chairman 
of the NCEOPPDZ, Mr Chona, who was one of the victims of the changes 
referred to in this Section, were sought on the powers of the President.
His view is that the powers of the President are extensive and that the 
changes in April, 1985, in which an elected MCC, who happened to be the 
Secretary-General of the Party, was removed from the Central Committee, 
among others, showed that the President could override the Constitution 
of the Party "unless he asked to relinguish his membership of the Central 
Committee, it means that our Constitution gives power to the President to 
remove elected members of the Central Committee. This widens the powers 
than was thought to be the case."^
There is no evidence that the elected MCC removed from the 
Central Committee in 1985 had resigned from the Committee. Since there is 
no provision in the Constitution of the Party empowering the President to 
remove from the Central Committee a person elected to the Committee by the 
Party Congress, such a removal could be described as 'unconstitutional'.
The Constitution empowers the President to take any disciplinary action 
against any member of the Party on the grounds of the member' s
2
misconduct and to report his action to the Committee of Chairmen. In the
public service, 'disciplinary action' means a process in which a public
officer is formally charged and is given an opportunity to exculpate
3
himself, often in writing. In politics no such procedures exist: 'disciplinary 
action' means the imposition of a sanction.
The mid-term removal and replacement of MCCs do not disturb 
the tribal balancing in the Central Committee because the removed MCC is 
replaced by someone from the same Province; the removal is a personal and 
not a provincial lose. However, once MCCs have been afforded the status of
1. Chona, M.M., Appendix 'A', infra, Answer to Question No. 8, p. 546.
2. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 74(h)..
3. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Public Service
Commission (Delegation) Directions, Cap. 1, Subsidiary, 
Part IV, Reg. 8.
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'elected MCCs1, their removal should be in accordance with the provisions
of the Constitution of the Party in the context of the observation of
the Supreme Court in Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. Attorney-General,^ namely
that the purpose of the Party in promulgating a Constitution must be taken
by law as meaning that the Party would observe its rules. The problem,
however, is that in the absence of a formal charge followed by a disciplinary
2
action, the maxim eodem modo quo oritur, eodem modo dissolvitur cannot be
invoked by a person removed from the Central Committee. The highest
appellate organ in the Party, the National Council ad hoc Appeals Committee
can consider appeals against expulsion from the membership of the Party or
3
appeals from decisions of the Central Committee. There is no procedure
through which a person removed from the Central Committee might challenge
the decision of the President. So far there has been no case in which a
person removed from the Central Committee has challenged his removal either
before a Party organ or the Courts of law. As a matter of hypothesis, a
court of law would probably hold that such a removal 'unconstitutional' and
null and void, except where it was as a result of a 'disciplinary action'.
4
Because the National Council meets only once a year, it hardly exercises 
its extensive powers and functions.
(iii) The President and the Central Committee.
Originally the General Secretary of UNIP was primus inter pares 
to his fellow MCCJr in the Party. The Independence and One-Party Constitutions 
elevated the position of the President far above the other MCCs? in fact 
he is rarely referred to as an MCC, of which he is. Although the President 
selects the MCCs, once he and the other MCCs have been elected by the Party 
Congress, they are of equal status, hence, the provisions of the Constitutions
1. (1979) ZR 267, supra, pp. 154 - 160.
2. What has been created by a certain method may be
extinguished by the same method.
3. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 56 (i) and Reg. 18
4. ibid. Art. 54(2).
of the Party did not provide that one of the functions of the Central Committee
was to advise the President.^ The Central Committee is the primary elected
national organ of the Party and MCCs are expected to deliberate in that organ
on equal terms with the President. The provision that the Central Committee
2
'advises the President' was contained in the Constitution of Zambia. The
Party, however, operates under its own Constitution and the provisions of
the Constitution of Zambia are irrelevant to the administration of UNIP.
The President has assumed a dominant role over the other MCCs, first,
through the power he exercises of constituting the Central Committee, e.g. the
enlargement of the Central Committee at the Tenth Party Congress in August,
1988, which brought into the Central Committee his own hand-picked men and
women, including non-political public functionaries, devoid of political
support or base in the country. The inclusion of Cabinet Ministers in the
Central Committee was a reversion to earlier arrangements; the controversial
Central Committee elected at the Mulungushi Conference in 1967 and dissolved
by President Kaunda in 1969 on grounds of tribal conflicts and the 1970
'decentralized' Central Committee, included Cabinet Ministers. Secondly,
his deployment of MCCs into provincial administration gives the
President the control of the country as a whole. Thirdly, through the power
of removal of any MCC from the Central Committee at any time.
The principle that the Central Committee and Cabinet should have
3
separate membership was recommended by the NCEOPPDZ and was accepted by the 
4
Government which added its own dimension that the Central Committee should
5
take precedence over Cabinet. Eventually that principle was enshrined in the
provision that where a decision of the Central Committee was in conflict
with a decision of Cabinet, the decision of the Central Committee shall prevail.
1. UNIP; Constitution, 1973, Art. 12; 1978, Art. 54 and 1988, Art. 59
2. Zambia; Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act, 1975, No. 22,
Art. 47C (1).
3. NCEOPPDZ, Report, 1972; paras. 148 and 149, p. 45.
4. NCEOPPDZ—SRAG, 1972, pp. 24 and 25.
5. Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act, 1975, loc. cit.,
Art. 47C (2) .
The inclusion of Cabinet Ministers in the Central Committee 
of the party is also adopted by CCM, for instance, the President, the
First Vice-President (the Prime Minister), the Second Vice-President
(the President of Zanzibar), the Ministers of Natural Resources and
Tburism, of Local Government and Co-operatives, and of Trade and
Industries, are members of the Central Committee.^ The ministers are
appointed by the Chairman of CCM as members of the Central Committee.
2
In Zambia the Tenth Party Congress elected 40 of the 68 MCCs.
3
The President appointed seven other MCCs, and he is empowered to
4
appoint not more than 20 Cabinet Ministers as MCCs. All 16 Cabinet 
Ministers were appointed to the Central Committee.'* The four MCCs who 
were left out of the Central Committee, three reportedly on grounds of 
ill-health and the fourth for re-deployment into foreign service, were 
known to be outspoken critics of the Party and its leadership. The 
fact that 21 out of 25 MCCs who served in the 1983-1988 Central Committee 
are continuing in the 1988-1993 Central Committee, shows that there is 
little turn-over in the leadership of the Party and that the leadership 
is entrenched. Such an entrenched leadership brings, prima facie, 
stability in the leadership but it also results in stagnation in the 
Party in particular and the country in general.
Although there is provision on how to solve a conflict in 
decisions of the Central Committee and Cabinet, there is no provision 
on how to solve a conflict between a decision of the President and a 
decision of the Central Committee^ For example, a conflict could occur 
between a decision of the President disciplining a member of the Party
1. Esterhuysen, P., and Rudolph, H v, "Tanzania; The Teacher's strategy",
Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 12, 1987, 221-223 at p. 222.
2. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 57(1) (b).
3. ibid. Art. 57(1)(c).
4. ibid. Art. 57(1) (d).
5. Times of Zambia, 3rd November, 1988; 'Cabinet Reduced', p. 1.
on the grounds of the member's alleged misbehaviour and of the Central 
Committee that the President's action was unwarranted. Such a situation 
could occur because the President is required to report any disciplinary 
action to the Central Committee for ratification.1 The Central Committee 
can refuse to ratify a President's disciplinary action and instead make 
its own decision on the matter. Democratically, the majority's (that is 
the Central Committee's) decision should prevail over that of the President.
In practice, however, because of his dominant position, individual members 
of the Central Committee might express reservations on the Presidential 
action, but the Central Committee as a whole, would hardly over-rule the 
decision of the President as that would be tantamount to a vote of no 
confidence in the President.
The enlargement of the Central Committee from 25 to 68 MCCs
and the reduction of Central Committee meetings from twelve to two in 
2
a year, will create a new form of relationship between the President and 
the MCCs: there will be less close comradeship between the President and 
the MCCs compared to that which existed when the Central Committee was 
small and composed of seasoned politicians. The inclusion of the armed 
forces and parastatal chiefs and trade union leaders in the Central Committee 
must be seen as an attempt not to facilitate participatory democracy, but 
to spread the responsibility for the administration of the State to all 
those in the leadership of leading institutions. Previously, the poor 
performance of the economy and soaring crime rate, were blamed on the 
policies and performance of the Party in general and the Central Committee 
in particular. The enlargement of the Central Committee spready collective 
responsibility to all those concerned with national leadership - in the 
Party, the Government, parastatals, trade unions etc. The enlargement will not
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 74(h).
2. ibid. Art. 58(2).
end the chronic shortages of essential commodities such as cooking 
oil, sugar, bread, soap, salt or mealie-meal, or, eliminate crime.
On the contrary, the inclusion of parastatal chiefs in the Central 
Committee might in fact result in weakening Central Committee's 
criticism of the performance of the public sector.
One of the immediate consequences of the inclusion of
Cabinet Ministers in the Central Committee, was the blurring of the
separation of the Central Committee and Cabinet; a separation the
NCEOPPDZ considered essential under a One-Party system.1 The inclusion
of the Cabinet Ministers in the Central Committee means that the
dichotomy between the Central Committee as the policy-formulating body
and the Cabinet as the policy-implementing body, has been, to some
extent, modified. The fact that the old Central Committee has been
converted into the Committee of Chairmen and is also empowered to
initiate policies for consideration by the Central Committee, the
2
National Council and the Party Congress, has not changed the status 
and role of the Central Committee as the Party's policy-formulating 
body. The Cabinet has, consequently become part and parcel of the 
Party's policy-formulating machinery. Under the present arrangement, 
power is retained by the President. The Central Committee has become 
a deliberative body, there merely to endorse decisions of the President 
and the Committee of Chairmen. The role of the Secretary-General, the 
Prime Minister, Provincial MCCs and armed forces and parastatals chiefs 
as well as Cabinet Ministers is to inform the Central Committee of what 
is happening in their field of activity and carry out decisions of the 
Central Committee. Cabinet has become superflous or redundant: Ministers 
will be told what to do in the Central Committee.
1. Zambia:
2. UNIP:
NCEOPPDZ, Report, 1972, p. 47, par. 148. 
Constitution, 1988, Art. 63(1)(g).
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What was said when the One-Party system was introduced in
Zambia in 1972, could still be said to-day, that the introduction of
the One-Party system by itself resolved nothing, and that the Government
of Zambia had to demonstrate that the new structure was any more effective
than the old, either in providing a stable base for a UNIP Government,
or for mobilizing people and resources for development.^” The present
Central Committee is a national body constituted by the President to
assist him running not the Party but the country. The original concept
of the Central Committee of UNIP, composed of political leaders, has
been destroyed. The election of the MCCs at the Party Congress, merely
legitimizes the Presidential invention, hence, MCCs are now required
to subscribe an oath before the President, pledging obedience to the 
2
Party, in reality to the President. One of the adverse effects of
such devices is that it lowers the importance of the role and decisions
of a national organization in the estimation of the members of the
public who make up the majority of the population.
The Central Committee is dominated by the President and
the Constitution of UNIP clearly states that the Secretary-General of
the Party (the 'No. 2'), carries out all Party functions as directed 
3
by the President. Although the Party Congress and the National Council 
are the supreme and the highest policy-making bodies, respectively, it 
is the Central Committee's composition, mode of election, role and 
prominance that are often in the public's perception of the central 
role of UNIP in Zambia. The Central Committee is the visible Party in 
action. In the final analysis, the central role of the Party's Central 
committee, is played by the President who pulls the lever in practically 
all important decisions and actions of the Party.
1. Pettman, J., Zambia, Security and Conflict; Friedmann, 1974, p. 241.
2. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 18(2)(d), Schedule.
3. ibid. Art. 78(g).
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Section 6. Participatory Democracy and the Judiciary.
Under a multi-party system it could be said that government 
consists of two elements: the political and the non-political. The first 
is temporary and elected; the second is permanent and appointed. Under a
One-Party system, the first is also elected but is also permanently in 
office. In both cases, however, one could not exist without the other: 
theirs is essentially a partnership of mutual dependence. Without civil 
servants to implement Party policies, UNIP would be impotent. If the 
Party were not to rely on the integrity of the people operating the civil 
service, the administration of Zambia would be threatened. The civil 
service has the task of translating political objectives of the Party into 
practical realities.
In Chicewa, one of the Zambian languages used at UNIP public 
meetings in interpreting speeches made in the official language, 
'politics' is translated as ndale za dziko: ndale (tricks) ssa (of) 
dziko (country). This translation of 'politics', notwithstanding the 
trickery aspect, perceives politics as something which politicians do 
using the power of the state something which private individuals cannot do. 
'Tricks of the country' have no definite rules: politics seek to deal with 
controversial issues by looking at the arguments for and against, seeking 
alternative solutions, and then, once a decision to act has been taken, 
those in authority have to use authority and the administration - power 
of government - in enforcing the political will of the rulers. Civil 
servants who form part of the executive machine are expected to be 
politically neutral as far as their work - implementing political decisions - 
is concerned.^” They will obviously have their own political views, which 
may or may not coincide with those of the politicians they are employed 
to serve, but these should not affect their neutrality or ability to
1. Infra, p. 214.
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do their jobs efficiently. If a civil servant had such strong political 
convictions that he found it impossible to suppress them when he were 
performing his official duties, it would be advisable to resign from 
the public service and enter politics. That forms the background to 
our consideration of participatory democracy in Zambia and the judiciary,
(a) Party Control of the Judicial Service Commission.
In principle, the policy that senior members of the judiciary
should not participate in politics, is advocated in UNIP. Consequently,
the appointment and removal of judges are matters regulated by the
Constitution of Zambia. The Party does not show a keen interest in the
manner the judiciary carries out its functions unless there is a case
before the courts in which political leaders are implicated. The Party,
through its President, has had some influence on the Judicial Service
Commission which is responsible for the appointment and deployment of
some of the judicial officers. Under the Independence Constitution, the
Judicial Service Commission consisted of the Chief Justice, appointed
by the President, as the Chairman, the Chairman of the Public Service
Commission, a judge of the Court of Appeal or the High Court selected
by the Chief Justice and one person appointed by the President, as the
members of the Commission.^ Hie person appointed by the President was
required to be a person qualified to hold or had held, a high judicial 
2
office. With the exception of the Chairman of the Public Service
Commission, the Commission was, therefore, composed mostly of lawyers.
Under the One-Party Constitution, the composition of the
Judicial Service Commission was slightly expanded by the appointment
3
of the Attorney-rGeneral as a member of the Commission. A year later,
1. UK: Zambia Independence Order, 1964, S.I. 1964/1652,
sec. 104, (1) (a) to (d) .
2. ibid. sec. 104 (2) (a)..
3. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 115(1)(a)
to (e)^
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the Secretary to the Cabinet, was included in the membership of the
Judicial Service Commission.^ The Commission °f composed of persons
appointed by the President, who is empowered to give the Commission
such general directions with respect to the exercise of its functions
2
and the Commission is required to comply with such directions. The 
Commission, however is not subject to the direction or control of any 
other person or authority in the exercise of its functions. The Party is 
not represented on the Judicial Service Commission; the one person 
required to be appointed by the President, has often been the Chairman 
of the Law Association of Zambia, the body which represents the legal 
practitioners of Zambia's fused legal profession: barristers and 
solicitors are called to the Zambian bar as Advocates. Except for the 
influence of the President of the Party, UNIP as a political organization, 
has no direct control of the Judicial Service Commission.
(b) Appointment of Judges.
The Judicial Service Commission is vulnerable to political
influence by the President through his power of appointment of its members,
the appointment of Supreme Court judges, and, the deployment of judges
in other government services, for e.g. chairmanship of State Commissions.
Even in the USA where in some States judges are directly elected by the
people, the President nominates the Chief Justice and appoints judges
3
of the Supreme Court. In the UK, judges are appointed by the Lord 
Chancellor, a politician and a member of the Cabinet. It cannot be argued 
that in these countries political considerations do not enter into the
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act, 1974,
No. 18, Art. 9 amending Art. 115(1) of the 
Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973.
2. ibid. Art. 115(3).
3. Williams, P.M., "The Supreme Court and Politiqs", Oxford Journal
of Legal Studies; Vol. 5, No. 1, 1985, p. 92.
aPpointment of judges under the two-party system of these two developed
countries: politicians are bound to give preference to the appointment
of persons as judges who were known to be politically sympathetic with
the policies of their political party.
Under Zambia's One-Party system, unlike under the multi-party
system under which the President appointed judges of Court of Appeal
in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission, the
President appoints these judges without the advice of the Commission.^
The President cannot, however, remove a judge of the Supreme Court
except with the advice of a tribunal consisting of a Chairman and not
less than two other members who should be persons holding or had held
2
a high judicial office.
UNIP does not afford the judiciary any representation in
any of its organs such as the Party Congress, the National Council, the
Central Committee or lower bodies. Although the Chief Justice is often
invited to attend the official opening of the Party Congress and the
National Council, there is no way in which the Party can become
familiar with the political views of judges. Members of the armed
forces (the police, the army, prison services and intelligence) are
represented in most Party organs and the Party's National Council, has
had the opportunity to hear political views of representatives of these
state institutions. There is no stated policy on the differentiation
in the treatment of the judiciary and the armed forces. It is certainly
not the Party's opposition to a politicization of the judiciary since
both the armed forces and the judiciary are encouraged to form the Party
3
Committee at the Place of Work. The fact that the President can appoint 
Supreme Court judges alone, introduces political considerations.
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 108(1).
2. ibid. Art. 113(3) to (5).
3. On Party Committee at the Place of Work, see 
infra, pp. 432-442.
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(c) Judicial Officers' Membership of the Party.
At independence the colonial civil service structure was 
carried over into the civil service of independent Zambia to the extent 
that it was possible, the bureaucracy was insulated from the political 
interference of UNIP. The Independence Constitution contained a variety 
of provisions to make a demarcation betweeen 'political' and 'non-'-political' 
decision-making structures. The judiciary was accordingly isolated from 
the political decision-making structure, e.g. the cabinet. The^P^esent 
Constitution of Zambia prescribes for a number of very specific roles 
for the Attorney-General (Art. 57) , the DPP (Art. 58) , the Auditor- 
General (Art. 128) , Parliament (Art. 79) , the Central Committee
(Art. 47C) and the Judicature, (Art. 107). Ihese provisions provide 
the so-called checks and balances and they are based on the pervasive
i
suspecion that politicians are evil and tricky men concerned with
representing not their constituencies, but themselves. Consequently,
it is contended that there was a need for the independence of the
judiciary and that judicial officers should refrain from politics or
establishing political links:
We tend to think that independence of the judiciary 
means just independence from the legislature and 
the executive. But is means much more than that. It 
means independence from political influence, whether 
exerted by the political organs of government or by 
the public or brought in by the judges themselves 
through their involvement in politics. Judicial 
involvement in politics (i.e. organised politics) 
has taken two main forms:
(a) Decision Biased in Favour of a Ruling Party...
(b) Judicial Membership of Political Parties.!
There is no doubt that the presence of either or both of 
these 'evils' would adversely affect the role of the judiciary. The 
absence of any of these 'evils'-, however, does not perse, guarantee
1. Nwabueze, B.O., Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa; C. Hurst & Co.
1977, pp. 266-267. Brackets supplied.
the independence of the judiciary, for instance, under a military 
non-political party regime. One of the reasons advanced against the 
annexation to the Constitution of the State of the Constitution of the 
Party (in a One-Party State) , is said to be that such an annexation 
would give the Constitution of the Party the force of law and become 
binding on all persons, members as well as non-members of the party: 
"This may be undesirable in view of the fact that there are persons 
who cannot be members of the party either because they are not citizens 
or because they hold office (e.g. judges) which enjoin on them 
non-involvement in politics".^ This is not a valid reason against the 
annexation of the Party Constitution to the State Constitution since 
such annexation would not mean compulsory membership of the Party; 
membership would still remain voluntary. Annexation is objected to by 
the Party because it would be contrary to the concept of the 'supremacy 
of the Party' and might also enable Parliament to amend the Constitution 
of the Party; that is a prerogative of the Party.
In Zambia UNIP is a formal organization. Its distinctive 
feature is that it was deliberately established for the explict purpose 
of achieving, inter alia, national unity and independence. UNIP is in 
a general sense, a 'social organization' because political activity is 
a social human acitivity.. But, strictly speaking, UNIP is not a 'social 
organization' in the sense that it arose as a consequence of the people 
of Zambia living together. It is a formal organization with a set of 
goals to be achieved and rules that its members are required to follow. 
These have not emerged spontaneously in the course of social interaction 
but were consciously designed to guide the role of the Party in carrying 
out its aims and objects. It is a political institution. The question
1. Nwabueze, B.O., Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa; C. Hurst & Co.
1974, p. 239. Brackets supplied.
whether judicial officers should or should not join the Party, can
be decided by the Party which can assess whether such membership or
prohibition from membership would be in accord with or contrary to,
its objects. Membership of political party or parties by judicial
officers does not per se adversely affect the independence of the
judiciary. The fact that a judge was a member of the ruling political
party does not necessarily guarantee decisions in favour of the party
or its Government. UNIP learnt that lesson quite early in its life as
a governing Party. The former Chief Justice James Skinner was a
staunch member of UNIP and Zambia's first post-independence Attorney-
General. When he became Chief Justice, he reviewed a case involving
two Portuguese soldiers convicted of unlawfully entering Zambia. The
convictions were quashedjJ^UNIP militants demonstrated at the High
Court in Lusaka against the release of the two convicts and that forced
Skinner to quit his post of Chief Justice and Zambia. The fact that
Skinner was a staunch member of UNIP did not inhibit his ruling that
two Portuguese should be set free. That was a political case in that
the Portuguese soldiers entered Zambia in pursuit of FRELIMO fighters
given shelter in Zambia by UNIP} the latter a party to which Skinner
belonged. Even in countries (wer^ judicial officers are barred from joining
political parties, they encounter difficulties in handling cases
in which political parties are involved:
The experience of the judiciary in Nigeria shows that it 
finds itself in a more difficult situation if the parties 
in the case before it are political parties. To them, the 
correct, honest and unbiased decision is that which makes 
every party to the case get what it pleaded for. That is 
a situation which is incredibly difficult.^
1. The People v. Silva and Freita (1969) ZR (unreported).
2. Yakubu, M., "The Judiciary Under a Presidential System of Government",
ABULJ, Vol. 1, 1983, p. 28.
181.
The fact of litigants being at variance is indeed the essence
of every litigation otherwise there would be no dispute for the court
to resolve one way of the other. The principle that judicial officers
should not belong to political parties is based on the assumption
that if judges joined political parties or the political party under
a one-party system, in handling political disputes set in a legal
context, or involving political parties or the Government, some might
be tempted to lean on the side of the politician or the political party
or the government of their favour. In the UK, for instance, judges are
seen as neutral arbiters, as having no position or interest in any
matter in dispute, between individuals or between individuals and the
State. The law they are expected to enforce is thought of as established
body of rules and principles which prescribe the rights, duties and
obligations of the individual as well as the State.^ The judge's first
essential quality is impartiality. He is expected to take no side on a
political issue: "When public opinion is sharply divided on any political
issue, no judge ought to lean on one side or the other if that can
possibly be avoided. Where it is, however, difficult to do so, then I
2
think we must play safe".
Membership of political party or parties by judicial officers 
does not per se result either in the politicization of the judiciary or 
biased court decisions in favour of a political party or leader or the 
government of the day. The impartiality of the judiciary depends, among 
other things, on the sociology of the body-politic of the community 
concerned. The James Skinner incident referred to earlier, confirms 
that fact. That incident, however, also confirms one other thing, namely
1. Palley, C., "Rethinking the Judicial Role - The Judiciary and Good
Government", ZLJ, Vol. 1, 1969, No. 1, cites a protest in 
Scotland against Lord Clyde, President of the Court of 
Sessions' nomination of Lord Avonside, a judge of the 
Court, to the Commission established by the Conservative 
Party to investigate self-government for Scotland (quoting 
The Times, 27th July, 1968), p. 7.
2. Lord Reid, "The Judge as a Law Maker", JSPTL (1972) 12, 22, p. 23.
that the established body of rules of procedure and substantive law
which judicial officers follow and/or apply, make it difficult for the
judges to easily lean on the side of a political leader, or a political
party or a government of their favour. Conversely, the established rules
also make it equally difficult for judicial officers to unjustly treat
political leaders, political parties, or government of their disfavour.
The former Chief Justice of Tanzania, Telford Georges' view
on membership of TANU by judicial officers was that
in Tanzania there is no reason why a judicial officer 
should not be a member of TANU. In a sense every judge
everywhere is a member of the government in the broad
sense in that he plays an active part in some organised
system by which order is regulated in the society.^
UNIP has adopted this policy of not prohibiting judicial officers
from having close links with the Party. Ihe NCEOPPDZ did not make a direct
recommendation on the membership of the Party by judicial officers but it
recommended that membership of UNIP should be voluntary and open to all 
2
Zambian nationals. Accordingly, a judge of the Supreme Court was in 1976
3
nominated by the President, as a member of Parliament and appointed the 
Minister of Legal Affairs and Attorney-General. During the 1978 General 
Election instead of waiting for a further nomination, the former judge 
contested and won a Parliamentary seat. He was appointed a minister to 
another ministry. In 1983 Parliamentary election, he retained his seat 
and he was re-appointed Minister of Legal Affairs and Attorney-General.
In April, 1986, he was re-commissioned a judge of the Supreme Court and
ceased being an MP and minister. In May, 1987, he was once again nominated
4
an MP and appointed Minister of Legal Affairs and Attorney-General. This
1. James, R.W. and Kassam, F.M.„, Law and its Administration in a One
Party State, Selected Speeches of Telford Georges; East 
African Literature Bureau j Nairobi, 1973, p. 55.
2. Zambia: NCEOPPDZ, Report, 1972; p. 49.
3. Nominated under Art. 66, Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973.
After the 1988 Parliamentary General Election, he was once
again re-nominated MP and appointed Minister of Legal Affairs 
and Attorney-General.
case reveals at least two things, first, the danger that a judicial
develop a taste for politics, and, secondly, how the President can 
easily circumvent the rigorous procedures required to be followed on 
the removal of a judge from the Bench through nomination to Parliament 
without a guarantee of the officer of being re-commissioned to the 
Bench on dissolution of a Parliament.
own consent, no person in Zambia should be hindered in the enjoyment 
of his freedom of assembly and association and in particular to form or 
belong to trade unions and other associations for the protection of his 
interests.^- Notwithstanding the fact that under a One-Party system the 
freedom of association is curtailed, a judicial officer, like any other 
citizen, is entitled to enjoy that little freedom of association granted 
by the Constitution. A political party is a socialising institution and 
judicial officers live in the same political ethos as the rest of the 
members of the society and feel the same impact of popular opinion. They 
are not too far removed from the influence of the Party owing to the 
power politicians have in their appointment, promotion and deployment.
A ruling political party would not favourably consider appointing to a 
high judicial office a judicial officer who appeared aloof and out of 
touch with development and sentiments in society. There should somehow be 
a link between a political party and the judiciary. Judicial officers 
should be allowed to membership of the Party but barred from active 
involvement in the tricks of the Party, e.g. holding of a Party office.
moving towards a restriction on the 'politicization' of the public 
service. It is now provided that public officers, that is officers
officer once exposed to political power or office,
The current fundamental principle is that except with his
Recent changes in the law seem to suggest that UNIP might be
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 23(1).
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in the civil service, parastatal organizations and non-political staff 
in the service of the Party, should first resign their posts before they 
can stand for election to the National Assembly.^ Previously a public 
officer could stand for election and he was required to resign upon 
being elected to the Assembly. The amendment is silent on whether a 
nominated public officer, e.g. the judge referred to earlier in this 
Section, would be required to resign before taking his seat in the 
National Assembly. That would be unfair and such a requirement would 
most likely be abused, e.g. as a mode of removing from the Bench judges 
whose security of tenure is protected by the Constitution.
CONCLUSION.
This Chapter has considered the manner some States in West,
East and Central Africa amended or in some cases, discarded their
Independence Constitutions in order to adopt a republican form of
government or establish a de jure One-Party system. The Chapter has
also considered the manner UNIP's national leadership is selected, the
relationship between the organs of the Party and the President and the
place of the judiciary in the political party system in Zambia.
The liberal democracy based on a multi-party system inherited
at independence was tried for eight years but failed mainly because of
2
inter-party violence and UNIP's policy to eliminate opposition. Although 
the One^Party system has arrested violent political clashes, it has not 
eliminated opposition to UNIP or 'provincialism1. While the Party has 
encouraged 'tribal balancing' as a panacea against tribal pacts and 
conflict, it has also encouraged 'provincialism' through the inclusion 
of the Paramount Chiefs of Barotseland (Litunga Iluta Yeta) and of the 
Northern Province (Chitimukulu Ng'andu) and their deployment as the
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 68 as
amended by the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) 
Act, 1986, No. 3, Art. 7, infra, p. 287.
2. See M.M. Chona, Appendix 'A', Answer to Question
No. 1, p. 538.
provincial MCCs in their traditional Provinces. Such deployment confirms 
and encourages provincialism and weakens national feelings among the 
people in that as Paramount Chiefs, these MCCs can serve only in their 
areas. That weakens the Party: no other MCC can serve in these Provinces.
Although UNIP remains a 'mass organization', the general members 
of the Party are often not granted the opportunity to effectively participate 
in decision-making or election of the President or MCCs. Their assigned 
role is not to determine who should be their leaders, but affirming the 
selection of the leaders choosen for them by the President. The system of 
selection of leaders shows that the often canvassed view that anybody can 
run for office and that the arena of political combat under a One-Party 
system is open to any would-be political gladiator, is but a myth. In the 
real practical politics of the Party, every set of selection arrangements 
necessarily contain some sort of limits on the aspiration to power. That 
has resulted in some leaders remaining in office in perpetuity, and, less 
democracy in the internal organization of the Party. Unless a ruling party 
is democratically organized and run, it cannot democratically organize and 
run the State; as it is said, 'charity begins at home'.
In the transitional period the cross-deployment of judicial 
officers with other public officers or political leaders enables these men 
and women to operate on the same wave-length. The practice does not in 
itself affect the independence of the public service, e.g., the judiciary.
On the contrary, it enhances the role of the judiciary in that through such 
links the judiciary with its wigs, gowns and English law, ceases to be 
viewed as a distant and isolated exotic odd institution purveying foreign 
values, but as one of the ordinary local institutions of the Party and its 
Government. A certain measure of tension, however, should be allowed to 
exist between institutions, but that should arise from the institutions' 
effective performance of their allotted functions.
CHAPTER V.
THE PARTY, GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN ZAMBIA.
The Role of the Party and Party Functionaries in 
Public Administration.
Introduction.
The role of UNIP in Zambia's public administration is conducted
under the provisions of the Constitutions of the Party and of the Republic.
According to Hans Kelsen a legal system consists of hierarchically arranged
norms; all the norms traceable from the grundnorm at the top form a system
of norms/ The grundnorm is not created in a legal procedure by a law
creating organ. It is not a norm of positive law. Whereas norms of the
legal system are created by the real acts of will, of a legal organ,
according to the procedural requirements of norm creation, the grundnorm
is not. He described the 'basic norm' as an 'initial hypothesis, presupposed*
in juristic thinking. In constitutional terms, Kelsen's theory proffers
a constitution in a positive-legal sense and a constitution in a
2
legal-logical sense. The term 'basic norm' was used in two distinct senses:-
(a) as a presupposition, i.e. as a norm presupposed in 
juristic thinking, and
(b) to refer to an existing concrete, historically first 
Constitution.
This Introduction is restricted to the second aspect. In Ghana
3 4
where the Independence Constitution was repealed and the repealing
Constitution was overthrown in a 'revolution', the Armed Forces Revolutionay
Council (Establishment) Proclamation, provided, inter alia, that
Until such time as a new Constitution is promulgated and 
comes into force, the Revolutionary Council shall have power
for such purposes as it may think fit to make and issue
decrees which shall have the force of law in Ghana.5
1. Kelsen, H., The General Theory of Law and State; Harvard UP, 1949, p. 117.
2. Kelsen, H., "Professor Stone and the Pure Theory of Law", 17 Stanford
Law Review; 1965, 1128 at 1141.
3. UK: Ghana (Constitution) Order in Council, 1957, S.I. 277
4. Ghana: Constitution of Ghana Act, 1964, CA No. 1
5. 1979, No. 1, sec. 3(1); 4th June, 1979.
The Constitution of Ghana promulgated by the Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council provided as follows:
This constitution shall be the supreme law of Ghana and any 
other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of 
this constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency 
be void and of no effect.1
The view in Ghana is that the 'basic norm' is not the Constitution
but the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council's Proclamation because the validity
of the 1979 Constitution can be challenged by reference to the Armed Forces'
Proclamation and Decree which effected a 'lawful devolution'. There are,
according to this view, not really two competing 'basic norms' in Ghana,
neither are there two competing constitutions. There is one Constitution,
that of 1979, but whose validity cannot be presupposed, because it owes its
validity to another positive norm of the system, the Proclamation, via the
2
Armed Forces Decree.
3
In Kenya where the Independence Constitution was not overthrown
in a violent revolution but amended to provide for a republican system of
4 5
government, the view is that the amended Constitution is the grundnorm ;
it is presupposed at the apex of the legal system. The Constitution provides:
This constitution is the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 
and shall have the force of law throughout Kenya and subject 
to section 47, if any other law is inconsistent with this 
Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail and the other 
law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void.6
In Zambia there was no revolution; the phenomenon that occured on
the mid-night of 24th October, 1964 was one of 'lawful devolution' when
the Imperial Power, Britain, granted independence and republican status to
1. Ghana: Constitution of the Third Republic of Ghana (Promulgation)
Decree, 1979, No. 24, sec. 1(2).
2. Ahwoi, K., "Kelsen, The Grundnorm and the 1979 Constitution",
UGLJ, Vol. XV, 1978-81, 139 at p. 160
3. UK: Kenya (Constitution) Order in Council, 1963, S.I. 1968
4. Kenya: Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act, 1964, No. 28,
sec. 4.
5. Rachuonyo, J.O., "Kelsen's Grundnorm in modern Constitution-Making: The
Kenyan Case", Verfassung und recht in Ubersee, 20 
Jahsgang 4, 1987, p. 430
6 . Kenya: Constitution of Kenya Act, 1969, No. 5, sec. 3.
Section 47 provides, for amendment of the Constitution.
its former Protectorate of NR. It could be argued that in such a situation
the umbilical cord between the Imperial Parliament and Zambia was not
cut since Zambia would have to trace the validity of its independence
Constitution to the validity of the Zambia Independence Order, 1964.^
The One-Party Constitution which repealed the Independence Constitution,
however, was intended to sever that Constitution from any links with the
UK Parliament, hence it stated, albeit in the Preamble, that
We, the people of Zambia, by our representatives assembled 
in our Parliament, having established a One-Party 
Participatory Democracy under the Philosophy of Humanism 
Do hereby enact and give to ourselves this Constitution.2
Although the Constitution of Zambia, 1973, unlike that of
Ghana (1979) and of Kenya (1964) does not state that the Constitution is
the supreme law of Zambia and that any other law found to be inconsistent
with any provision of the Constitution shall be void and of no effect,
3
it is neverthless regarded as the supreme law of Zambia.
UNIP has its own Constitution which provides that no Act of 
Parliament, regulation, rule or by-law shall be in conflict or inconsistent
4
with the Constitution of the Party, or its national policies. Prima facie,
that provision purports to spell out where the 'Zambian grundnorm' resides,
namely in the Party. The Constitution of the Party is not created in a
legal procedure by a law creating organ. It is not a norm of positive law. 
Prima facie, that would make it 'the basic norm', the grundnorm; that is,
in as far as the Party Constitution's provision quoted above purports to
portray. In fact the Party's Constitution is a political document which
cannot be equated to a proclamation or decree of a military junta which
is legislative, e.g. those of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in
Ghana which can be presupposed to be the grundnorm. The UNIP leadership,
1. UK: Zambia Independence Order, 1964, S.I. 1652.
2. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, No. 27, Preamble
3. Infra, p. 246, et seq.
4. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 8 ; infra, p. 322
however, utilized the Republican Constitution and Government departments in
asserting its central role, e.g. in the deployment of its functionaries
in public administration. After independence UNIP deployed Provincial
Ministers (to assist UNIP's regional officials in membership drives and
carry out Government functions, e.g. implementation of Development Plans)
and Special Presidential Public Relations Assistants (SPPRA) (to improve
race relations and work-discipline among public servants and those engaged
in the copper-mining industries). Political Assistants were also appointed
to provide a link between public administration (the Provincial Minister,
civil servants and local government officers) and the Party. Their role was
mainly political and operated under the Constitution of the Party, while
the Provincial Ministers and the SPPRA operated under the Party and the
Republican Constitution having been deployed by the President.^"
During the struggle for independence most of the African party
leaders were involved with some aspects of colonial authority, e.g. in their
application for registration of party branches, or application for a permit
2
to hold a public meeting or when arrested and prosecuted for holding an
3
unauthorized rally. These encounters gave the African leaders the impression 
that real power resided not necessarily in the Legco or the Legislative 
Assembly, but at the Secretariat (the office of the Chief Secretary) and 
at the Boma (the office of the Provincial or District Commissioner). Hence, 
the deployment of Party functionaries in public offices which were perceived 
as the seat of real power. That perception lingers on to-day and forms the 
background to the role of UNIP in public administration. UNIP, as a party 
and not as the Government, was able to spot-check the internal operations
1. Zambia: See, e.g. Circular 0P/4/108/66 of June, 1966 (on
functions of District Secretaries), OP/4/13/69 
of July, 1969 (on the functions of Provincial 
Ministers).
2. NR; under sec. 22(2), Societies Ordinance, 1957, No. 65,
and sec. 28, Northern Rhodesia Police Ordinance, 1926, 
as amended by the Northern Rhodesia Police 
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1955, No. 10, sec. 3QA.
3. e.g. -R. v. Mulumba (1959) R & N LR 184 and 
Attorney-General v. Hagamata (1959) R & N LR 226.
of public offices in the country. The presence of Party functionaries 
in public offices did not result in the introduction of some political 
directives in the internal organization of the public service; public 
officers continued to work in accordance with the Constitution of the 
Republic and their Civil Service Standing Orders. Party functionaries 
provided only the political 'push' which made public officers come up 
with speedy decisions, probably at the expense of the quality of those 
decisions.
Section 1. The Supremacy of the Party Decisions.
One of the aims of the establishment of a One-Party system
in Zambia was to achieve the 'supremacy of the Party' vis-a-vis the
Government administration.^" The concept of the 'supremacy of the Party'
although it does not contain a precise legal meaning, is central in
the role of UNIP in Zambia to-day. The NCEOPPDZ''s recommendation was
that it was desirable that there should be a separation between UNIP
and the Government and in the membership of the Central Committee and
Cabinet, with the exception of the Secretary-General of the Party and
the Prime Minister who were to be members of both the Central Committee 
2
and Cabinet. That recommendation meant that distinction between the 
Party and the Government was to be maintained. The decision that the
3
Party should be supreme (over the Government) came from the Government. 
The decision of the Government that under a One-Party system UNIP should 
be supreme convert! the Party into a supreme organization over the
r
Government as established under the Republican Constitution. The Party's
4
supremacy had to be achieved through the Constitution of Zambia.
1. Zambia: NCEOPPDZ, Report, 1972, Terms of Reference 9(f),
p. 69.
2. ibid. p. 47, par. 148.
3. NCEOPPDZ-SRAG, 1972, p. 24.
4. Infra, p. 195.
The NCEOPPDZ refrained from making an express recommendation
on the 'supremacy' of the Party. It instead opted for a 'weak' President
and a 'strong' Prime Minister by proposing that the Prime Minister
appointed Ministers, Deputy Ministers and the Attorney-General in
consultation with the President. The Prime Minister was to be the head
of Government and he was to preside over Cabinet meetings.^" On the Party
side, the Secretary-General was to appoint the Chairmen of sub-Committees
of the Central Committee and he was to preside over the Central Committee 
2
meetings. If these recommendations had been accepted by the Party and
the Government, one of their effects would have been that UNIP would have
continued to exist and operate like any other ruling political party under
a multi-party system: separate and independent of but subordinate to, the
Government. All these recommendations were rejected by the Party and the
Government, and, instead, the powers of appointing Ministers, junior
Ministers and Chairmen of sub-Committees of the Central Committee and
the chairmanship of the Central Committee and the Cabinet, were vested
in the President.
The NCEOPPDZ's failure to make a direct recommendation on
the 'supremacy' of the Party, resulted in the absence of provisions to
3
that effect in the Constitution (Amendment) (No. 5) Act, 1972, whose
sec. 12a  introduced the One-Party system in Zambia, or in the Constitution
4
of Zambia Act, 1973, which contains the present One-Party State
5
Constitution of Zambia. The feeling was that UNIP was supreme over all 
institutions in the land. Its supremacy ought not to be theoretical nor
g
was it enough to merely reduce it to a constitutional provision. But legal 
supremacy could only be achieved through law: law asserting UNIP's 
central role and the much sought 'supremacy' over public institutions and
1. Zambia: NCEOPPDZ, Report, 1972, par. 57, p. 14
2. ibid. paras. 146-148, pp. 46 and 47.
3. 1972, No. Ip-supra, p. 131.
4. 1973, No. 27; 'supra, p. 133.
5. ibid. Art. 4.
6 . UNIP: President K.D. Kaunda, opening the National
Council, June 30-3rd July, 1975.
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Government came only in 1975 and in 1980 and institutionalized Party
supremacy over State organs. In theory, the 'supremacy' of the Party
means what it says, that is the supremacy of the political party. But
in practice a political party being a body of persons pursuing political
ends, 'supremacy' means the supremacy of those in the leadership of the
Party. However, because the Party's legal status is unsettled and its
capacity is non-existent, 'Party' supremacy would only exist as a facade
for 'Presidential' supremacy: for it is the President of the Party who
actually exercises the political authority of the Party. The Constitution
of Zambia, however, provides for the supremacy of the decisions of the
Central Committee of the Party:-
47C(1). The Central Committee shall formulate the 
policy of the Government and shall be responsible for 
advising the President with respect to the policy of 
the Party and the Government and with respect to such 
other matters as may be referred to it by the President.
(2) Where a decision of the Central Committee is in 
conflict with a decision of the Cabinet, the decision 
of the Central Committee shall prevail.
This provision is mis-leading because the members of the Central
Committee formally participate in a collective decision-making process.
That role of the Central Committee remains the same notwithstanding the
recent enlargement of that organ of the Party and the inclusion of Cabinet 
2
Ministers in it. Although members of the Central Committee are nominated
by the President, once they have been formally elected as MCCs by the Party
Congress, they acquire the status of elected MCCs and as such they cannot
be removed from the Committee except as provided by the Constitution of 
3
the Party. Their status is, therefore, different from that of Cabinet 
Ministers who serve at the President's pleasure. The provision entrenches 
the 'supremacy' of the President by portraying the Central Committee as
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act, 1975,
No. 22.
2. Supra, pp. 168-174.
3. Supra, p. 140.
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an advisory body. It is not. It is basically an elected representative 
body. The President is a member of the Central Committee like any other 
MCC, but he is primus inter pares.
Commenting on the provisions of sec. 3 of the Constitution of
Tanzania, 1977, which re-organized the One-Party system in that country
under CCM, it has been said that the question of party supremacy is not
a meta-legal one, as it is sometimes made out. In legal theory, party
supremacy "may only mean the supremacy of the decisions of the party, not
the supremacy of individuals within the party".^ This statement is, prima
facie, correct; however, if Nwabueze is correct in what he says about
Zambia and other former British-ruled African States, 'supremacy' is vested
in individuals but only expressed through the medium of the party. He says:
the President is the government. His responsibility for it 
is entire and undivided. The executive power is vested in him 
alone, and in the exercise of it he is bound by no one else's 
advice. With him too lies the ultimate responsibility for 
policy.^
Under the One-Party system of Zambia, the President plays a role 
in both the adoption and the implementation of policy. There is no provision 
in both the Party and the State Constitution on how to resolve a conflict 
between a decision of the Central Committee and of the President. Because 
of his dominant position, the decision of the President would probably 
prevail over that of the Central Committee. There is no likelihood of a 
conflict between a decision of the Central Committee and Cabinet mainly 
because the President, the Secretary-General, the Prime Minister and the 
Secretary of Defence and Security are members of both the Central Committee 
and Cabinet. Secondly, now that practically all members of the Cabinet are 
members of the Central Committee,^ it would be ironic for the same persons
1. Kumar, U., "Justice in a One-Party African State: The Tanzanian
Experience", Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee, 19,
January, 1986, p. 257.
2. Nwabueze, B.O., Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa; C. Hurst & Co.
1974, p. 175.
3. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 58(1) (b).
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to be making conflicting decisions in Central Committee with those they 
made in Cabinet. Thirdly, under a One-Party system, there should be only 
one approved or official policy on any particular subject at a particular 
time. These factors lessen the possibility of conflict between the Central 
and Cabinet but they increase the strength of the supremacy of those in 
the leadership of the Party, in particular the President. In practice the 
supremacy of the Party is the supremacy of those in the leadership of the 
Party which is exercised and expressed in the guise of decisions of the 
Party.
The primary purpose of Art. 47C, aforementioned, is to 'legalize'
the role of the Central Committee in the public administration of Zambia.
Although Art. 4 of the Constitution of Zambia establishes a One-Party
system, it does not establish UNIP which remains a 'society' under the
Societies Act. Party organs are not organs of the State, consequently,
any role of the Party's organ has to be expressly provided for by law, e.g.
that the Party Congress elects the Presidential Candidate,^" or that the
2
Central Committee (now the Committee of Chairmen ) shall approve candidates
3
for election to the National Assembly.
So far there has been no case of the Central Committee purporting 
to over-rule a decision of a Minister based on legislation assigned to him 
for implementation: such a decision should prevail on the basis of the 
principle of the supremacy of Parliament. The decision of the Central 
Committee should, however, prevail over a Minister's decision not based on 
legislation, e.g,- if" the former directed that Party Committees be formed 
in every Ministry and the latter decided that no such Committee should be 
f o r m e d  in his Ministry headquarters, the Central Committee's decision 
would prevail over the Minister's decision; which was a political decision.
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 38(3).
2. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 85 (2) (a).
3. Constitution of Zambia, loc. cit., Art. 75(5).
infra, p. 286.
The Presence of two Constitutions.
The presence of the Central Committee and the Cabinet in the
Zambian administrative system is not only wasteful of human and material
resources, but difficult to justify. The two bodies do not represent any
such sharply differing interests that it is essential for them to be
accommodated in two separate bodies, the former supposedly formulating
policy and the latter executing it. The 1988 changes, under which the
President can now appoint not more than twenty Cabinet Ministers (the
Cabinet is composed of a maximum of sixteen Ministers) to the Central
Committee,^ makes nonsense of the distinction. The presence of the two
bodies, however, is tied up with the presence of two Constitutions; one
for the Party and the other for the State. The presence of the Party and
the State Constitutions is both historical and legal. UNIP, in accordance
with the provisions of the Societies Ordinance, 1957, had to adopt a
written Constitution at its inception. That law is still in force and
requires that the Party maintains a written Constitution. Supremacy of
the Party, however, has not meant that the Constitution of the Party
becomes superior to that of the State or that the Party becomes synonymous
with the State; hence, the following observation of the Court in the case
in which the question arose as to whether in a One-Party State the State's
Attorney-Government can represent the ruling Party:-
I cannot, with greatest respect, say that the United 
National Independence Party forms the State (the 
Sovereign Republic of Zambia). I am strengthened in 
in this view by the very existence of two different 
Constitutions, namely the Republican Constitution 
and the Constitution of the United National 
Independence Party. If the United National Independence 
Party were the State why two separate Constitutions?2
The UNIP Constitution, however, is not a 'state' or 'national 
constitution emboding national sentiments; it is at law a set of rules 
on the management of a 'society' registrable with the Registrar of Societies.
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 58(1) (d), supra, p. 143.
2. Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. UNIP (1978) ZR 378, per Sakala, J., at p. 384.
supra, p. 153.
The dichotomy of the Central Committee and Cabinet (and the
requirement that the decisions of the former should prevail over the decision
of the latter) and the presence of the two Constitutions, could be ended
by a fusion of the two bodies and of the two Constitutions. Mainza Chona's
view that the presence of the two Constitutions did not matter,^" was based
on British experiences, where party functionaries and organs as such, do not
play any role in the administration of the country. Hie same could be said
of the American party system. The Charter of the Democratic Party, adopted
2
in 1972 and amended in 1981, and the Rules of the Republican National Party
3
adopted in July, 1980, do not play the same role as that played by the UNIP 
Constitution. In Zambia the Secretary-General occupies and plays roles 
similar to those played by the Vice-President in other constitutional systems.
And yet he operates mainly under the Constitution of the Party.
4 5 6
In Angola, Mozambique, and Zaire, there is only one Constitution
that provides for the administration of the State (the Government) and the
Party, namely the MPLA-WP, FRELIMO and MPR, respectively. The separation of
the officers holding the post of Chairman of CCM and the office of President
of Tanzania, introduced in 1984, might be indicative of some opposition to a
fusion of the Constitutions and of the roles of the Party and the Government.
Reform of governmental institutions is a continuous process. In
the meantime, the two-Constitution-arrangement with its corollary of the
supremacy of the decisions of the Central Committee, provides a flexible
situation in the event of a reversion to a multi-party system in the future
or a separation in the leadership of the Party and of the Government.
1. Chona, M.M., Appendix 'A1, pp. 538-551, Answer to Question lO at p. 549.
2. Harmel, R. and Janda, K. , Parties and Their Envionments: Limits to Reform?
Longman, N.Y., 1982, Appendix 'B1, p. 154.
3. ibid. Appendix 'C', p. 163.
4. Angola: Constitution, 11th November, 1975, Arts. 31-51.
5. Mozambique: Constitution, 25th June, 1975, Arts. 37-53.
6 . Zaire: Constitution, 15th February, 1978, Arts. 87-93. On the
effect of the combination, see Callaghy# T.M., The
State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective? 
Columbia UP, N.Y., 1984.
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Section 2. Party Functionaries in Public Administration*
One of the changes necessiated by the One-Party system in
Zambia, was the abolition of the office of Vice-President and the
re-introduction of the office of Prime Minister. The Prime Minister was
relegated to a third place with the Secretary-General of the Party assuming
the position of the second-in-command to the President. The Secretary-
General is appointed by the President and he is responsible for Party
administration,^ while the Prime Minister, also appointed by the President,
2
is responsible for Government administration.
Whenever the office of President becomes vacant (which has so
far not occured since Independence), or the President is temporarily out
of the country (which occurs often), or if he should be ill or he is
incapable by reason of physical or mental informity of discharging the
functions of his office, the Secretary-General performs the functions of
the President.^ When the President dies or is removed from office, the
4
Secretary-General becomes the Acting President, but only for a maximum 
period of three months during which period the vacancy should be filled.
The Acting President is not allowed to dissolve Parliament or revoke any 
appointment made by the former President.^ Where there is no Secretary- 
General, the Central Committee (after 1988 the Committee of Chairmen) 
selects an MCC to act as the Secretary-General who consequently becomes 
the Acting President until the person elected as President assumes office.
These provisions are intended to ensure that the Party and 
not the Government, is the source of the top leadership, hence only the 
Secretary-General or an MCC and not the Prime Minister can become Acting 
President. That is an aspect of the 'supremacy' of the Party.
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 77.
2. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 48(1).
3. ibid. Arts. 40(3) and 43.
4. ibid. Art. 42(2).
5. ibid. Arts. 42(3) and 43(2), proviso. Similar
provisions are contained in UNIP Constitution, 
1988, Arts. 75 and 76.
The procedure for the removal of the President shows that it 
is the Party and not the Government which initiates the removal. A joint 
Central Committee and Cabinet meeting, chaired by the Secretary-General, 
has to resolve by a motion, supported by the votes of the majority of 
the joint session, that, for instance, the question of the physical or 
mental capacity of the President to discharge the functions of his office, 
should be investigated. The investigation is carried out by a board 
consisting of three medical practitioners appointed by the Chief Justice.
If the board reports that the President is, in its opinion, incapable of 
discharging his official duties, the Chief Justice should in writing 
certify accordingly.^ On paper there are sufficient provisions and 
procedures for a peaceful removal of a President from office either on 
grounds of ill-health or misconduct, however, these have not been put to 
a test, yet. President Kaunda has enjoyed good health and hard-working.
Since the establishment of the Cne-Party system three persons
have held the office of Secretary-General: Alexander Gray Zulu (1973-1976),
Mathias Mainza Chona (1976-1981) and Humphrey Mulemba (1981-1985). In 1985
A.G. Zulu was re-appointed Secretary-General and he is still in office at
the time of writing (1989). During the same period five persons have been
appointed Prime Minister, namely M.M. Chona (1973-1976), Daniel Lisulo
(1976-1981), Nalumino Mundia (1981-1985), Kebby Musokotwane (1985-1989)
2
and Mulimba Masheke, 1989 and still in office at the time of writing. The 
President has a firm control of the Party and Government top leadership 
to the extent that appointments and removals of these leaders are carried 
out at his pleasure and as a matter of course. The Cabinet is composed of 
the President (as Chairman), the Secretary-General, ex-officio, the 
Secretary of Defence and Security and about sixteen Ministers: all 
appointees of the President. That is the apex of the public administration 
in which Party functionaries are deployed and the Party plays its role.
1. Zambia:
2.
Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 40(2); and 
the President ceases to hold office; infra, p. 333. 
Appointed 15th March, 1989.
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(a) The Secretary-General in Public Administration.
One of the fascinating things about the One-Party system 
is the persistence of the demarcation between those belonging to the 
'Party' and those in the 'Government'. The provisions of the State's 
Constitution on the 'supremacy' of the Party decisions considered in 
the previous Section and the provisions on the role of the Secretary- 
General in public administration considered in this Section, are all 
based on the notion that the Prime Minister and Ministers do not 
represent the Party. Views are expressed in the Party circles to the 
effect that even the President (of the Party), once sworn-in as the 
President of the Republic, 'ceases to represent the Party' but personifies 
the Government and the State. Accordingly, the role of the Secretary- 
General in public administration is perceived as symbolizing the presence 
of the Party in Government administration.
A close observation of the manner each of the men who have 
held the office of the Secretary-General has conducted his public 
administration duties, gives the impression that each one of them 
believed that he carried out such functions as a representative of the 
Party. That belief could be based on the fact that he carried out such 
duties ex-ef ficio - by virtue of being Secretary-General of the Party.
However, the Secretary-General performs such duties as are assigned to 
him by the Constitution of Zambia as the second-in-command to the President.
(i) Chairmanship of Cabinet.
The chairmanship of Cabinet by the Secretary-General runs 
counter to one of the basic principles pronounced at the inception of 
the One-Party system, that supreme power ought to be vested in the people, 
exercised by them directly where possible, and indirectly through 
established democratic representative institutions.^” The Prime Minister
1. Zambia: NCEOPPDZ, Report, 1972, Appendix I, Seventh
terms of reference; p. 69.
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being the head of Government administration, is, prima facie, the 
appropriate officer to chair a Cabinet meeting in the absence of the 
President. The fact that the Secretary-General who is not a member of 
Parliament, can preside over Cabinet is significant in itself. These 
provisions assert the 'supremacy' of the Party over Government 
administration. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the 
Constitution of UNIP does not afford the Prime Minister, who is an 
ex-officio member of the Central Committee, a similar role, that is, 
the chairmanship of the Central Committee in the absence of both the 
President and the Secretary-General.
Although the Secretary-General can preside over a Cabinet 
meeting, he is not empowered to play any role in the administration of 
the Government; the Prime Minister is the head of Government administration. 
The office of the Secretary-General is not a 'public office'. A 'public 
office' is an office of emolument in the public service of Zambia but 
excludes an office constituted by the President and declared by him not 
to be an office in the public service.^ Although the Secretary-General 
receives his monthly salary and allowances from the Ministry of Finance, 
his office is not an office in the public service nor created by the 
President. His office is an office under the Constitution of the Party.
2
In Chipimo v. Chona, The Secretary-General of UNIP and Attorney-General 
the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that under Zambia's 
One-Party system the office of the Secretary-General should be equated 
to that of the Attorney-General and cited as such in litigation. The 
Secretary-General chairs a Cabinet meeting by virtue of authority vested 
in him by the Constitution of Zambia. This is another incident in which 
the Party has used the law to assert its presence of public administration.
1. Zambia;
2. (1983) ZR 125.
Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 62.
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(ii) Consultation on Important Appointments.
The introduction of the One-Party system has resulted in the 
identity of the Party permeating the Constitution of Zambia? for example,
the President is required to consult the Secretary-General on making
1 2 
ministerial appointments and on the appointment of the Attorney-General.
He is not required to consult the Secretary-General or the Prime Minister
or anyone on the appointment of the (next) Secretary-General or the Prime
Minister. Consultation was intended to establish 'collective responsibility'
in the deployment of personnel in the leadership of the Government and to
avoid the concentration of appointment powers in the President alone. It
was anticipated that when consulted, the Secretary-General would in turn
consult those in the leadership of the Party, e.g. chairmen of sub-Committees
3
of the Central Committee. Conversely, in the absence of consultation, the 
decisions of the President would be. seen as his own. In the appointment of 
public officers, on the other hand, the President was to be assisted by 
the various Service Commissions.
To 'consult' means in this context, to seek information or 
advice from a person or to take counsel with the source consulted or to 
take into consideration the views of the source consulted. The Constitution 
does not indicate or provide the manner the consultation has to be carried 
out. The consultation can, therefore, be formal, e.g. in writing or informal, 
e.g. a verbal consultation on the State House golf-course. On both occasions, 
however, consultation should be before the appointment is made, otherwise 
if made after the appointmeht has already been made it would become a matter 
of being informed of the President's action.
One of the former Secretaries-General' s experience of the 
implementation of the provisions of the Constitution on consultation
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 48(4).
2. ibid. Art. 57(1).
3. UNIP: Constitution, 1978, Art. 54, now called Sub—Committees
of the Committee of Chairmen; Constitution, 1988,
Art. 65(1); infra, p. 219.
between the President and the Secretary-General was that consultation was
carried out but that because of the dominant position of the President,
such consultations did not curtail his powers:-
As for the present powers of the President in our 
Constitution, on paper, they do not appear too wide.
There are provisions for consultation. If these 
consultations continue to take place, they are not 
too wide. Otherwise they are. The leadership changes 
in February, 1981 and April, 1985, (when both the 
'No. 2' and 'No. 3' were suddenly replaced at one time 
without sufficient reasons) proved that under our 
Constitution only one person was in charge. There seems 
to be no collective leadership as was thought to be the 
case. There was no longer a real No. 2 or No. 3 as any 
of them can be removed at the stroke of the pen.l
This observation reveals that there is no want of consultation
between the President and the Secretaries-General but it also reveals an
element of discontent with certain aspects of the consultation. In theory -
and this is an area where law and practice diverge - the provisions are 
2
there and it would be quite legitimate and lawful for a Secretary-General 
who was not consulted on a matter on which he should have been consulted, to 
gather enough courage and raise the matter with the high authority. In practice, 
and in the political context, such a query might be construed as a challenge 
to the executive authority. Since the Secretary-General is appointed by the 
President and serves at 'his pleasure', the possible consequence of such a 
confrontation might be the removal from office of the Secretary-General. The 
successful implementation of the consultation provisions, therefore, depends 
on the nature of the relationship between the President and each of the
r
Secretary-General which could either be ^cai&radely, e.g. between President 
Kaunda and Secretary-General Gray Zulu, or merely cordial, e.g. that which 
existed between Kaunda and Secretary-General Humphrey Mulemba. It is pertinent 
to point out that, first, the President is not required to consult anyone on 
the appointment or removal of the Secretary-General of the Party or the 
Prime Minister: he acts on his own discretion. In the second place, it
1. Chona, M.M., Appendix 'A', Answer to Question No. 8 , infra, p. 546.
2. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Arts. 48(3) and 57(1).
would be difficult to consult a Secretary-General on his own removal from
office. The UNIP Constitution of 1973, for instance, had provided, among
other things, that MCCs considered and approved their own re-election to
the Central Committee.^ That provision was retained in the Constitution
2
of 1978 but proved unworkable. There were reports of certain MCCs simply
refusing being removed from the Central Committee! Accordingly, in 1983
that provision was quietly removed from the Constitution; it is
now provided that the President alone decides the composition of the
Central Committee and submits his 'list' of candidates to the National
3
Council for approval. It is unlikely that a Secretary-General consulted 
on his own removal from office would gladly agree to go.
It is pertinent to point out that what might appear as prima 
facie 'dictatorial' attitude of the President, in the manner he appoints 
and reshuffles or dismisses leaders in the Party or Government, is, to 
some extent, as a result of constitutional provisions which make the
President the real authority on whom all power is vested. The Constitution
4 5
(Amendment) (No. 5) Act, 1972 and the Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973,
did not contain any provisions on consultation between the President and
the Secretary-General on any matter including ministerial appointments.
6
The requirement of consultation was introduced in 1975 by which time the 
President had already acquired a dominant role in the administration of 
the affairs of both the Party and the Republic. The people of Zambia are 
generally humble and law-abiding and less desposed to political conflict 
or confrontation. That provides the environment within which consultation 
is supposed to be conducted. In addition to that, the political system is
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1973, Art. 8(4) (ii); supra, p. 141.
2. Constitution, 1978, Art. 53 (3)(a).
3. Constitution, 1983, Art. 53(3)(a), now Art. 60(3),
Constitution, 1988.
4. Zambia: 1972, No. 1.
5. 1973, No. 27.
6 . Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act, 1975, No. 22,
Arts. 48(4) and 57(1).
dominated by the established principle that the executive power of the 
Republic is vested in the President and that upon the exercise of any 
function conferred upon him by the Constitution or any other written 
law, the President shall, unless it is otherwise provided, act in his 
own deliberate judgement and shall not be obliged to follow the advice 
tendered by any person or authority.^" Notwithstanding the qualification 
- unless it is otherwise provided - in practice the emphasis is placed 
on the fact that the President is not obliged to follow any advice 
tendered by any person or authority. Consultation under such circumstances 
might appear to be of no practical value since the President is empowered 
to ignore any advice and act as he sees fit.
A president, however powerful, cannot know everything and 
everybody in his country. In Zambia President Kaunda because of his 
long leadership of the Party and the Government has come to know so well 
personally most of those in the leadership of the Party and Government 
that he has been able to appoint, promote, reshuffle, demote or dismiss
2
or re-appoint persons without consultation with any person or authority. 
That has included the appointment and dismissal of Secretaries-General, 
Prime Ministers, Ministers, Army Commanders and public servants in the 
Government and parastatal organizations. The President, however, does 
consult the appropriate authorities in the deployment of public servants.
The One-Party system in Zambia is supposed to be based on the 
principle of the Party and its Government and not of the Party and the 
Government. The consultation between the President and the Secretary- 
General was aimed at fusion of the appointing authority for Party and 
Government leaders. The dominant authority, however, is the President.
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 53(2).
2. Good, K., "Zambia; Back into the future", Third World Quarterly;
Vol. 10, No. 1, January, 1988, pp. 37-38.
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In as far as performance of official functions is concerned, 
the provision that junior ministers (Ministers of State) assist the 
Secretary-General in the discharge of his functions ^has no bearing 
on what goes on in practice. It is interesting to note that that 
provision does not apply to Ministers. In practice Ministers of State 
do not 'assist' the Secretary^General in Party matters. Probably that 
provision was intended to refer to those situations when the Secretary- 
General is performing the functions of the President; in which case he 
would expect to be assisted by Ministers and Ministers of Statef as 
well as by public servants.
(b) The Secretary of State for Defence and Security: a Hybrid.
President Kaunda announced the creation of the office of
Secretary of Defence and Security, to be referred to for short simply as
the Secretary for Defence, at the Eighth General Conference of the
Party held in September, 1978, and the office was accordingly included
2
in the Party Constitution adopted at that Conference. The office is 
basically an office in the Party, and the holder, appointed by the 
President, is an MCC and ranks fourth in the State order of precedence. 
The impression at the time of its creation was that the office of the 
Secretary of Defence was to provide political leadership to the armed 
forces. The office was established at the peak of the liberation war in 
the then SRf to-day's Zimbabwe. The first appointee to the office was 
the then Secretary-General, Alexander Gray Zulu. Hie Secretary of Defence 
is deployed in Government administration, that is he occupies an office 
within the Government's Ministry of Defence, with the Minister of Defence 
operating under him. But he is a UNIP official and his official 
correspondence is on UNIP stationery.
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 56(3)
as amended by the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 
1975.
2. UNIP: Constitution, 1978, Art. 56(2).
Under Zambia's system of administration based on a written State
Constitution, it is difficult to evolve important 'conventions' of the
Constitution similar to those evolved under the unwritten English
Constitution. Ideally, the role of the Secretary of Defence in the
administration of the Government would have been left to operate on
the basis of the Party's wish to deploy one of its leading cadres in
the service of the State. Under the written Constitution of Zambia such
deployment could not be done on the basis of a 'convention': it had to
be expressly provided for by the Constitution. The Constitution had,
therefore, to be drastically amended to implement the Party's policy of
deploying the Secretary of Defence in the administration of Zambia.
The Secretary of Defence is responsible, under the direction
of the President, for the business of the Government relating to defence
and security, including the administration of any department of the
Government, as the President, in consultation with the Secretary-General
and the Prime Minister, may assign to him.^ He can convene a meeting of
the Central Committee or Cabinet in the absence of the President, the
2
Secretary-General and the Prime Minister, and, if and when the Prime
Minister is out of the country or is incapable of discharging the
functions of his office by reason of illness or other cause, the Secretary
3
of Defence performs the functions of the Prime Minister. The Prime 
Minister, however, cannot perform the functions of the Secretary of 
Defence in the latter's absence from Zambia or illness or incapacity.
That reveals that the arrangement is intended to project the presence 
of the Party in Government administration and not vice versa. Also by 
the fact that the Ministry of Defence and the Minister of Defence are
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 55A as
amended by the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1980, 
No. 10, Art. 3.
2. ibid. Art. 40(4) as amended.
3. ibid. Arts. 49 and 50, as amended
placed under the Secretary of Defence, shows that the arrangement was 
devised as an aspect of the 'supremacy' of the Party over Government 
administration. The point to note, however, is that the deployment of 
the Secretary of Defence was not accomplished as a matter of a 
political fact, but had to be achieved through law. That resort to law 
might be said to have been inevitable under Zambia's written Constitution. 
Ch the other hand, it could be argued that the Party, being aware of its 
rather unclear legal capacity, had no alternative but to utilize the law 
in asserting its supremacy - that is of its functionaries - over 
Government administration. In fact it is a combination of these two 
factors: a written State Constitution and UNIP's lack of precise legal 
capacity. The presence of the Secretary of Defence in Government 
administration between 1978 and 1980, before the amendments to the 
Constitution of Zambia, was not different from that of the SPPRA and 
Political Assistants in Government administration before the One-Party 
system was introduced, whose presence in government administration was 
not backed by l a w T h e  Secretary of Defence could have continued in 
Government administration without legal backing. Under the One-Party 
system the Party's strategy has been to utilize the law in asserting 
the role of its organs such as the Central Committee or its leading 
functionaries such as the Secretary-General and the Secretary of Defence. 
The constitutional provisions provide the legal basis for the Party's 
intervention in administrative activities: the Party providing the 
'correct political line' for the Government officers.
There were two main ways through which UNIP could have used 
in its bid to control Government administration. It could either have 
deployed its functionaries in the administration itself (who would 
control the administration from inside), or, placed government officers
1. Supra, p. 189.
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in Party organs (to which they reported the workings of their public 
institutions and from which they got instructions on how to run their 
institutions). The roles of the Secretary-General and the Secretary of 
Defence show that UNIP has opted for the former approach. One of the 
reasons for adopting the former method is that the two Party leaders 
work under, and report to, the President of the Party and the State. If 
the latter method were adopted (which would be more beneficial to the 
Party) officers would report not to the President, but to the Party 
organs of their assignment. That would run counter to the present 
all-embracing dominant role of the President.
The office of the Secretary of Defence is now a public office 
in the administration of the Government of Zambia; prima facie, an MCC 
or any other person can be appointed the Secretary of Defence. The 
Secretary of Defence is a public officer and he does not hold his office 
ex-officio, that is by virtue of being an MCC, but through the appointment 
by the President, under the Constitution of Zambia. There is, therefore, 
a difference in status vis-a-vis their role in public administration 
between the Secretary-General and the Secretary of Defence. The former
1
sits in Cabinet ex-officio, that is by being Secretary-General of UNIP.
The latter sits in Cabinet and holds his office by virtue of his 
appointment by the President. If and when the Central Committee is 
dissolved or he otherwise ceased to be an MCC, the Secretary of Defence 
would continue to hold that office until removed by the President. The 
Secretary-General's membership of Cabinet ceases immediately he is 
removed from that office or the Central Committee is dissolved. The office 
of the Secretary for Defence is, therefore, a hybrid post in the 
constitutional system of Zambia in that it is an office in the 
Government administration held by a Party official.
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 50(1).
Section 3. The Party and the Civil Service.
The Background.
The Colonial Civil Service in NR was, broadly speaking,
divided into two divisions; the Colonial Civil Service composed of
British overseas officers , and the African Civil Service, composed of
locally recruited African low rank officers. No African held a high
civil service post in NR until after Independence. African civil
servants were forbidden from participating in politics.^" During the
peak of the nationalist agitation for one-man-one-vote and self-
government, Africans in the civil service and those joining the
Service were made to sign a declaration to the effect that their
attention had been drawn to the requirement that they did not take
2
party in political activities. Any African civil servant who,
contrary to his undertaking not to participate in politics, did
participate in politics, was subject to disciplinary action, which in
some cases, meant instant dismissal from the Service, hence the NRANC's
complaint to the authorities against dismissals from the Service of
3
Africans who supported the organization's campaign for self-rule.
Following Independence, UNIP called for patriotism among 
the newly Zambianized Civil Service to serve loyally an African 
Government. The Party appeared unimpressed by the support that call 
received from the civil servants, hence in 1968 UNIP activitists were 
deployed in government administration and in the Parliamentary General
1. NR: Establishment Minute No. TSN. 127(E), 22nd May,
1953, Rule 9.
2. Establishment Minute No. TSN. 127 (E) , 26th May,
1960, African Civil Service Form C.S. B55,
issued by A.B. Shone, Chief Establishment Officer.
3. See, supra, p. 67; African National Congress, 
B/5-291, NR 11/158? NAZ-L$ supra, p. 67.
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Election of that year, UNIP fielded some civil servants as candidates.
Some civil servants were nominated to Parliament. In 1969 an amendment
was effected to the Constitution of Zambia whereby, in exercise of the
powers vested in him of constituting or abolishing offices in the
public service of the Public, the President could declare that any
office constituted by him shall not be an office in the public service.^-
President Kaunda created the office of the DG and declared that that
office was not an office in the public service. An appointment to such
an office was made by the President without consultation with the Public
Service Commission or any other authority; consequently, the President
was enabled to appoint UNIP activists into the public service; mainly to
provide 'political leadership' and to establish the Party's presence.
Although it has been said that the Zambian civil service was
2
already politicized at Independence, in reality there was not much of 
a 'Zambian' civil service at Independence; that only began to emerge after 
the intensification of the Zambianization programme after 1968. Secondly, 
the British restrictions on Africans working for the colonial government 
participating in politics, and the presence of a multi-party system, 
encouraged some form of neutrality on the part of the civil servants.
(a) The Relationship between the Party and the Civil Service.
The Constitution of UNIP of 1973 - annexed to the One-Party
Constitution of Zambia - dealt purely with Party matters and did not
3
refer to the State, Government or parastatal institutions. The functions
1. Zambia: Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1969, No. 1,
sec. 56(1), now Art. 62 of the Constitution of 
Zambia Act, 1973, No. 27.
2. Pettman, J., "Zambia's Second Republic - the Establishment of a
One-Party System", JMAS, 1974, p. 231.
3. UNIP: The 1973 Constitution was repealed and replaced
at the 8th General Conference held in September, 
1978.
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of the President, the Party Secretary-General and the Committee of Chairmen's
sub-Committees did not include the supervision of State institutions or
parastatal organizations. Following the establishment of the One-Party
system agitation began formally to bring the public service under the
leadership of the Party. The relationship between the Party and the civil
service, for instance, was spelt out in the following statement:
We agreed that the Party is supreme. We agreed that the 
cause of the Party is the cause of the masses. But our 
major task is still to make the administration efficient.
The Party's administration has not asserted its position 
as the leading force in the nation. On the other hand 
there are still a few members of the Public Service who 
tend to consider themselves as institutions apart. These 
nurse the colonial ideas of an independent civil service, 
yet there is no independent civil service in the world.
Time has come to make the Public Service part of UNIP, 
its leading force. By virtue of their employment, the 
Public Service owes allegiance to UNIP, members of the 
Service are bound by the Philosophy, principles and 
objectives of the Party; they are bound by its Code of 
discipline. We therefore, must integrate the Party and 
Government machinery so that all the cadres in the Party 
and the Public Service can trully form one dynamic 
cooperative enterprise geared to run and develop Zambia.
The 'agreement' ^ or appropriately the decision that the Party
should be supreme was that of the Party rather than of the nation as a
whole. The purported rejection of a non-political and neutral public
service was expressed through the provisions of the Party Constitution
adopted at the Eighth General Conference held in August, 1978 which
provided, inter alia, that the cause of the Party 'is the cause of the
people', that the Party should ensure that all public institutions,
State-owned enterprises and similar organizations are led by members of 
2
Party, that the Party was the supreme organization and the guiding
3
political force in the land, and that the Party exercises disciplinary
4
powers over, among others, public servants. Thus, deliberately, the
1. UNIP: President K.D. Kaunda, Opening Speech at the
8th National Council, 27th-29th April, 1975.
2. Constitution, 1978, Art. 3.
3. ibid. Art. 5.
4. ibid. Art. 55(F) and Reg. 37(a).
Constitution of the Party tried to extend Party influence to the public
service. For instance, the Appointment and Disciplinary sub-Committee
of the Central Committee was made responsible for the discipline of,
among others, heads of Zambian missions abroad, some of whom are civil
servants, all officers of and above the rank of Assistant Secretary in
the Party and Government, all officers of and above the rank of High
Court Judge including the DPP and all officers of and above the rank
of General Manager of parastatal organizations.^ In addition to that
all Permanent Secretaries and Under-Secretaries who were members of the
Party - and almost all of them were members of the Party - pay, on the
basis of pay-as-you-eam, two-and-half percent (2h%) of their salaries
2
exclusive of allowances, as monthly contributions to the Party.
The relationship between the Party and the Public Service,
however, remained that of a political party and the Government. The
Government as an institution continued to be composed of Ministries and
departments run my Ministers, Ministers of State and civil servants. Civil
servants deployed in the Party service enjoyed no special status and did
not lose their status of public officers. Inspite of the provisions of the
Constitution of the Party, the Party's Appointments and Disciplinary
sub-Committee did not exercise disciplinary jurisdiction over the
stipulated public officers. In practice there was no way in which that
sub-Committee could discipline, for example, Assistant Secretaries and
Judges in the public service of the Republic because their conditions of
service were regulated by the provisions of the Constitution of Zambia
3
and regulations made thereunder. The Appointments and Disciplinary 
sub-Committee, however, exercises disciplinary powers over civil servants 
on secondment to the Party service. The Party's actions, however, are 
subject to confirmation by the Public Service Commission.
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1978, Reg. 37(a)(i) to (iv).
2. ibid. Reg. 95(e) now Reg. 69, Constitution,
1988.
3. The Attorney-General v. Kang'ombe (1973) ZR 114.
There was some discontent in the public service with the
Party's interference in the discipline of public servants. However,
a number of public servants dissatisfied with decisions of a Service
Commission or the Investigator-General, 'appealed' to the Party for
the settlement of the matter in dispute. Between 1978 and 1987 the
Appointments and Disciplinary sub-Committee of the Central Committee
formally reviewed decisions: some decisions were upheld and others
were referred back to the Commission concerned,with an 'advice' that
the Commission reconsider its earlier decision. A public officer who
had his disciplinary action reversed/following such an intervention,
was bound to applaud the close relationship between the Party and the
public service. However, Party intervention contributed towards some
indiscipline in the public service; some public servants with strong
political connections were becoming 'untouchables'.
The Party Constitution adopted at the Tenth Party Congress
in August 1988 has accordingly left out from the Constitution of the
Party, any references to public servants, including judges and the DPP,
in the category of persons over whom the Party might exercise
disciplinary powers.^" The provisions regarding compulsory monthly
contributions to Party funds by public servants, among others, have 
2
been retained. The relationship between the Party and the public
service after the 1988 Party Congress is, vis-^-vis disciplinary
matters, that of a political party and a Government administration
3
as described by President Kaunda in 1975. This conclusion should, 
however, be made subject to one important qualification, namely that 
the Party might exercise more influence over the public service through
5
the Party Control Commission established by the 1988 Party Constitution.
Constitution, 1988 Art. 64(3) (F) (d) and Reg. 15 
ibid. Art. 86 and Reg. 69(f).
Infra, p. 222.
Constitution, 1988, loc. cit., Art. 66.
Infra, p. 228.
1. UNIP:
2.
3.
4.
5.
( b) The Party and the Service Commissions.
The Constitution of Zambia provides that the executive
power of the Republic shall vest in the President and shall be exercised
by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him.^ The
power to appoint persons to hold or act in any office in the public
service of Zambia and to exercise discipline over such persons vests
in the President, however, before exercising such power the President
is required to consult a number of Service Commissions who actually
2
exercise the powers of the President on a delegated basis. The
Commissions are the Public Service, the Police and Prison Service,
the Teaching Service and the Judicial Service Commissions. Each of
these Commissions consists of a Chairman and a number of prescribed
members appointed by the President. Members of Parliament and public
officers are not qualified to be appointed members of a Commission and
UNIP has refrained from direct representation on the membership of
the Service Commissions. Service Commissions are regarded as State
institutions and their functions are extensions of the executive
authority of the President, who, however, is the President of the Party.
But the President does not exercise his appointment powers as the
leader of the Party but under authority granted him by the Constitution
3
of Zambia. Thus, in Chanda v. Attorney-General, the plaintiff was a 
prominent 'freedom-fighter' and an MP, who was sent into foreign service 
through a letter signed by the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Lusaka. The letter did not reveal the appointing authority.
On his recall to Zambia, the plaintiff was placed under a Presidential 
detention order and subsequently dismissed from the public service.
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 53(1).
2. ibid. Art. 132.
3. (1975) ZR 56.
The Court held that (it could be presumed) the appointing 
authority was the President and not the Permanent Secretary and that 
the plaintiff held a 'public office' and he was a 'public officer', 
but that he did not hold an office constituted by the President and 
declared by him not to be an office in the public service. However, 
ambassadors and high commissioners being appointees of the President, 
served at his pleasure and could be dismissed by him as he saw fit.^
The President is bound to 'interfere' with the functions of 
the Service Commissions since he is empowered to give the Commissions 
such general directions with respect to the exercise of their functions 
as he considers necessary and the Commissions are expected to comply 
with such directions. The role of the Commissions is, however, outside 
the realm of the Party, except as observed earlier, that the President 
is also President of the Party. The Party, however, maintains a close 
link with the Chairmen of Commissions, for example, with the exception 
of the Chairman of the Judicial Service Commission (the Chief Justice), 
all chairmen are appointed as advisors to sub-Committees of the Chairmen's 
Committee. The Deputy Chief Justice is the Chairman of both the Party 
and State Electoral Commissions.
In retrospect, UNIP was more active in 'interfering' with
the public service during the multi-party system than under the One-Party
system. There is under the latter system no fear of public servants
supporting another or other political party or parties. Today the
public service's neutrality has been broken and public servants have
been compelled,by the prevailing circumstances of a One-Party system,
to submit to the dominant role of the Party. The changes in the Party
2
Constitution adopted at the 1988 Party Congress, however, suggest that 
the Party has failed to integrate Party and Government machinery and 
that the public service stands as. an institution apart.
1. Chanda v. Attorney-General (1975) ZR 56, at p. 61.
2. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 65(3)(F) omits reference
to civil servants vis-a-vis Party descipline.
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Section 4. The Party Control1 of Government Ministries.
One of the consequences of the evolution of the concept of
the Party and its Government has been that the Party hardly criticises
the Government and vice versa. This lack of criticism is not influenced
by the stated political line of the Party that the Party should have
confidence in workers and peasants in every field, whether Party or
Government officials, office, mine, factory or construction workers or
teachers.^- Lack of criticism arises from the fact that Party criticism
of the Government would be tantamount to self-criticism. Government
criticism of the Party would, on the Party's side, be viewed as an
attempt by the Government to institute itself as a body independent of
the Party. Although the Party leadership has faith in its Government,
it still feels it should maintain a close constant view of the work of
the Government Ministries and Departments.
So far, there is no known Government body that monitors the
role of the Party in Zambia. Members of the National Assembly have in
the past tried to point out defects in the role of the Party under the
protective ambrella of Parliamentary privilege . But such criticisms have
resulted in the outspoken M.P.s being vetted from returning to the House.
The Party control of the Government ministries is not based on
any specific legislation. In Party circles, the provisions of Art. 47C(2)
of the Constitution of Zambiaf which provides that where a decision of
the Central Committee is in conflict with a decision of the Cabinet, the
former should prevail over the latter, is cited as the authority for the
3
supervision of Government ministries. That is of course stretching the 
provisions beyond their intended purpose. The following page shows the 
relationship between the Party and the Government in a graphic form.
1. UNIP: President Kaunda, Opening the National Council,
30th June—3rd July, 1975, see The 'Watershed'
Speech, p. 7.
2. Infra, p. 286.
3. Supra, p. 190.
FIGURE I: The Relationship between the Party and the Government.
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Government representatives. Members of the House 
of Chiefs are elected by the Chiefs Provincial 
Councils and they discuss Bills referred to them 
by the President: Constitution of Zambia Act, 
1973, Art. 96.
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(i) Ministries under Chairmen of Committees Sub-Committees.
The placement of Government Ministries under sub-Committees
of the Committee of Chairmen could be said to be based on a 'convention'
which is taking root that Ministries operate under one of the Chairmen of
Committees sub-Committees. For instance, when the Ministry of Presidential
Affairs was established in 1986, it was immediately placed under the then
Political and Legal sub-Committee.^ Under the unwritten British Constitution
a distinction is drawn between laws and conventions. Laws are rules which
are enforced by the courts. The conventions (of the Constitution), however,
presuppose the law and they play an important role in the British
2
Parliamentary system. Necessarily conventional rules spring up to regulate 
the working of the various organs of government, their relations to one 
another and to the subject.
Under the 1978 Party Constitution sub-Committees fell directly
3
under the Central Committee. The enlargement of the Central Committee at
the Tenth Party Congress from 25 to 68 members necessiated the placement
of the ten sub-Committees under the Committee of Chairmen of sub-Committees
4
chaired by the President. The President appoints the Chairman and Vice-
Chairmen and members of the sub-Committees who should be members of the 
5
National Council and not more than six advisors to each of the sub-Committees, 
who need not be members of the National Council.^ Advisors are drawn from 
the Churches, trade unions, women's and youth organizations and institutions 
of higher learning and their presence on the sub-Committees is intended to 
expose Party policies to outside lobby or opinion or scrutiny. Advisors 
often play an important role in advising sub-Committees, e.g. by pointing
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 65(1) omits that Ministry
which was reported abolished: Times of Zambia,
3rd November, 1988.
2. Jennings, I., The Law and the Constitution? Hodder & Soughton,
Cambridge, 1976, Fifth ed., p. 103.
3. UNIP: Constitution, 1978, Art. 55(1),
4. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 65(1)*
5. ibid. Art. 65(1)
6. ibid. Art. 65(2).
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out some short-comings in Party policies and practices, something which 
Party functionaries are often reluctant to do in committees. Each of the 
sub-Committee's Chairman and Vice-Chairman are MCCs. All the sub-Committees 
operate under the overall supervision of the Secretary-General of the Party, 
The allocation of Government Ministries is as follows:-
Sub-Committee of Chairmen of Committees 
Defence and Security
Political, Ideological and Legal 
Economic and Finance
Elections and Publicity 
Rural Development
Social and Culture
Appointments and Disciplinary 
Youth and Sport
Women's Affairs 
Science and Technology
Government Ministry
Home Affairs 
Defence
Legal Affairs 
Foreign Affairs 
National Guidance
Finance and Planning
Mines
Tourism
Power, Transport and 
Communications 
Commerce and Trade
Broadcasting and Information
Agriculture and Co-operatives 
Water, Lands and Natural . 
Resources
Labour, Social Services and
Culture
Health
General Education, Youth and 
Sport
Service Commissions
Youth Department, Labour and 
Social Services
Women Affairs, Labour and
Social Services
Health
High Education 
Science and Technoloby
Parastatal organizations are not formally placed under any of 
the ten sub-Committees. In practice, however, because of the nature of 
their functions, they are supervised by the Economic and Financial 
sub-Committee together with public financial institutions such
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as the Bank of Zambia, the Development Bank and the Lima Bank. The
allocation of ministries to each of the sub-Committees is done by
the President alone and not in consultation with either the Central
Control or the Committee of Chairmen of sub-Committees. By making the
sub-Committees 'sub-Committees of the Committee of Chairmen'^ and not
2
as previously, sub-Committees of the Central Committee, the control 
of ministries remains in the hands of the members of the pre-1988 
Central Committee who have become Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the 
sub-Committees. Consequently, the Central Committee will have less 
direct influence on ministries.
(ii) The Nature of sub-Committee Control.
The ultimate objective underlying the supervision of Ministries 
by the Party's sub-Committees is not primarily to safeguard citizens' 
rights and interests against maladministration or administrative partiality, 
favouritism or against unfair or unjustified decisions of public organs, 
but to coordinate the work of the Party and its Government. To some extent, 
the system enables the Party to monitor accurately what goes on in the 
Ministries. That enables the Party to appreciate the extent to which 
Ministries were succeeding or failing to implement Party policies.
The nature of the control exercised by a sub-Committee takes 
different forms, e.g. it could be through a letter from the Chairman of 
the sub-Committee to the Minister or Permanent Secretary or the Director 
of the Ministry or Department under his supervision. In most cases the 
Government official is summoned to appear before the Chairman, rarely 
before the sub-Committee as a whole. For example, the Chairman of the 
Economic and Finance sub-Committee can summon the Minister of Finance
to explain why a general manager of a parastatal organization issued
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 65(1).
2. Constitution, 1978, Art. 55(1).
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a public statement blaming the Government for shortage of essential 
commodities. Such a 'confrontation' compels the Minister to investigate 
the matter and report back to the Chairman.
The placing of Government Ministries under sub-Committees 
suppresses criticism of the Government by the Party. Party 'militants' 
such as DGs whose historical pre-occupation, which brought them to 
pre-eminence soon after Independence, was constant criticism of public 
officers, are now inhibited at criticising Government performance as 
that would be interpreted as criticising the Minister and the Chairman 
of the supervising sub-Committee. The arrangement to some extent has 
destroyed the parallel bureaucracies in the Party and the Government; 
and instead created a huge bureaucracy embracing the two institutions, 
which operates free from competition and challenge. The arrangement 
concentrates power in the President, who appoints the Chairmen and 
Vice-Chairmen, members and advisors of each sub-Committee.
Although each of the sub-Committees is assigned specific
functions,^" failure to effectively carry out those functions or abuse
of those powers, can only be querried within the Party. Thus, although
the supervision of Government Ministries by the Party can be considered
in the context of 'public administration', in reality there is nothing
'public' about the arrangement: it is a political intrusion of the Party
into the internal administration of the Government. The system, however,
has not eliminated complacency among Party or Government leaders; energetic
implementation of development programmes is still wanting. The recent
2
establishment of the Party Control Commission is indicative of the 
Party's admission that control through sub-Committees was ineffective.
1. UNIP:
2.
Constitution, 1988, Art. 65(3).
ibid. Art. 66, infra, p. 228.
(iii) The Sub-Committees and Specialized Institutions.
Among the major functions of the sub-Committees are the
consideration of Party policies, carried out at the sub-Committees' monthly
meetings, and, the supervision of public institutions, carried out mainly
by the full-time Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the sub-Committees and their
officials. The sub-Committees do not intervene in the work of specialized
institutions such as the National Assembly and its Committees or the House
Chiefs or the Judiciary or the Armed Forces or private companies. The
sub-Committees do not scrutinize the role of the executive, e.g. the
President's conduct of foreign relations."^ But the sub-Committees are in
constant contact with the Investigator-General' s , the Anti-Corruption and
Prices and Incomes Commissions because of the nature of their public
functions. Such contacts are in the form of co-ordination of their efforts
in combating economic and social problem and not on the basis of supervisor
and supervised institution. Trade unions have often resisted scrutiny by
the sub-Committees mainly on the ground that their existence and role are
2
regulated by legislation; an argument the Anti-Corruption and the Prices 
and Incomes Commissions could also use since they operate under their own 
respective legislation. In practice the Economic and Finance sub-Committee 
influences the labour movement through the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Services. The Ministry controls trade unions through the Commissioner of
3
Labour, an official of the Ministry who is the Registrar of trade unions.
Constitutional and administrative law provide a framework for 
the exercise of political and legal power by those in authority. A State 
Constitution is an instrument of national co-operation and the spirit of 
co-operation is as necessary as the instrument itself. In some respects 
the sub-Committee system works as an instrument for effecting national 
co-operation, for instance, co-ordination between the sub-Committees and the 
Prices and Incomes Commission in price fixing. In the absence of a legal
1. Infra, p. 460.
2. Zambia: Industrial Relations Act, 1971, No. 36, Cap. 508.
3. ibid. sec. 5.
basis (other than the Constitution of the Party provisions) regulating 
the role of sub-Committees, the sub-Committees operate on the notion that 
the exercise of political power should be flexible and should be free 
from rigorous legal controls.^ One of the consequences of the system 
has been that there has been less Parliamentary control and more Party 
supervision of public institutions. While Parliament is accountable to 
the nation on its role, the Party is not. In theory, the Party represents 
the nation as a whole and it could be argued that supervision of public 
institutions by the sub-Committees is a form of accountability of public 
officers and governmental institutions to the public through the Party.
The Party, however, unlike Parliament, cannot be questioned or criticised 
on its role of supervising public institutions. Hie Party's want of 
supervision of specialized public institutions arises from the nature of 
its supervision of public bodies which is often in general terms and not 
into specifics, consequently, sub-Committees cannot, for instance, 
supervise the work of the Courts of law or the armed forces.
Section 5. The Party Control of Parastatal Organizations.
The Background.
Hie origins of huge private economic organizations in NR 
began with the exploitation of copper deposits in 1910 though mining 
on a large scale started in the 1930's with the opening up by the Anglo- 
American Corporation (AAC) of the Copperbelt mines. The other Corporations 
engaged in copper mining were the Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines (NCCM) 
and the Roan Consolidated Mines (RCM). Public economic bodies formed by
2
the Colonial Government appeared later; the Maize Control Board in 1936 
and the Cattle Control Board in 1937. At Independence (October, 1964), 
Zambia inherited about fifty public organizations, the majority formed
1. See, for example, M..M. Chona, Appendix 'A', Answer to Question No. 10,
infra, p. 549.
2. NR: Maize Control Board Ordinance, 1935, No. 20, Board members
appointed by the Governor; sec. 3.
during the period (1953 to 1963) of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland. Four major types of economic enterprise have existed in Zambia 
namely (a) foreign enterprise, the multi-nationals, e.g. Dunlop Zambia 
Limited (23% interest held by the State), (b) expatriate enterprise, e.g. 
Eagle Travel Limited (51% held by the State), (c) Zambian enterprise, e.g. 
Chimanga Changa milling, wholly Zambian owned, and (d) State enterprise, 
e.g. ZIMCO and INDECO wholly owned by the State. Although State Corporations 
are wholly owned by the State, e.g. the State Finance and Development, the 
National Import and Export and National Transport Corporations, their 
subsidiary companies are owned by the State and private companies.^
(i) The Party Policy on Parastatal Organizations.
Parastatal bodies and private companies are creatures of the law,
with structures, powers and responsibilities ordained by law. The Party has
no similar status or powers. The business of the Party is to carry out its
political manifestos adopted before and after Independence. UNIP, however,
has lacked a clear policy on the role of or its relationship with, the
parastatal bodies. Under the philosophy of Humanism, parastatal bodies are
2
regarded as 'interim structures' to carry out certain earmarked schemes 
of economic and social development and that their role will eventually be
3
handed over to 'District Government'. Consequently, the Party's interest
in parastatals has been weak. The NCEOPPDZ anticipated that under the
One-Party system, the Party should not interfere with the work of parastatals
accordingly, it recommended that Chairmen of these bodies should be appointed
by Cabinet, Vice-Chairmen elected by Board members and administrative heads
4
appointed by a parastatal bodies commission. The Party was excluded from the
1. e.g. the Zambia National Energy Corporation's subsidiaries
are owned as follows: Agip Ltd. and Indeni Ltd., 50% by the
State and 50% by Italian companies, Shell and BP Ltd. 51%
Zambia and 49%UK, Tazama Pipelines Ltd., 66% Zambia and
34% Tanzania and Zambia Electricity Supply Ltd., 100% Zambia
2. Zambia: Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to Its Implementation,
Part II, 1972; p. 66.
3. ibid. p. 66.
4. NCEOPPDZ, Report, 1972? p. 36, par. 123.
management of parastatal organizations. These recommendations were accepted
by the Government^ and accordingly, in 1976 the Parastatal Bodies
2 3
Commission was established but abolished three years later; accused of
nepotism, corruption and inefficience among its administrative officers
and by that time it was said that "the name Parastatal is now virtually
4
a derogatory term".
The Party*s basic economic policy is that economic development 
should be through economic planning because "an unplanned economy only 
ends up benefitting the few with capital and liquidity as the expense of 
the majority. It was with background in mind that the Party and its 
Government seriously embarked on rationalisation of economic planning as 
soon as independence was won on 24th October, 1964".^ President Kaunda's 
major economic policy statement was made to the Party's National Council 
on 19th April, 1968: the policy advocated Government control of the 
economy. Between 1968 and 1970 the Government acquired 51 per cent of 
shares in twentysix major companies including the ACC and NCCM. Between 
1970 and 1980 the Government formed or merged existing parastatal bodies 
such as INDECO and ZIMCO to manage its shareholdings in the copper-mining 
and other corporations and companies. Through further acquisition of 
shares and re-organization, major mining and industrial and commercial 
concerns are either wholly owned by the State or the Government is the 
majority shareholder. Parastatl organizations 'own' such companies or 
corporations are wholly owned by the State. That enables the President to 
chair board meetings or appoint directors and chief executives of some 
of these parastatal organizations such as ZIMCO and INDECO.
1. Zambia: NCEOPPDZ-SRAG, 1972, p. 17.
2. Parastatal Bodies Service Commission Act, 1976, No. 18
3. Parastatal Bodies Service Commission (Repeal) Act,
1979, No. 14.
4. The 'Watershed' Speech, 30th June-3rd July, 1975?
p. 19: emphasis supplied.
5. UNIP: A Review of the Implementation of the National
Policies for the Decade 1974-1984; 1984, p. 54.
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The President of the State is also the President of the Party and 
his involvement in the management of parastatal bodies could correctly be 
attributed to the Party. He has himself at times attributed his involvement 
in parastatals affairs to Party policies. For instance, in the appointment 
of the General Managers of parastatal organizations such as the United Bus 
Company of Zambia (UBZ).
(ii) Presidential Authority over Public Bodies.
In Mwanza v. National Transport Corporation^- the plaintiff
contended that he was appointed by President Kaunda through a letter dated
30th April, 1974, as the General Manager of UBZ, 'with immediate effect'.
However, on 25th June, 1975, the plaintiff received a letter from the
Managing Director of the defendant corporation, the holding company of UBZ,
stating, inter alia, that "I wish to advise you that, with immediate effect,
you have been relieved of your appointment as General Manager of UBZ". The
plaintiff contended that being a Presidential appointee, his appointment
could only be terminated by the President.
The High Court did not make a ruling on the legal effect of the
Presidential appointment of the plaintiff on the ground that counsel for
both parties had agreed that the appointment was made by the defendant
corporation and that the President's letter was a mere nomination. On the
dismissal itself, the Court held that the Articles of UBZ's Memorandum of
Association vested the powers of appointment and dismissal of the chief
executive of UBZ, in the Board of Directors of UBZ and/or the defendant
corporation. Accordingly, the dismissal of the plaintiff was in order and
valid. It was obvious at the time that the plaintiff's dismissal was as a
result of opposition to 'political appointees' in parastatal organizations.
The dominant role of the President has been strengthened since Mwanza's 
2
case in 1975 which was only two years after the introduction of the
1. (1979) ZR 129
2. That is, when the dismissal took place, though
the case was heard in 1979.
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One-Party system. During the past ten years or so Articles of Memorandum 
of Association of state-owned public bodies as well as statutory provisions 
of those boards constituted by statute, have been,\ wer;e necessary, amended 
to empower the President to appoint the chief executives of the bodies.
Thus, the President as an individual has control of public bodies either 
through chairmanship of the board of directors, or, through his appointees. 
But the Party's control of public bodies through the sub-Committees, is 
nominal.
(iii) Party Control of Parastatal Organizations.
UNIP at independence had not effectively asserted itself in 
the Zambian economic sectorAlthough UNIP became Government, before 
independence UNIP leaders had no meaningful contact with the Colonial 
bureaucracy, the legislature, the judiciary and major industrial and 
commercial undertakings such as the copper mining corporations. The Party's 
leaders, whose administrative and business experience was restricted to 
running the 'party headquarters', did not possess experience or knowledge 
to enable them formulate a policy on the relationship between the Party 
and public bodies. Consequently, the'supremacy' of the Party ushered by 
Arts. 4 and 47C(2) of the Constitution of Zambia in 1973 and 1975, 
respectively, merely placedthe Party as a super-structure over the 
inherited economic and social structures which the Party leadership has 
neither the power nor knowledge (yet) to control them. The supremacy of 
the Party has been restricted to political affairs.
During the past ten years the Party has acquired a number of 
private businesses dealing with motor vehicle and agricultural equipment 
distribution, publishing and quarries. But these are not 'public bodies' 
but private Party companies, and together with public bodies, are not 
represented in Party organs. Hie appointment of ZIMCO Director-General 
(Evans Willima) and the ZCCM chairman and the chief
1. For further reference see: Stefanski, B., "Public
Sector in Africa: The Case Study of Zambian Parastatals";
African Bulletin/ Warsaw University, 1987, No. 34, p. 35.
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executive (Francis Kaunda, no relation of the President) and Zambia
State Insurance Corporation managing director (Mweene Mwiinga) as MCCs, is
prima facie, on a representative basis. There is, however, no provision
(in the Constitution of the Party) requiring that parastatals should be
represented in the Central Committee or any organ of the Party. Their
presence in the Central Committee is, therefore, an administrative
arrangement by the President. The Party will, to some extent, influence
parastatal bodies through these chief executives and vice versa.
The Party's strategy is to assert its influence throughout
all leading institutions, including parastatal organizationsThe Party
Control Commission set up after the 10th Party Congress in August, 1988
(the former Prime Minister and a present MCC, Elijah Mudenda was.
appointed its first Chairman) was the result of ten years of UNIP's
study of Eastern European Control Commissions, particularly those of
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The Party Control Commission
2
consists of eleven members,, under a Chairman appointed by the President 
3
from among MCCs. While the tenure of office of the Chairman is not
4
stated, that of the members is five years. The Party Control Commission
will monitor and ensure that Party, Government and parastatal bodies
understand and actively implement Party policies, decisions, plans,
5
directives and programmes. The Commission can require any person in 
charge of a Party, Government or parastatal organ, to appear before it 
and to discuss with him his personal shortcomings or his organization's 
poor performance. The Control Commission is, however, not an investigating 
body with disciplinary powers; it is much of an inspectorate with an
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 7.
2. ibid. Art. 66.
3. ibid. Art. 67 (1) (a).
4. ibid. Art. 67(1) (b).
5. ibid. Art. 70(1)(a).
advisory role. Its periodic reports together with any recommendations
are submitted to the Party's Committee of Chairmen, the National Council
and the Party Congress.^" There is an obvious duplication of functions
between the Control Commission and the sub-Committees discussed in the
previous Section. On the other hand, the Control Commission will monitor
the work of sub-Committees, and on the face of it, even summon a
sub-Committee chairman, as a person in charge of a Party organ, whose
performance or his sub-committee's work, is below expectation, to appear
before it to explain his or his sub-committee's problems.
In the absence of disciplinary powers, the Commission's role or
effectiveness is limited particularly when it comes to any control
of parastatal bodies and their personnel. One of the effects of the
2
decision in Mwanza v. National TranspOrt^Corporation, was that it 
highlighted the fact that public institutions operate in accordance with 
and within the limits of their statutory powers. The Party cannot, 
therefore, effectively control parastatal bodies. The provision that 
the Party Control Commission might use the services of any person,
3
institution, organ or enterprise to assist it in carrying its functions,
might enable the Commission to assert its authority. However, it will
still depend on the same institution whose poor performance it would
be criticising, to implement its decisions. It remains, however, to be
seen how the Party Control Commission will revolutionalize the Party's
control of public institutions, including parastatal organizations.
Otherwise its composition and functions are not different from those of
4
sub-Committees of the Central Committeet which have had little success.
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 77.
2. (1979) ZR 129, supra, p. 226.
3. UNI: Constitution, loc. cit., Art. 70(2).
4 * Constitution, loc. cit., now known as the Sub­
committees of the Committee of Chairmen: Art. 65(3).
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CONCLUSION.
The One-Party system established in Zambia in 1973, was super-imposed 
on a legal regime that did not and still do not precisely afford a political
party exact legal capacity or role. The deployment and role of UNIP's top
(
furi^actionaries in public administration both during the multi-party and the
single-party systems, was to some extent, as a consequence of the Party's
lack of clear legal status. In the absence of such a status, the Party could
not directly control Government and other public institutions. Hence, the
Party's strategy has been based on the notion that there should be direct
Party's presence in leading public institutions; the more the Party
participates in the decision-making of leading public institutions, the more
it could consolidate its central role from which to influence the affairs
of the State as a whole.
The mode of the appointment and the role of Party functionaries
in public administration, tend to show that the central role of the Party
is played by the President of the Party. The enlargement of the Central
Committee of the Party at the Tenth Party Congress in August, 1 9 8 8 confirms
the dominant role of the President and the fact that the Party Congress
merely endorses his schemes. The enlargement of the Central Committee, the
removal of the supervision of the sub-Committees by the Central Committee
2
and their placement under the Committee of Chairmen and the reduction of
3
the meetings of the Central Committee from twelve to two in a year, reduce
the Central Committee into a convocation of sectional representatives. UNIP
as a 'political party' is consequently withering away: its national organs
4
are becoming co-extensive with the nation. Paradoxically, though the Party 
leadership might defend or justify the enlargement of the Central Committee 
from twentyfive to sixtyeight members on the ground that it brings to the
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 58 Cl); supra, p. 140.
2. ibid. Art. 65(3) supra, p. 221.
3. ibid. Art. 58(2); supra, p. 171.
4. infra, p. 239.
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Central Committee representativeness of all sections, it also justifies 
the demand that the Central Committee should be democratically elected.
It is rather difficult to justify or defend the fairness in the composition 
of a national body of sixtyeight members all selected by the President.
Let the people participate in the election of the MCCs.
The Tenth National Council meeting held in June, 1977, resolved,
among other things, that the Secretary-General and the Prime Minister
should "evaluate and determine the causal factors underlying the failure
of some Party and Government personnel and institutions to implement Party
policies and programmes and to come up with recommendations as to what
remedial action should be taken in the matter".^ The two high offices
have so far not come up with any recommendations as directed. One of the
causes of the failure to implement Party policies or Government projects
has been the sub-Committees' inability to instil a sense of responsibility
in those in the leadership of the Party and Government. The tendency has
been that leaders assume that Party and Government institutions ' take
notice' of Party resolutions without themselves actually getting involved
in seeing that resolutions are implemented and Government projects are
began and finished.There had been no body charged with the responsibility
of seeing that Party and Government leaders perform their functions. The
Party Control Commission is now charged with that responsibility. The
Commission's efforts will be hindered by legal impendiments, for instance,
Cabinet operates under the Constitution of Zambia in its role as the
policy-implementing body of the Government and parastatal bodies operate
2
under the Companies Act or special legislation under which they are 
incorporated. In practice, therefore, notwithstanding political pressure, 
these institutions will remain unresponsive to any Party's attempts to 
bring them under the Commission's control. There is no need for control of
1. UNIP:
2. Zambia:
National Council, June, 1977, Resolution 5(b). 
Cap. 686.
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Government and parastatal organizations by the Party. The Commission's first 
task should be to instila sense of responsibility and the elimination of 
casual attitudes among public office-holders towards their official duties.
The period of the One-Party system - 1973-1989 - has been short 
for any (immemorial) conventions of the Constitution to evolve vis-a-vis 
the relationship between the Party and the Government or around the
r ,
Constitution of Zambia. In \div)Lsing institutions such as the Central Committee 
and its sub-Committees, UNIP acted on the basis of imperfect knowledge on 
how the system was going to work in practice. But the Party expected the 
system to operate well otherwise it would not have been introduced it in the 
first place. The past fifteen years afforded the Central Committee some 
experiences with which to assess what was possible and how 'things work' in 
the Party and in the Government. Ideally the old Central Committee and the 
Sub-Committee system should have been allowed to consolidate and perfect 
their roles as well as those of the Government institutions whose efforts 
they coordinated. The enlargement of the Central Committee and the creation 
of the Party Control Commission, however, reveal one of UNIP's weaknesses: 
dublication of Party organs and State bodies consisting of the same personnel 
and performing similar functions, e.g. the Central Committee, the Committee of 
Chairmen, the Cabinet, the Party Control Commission and the sub-Committees. 
Given time, coordination (between the sub-Committees and Government Ministries) 
rather than inspection (of Government and parastatal institutions) by the 
Party Control Commission, was going to prove an effective method of cordial 
relationship between and among Party, Government and public institutions such 
as local authorities and parastatal organizations. Inspection by the Party 
Control Commission is bound to be resented by public officers who are likely 
to view it as an attempt by the Party to convert public institutions into 
wings of the Party. That is likely to create unnecessary conflicts between 
and among otherwise complementary institutions.
CHAPTER VI.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A ONE-PARTY STATE.
Judicial Review and Administrative Controls
of Party Activities.
Introduction.
The dominant features of colonial administration in NR were, 
inter alia, centralism and authoritarianism. Most decisions of colonial 
administrators were not open to question. For instance, in Re Mailo^ 
the court refused to grant an order of certiorari against District 
Commissioners on the ground that they were only performing a ministerial 
function and not exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function. The 
brief facts were that there was a dispute between the applicant, Chief 
Mailo and the third respondent, Chief Mpumba, about the common boundary, 
which was also the boundary between two administrative districts defined 
by the Governor under Art. 13 of the Northern Rhodesia Order in Council, 
1924-1957. On instructions the first and second respondents, the 
respective District Commissioners of these districts, heard the submissions 
of the parties, forwarded them to higher authority, and subsequently 
conveyed to the parties the decision thereon. Cn an application, by way 
of certiorari, to the court to review and quash the decision, and for an 
order of mandamus to the District Commissioners to re-hear and determine 
the dispute, it was held that in hearing the submissions and conveying the 
Governor's decision thereon the District Commissioners were not exercising 
a judicial or quasi-judicial function, but were merely performing a 
ministerial function - consequently certiorari did not lie.
Judicial review was in the main invoked to protect settler rights
^ \while native interests were protected by a hierarchy of authorities 
ranging from the Chief, District and Provincial Commissioners and ending with
1. (1960) R & N LR 132.
Secretary for Native Affairs, the High Commissioner or the Governor
himself. In general, Africans were reluctant to challenge colonial
administrators' decisions or actions in the courts of law, on suspicion
that justice might not be seen to be done in their favour as they
perceived the judiciary as a wing of the colonial administration. African
leaders of NRANC, ZANC and UNIP although they were often victims of some
administrative decisions or actions which otherwise they should have
challenged, e.g., being refused permission to hold a public meeting or a
procession, hardly challenged such official decisions. Their challenge^"
was sometimes through the holding of unauthorized meetings or processions
2
which often ended with the leaders being charged with unlawful assembly.
3
In the case of In re Aaron Mwenya the applicant for a writ of habeas 
corpus instituted his application in the High Court in London probably 
for two main reasons, first, that although he was a native of NR and 
therefore, a British Protected Person, he was also a registered British 
subject, and, secondly, he assumed that his application had a better chance 
of a fairer hearing in the UK than in his native country NR.
The common law of England imported into NR had not evolved 
a satisfactory approach to public law in the form of effective scheme 
of administrative law or an integrated pattern of judicial remedies for 
the control of administrative actions. Many factors inhibited a systematic 
growth of public-law remedies parallel to those which were developed by 
the courts for private-law suits. Among these factors was the recognition 
of extensive prerogative powers, the exercise of which was considered to 
be beyond judicial review, e.g. the actions of the Governor and the 
immunities of the Crown except as modified by the Crown Proceedings
1. See supra, p. 73, Kenneth Kaunda's statement in
defiance of such prohibition.
2. Attorney-KSeveral v. Hagamata (1959) R & N LR 226
3. /1959/ 3 WLR 509 and /1960/ 1 QBD 241
235.
Ordinance, 1951^ which allowed certain actions against the Government
and modified 'Crown privileges' in the law of evidence. The Courts in
NR exercised their responsibility of investigating the scope of lawful
authority for administrative actions, whenever it was challenged, through
the prerogative orders of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and they
could grant equitable remedies of injunction or declaration.
After Independence, Zambia has continued to apply most of the
administrative laws and practices established during the colonial era.
2
The High Court Act, provides that the jurisdiction vested in the High
Court shall, as regard practice and procedure, be exercised in the manner
provided by the Criminal Procedure Code or by such rules and Orders of the
Court as may be made persuant to the Act and the Code, and in default
thereof in substantial conformity with the law and practice for the time
being observed in England in the High Court of Justice.^ In Kausa v. The
4
Registrar of Societies the High Court relied on this provision, and
5
various English authorities to suggest the right and the manner in which 
such right should be exercised, by the Court to grant an order of 
certiorari and review the decision of the Assistant Registrar. The Court 
quashed the decision of the Assistant Registrar on the ground that judicial 
functions imposed on the Registrar must be performed by him personally and 
cannot be carried out through subordinate officers. Presumably, the 
jurisdiction for such matters as mandamus and certiorari, not specifically 
mentioned in the statutes, derives from the provisions of the High Court Act 
which. gives the High Court supervisory jurisdiction.^
In the UK there are two recognized separate fields of law: one 
of private law, and the other of public law. Private law regulates
1. NR: 1951, No. 14, which introduced into NR law some of
the provisions of UK's Crown Proceedings Act, 1947,
10 & 11 Geo. 6, c.. 44i sec. 6.
2. 1961, No. 43, Cap. 3.
3. ibid. sec. 10.
4. (1977) ZR 195.
5. Rex v. Hendon R.D.C. ^1933/ All E.R. 20, R. Electricity Commissioner
/1924/ 1 KB 171, R. v. Barnstaple Justices ^1938/
1 K.B. 385,
6. Muyungo v. Induna Nalubutu (1959) R & N LR 677.
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the affairs of subjects vis-a-vis public authorities. For many years 
there were special remedies available in public law. Ihey were the 
prerogative writ of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. They were 
taken in the name of the sovereign against a public authority which 
had failed to perform its duty to the public at large or had performed 
it wrongly. Any subject could complain to the sovereign and then the 
King's courts, at their discretion, would give him leave to issue one 
of the prerogative writs as was appropriate to meet his case. But these 
writs only gave the remedies of quashing, commanding or prohibiting.
They did not enable a subject to recover damages against a public authority, 
nor a declaration, nor an injunction. Although through out the years some 
of these defects were rectified, it was not until 1976 that the Law 
Commission on Remedies in Administrative Law,^ made fundamental 
recommendations on the reform of 'Forms of Action' in English legal 
system. The Commission recommended introduction of a completely new, 
unified procedure - an application for judicial review - through which 
all the existing remedies would be available.
Consequently, a new Order 53, Rules of the Supreme Court (1977)
was introduced which provides for prerogative orders, declaration and
injunction to be available through an 'application for judicial review'
in the Queen's Bench Division; there is a two-stage process; first an
application is made, ex parte, for leave to apply, and, second, the
the application itself after leave is granted. The new arrangements
2
were confirmed later by the Supreme Court Act, 1981, sec. 31.
The High Court in Zambia in its procedure is guided by the 
provisions of the High Court Act, referred to on the previous page, and
1. UK: Report on Remedies in Administrative Law;
Cmnd. 1976/6407.
2. 1981, c. 54. Rules of the Supreme Court, Ord.
53, came into force in January, 1978, see:
O'Reilly and Others v. Mackman and Others
/I983/ 2 AC 237
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the Constitution of Zambia, 1973, which, e.g. allows a party to bring a 
question of fundamental rights infringement before the High Court.^ UK 
legislation is not automatically applied in Zambia unless it is incorporated 
into Zambian law. Notwithstanding the provisions of sec. 10 of the High 
Court Act that the jurisdiction of the High Court shall be exercised in the 
manner provided by local legislation and Orders, and that in default thereof 
in substantial conformity with the law and practice for the time being 
observed in England in the High Court of Justice, Ord. 53 of the UK Rules 
of the Supreme Court, 1977 could apply in Zambia only in default of any 
specific procedure being laid down in the Constitution or any rules thereunder 
or under the Rules of the Supreme Court of Zambia. So far that Order has not 
been (^ei)voked in the High Court in Zambia.^
Definition of 'Administrative Law1 and the Party.
The field of administrative law is a large one and there is no single
universally accepted way of dividing it up for the purposes of an exposition.
Definitions of 'administrative law' are correspondingly legion: however,
'administrative law' is the law which deals with the legal control of
governmental powers and which is exercised by the courts over the use of
3
statutory powers by administrative agencies. That definition should be 
viewed in a wider context in that supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court 
was adaptable and could be extended to any body which performed or operated 
as an integral part of a system which performed public law duties and whose 
role affected members of the public. Administrative law, however, is often 
perceived as that body of law which is concerned with public or governmental
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 29. See, e.g.
Sinkamba v. The Chief Justice (1974) ZR 1, being an 
application for mandamus directed at the Chief 
Justice to appoint a tribunal under that Article.
2. See e.g. ZNPF v. Attomey^General and Others (1983) ZR 140 and
Walulya v. Attorney-General (1981) ZR 327.
3. Hawke, N., An Introduction to Administrative Law; ESC, Oxford,
1984, p. 3.
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agencies; it regulates the relationship between governmental agencies 
and private individuals and between governmental agencies and other 
public institutions.'*’ These definitions contain both institutional and 
functional elements within administrative law. The institutional 
divisions tends to follow broadly the traditional tripartite division 
of government into the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary.
Some studies of administrative law concentrate on functional aspects, 
for instance, the legal control of administrative action, especially 
by means of judicial review.
The definitions of administrative law cited above show that 
administrative law is concerned with governmental agencies which possess 
and exercise powers and functions delegated to them by legislation. A 
political party such as UNIP is not a governmental agency in form or 
substance and does not belong to the category of ’public authorities’: 
its legal status is that of an unincorporated members’ association 
at common law and its business is the mobilization of people for political 
ends. Its leaders and workers are not strictly speaking, ’public officers’.
It would appear, therefore, inappropriate to include and consider the 
role of UNIP in Zambia in the context of administrative law. However, 
under the One'-Party system currently operating in Zambia, Party leaders
and officials are sometimes included among ’public officers’ e.g. under the
2 3
Leadership Code, the Commission for Investigations, and the
4
anti-corruption legislation. Moreover UNIP enjoys a monopoly of power as the 
only authoritative source of Governmental pcwer and Party leaders and 
Party organs are assigned vital functions under the Constitution of
1. Cane, P., An introduction to Administrative Law; Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1986, p. 4.
2. Zambia; Leadership Code, S.I. 1976/88, Reg. 2.
3. Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 117(4) (b) .
4. Corrupt Practices Act, 1980, No. 14, sec. 3.
Zambia which brings their role within the ambit of public administration.
The management of 'societies' in Zambia falls under the Registrar
of Societies,^-a public officer who is empowered to perform administrative,
judicial and quasi-judicial functions which include the registration or
the exemption from registration of societies. He can rescind exemption of
2
any society as well as cancel registration of any society, including UNIP's
branches or the headquarters. In performing his functions, the decisions
of the Registrar of Societies are sometimes made in conjunction with some
consultation with the Permanent Secretary or the Minister of Home Affairs.
As regards registration or cancellation of registration of a society, the
Registrar merely briefs the Minister because that is a function - a judicial
function - imposed on the Registrar by the Act and must be performed by
him personally while purely administrative functions can be carried out
3
through subordinate officers.
The Registrar of Societies may, in his discretion, cancel at
any time the registration of any society effected under the Act on several
grounds, for instance, that the terms of the constitution or rules of such
a society are, in his opinion in any respect repugnant to or inconsistent
4
with the provisions of any law for the time being in force in Zambia, or 
that the society has changed its name and the new name it has adopted is, 
in his opinion, repugnant to or inconsistent with the provisions of any 
law in force in Zambia or is otherwise undesirable.^
The Registrar of Societies registers annually all UNIP branches 
and the headquarters. Since Independence there has been no case of a UNIP 
branch being proscribed by the Registrar of Societies. The Registrar of 
Societies in consultation with the Minister (of Home Affairs) can, as a 
matter of law, proscribe any branch of UNIP or UNIP as a whole.
1. Zambia: Societies Act, Cap. 105, sec. 3(1).
2. ibid. sec. 12(1).
3. McConville v. Commissioner of Taxes (1973) ZR 195.
4. Societies Act, loc. cit., sec. 13(2) (a).
5* ibid. sec. 13 (2) (e) (iii).
Section 1. Judicial Review of Administrative Action.
A Constitution imposes some limitations on the use of governmental 
powers in its attempt to ensure a 'government of laws and not of man'. The 
essence of constitutionalism lies in a certain diffusion of powers at 
least into the traditional divisions of the executive, the legislature 
and the judiciary. Under a One-Party system the executive, the legislature 
and the Party, are closely tied together.
Because the machinery of judicial review is closely associated
with a written Constitution, it is sometimes assumed to have originated
in the USA through the exercise of such powers by the Supreme Court. The
origins of judicial review, however, can be traced to the earliest
period of English legal history; the idea of a 'fundamental' or 'higher'
law was identified with the common law. Sir Edward Coke, the renowned
Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in England, once declared that
"it appears in our books that in many cases of common law will control
acts of Parliament; and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for
when an act of Parliament is against common right and reason, and
repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will control
it and adjudge such acts to be void. " This declaration has been a subject
of debate and criticism particularly by the m o d e m  advocates of the
2
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Coke's observation, however, 
revealed that the question whether one governmental institution should 
or should not exercise control over another governmental institution, 
exercised the minds of the English judiciary many years before the 
emergence of the USA Supreme Court.
1. The Case of Bonham (1610) Coke's Rep. 107 at p. 118.v
2. See for example, Plucknett, T.F.T., "Doctor
Bonham's Case and Judicial Review", 40 Harvard 
Law Review, 30; Jennings, I., "Was Lord Coke a 
Heretic?" in his The Law and the Constitution;
Hodder and Stoughton, Cambridge, Fifth ed. 1976, 
Appendix III, p. 318.
Judicial review has played a prominent role under the written
Constitution of the USA: a prominance highlighted by the judgement of
Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison,^ in which he said, among
other things, that
Certainly all those who have framed written Constitutions 
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount 
law of the nation, and consequently, the theory of every 
such government must be, that an act of the legislature, 
repugnant to the constitution, is void. This theory is
essentially attached to a written constitution, and is
consequently to be considered by the court, as one of the 
fundamental principle in our society.
The American notion of judicial review, however, was rooted in 
the English legal tradition, based on the common law which assigned to 
the rulers (Parliament) their powers, to each of the Courts of the 
realm its proper jurisdiction, and, to the English people their rights 
and privileges. At Independence (24th October, 1964) Zambia inherited 
the English methods of controlling the administration through Court 
orders of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition and the equitable 
remedies of injuction and declaration. The Independence Constitution and 
the One-Party Constitution of 1973 contained and contains, respectively, 
provisions on the role of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. 
The provisions on the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the individual (the Bill of Rights) provide that any person who felt that
his fundamental rights and freedoms as granted and protected by the
Constitution had been, or were being or were likely to be contravened in 
relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action with respect 
to the same matter which was lawfully available, may apply to the High 
Court for redress; and the High Court may make such orders, issue such 
writs and give such directions as it may consider necessary for the 
purpose of enforcing the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.
1. 1 Cranch, 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
2. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 29;
supra pp. 127-129.
With the exception of damages, the Constitution does not name the nature
of the redress that the High Court might give, consequently, the remedies
are those under common law and equity.
The Constitutional provisions guaranteeing and protecting the
rights of the individual, although aimed at the application of executive
powers, apply also to other institutions which have powers that might be
used to deprive any person his rights and freedoms under the law. That
would include UNIP, for instance, a person who alleges that his opportunity
to exercise his right to stand for election for an office in the Party, was
unlawfully hindered, could seek some redress from the court. That, however,
is not without some difficult because, on one hand, the courts do not afford
2
UNIP legal capacity to sue or be sued in its name, while# on the other hand,
the courts would intervene in matters pertaining to the internal affairs of
3
the Party. This matter will be considered in the context of State immunity 
and the Party and the equitable remedies, in particular that of declaration.
(a) State Immunity and the Party.
Official functions on behalf of the Republic of Zambia are 
performed by public officers, that is, persons in the public service 
and these include the President, the Prime Minister, Ministers, Ministers 
of State, the Attorney-General, the DPP, civil servants and members of the 
Zambian armed forces. Among the classic English administrative law rules 
that can be said to transcend society and political ideology is that of
state immunity, namely that action in contract or tort might not be
commenced against the State or servant or agent of the State (the Crown),
4 5
except as allowed by the law. In Zambia the State Proceedings Act, 1965,
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 29(8) as
amended by the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) 
Act, 1974, No. 18.
2. Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. UNIP (1978) ZR 378.
3. Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. Attorney-General (1979) ZR 263
4. UK:
5. Zambia:
Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c, 44 
1965, No. 27
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is modelled on the UK legislation. The State has inherited the general 
immunity of the British Crown from legal liability for the acts of its 
servants and agents. However, subject to the provisions of the Act, the 
State is liable in contract and tort"^ for the acts of its servants and 
agents in cases in which a private person of full age and capacity 
would have been liable and any claim arising therefrom will be enforced 
against the State as of right. The High Court can, in such cases, make 
such orders as it has power to make in proceedings between subjects, e.g., 
it may issue an injunction or order specific performance or make a 
declaratory ruling or award damages.
The State Proceedings Act does not apply to UNIP. The introduction 
of the 1 One-Party State', and the inclusion of Party organs such as the 
Central Committee and the Party Congress in the State Constitution, has not 
converted the Party or its organs into organs of the State. Accordingly, 
the Committee of Chairmen's adoption of candidates for election to the
2
National Assembly, although assigned to it by the Constitution of Zambia,
was open to judicial review unlike proceedings of Cabinet which are not
susceptible to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. The Committee
of Chairmen cannot successfully claim 'State Immunity1 against any suit
challenging its decision disapproving the candidature of a prospective
Parliamentary candidate. In the absence of legislation ousting the courts'
jurisdiction of review of decisions of the Committee in carrying out its 
3
vetting role, its decisions would have been subject to judicial review.
The chairmanship by the Secretary-General of the Party of the
4
Cabinet, and the supervision of Government ministries by the Party Control
5 6
Commission and sub-Committees of the Central Committee, do not convert
1. Zambia: State Proceedings Act, op . cit., secs. 3 and 4.
2. Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 75(5).
3. Electoral (Amendment) Act,1983, No. 2, sec. 5,
4.
5.
6.
infra, p. 286.
supra, p. 199.
supra, p. 228.
supra, p. 218; sub-Committees of the Central 
Committee new referred to as sub-Committees of the 
Committee of Chairmen; supra, p. 219.
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Government institutions into Party organs, or, conversely, make the Party 
or any of the Party' s organs organs of the State. UNIP remains an 
unincorporated members' association at common law: a political party. The 
Party's Central Committee and Committee of Chairmen are so closely 
integrated into the general administration of Zambia that the courts of 
law might in future hold that these organs of the Party are State organs.
The Party would possibly be opposed to such a development as it would run 
counter to its wish to maintain the Party as the 'supreme organization' 
in the land. Political leaders would also object to their role and status 
being equated with those of public servants. Such a development would be 
welcomed by some members of the public as it would make the State and not 
the Party, accountable for the acts of Party functionaries whether in 
contract, tort or otherwise. It would go far towards safeguarding the 
interests of the members of the public who at the moment cannot take action 
against the Party because of its illusive status as a members' association 
except in a representative capacity.
(b) Review of Governmental Activities.
Judicial review of Governmental activities can be in the form 
of review of the legislation or of the functions of Ministers and their 
subordinate officers. Under Zambia's One-Party system, where legislation 
is passed without 'opposition', the judiciary has an added responsibility, 
as one of the sentinels of public interests, to ensure that legislation 
passed by a One-Party Parliament or its implementation by the administration 
does not run counter to the letter and spirit of the Constitution, which is 
the supreme law of the land though it can be amended by Parliament.
(i) Judicial Review of Legislation.
Judicial review of legislation is a matter between the Courts 
and the Government and does not affect the role of UNIP. However, in the 
context of the Party's claim that the National Assembly is a wing of the 
Party charged with the responsibility of converting Party policies into 
the . laws of the country, it could be argued that judicial review
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of the legislative function of Parliament is a form of review of Party
policy or its implementation. One of the areas of the Zambian society
where the Party has been unsuccessful in getting a positive response
from those in the leadership of the Party, the Government and the
parastatal organizations, has been in the control of official abuse
of office. Corrupt practices in public office have been on the increase
since the introduction of the One-Party system. In an effort to control
corruption, the Corrupt Practices Act, 1980^ was passed, implementing
the Party's policy that bribery, nepotism and corruption should be
eliminated from public office. The Act provides, vis-a-vis the mode of
trial of a person charged with the offence of corruption, that
An accused person charged with an offence under Part IV 
shall not, in his defence be allowed to make an unsworn 
statement but may give evidence on oath or affirmation 
from the witness b o x .2
That section does not compel an accused person to give evidence;
his right to remain silent is maintained, all that it requires is that
if he elects to say something, he has to do so on oath. On the other
hand, the Constitution of Zambia provides as follows, that
No person who is tried for a criminal offence shall be 
compelled to give evidence at the trial.3
In corruption cases refusal by the accused to give evidence 
might be construed as a sign of guilt and there is, therefore, some 
pressure on the accused to defend himself. The consequences of the 
provisions of the Corrupt Practices Act, were indirectly to compel an 
accused person to give evidence and to give that evidence on oath. To 
that extent, the provisions of the Act purported to amend the provisions 
of the Constitution. The provisions of the Act would not be null and 
void if it could be shown that the Act was intended to amend the 
Constitution and had in fact done so. That could be shown by a
1. Zambia: 1980, No. 14.
2. ibid. sec. 53(1).
3. Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 20(7).
certificate signed by the Speaker that the Act was passed in the manner 
provided for by the Constitution in its amendment. In Mumba v. The People^- 
an attempt was made to compel the accused public officer charged with 
corrupt practices to give evidence on oath in accordance with the 
provisions of the Act. The High Court held that the Corrupt Practices Act 
did not amend the provisions of the Constitution, that there can be no 
implied amendment of the Constitution, that an accused person charged 
under the Act cannot be compelled to give evidence if he elected to make 
an unsworn statement, and, consequently sec. 53(1) of the Act was ultra vires 
Art. 20(7) of the Constitution and to that extent null and void.
The Party's commitment to change the law to comform with the
goals of the 'revolution' is influenced by the notion that the Party should
\
unshac]je the Zambian society from foreign laws and institutions. The value
\
in doing that would be that the running of the Party, its Government and the
society would be based on home-grown norms of conduct which were not only
pertinent to the Zambian way of life but which were ingrained in the Zambian
2
traditions and customary rules. There is no doubt that the Zambian society 
abhors corruption of any form. There is also no doubt that the majority of 
Zambians support the Party's effort to eradicate corrupt practices in public 
office. But most people would, notwithstanding their support for stringent 
laws combating corruption, endorse the principle that a person charged with 
corrupt practices should be presumed innocent until proved guilty and 
should, therefore, be fairly tried.
The decision in Mumba's Case showed that the role of the Party 
as the policy-maker, Parliament as the law-maker and the judiciary as the 
law-interpreter, resemble those which exist in the English system of
1. (1984) ZR 38
2. UNIP: See, for example, President Kaunda's observation,
The 'Watershed' Speech, 30th June-3rd July, 1975;
pp. 16 — 20.
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government. Although the provisions of sec. 53(1) of the Corrupt Practices
Act might have precisely stated the Party's policy of less lenience and
more severity in dealing with public officers accused of corruption, UNIP
could not intervene in the matter. The Court had to decide whether the
procedure laid down by the Constitution of Zambia with regard to making
amendments to that Constitution had or had not been followed,^" or whether
there was the Speaker's certificate showing that those procedures had been 
2
followed, or whether there was a conflict between the provisions of the
Constitution and the Act, and what the legal consequences were of the
presence or absence of any of these requirements. The Party obviously
plays no role in the judicial review of legislation.
(ii) Judicial Review of Presidential Authority.
The establishment of the One-Party system in Zambia has
witnessed a steady increase in the number of cases requiring judicial
review of executive authority. That has been as a result of more Zambians
3
engaging in economic or political ventures which have brought them into
conflict with authority and the Party and its Government becoming more
sensaiive to public criticism than was the case during the multi-party
system. During the multi-party system opposition MPs and members of
opposition parties could criticise UNIP and the Government in or outside
Parliament and could not be detained for that. Under the One-Party system
4
opponents of the Party have at times been placed under detention orders.
Most African Presidents inherited extensive undiluted detention powers 
formerly vested in and used by the colonial Governors and colonial
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 80.
2. Acts of Parliament Act, 1964, No. 64, Cap. 16, sec. 9(c).
3. In Bagaratilal Rao v. Attorney-General (1987) SCZ,
the Supreme Court upheld a detention order for
'economic sabotage': Times of Zambia, 20th November,
1987.
4. See e.g. Kapwepwe and Kaenga, In re (1972) ZR 248
and Chifcata and Lombe v. Attorney-General (1981)
ZR 35/ both cases concerned the detention of former 
leaders of the proscribed UPP.
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administrators, which were in the majority of cases used arbitrarily.
At Independence, however, the Instrument of Independence was ceremonially 
handed over to the leader of the majority party forming the Government, 
on behalf of the people. In the case of Zambia, the President of the State 
is also the President of the Party. Judicial review of executive authority 
is, prima facie, a review of the role of the President in State matters, 
that is the review is restricted to the President's role as Head of State 
and Government under the Constitution of Zambia. So far there has been no 
case before the courts involving the President in his capacity as the 
leader of UNIP. All cases of judicial review of executive authority are 
conducted as matters pertaining to the Constitution of Zambia and the 
President is accordingly represented by the Attorney-General. One could 
speculate that the President, in detaining a political opponent of the 
Party, subjectively acts as the leader of UNIP and his primary concern 
in such a case is the preservation of the Party first and the State second.
The law, however, merely provides that whenever the President
is satisfied that for the preservation of public security it is necessary
to exercise control over any person, he may make an order directing that
such a person should be arrested and detained whether inside or outside
Zambia.^ The determination as to whether a detention is reasonably
2
justifiable is a privilege of the detaining authority. It is difficult 
to know if the President consults the Secretary-General of the Party or 
members of the Committee of Chairmen or any body before he detains political 
opponents of the Party, because those are matters stricted to those in 
authority. There have been cases, however, where the President has detained 
persons following a public demand by the Party (expressed on placards and
1. Zambia: Reg. 33, Preservation of Public Security
Regulations, Cap. 109.
2. In the Matter of Nkaka Chisanga Puta (1982) ZR 80 per Sakala, J., at
p. 108.
slogans at public rallies) that certain named opponents of the Party 
should be detained.^ Judicial review of such cases has been confined to 
the executive authority of the President as President of Zambia and not 
as President of the Party. The fact that the detention was as a result 
of the Party publicly demanding that its President detain the opponents 
of the Party in question, has not resulted in such cases being treated 
as Party matters. Such detentions are State matters because the detentions 
are carried out under the powers vested in the President by the laws of 
Zambia and not the Constitution of UNIP.
That situation should be maintained because it enables a
detained person to seek redress through judicial review under the laws
of the country. Otherwise f if the detentions were regarded as matters
pertaining to the role of the Party, problems of the legal capacity of
the Party would arise and most likely the injured person would fail to
seek any remedy against the Party or its leaders. Although at the moment
most detainees fail to obtain their release from detention or damages
for wrongful detention, at least the procedure to challenge executive
authority exists. The failures are caused by the limited grounds upon
which a detention order can be challenged: first that of mistaken
identity of the detained person and, second, that the grounds supplied
2
for detention were vague. But these are matters between the detaining 
authority (the President) and the detainee and the Party hardly features 
in the conflict. Although between 1983 and 1988 the number of detentions 
for economic 'sabotage' has been on the increase, political detentions 
have continued to be used as means of political control of opponents of 
the Party and the Government.
1. See for instance, Chipimo v. Chona, Secretary-General of UNIP and
Attorney-General (1983) ZR 125.
2. Zambia; Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 27(1) (a).
(ii) Judicial Review of Ministerial Actions.
The phrase 'ministerial actions' refers to the official acts of
Ministers, Ministers of State and civil servants but excludes official
actions of the President and Party functionaries engaged in public
administration, such as Provincial MCCs, PPS and DGs. The role of the
Courts in reviewing ministerial actions or decisions is merely that of
ensuring that public officers act in accordance with the law or ministerial
codes of conduct, where these exist. 'Maladministration' includes bias,
neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, perversity, turpitude
and arbitrariness} matters which could possibly be proved in judicial
review. 'Maladministration', however, also covers matters that cannot be
reached in judicial review such as official discourtesy. Notwithstanding
the twoply phrase of 'the Party and its Government', judicial review of
ministerial decisions or actions is a review of the Government and not of
the Party administration. The role of UNIP in ministerial actions is
confined to the relationship between Ministries and sub-Committees. In
some cases the Party can spring to the defence of an individual against
2
ministerial action, e.g in re Chirwa (Edward Yapwantha) the applicant for
declaration that he had a right to remain in Zambia, had entered Zambia
as part of UNIP's policy of giving shelter to political refugees fleeing
from Malawi. He was granted refugee status under the Refugee (Control) Act,
1970. The Minister responsible for immigration and refugees declared
the applicant's presence in Zambia to be inimical to the public interest,
declared him a prohibited immigrant and accordingly served him with a
4
deportation order under the Immigration and Deportation Act, 1965.
1. UK: The Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1967, sec. 5(1) (a)
did not define 'maladministration'; that is left to 
the Courts: Local Commissioner, Ex Parte Eastleigh 
Borough Council /I988/ 3 WLR 113.
2.(1974) ZR 14, infra, p. 471.
3. Zambia: 1970, No. 40, Cap. 112/ sec. 10.
4. 1965, No. 29, Cap. 122, secs. 22(2) and 26.
The Minister's action was contrary to both the Party policy on 
political refugees and provisions of the Refugee (Control) Act but it 
was in accordance with his powers under the Immigration and Deportation 
Act; he could deport from Zambia any person who, in his opinion, presented 
a threat to peace, law and order in the country. The Court ruled that the 
Minister could not deport a person who had entered Zambia and remained 
therein under the Refugee (Control) Act. That was probably a decision 
which cheered the Party as it was in line with its declared policy.
There is no evidence to suggest that, in carrying out its task
of the review of ministerial functions, a court is subjected to Party
pressures to reach a particular decision. The court works on the assumption
that Parliament acts constitutionally and that the laws it passes are
necessary and reasonable. Consequently, the court presumes that actions of
Ministers etc., are lawful; where such actions are queried, the role of
the court in judicial review is to uphold legality and ensure that the
rule of law, and not the rule of man, prevails. Judicial review of
ministerial actions is, therefore, a matter which does not directly apply
to the role of UNIP. The Party is, however, one way or the other, sometimes
interested in the outcome of a judicial review of ministerial actions.^-So
far there has been no case in which a Minister has objected to judicial
review of his action on the ground that he was carrying out Party policy
2
and that the review would be contrary to Party policy.
(c) Judicial Review of Activities of the Party.
Judicial review of administrative acts can be carried out in 
many different forms, for instance, in the form of hearing of applications 
for review of a decision of an administrative authority, or an appeal 
from such a decision or where a court prevents 311 administrative authority 
from exceeding its statutory powers. There are two contrasting views on
1. Infra, p. 475.
2. In Shipanga v. Attorney-General (1977) ZR 53, the
Attorney-General who objected to carrying out certain
Court instructions, was not defending his own action:
infra, p. 479.
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the source of power of public bodies whose activities are subject to
judicial review: the sole test whether the body of persons is subject
to judicial review is the source of its power and that that source has
been through legislation including subordinate legislation, or the
prerogative. In support of this view, it has been observed as follows:-
For a decision to be susceptible to judicial review the 
decision-maker must be empowered by public law (and not 
merely, as in arbitration, by agreement) to make decisions 
that, if validly made, will lead to administrative action 
or abstention from action by an authority endowed by law
with executive power........  The ultimate source of the
decision-making power is nearly always a statute or 
subordinate legislation made under the statute; but in 
the absence of any statute regulating the subject matter 
of the decision the source of the decision-making power 
may still be the common law itself, i.e., that part of 
common law that is given by lawyers the label 'the prerogative' 
Where this is the source of decision-making, the power is 
confined to executive officers of central as distinct from 
local government and in constitutional practice is generally 
exercised by those holding ministerial rank.^
The other contrasting view has been expressed as follows:-
I do not agree that the source of the power is the sole test 
whether a body is subject to judicial review, nor do I so read 
Lord Diplock's speech. Of course the source of power will 
often, perhaps usually, be decisive. If the source of power 
is a statute, or subordinate legislation under a statute, 
then clearly the body in question will be subject to judicial 
review. If, at the other end of the scale, the source of 
power is contractual, as in the case of private arbitration, 
then clearly the arbitrator is not subject to judicial review.
But in between these extremes there is an area in 
which it is helpful to look not just at the source of the 
power but at the nature of the power. If the body in question 
is exercising public law functions, or if the exercise of its
functions have public law consequences, then that may.......
be sufficient to bring the body within the reach of judicial
review.2
The essential distinction between decisions that do or do not 
produce 'public law consequences' which runs through cases decided
1. Council of Civil Service Union v. Minister for the Civil Service
/I985/ A.C. 374, per Lord Diplock at p. 409; the 
brackets provided in the observation.
2. R. v. Panel On Take-Overs and Mergers, Ex parte Datafin Pic and Others
/1986/ 1 QB 815, per Lloyd. L.J., at p. 847
by the courts, is between a domestic or private tribunal on the one 
hand and a body of persons who are under some public duty on the other.
In the Ex parte Datafin Pic case, the Panel on Take-Overs is an 
unincorporated association without legal personality whose members are 
appointed by and represent the Accepting Houses Committee, representing 
financial institutions in the City of London. It has no statutory, 
prerogative or common law powers and it is not in contractual relationship 
with the financial institutions or those who deal in the financial market. 
Its role is that of enforcing the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers. The 
applicants applied to the High Court for leave to apply for judicial 
review by way, inter alia, of certiorari to quash a decision of the Panel 
and of mandamus to compel the Panel to reconsider their complaint. The 
judge refused leave on the ground that the panel's decision was not 
susceptible to judicial review.
The Court of Appeal held that the supervisory jurisdiction of 
the High Court was adaptable and could be extended to any body which 
performed or operated as an integral part of a system which performed 
public law duties, which was supported by public law sanctions and which 
was under an obligation to act judicially, but whose source of power was 
not simply the consent of those over whom it exercised that power; that 
although the panel purported to be part of a system of self-regulation 
and to derive its power solely from the consent of those whom its decisions 
affected, it was in fact operating as an integral part of a governmental 
framework for the regulation of financial activity in the City of London, 
was supported by a periphery of statutory powers and penalties and was 
under a duty in exercising what amounted to public powers to act judicially 
and, that the Panel's role was subject to judicial review.
In Zambia UNIP operates as a non-statutory self-regulating
1
body engaged in the political business of the Republic. In one case, that
1. Infra, p. 315.
of Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. Attorney-General notwithstanding the earlier
2
decisions that the Party could not sue or be sued in its name and that
the Secretary-General of the Party could not be cited in his official
3
capacity in litigation, the Court entertained an application for a judicial 
review of the activities of UNIP at its General Conference. That decision 
and the decision in Panel on Taker-overs and Mergers confirm that a 
non-statutory self-regulatory body, e.g. UNIP, can have its decisions and 
activities reviewed by the Courts. Some of the consequences of such a review 
are considered in the following Section on remedies in judicial review.
Section 2. Judicial Review : Some Remedies.
Unlike under the UK's Order 53 which has since 1977 provided 
a procedure by which every type of remedy for infringement of the rights 
of an individual that are entitled to protection in public law can be 
obtained in one and the same proceeding by way of an application for a 
judicial review, and which remedy is found to be the most appropriate in 
the light of what has emerged from the hearing of the application, can be 
granted to him, in Zambia the applicant for judicial review has to apply 
for a specific remedy; granted or denied at the discretion of the Court.
(i) Damages.
Damages can be awarded to or against UNIP in contract or tort
4
m  a representative capacity. Damages are rarely awarded in judicial 
review cases, for instance, no court can make an order for damages against 
the Republic in respect of a detention or restriction order signed by 
the President except for physical or mental ill-treatment"* or an error
1. (1979) ZR 267; supra, p. 158.
2. Supra, p. 153 et seq.
3. Supra, p. 155 et seq.
4. Campbell v. Thompson /1953/ 2 WIR 565, an unincorporated body sued in
a representative capacity.
5. In the Matter of Nkaka Chisanda Puta (1982) ZR 80 at p. 109; awarded
K65,000 for physical and mental ill-treatment while in 
detention: Times of Zambia, 25th March, 1989.
in the identity of the person restricted or detained. Most Commonwealth
countries follow the common law principle that there is no general right to
damages for loss or injury suffered by an individual as a result of an
2
invalid administrative action. In Zambia the position was the opposite
3
in that Courts awarded damages to persons 'wrongfully detained', which
in essence meant the person was invalidly or irregularly or unjustly
detained. As stated earlier, the President of Zambia is also President
of the Party and although his restriction or detention powers are
derived from the Constitution of Zambia, the Party is partly involved
in such matters. That can be shown by the Party reaction against the
payment of damages to persons, mostly former UPP leaders, detained by
the President at the time of the introduction of the One-Party system.
The Party resolved that the payment of damages should be discontinued
and directed that
to close the loophole in the law used by by ex-detainees 
to sue the State, the Government should take steps to 
have the law amended so that a person should not be able 
to sue the State after his release. 4
This resolution resulted in the amendment to the Constitution
of Zambia cited above f  What had happened was that following the
establishment of the One-Party system and the prescription of the
\ /
ANC and UPP, a number of political leaders of these organizations were 
detained. Most of these had their detention orders declared invalid, were 
released and later awarded damages in actions for wrongful detention.
The Party's resolution and the subsequent amendment of the Constitution 
have had the effect that courts can hold that the applicant was detained
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 29(8)
as. amended by the Constitution (Amendment)
Act, 1974, No. 18.
2. Read, J.S., "Damages in administrative law", CLB, January, 1988, p. 428.
3. Kawimbe v. Attorney-General (1974) ZR 244.
4. UNIP:
5.
National Council, April, 1974. 
loc. cit., footnote (1) above*
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unlawfully but refuse to award him damages except in those two situations 
of wrongful identity or ill-treatment while in detention^ The amendment 
has not stopped detainees challenging administrative actions, but it 
has removed one of the effective deterrents against executive 'abuse' 
of detention powers: substantial damages paid by the State to persons 
whose restriction or detention orders were found to be irregular or 
based on unreasonable grounds. To some extent, that has contributed 
to an increase in the number of detention orders being issued after 1974.
Except for the link between the President and the Party, UNIP 
as a Party does not possess restriction or detention powers. The 
Secretary-General of the Party, except when performing the functions 
of the President, cannot issue a restriction or detention order against 
any person. If he did, it would be an invalid order and the person
detained or restricted under such an order would sue not the State or
2 3
UNIP or the 'Secretary-General of UNIP', but the Secretary-General in
4
person or m  a representative capacity. Such an action, however, would 
not, strictly speaking, fall within the ambit of 'administrative law' 
or 'judicial review', but under the general law of torts. The reason 
for that would be that the Secretary-General would not have used any 
known administrative powers vested in him. The other reason would be 
that UNIP is not an administrative authority or agent.
(ii) The Writ of Habeas Corpus.
The writ of habeas corpus is one of the prerogative orders 
and its use is restricted to the release of persons unlawfully detained. 
Unlawful detention can be effected by any person over another person.
It is possible for an official of the Party, acting in the name of the
l.Kaira v. Attorney-General (1980) ZR 172.
2.
3.
4.
Supra, p. 156.
Supra, p. 200.
Supra, p. 156.
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Party, to unlawfully detain another person. In practice, the writ is 
used for the release from detention of a person detained under a 
Presidential order. The machinery of detention without trial is intended 
for circumstances where the ordinary criminal law or criminal procedure 
is regarded by the detaining authority as inadequate to meet the 
particular situation. There may be various reasons for the inadequancy: 
there may be insufficient evidence to secure a conviction or it may be 
impossible to secure a conviction without disclosing sources of some 
information which it would be contrary to national interest to disclose.
It is obvious that these are matters of State in which the
Party is not involved. Notwithstanding the 'supervision' of Government
ministries by the sub-Committees of the Committee of Chairmen, criminal
investigations and prosecutions are among the matters in which the
sub-Committees do not interfere; consequently, it has been possible for
a wife of an MCC and a former Prime Minister to be detained on suspicion
of dealing in precious stones and have her application for release under
the writ of habeas corpus rejected.^*
Although there is no decided authority yet on the matter,
it is feasible that the writ of habeas corpus would issue against an
official of the Party who unlawfully detained another person. The legal
capacity of the Party in such a case would be irrelevant. The writ is
directed against the custodian of the unlawfully detained person. In as
far as detentions by the President are concerned, courts in Zambia
enforce Zambian law but they also follow English decisions, particularly
those decided under the Preventive Detention Regulations which were in
2
force in Britain as a war-time measure. In Zambia the criticism is
1. Mudenda v. Attorney-General (1979) ZR 245.
2. In re Sikhuka (1978) ZR 138, per Hadden, J. , at p. 143.
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that detention orders are made during peace-time (notwithstanding the 
so-called 'permanent emergency' caused by the security situation in 
southern Africa) and the detaining authority is regarded as exercising 
discretionary powers which the courts of law cannot inquire into. As a 
consequence, the writ of habeas corpus stands in most cases merely as 
a scare-crow to the administrators in most cases.
(iii) Prerogative Orders.
The role of UNIP hardly calls for the application of any of
the prerogative orders,although these have been applied against the
appropriate institutions. For instance, the prerogative order of
certiorari has been used against the University of Zambia Senate
Gratjuate Committee in a case in which it was held that the High Court
had jurisdiction to hear and determine and quash a decision of the
University Senate Graduate Committee.^ Prohibition and certiorari
will lie to prevent a body, which cannot be described as a court in
any strict sense, from acting in excess of its judicial or quasi-judicial
jurisdiction if it has legal authority to determine questions affecting
the rights of subjects. The only possible area in which these orders
might be used against the Party is that of the role of the Appointments
and Disciplinary sub-Comnittee of the Committee of Chairmen which exercises
quasi-judicial powers in its role as the organ with original and
2
appellate jurisdiction in respect of discipline in the Party. Persons 
appearing before the Party •'s disciplinary organs are often scared to 
question suah proceedings and as a result not much is known of what 
goes on. Thus, although that sub-Committee does not belong to or falls 
within •the traditional categories of bodies to which these orders
may issue, such as tribunals, inferior courts, local authorities,
1. Mwisiya v. The Council of the University of Zambia (1981) ZR 247.
2. UNIP: quasi-judicial functions of the Central Committee
and the National Council ad hoc Appeals Committee; 
Constitution, 1988, regs. 17 and 18, respectively, 
should similarily be subject to judicial review.
ministries, statutory and non-statutory bodies, however, these orders may 
be applicable if the sub-Committee was alleged to have acted contrary to or in 
breach of 'natural justice', e.g. where a member was expelled from the 
membership of the Party without being formally charged. It is possible 
that such a person may apply to the High Court for an order of either 
prohibition to prohibit the expulsion or certiorari to quash the decision 
of the Party. The Party in such proceedings would have to be proceeded 
against in a representative capacity. Under a One-Party system membership 
of the Party is important for some people and its denial, suspension or
ntermination might result in serious financial consequences, e.g. lo^e^of
employment in the Party or of a seat in the National Assembly in case of
a member of Parliament or a post in the public service.
Under English law, certiorari is not available to challenge
the legality of decisions of trade unions or professional bodies, e.g. where
the relations between the member and the trade union or professional body
is based on contract.^" The membership of a political organizations is
2
considered to be contractual. It is very likely that these English decisions
are bound to be followed in Zambia vis-a-vis the relationship between UNIP
and its members. But certiorari could, however, be invoked against the Party's
acts which might be considered to be exercised under judicial or quasi-judicial
powers, e.g. Central Committee's^ and National Council ad hoc Appeals 
4
Committee's disciplinary functions and appellate jurisdictions in disciplinary 
matters, particularly in cases of appeals against expulsion from the 
membership of the Party, in which these bodies perform quasi-judicial functions.
1. R. v. BBC, Ex parte Lavelle /1983/ 1 WLR 23.
2. Conservative and Unionist Central Office v. Burrell (Inspector of
Taxes) /1982/ 1 WLR 522, see Lawton, L.J. at p. 525.
3. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Reg. 17.
4. ibid. Reg. 18.
5. R. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, Ex parte Datafin Pic. /1986/ A.C. 815
see Sir John Donaldson, MR, at p. 839 where he says that 
the absence of legislation such as affects trade unions 
should not enable the Panel to "go on its way cocooned 
from the attention of the courts" while it performed 
quasi-judicial functions.
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It is very likely that political leaders would resent such
supervision of the organs of the Party by the courts. The courts, on the
other hand, might find cases involving the functions of Party organs,
'too hot' to handle. That however, should not deter judicial review of
quasi-judicial functions of some Party organs.
The order of mandamus is also one that might prove difficult to
apply to the role of the Party in Zambia. Mandamus can be used in
relation to want of performance by an administrative authority or agent
of its statutory functions. UNIP operates under the provisions of its
Constitution, which is not delegated legislation, but a political document.
It could be argued that mandamus could possibly issue if the Party failed
to carry out some of its functions as stipulated in its Constitution or
the Constitution of Zambia, e.g. those requiring that the Party Congress
should elect the Party President every five years^ who become the sole
2
Presidential Candidate in the election of the President of Zambia. This 
function of the Party Congress is not discretionary, but obligatory and 
there is no alternative method of selecting the Presidential Candidate 
except through the machinery of the Party Congress. The only difficult in 
obtaining the order of mandamus in such a situation would possibly arise 
in connection with the requirement of the locus standi of the applicant.
If the Party failed to convene the Party Congress, the Attorney- 
General or a member of the Party claiming to be a prospective Presidential 
Candidate, would probably satisfy the locus standi requirement. Since there 
is a public duty on the Party to convene the Party Congress and thereat 
elect the Party President, mandamus would issue in the event of the Party 
failing to perform that function. The Court will, as a general rule, 
and in the exercise of its discretionary powers grant mandamus
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 73(9).
2. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 38(3)*
supra, p. 137*
except when there is an alternative specific remedy at law which is not
less convenient, beneficial and effective.^
Under Zambia's One-Party system it is the Party around which
political activities in the country, take place. Parliament and the
Government still play equally important roles, but the Party organs
assume a dominant role. The function of the prerogative orders are to
regulate executive, governmental and other administrative powers; setting
limits or compelling the performance of those powers. These orders were
developed and applied for and in a political system of the UK dominated
not by the ruling political party of the day, but by Parliament. In Zambia
the ruling political party is permanently in office; some of its officials
2
performing political as well as administrative functions. Judicial review 
of administrative authorities should, under the One-Party system, take 
into account the role of UNIP in Zambia's public administration. For example, 
to be realistic, it might have to be declared that, in avoidance of 
doubt, the Party is an administrative organ of the Government and that 
its officers are public officers. It is unrealistic to cling to the 
notion that UNIP and the Government of Zambia are two distinct and 
separate institutions an^ that, for instance, certiorari or mandamus 
should apply only to the latter and not to the former. It would be ironic 
for the .Party to decline to be closely identified with its Government.
At the moment it appears as if what the politicians have joined together, 
the law purports to put asunder.
1. Zimba v. Registrar of Societies and Attorney-General (1981) ZR 335:
concerned applications for certiorari and 
mandamus to quash the first defendant's decision 
refusing to register a branch of a church suspected 
to be connected with the banned Lumpa Church of 
the late prophetess Alice Lenshina Mulenga; orders 
granted.
2. Zambia: e.g. the Secretary of Defence and Security;
Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act, 1980,
No. 10, Art. 55A; supra, p. 205.
262.
(iv) Equitable Remedies.
Declaration and injunction are major equitable remedies used
in administrative law. Declaration is widely used not to coerce a party
to do or refrain from doing, anything: it confirms the legal status of
a relationship. A distinction has been drawn between a 'retrospective'
and 'prospective' rulings in administrative l a w T h e  former does not
operate retrospectively to invalidate the particular decision that
triggered the application for judicial review but merely confirms the
status of the matter in issue as at the time of declaration, and the
latter operates to govern future exercise of the discretion in question.
A declaration has its use on those occasions when it is declared
that the act or decision of an administrative agency was ultra vires
its statutory powers, or where a relationship was affected by a breach
of natural justice, or where it is desired to challenge the legality
of delegated legislation, or where it is intended to establish that an
administrative agency is bound by an act or statement of its officer
or representative. An application for a declaration might be accompanied
2
by a claim for damages, for instance, in Valji v. Mulji appellants
sought a declaration and damages for having been unlawfully expelled
from an unincorporated association. The Court declined to decide upon
the rights of persons associated together when the association possessed
no property. For the action to lie, the appellants were required to
show that by the expulsion they were deprived of a right of property
vested in them as members of the association.
This decision was to some extent in line with the English
3
decision in Young v. Ladies imperial Club, in which the expulsion of
1. Lewis, C. "Retrospective and Prospective Rulings in Administrative
Law", PA, Spring, 1988, 78-105, p. 78.
2. (1952) EACA 193.
3. /1920/ 2 KB 523.
a member from a proprietary club carried out by the members of the 
Committee and one of the members of the committee had not received 
a notice of the meeting at which the applicant was expelled, the 
expulsion was held to be invalid. However, the question whether the 
applicants in these two cases were justly expelled should not been 
affected by the fact that the association was or was not a proprietory 
one. That question would have been relevant as to claim for damages.
A 'proprietary club' does not mean a club 'with property', for instance, 
UNIP owns buildings, companies and newspapers such as the Times of 
Zambia and the Zambia Daily Mail. It means a club in which each member 
owns a financial interest: he has invested money into the club and 
earns some income from what he has put into the association. UNIP is, 
therefore, not a 'proprietary club': nobody owns UNIP.^
The Supreme Court decision in Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. 
Attorney-General,2 although the declarations sought were not granted, 
establishes the rule that a person could ask the courts of law to 
declare proceedings of the Party Congress 'unconstitutional' etc. That 
decision, however, left a number of vital questions unanswered, for 
example, it did not explain the legal basis of its intervention, or 
the status of the Constitution of UNIP, or the decisions of the Party 
Congress, or the locus standi of each of the applicants. On the facts 
of that case, only Nkumbula, who was a delegate at the Conference and had 
actually tried to lodge his nomination papers as a presidential 
candidate, had a sufficient locus standi to support his application 
for the declarations he sought, which included one that proceedings at 
the Conference should be declared null and void. The second applicant, 
who was not qualified to contest the presidency and was not a delegate
Infra, p. 386.
2. (1979) ZR 267.
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at the conference, therefore had no locus standi in the matter;
the manner in which the conference adopted the Party Constitution and 
elected MCCs and the President of the Party.
One of the consequences of the Court's intervention in that 
case, is that prima facie, 'any person' could apply for a declaratory 
ruling or for an injunction (prohibitory, mandatory or interlocutory) 
against the Party. A prohibitory injunction prevents the respondent
o
from continuing with acts injhrous to the applicant or in violation of 
a law. A mandatory injuction commands a person to act in accordance 
with the law where the applicant had a private right which arose out 
of a failure to perform some public duty, interlocutory injunction, 
where granted, is intended to preserve the status quo between the parties 
until the matter in issue is disposed later.
In view of the power political parties possess over their 
members in particular and the public in general, there is a need for 
some form of external control over them. The nature and status of a 
political party, however, make declarations and injunctions ineffective 
remedies against abuse of political power by politicians. In the 
Nigerian case of Abubakar v. Abu Smith ^ it was stated that it is trite 
law that a court cannot make an unenforceable order, for instance, in a 
case in which there was undisputed averment that the amendment (to the 
party's constitution) complained of were popular and that even if the 
relief sought was granted, there would be nothing to prevent the 
respondents soon thereafter from summoning a meeting of the society and 
passing a proper resolution ratifying the amendments. Declarations, 
whether made to apply 'retrospectively' or 'prospectively' and injunctions 
(with the exception of mandatory injunction) are ineffective remedies with
1. (1973) SC 31, per Elias, CJ, at p.. 35.
which to safeguard some rights and interests of the members of the 
Party or of the general public because they are bound to be ignored 
by a political organization which considered such court intervention 
as interference in political matters. They are, however, a deterrence 
in that no political party would like to be seen to be in conflict 
with the law. Most political parties would comply with court rulings.
In Zambia if the Supreme Court had declared the 1978 Party Conference's 
adoption of the Party Constitution and the election of the President of 
the Party and the MCCs 'null and void', the Party would probably had 
ignored such a declaration, or, instead of going back to the Conference, 
the Party would have asked Parliament to pass a law validating the 
proceedings at that Conference.
In the converse situation, the Party, notwithstanding its 
unsettled legal capacity, can apply to the Court for a declaratory 
judgement on matters of concern to its role, for example if a 
Secretary-General of the Party were to refuse to accept his dismissal 
from that post by the President - which has not yet happened but which
can happen - the Party could, through a representative application, seek
the court's intervention and declare the dismissal to have been validly 
made. The Party could be granted an injunction restraining the former 
Secretary-General from acting as such or from remaining in office or in 
possession of Party property.^- The anticipation that the Party might alsi 
seek the court's assistance, works in favour of the Party complying with 
court order made against it. In that case it is not the fear of the 
equitable maxim that he who comes to equity must come with clean hands, 
but that he should be one who never ignored an equitable decree.
1. Nyasaland Trade Union Congress v. Nkolokesa (1963) R & N LR 184 f a
declaration was sought against a General Secretary 
(the respondent) by an unincorporated organization
(the applicant) who had refused to accept his formal
dismissal from office. Infra, p. 405.
Section 3. Administrative Controls and Remedies.
An administrative control or remedy is one provided for 
by a statute and does not involve a recourse to a court of law. 
Administrative controls and remedies can, therefore, be contrasted 
with judicial review remedies considered in the previous Section 
which are obtainable through a recourse to a court of law,. This Section 
is confined to the role of UNIP in Parliamentary controls, the 
enforcement of the Leadership Code and other regulatory legislation 
concerned with the behaviour of those in the leadership of the Party 
and the Government.
(a) Parliamentary Controls.
Parliamentary controls of ministerial responsibility are 
carried out through Questions asked in the National Assembly by 
backbenchers and through such Committees of the House as the Committee 
on Delegated Legislation, the Select Committees and the Committee of 
the Whole House (which considers budget matters). Hie functions of 
these committees include maintaining a continuous scrutiny of the 
running of government institutions. Although at times a Parliamentary 
Select Committee has considered policy matters concerned with the role 
of UNIP,^ Parliamentary scrutiny of public institutions does not 
include the administration of the Party, except in one respect in 
which the National Assembly scrutinises Party finances. Hiat 
exercise, however, is restricted to the manner the Party spends its 
annual grant-in-aid from the Government. The grant is paid through 
the office of the Prime Minister, who answers questions in the House 
on how. the Party utilized the money. The grant cannot be paid direct
1. Zambia: Ther Report of the Special Parliamentary
Committeej 14th. October, 1977, Government 
Printerf Lusaka. (Chairman: J.M. Mwanakatwe).
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to the Party because it is not a Government ministry or department to
which a Government budgetary disbursement can be made. In as far as
Government finances are concerned, UNIP is just a political party. The
Government's Auditor-General audits the Party books only with regard
to the grant and he is not authorized to have access to any books,
records, returns or reports or other documents if such access would
involve the disclosure of any matters or deliberations of a secret or
confidential nature of the Central Committee, the Cabinet or any
sub-Committee of the Central Committee.  ^ This restriction merely
expresses the Party's objection to control by Parliament, the institution
which considers the Auditor-General's report; otherwise the Auditor—
General has access to Government secrets concerned with his functions.
The principle that political organizations should receive
some financial support from the Government to enable them operate
efficiently, is acceptable under both multi-party and single-party
2
systems. It is followed in the UK and was adopted under Nigeria's
multi-party system.^ In the USSR, as in the case of the UK, payment of
such funds to the political party, the Communist Party of the Soviet
4
Union, is not regulated by legislation. Unlike the UK but like Zambia, 
the power of the Communist Party to draw or receive financial support
5
from the State is an essential element of the supremacy of the Party. 
Under a multi-party system all lawful political organizations receive 
such support and the question of 'supremacy' does not arise. In Zambia 
the payment of the grant and the Government's control — which is in fact
1. Zambia; Public Audit Act, 1980, No. 8, sec. 7(2) (ii).
2. Johnson, N., In search of the Constitution, Pergamon, 1977, p. 45.
3. Nigeria; Constitution, 1978, No. 25, Art. 208(c).
4. McNeal, R.H., "The Beginning of Communist Party Financial Exactions
from the Soviet State", in Loeber, D.A. (Ed.), 
Ruling Communist Parties and Hieir Status Under 
Law; Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht,
1986, p.. 189.
5. ibid. p. 189..
ineffective since the Government does not tell the Party how to 
spend the money - is intended to narrow the g$pe jbetween the Party 
and its Government; the Party, however, maintaining the dominant role, 
hence the refusal of Government access to its internal affairs.
The Party does use Parliament in carrying out certain public 
inquiries into allegations of maladministration, for instance, in a 
parastatal organization. For example, the Party Committee at the Place 
of Work^ at Zambia Railways Headquarters, Kabwe, on 12th November, 1975, 
resolved that the Party carry out investigations of abuse of office in 
Zambia Railways. The Zambia Railways Amalgamated Workers' Union (ZRAWU) 
on 18th August, 1977, also resolved that Zambia Railways management 
should be investigated. The Party could not conduct such an inquiry due to 
its legal incapacity. President Kaunda had to set up a Commission of
■r 2inquiry, under the chairmanship of the Minister of State, Ministry of
Power, Transport and Communications, to investigate and report (to the
Government) on the allegations of tribalism, nepotism, corruption and
theft of property by persons in the management of Zambia Railways. The
Commission recommended that in order to eliminate tribalism, nepotism
and corruption and incidence of theft, which the Commission found to
be rampant in the Railways, certain officials should be dismissed or
transferred from Zambia Railways. The Commission found that "the
problems identified are so complex and the evils are so ingrained that
no single solution is tabulated or a set of solutions can be suggested
3
which can have a lasting effect”.
This observation, although restricted to Zambia Railways, 
could also refer to any other parastatal organization in Zambia. Ihese 
organizations are not effectively controlled by Parliament. The Report
1. On Party Committees at Place of Work, infra, p. 432.
2. Zambia: S.I. 1977/165, Schedule, Term of Reference, 1.
3. Report of the Commission of inquiry into the
affairs of Zambia Railways; March, 1978, p. 95.
(Chairman: J.C. Mumpanshya).
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was followed by dismissals of some top personnel and re-organization 
of Zambia Railways management. The dismissal of top management was 
carried out by the President, who is a component of Parliament; to 
that extent it could be said that the inquiry and the implementation 
of its recommendations proved an effective control by Parliament of a 
parastatal organization. Otherwise, Parliamentary controls are often 
restricted to Government ministries.
(b) Control through the Leadership Code.
The first few years of Independence made UNIP leadership 
aware of a number of truisms of independence, and among these were that 
some of the leaders who were engaged in the struggle for self-government 
and independence, had looked forward to comfortable life after achieving 
self-rule; secondly, that the socio-political system inherited at 
independence was basically Capitalist, and, thirdly, that the masses had 
got an impression that independence had brought only a change of masters: 
a replacement of colonial by local masters. There were some obvious fears in 
the UNIP leadership that the 'masses' might organize against the new rulers 
in the same manner as they had organized against colonial rulers. The 
fear arose from the fact that while the social conditions of the masses 
remained unchanged or in some cases deteriorated, that of the leaders 
flourished. Consequently, some form of control of economic activities 
had to be introduced of those in the the leadership of
(a) the Party,
(b) the Government,
(c) any corporation, body or board, including institutions 
of higher learning, in which the Party or Government 
had a majority or controlling interest,
(d) local authority,
(e) any commission established by or under any law, and
(f) the ZCTU or any registered trade union.^
1. Zambia: The Leadership Code, S.I. 1976/88, Reg. 2,
the First Schedule. Tanzania the 'Leadership 
Code' provisions are contained in the State 
Constitution, the Elections Act, 1970, No. 25 
(now No. 1 of 1984) and the Civil Service 
Regulations, G.N. 1970 No. 228: sec. 2, the 
Committee for.the Enforcement of the leadership 
Code Act, 1973, No. 6.
On the eve of the introduction of the Leadership Code, the
emphasis was placed on the establishment of the One-Party system and
that the Code was an aspect of that system:-
I should stress that the leadership code is part and 
parcel of One-Party Participatory Democracy. Under 
the new social order, the leadership are like the 
judiciary and the church; mirrors through which we, 
as a nation should see how clean or how dirty we are.^
The Constitution of Zambia establishes a Leadership Committee
2
composed of five members appointed by the President, which is empowered 
to make regulations (to be known at the Leadership Code), applicable to 
the office-holders, their spouses and children under the age of twentyone 
years, in the institutions listed in the Leadership Code. These leaders 
are required to declare their assets and liabilities to the Chairman of 
the Leadership Committee, who happens to be the Secretary-General of 
UNIP. The President may appoint any other person as the Chairman of 
the Committee, however, it is a firm policy of the Party that the 
superintendence of the conduct and discipline of those in the 'leadership 
of the nation', is a matter for the Party. The Leadership Code was, 
therefore, intended to provide a form of 'national control, of those 
persons in the leadership of public institutions, including the Party.
The provisions of the Leadership Code itself, tend to blur 
that perception by requiring that every person employed in any of the 
stipulated institutions and earning more than K2,500 per annum (which 
salary is below most high and low ranking officers, including typists 
and secretaries) should not be in receipt of more than one income. This 
means that no 'leader' should engage in commercial activities such as 
letting of houses or business enterprises or private professional 
practices of lawyers, doctors or accountants. Some of these
1. UNIP: Leadership Code and Responsibilities of the
Leadership in the Creation of a New Social 
Order; President Kaunda, opening National 
Council, 2nd December, 1972.
2. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 32 as
amended by the Constitution (Amendment) Act,
1975, No. 22.
prohibited economic activities are 'harmless' to the society, if anything,
they are beneficial, for example if leaders engaged in commercial and
other financial businesses, they are bound to provide employment to their
fellow-countrymen. The prohibition, however, is based on the notion that
leaders were bound to use their official positions to enrich themselves.
Some of the prohibited activities could be considered as 'harmful' to the
society, for instance, abuse of office through bribery or use of official
information for personal ends.^
Members of the public are strongly in favour of a vigorously
enforced leadership code; hence, UNIP's National Council resolution that
leaders opposed to the Leadership Code, should resign and that those in
breach of the Code should have their salaries deducted by fifty per cent
2
(50%, during the months of July and August, 1975). Without a further
notice, this resolution was implemented and deductions were made from
the salaries of thousands of 'leaders' who were in breach of the Code,
mainly having failed to declare their assets and liabilities. Since the
National Council of the Party does not have legislative powers, the
deductions were unlawful and were later refunded to the leaders. The
Constitution was consequently amended to provide that where,as a result
of an inquiry held by the Leadership Committee, the Committee was
satisfied that a holder of a specified office in relation to whom such
an inquiry was held had failed to comply withf or had committed a breach
of the Leadership Code, the Committee may impose on the erring leader
any of the penalties, that is censure, suspension from office for a
period not exceeding six months, or forfeiture of emoluments of the
specified office or any other income in whole or in part for such
3
period as it may deem fit.
1. Zambia; Leadership Code, S.I. 1976/88, Regs. 6, 7 and 8.
2. UNIP; National Council, July, 1975, Resolution (d).
3. Zambia; Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 33A(4),
as amended by the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 
1975, No. 22.
The role of UNIP in the enforcement of the Leadership Code is
through the Secretary-General's chairmanship of the Leadership Committee.
Although members of the public are keen to see the Code firmly enforced
and are allowed to make allegations to the Secretary-General that a
leader had not complied with, or, had committed a breach of, the Code,^
in practice it is difficult for the public to 'see how dirty the
leadership is' because access to declarations of assets and liabilities
of leaders is restricted. In practice people are scared of asking for
the permission to inspect any declaration for fear of unknown
consequences. Members of the security forces are known to have regular
access to declarations in their investigations against leaders under the
2
Corrupt Practices Act, 1980 which is applicable to persons working or 
holding office in a 'public body', which include the Party, the Government, 
a local authority, parastatal organization or any board or commission 
appointed by the Party or Government or under any written law.^ The 
Leadership Committee and the Anti-Corruption Commission complement each 
other's efforts. The former is concerned with the leaders' financial or 
commercial activities and the latter is concerned with investigations of 
and prosecutions for abuse of office. Certiorari, mandamus and injunction 
could be envoked against the Secretary-General's refusal of permission to 
inspect a declaration of assets and liabilities although he acts in his 
discretion if it can be shown that the discretion was wrongly or 
unreasonably used.
(i) Method of Enforcement of the Code.
UNIP does not play a part in the enforcement of the Leadership 
Code; however, through the chairmanship of the Leadership Committee by the 
Seeretary-General, the enforcement of the Code has become part and parcel 
of UNIP's role. Allegations of breach of the Code are made to the
1. Zambia; Leadership Code, S.I. 1976/88, Reg. 12.
2. 1980, No. 14.
3. ibid. sec..3.
Leadership Committee in secret but the Committee is required to
observe rules of natural justice, for instance, the accused leader
should be informed in writing the nature of the breach of the Code
he is accused of committing and he is allowed legal representation.
Although a leader cannot appeal against the decision of the Leadership
Committee,^ that should not per se stop him from applying for judicial
review of the Leadership Committee's decision if he were dissatisfied
with it or what transpired at the inquiry. In addition to the sanctions
provided for by the Constitution of Zambia referred to on the previous
page, the Leadership Committee may direct that the leader dispose of his
share in the offending economic activity or dispose part of his land
2
if it were in excess of the allowed ten hectares. Penalties such as 
censure, suspension or forfeiture of emoluments are effected by the 
Committee through the appropriate institution of deployment of the 
leader found in breach of the Code.
Where the Leadership Committee is of the view that the 
allegation against a leader is too serious to warrant a removal from 
office, it must refer the matter to a Tribunal consisting of a Chairman 
appointed by the Chief Justice, who should be a person qualified to be 
appointed a judge of the High Court or a serving judge of the High 
Court or the Supreme Court. So far only one case was referred to the 
Chief Justice on an allegation of a Minister not declaring fire-arms.
Hie matter was dropped following the Minister's removal from office.
With the enactment of the Corrupt Practices Act, 1980, criminal aspects 
of maladministration are now dealt with under that Act. The emphasis 
in the administrative control of those in the leadership of public 
institutions have shifted to penal sanctions. One of the reasons for 
this shift in emphasis might be that the Party and its Government
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 33A(5).
A leader may appeal against the decision of 
the Leadership Code Tribunal under this same 
provision.
2. Leadership Code, S.I. 1976/88 Reg. 11.
are fighting a losing-battle against abuse of office through corrupt 
practices such as corruption and bribery. Although the Leadership 
Code provides that a leader should not directly or indirectly solicit
or accept benefits or gifts on account of anything done or to be done
or omitted to be done by him in the discharge of his d u t i e s i t  does 
not provide for criminal prosecution for abuse of office.
) Effectiveness of Controls through Leadership Code.
The inclusion of UNIP in the categories of public institutions 
to which the Leadership Code should apply, was probably influenced by 
President Kaunda's view that the Code was part and parcel of the
One-Party system. The Zambian form of the Leadership Code was adopted
2 3
under the multi-party system of Nigeria and Papua New Guinea. The
major differences between these Codes and the Zambian Code, were with
the chairmanship of the leadership code enforcement agency and the
concept or the philosophy behind the role of a code of leadership
conduct. In Nigeria the enforcement of the Code of Conduct was entrusted
to a Code of Conduct Bureau, composed of nine members appointed by the
Senate and a Code of Conduct Tribunal under a Chairman who was required
to be a person qualified to hold office of a judge of a superior court
4
of record in Nigeria, appointed by the President. Probably because the
1. Zambia: Leadership Code, S.I. 1976/88, Regs. 6 and 7.
2. Nigeria: Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee,
Part II; 1976, p. 40; Nigeria Federal Ministry 
of Information, Lagos. (Chairman: Chief F.R.A. 
Williams).
3. Goldring, J. , The Constitution of Papua New Guinea; Law Book Company,
Sydney, 1978, p. 33.
4. Nigeria: Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria, 1978,
Fifth Schedule, Par. 15(1)(a) to (d). This 
provision was saved when the Constitution was 
suspended (Constitution (Suspension and 
Modification) Decree, No. 1, Clause 1(2), 31st 
December, 1983) and is enforced by a military 
tribunal (Recovery of Public Property (Special 
Military Tribunals) Decree, No. 3, Clause 3;
31st December, 1983).
enforcement was entrusted to public officers and not to politicians
as in the case of Zambia,^" some public actions were taken against
political leaders accused of being in breach of the Code of Conduct,
2
for instance, in Ebiesuwa v. Commissioner of Police, it was held
that a Member of the then Ondo State House of Representatives who was
a legal practitioner by profession, was a leader as defined by the
Code of Conduct and as such he could not be a Member of the House and
practice law at the same time against the provision of the Code which
3
forbade leaders engaging in commercial activities. In Papua New
4
Guinea, in The State v. Independent Tribunal, Ex Parte Moses Sasakila, 
the applicant, a Minister in the Government of Papua New Guinea, failed 
to stop his removal from the office after he was found to be in breach 
of the Leadership Code: he had failed to declare his assets and 
liabilities as required by the Code. That punishment was considered 
too severe and the law was later changed to provide for censure, 
suspension from office and forfeiture of emoluments.^
Although in Tanzania it has been claimed that the leadership
g
Code of that country has been effectively enforced, the Leadership 
Codes of Tanzania and Zambia are ideologically ori^teid. The chairmanship 
of the Leadership Committee in Zambia is based on the notion that the 
Party is the custodian of public morality and the enforcement of the 
Code is done in the context of Humanism: avoidance of the exploitation 
of man by man. Administrative controls of those in the leadership are
1. Zambia: The Leadership Committee is composed of the
Secretary-General (Chairman), the Prime Minister, 
Secretary of Defence and Security and two MCCs.
2. (1982) 3 NCLR 339.
3. Nigeria: Constitution, 1978, op. cit., Fifth Schedule,
Clause 2 (a) and (b).
4. (1976) PNGLR 391
5. Papua New Guinea: Leadership Code (Alternative Penalties) Act,
1977.
6. Nyerere, J.K., "The Arusha Declaration After Ten Years", in Coulson,
A., (Ed.) African Socialism in Practice; The 
Tanzanian Experience; Spokesman, 1979, p. 35.
intended to reform 'capitalist tendencies' in the leadership and not to 
punish those who fail to comply with the Code. The Secretary-General is 
expected to assess political consequences of any sanction applied against 
an erring leader both on the leader as well as the image of the Party.
The result of such consideration is contradictory in that while the 
Party might like to punish breaches of the Leadership Code, vigorous 
enforcement might reveal the depth and width of financial and commercial 
involvement of many leaders in the service of the Party and Government. 
Consequently, the enforcement of the Code in Zambia, unlike in Nigeria and 
Papua New Guinea, has been 'invisible', for instance, not through formal 
charges before the Leadership Committee or Tribunal, but through reshuffles 
in the leadership of the Party, the Government and parastatal institutions.
That public officers, unless restrained, would use their 
official positions to favour their own social interests, seems to be one 
of the common grounds behind the introduction of leadership codes in many 
countries. Ostentatiously opulent living among those in the leadership of 
the political party, the Government or parastatal bodies, notwithstanding 
the presence of the Leadership Code, has adversely affected UNIP's claim 
that it stood for and was working towards a socialist classless society 
in Zambia. The Presidential exemption from the provisions of the Code^ has 
enabled certain leaders to retain public office while en^aa^ing in private 
businesses. Such option devalues the whole concept of administrative 
control of those holding office in public institutions. For those who are 
not exempt but remain surrounded by opportunities to make economic gains 
while they occupy public office, the rewards for successful avoidance or 
evasion are open to them to follow. Under such circumstances, the Code 
could hardly be effectively enforced.
1. Zambia: Leadership Code, S.I. 1976/88, Reg. 5.
(c) Control through the Commission for Investigations.
The recommendation that a public officer should be appointed to 
receive and investigate complaints from members of the public against
unfair or administrative abuse of office or authority under the One-Party
1 2 
system, was made by the NCEOPPDZ and was accepted by the Government.
The officer was to investigate allegations of tribalism, nepotism,
intimidation and all forms of discrimination taken by or on behalf of any
Government Ministry or the Party. The Independence Constitution (of 1964)
did not contain the office of the ombudsman, probably because such an
3
office did not then exist in the UK; it was established in 1967. The
institution of the Justiteombudsman was first established in Sweden in 
4
1713 and it has been statutorily adopted in one form or another in many
5 6 7 8
African states such as Tanzania, Ghana, Sudan and Nigeria. In Zambia
the Investigator-General (the Ombudsman) who should be a former judge of
the High Court or the Supreme Court or a person who is qualified to be
appointed a judge of the High Court, together with three Commissioners
9
of the Commission for Investigations, are appointed by the President.
The institutions and public officers open to investigations
1. Zambia: NCEOPPDZ, Report, 1972; p. 38 par. 129 (6) (d).
2. NCEOPPDZ-SRAG, 1972; pp. 18-19.
3. UK: Parliamentary Commissioner Act, 1967. On his role
see: Bradley, A.W., "The Case-Work of the British 
Parliamentary Ombudsman", The Ombudsman Journal,
No. 3, September, 1983, p. 12.
4. Rowart, D.C. (Ed.) The Ombudsman, Citizen's Defender; Allen, 1968,
p. 24, and Stacey, F., Ombudsmen Compared:
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978, p. 1.
5. Tanzania: Interim Constitution, 1965, No. 43, Cap. 596,
Art. 67(4) and Permanent Commission of Inquiry
Act, 1966, No. 25, sec. 3.
6. Ghana: Constitution, 1969, Arts. 100 and 101.
7. Sudan: Central Bureau of Public Control Act, 1975.
8. Nigeria: Public Complaints Commission Decree, No. 31,
16th October, 1975.
9. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 118(2) (a).
The previous three and the present (1989) 
Investigator-Generals have come from the Supreme Court.
by the Investigator-General are identical to those covered by the
Leadership Code.^ His functions are to investigate public complaints and
to redress genuine injury suffered by members of the public as a result
of maladministration in the Party or the Government. The ombudsman does
in the process defend and legitimize administrative decisions and actions
by upholding them as validly made and dismissing a complaint as frivolous,
vexatious, trivial, unwarranted or not made in good faith. He can decline
to investigate a complaint on the ground that the complainant had not
exhausted available remedies under the existing administrative practices
or written law, or, that investigation might be against public policy. The
powers of the ombudsman to investigate or not are probably beyond judicial
review, though the only case on that point is unsatisfactory. In Re Fletcher's 
2
Application (Note) the Court of Appeal in a note, and not in a reasoned 
decision, declined to grant mandamus to compel the Parliamentary Commissioner 
to conduct an inquiry. In Zambia the volume of complaints is large, the 
number of cases investigated is small and those concerned with the Party 
are negligible, as the following Table shows:
3
TABLE C: Complaints to Investigator-General (in brackets against UNIP) .
Complaints 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Received 500(5) 562(4) 555(1) 557(3) 713(3) 989(3)
Declined 243(1) 275(2) 166(1) 228(1) 320(3) 495(3)
Inquired 275(0) 287(0) 389 (0) 329(0) 393(0) 494 (0)
Completed 175(0) 171(0) 158(0) 111(0) 119(0) 151(1)
Withdrawn 24(4) 13(0) 18(0) 14 (0) 16(0) 17(0)
The complaints against UNIP are extremely low either because the 
ombudsman declines to investigate the Party or that Party functionaries 
are investigated under other public institutions, e.g. the DG through the 
District Council. The complaints against UNIP alleged failure by
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 117(4);
supra, p. 269.
2. /1970/ 2 All ER 527.
3. Compiled from the Investigator-General's Annual
Reports of the indicated years; infra, p. 279.
the Party to pay gratuity and allowances,^ failure to provide employment
2
to the complainant, suspension from duty and non-payment of over-time,
3 4
failure to pay terminal benefits, wrongful termination of employment,
failure to provide employment following the complainant's s p o n s o r s h i p  foi
a political course abroad, lack of promotion and denial of housing 
5
allowance, failure to employ the complainant whose father had died in 
the struggle for freedom and failure to reinstate the complainant after an
g
acquittal on a charge of theft by a servant. Although these cases were
concerned with the administration of the Party, they were, except for two,
concerned with employer-employee relationship and not maladministration.
These cases do not explain what happens to complaints against
leading Party functionaries such as MCCs, PPS and DGs in their role as
provincial or district administrators. The almost nil-return on complaints
against the Party might suggest that the ombudsman probably declines to
investigate complaints against Party functionaries; that is possibly due
to want of suitable sanction that the Investigator-General could recommend.
For instance, if an individual were to complain that a Section or Branch
Chairman had rejected his application to join the Party, the ombudsman
could not recommend that the person be admitted into the membership of the
Party as that would be shifting decision-making from the Party to the
administration. In his reports to the President the ombudsman can
recommend that compensation be paid to any person who suffered loss or
7
injury as a result of a misconduct or an abuse of office or authority. No 
any other remedy is expressly provided for. The importance of the
1. Zambia: Investigator-General's Report, 1978, p. 52
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
1979, p. 55.
1980, p. 73.
1981, p. 65.
1982, p. 80.
1983, p. 71.
7. Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 117A(1)
as amended by the Constitution (Amendment)
Act, 1974, No. 18.
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inclusion of the Party among public bodies whose activities were to be
scrutinized by the Investigator-General, lay in the expectation that
any shortcomings in the administration of the Party could be investigated
to ensure that, notwithstanding the establishment of the One-Party system,
every person in Zambia continued to enjoy life, liberty and freedom of
expression, movement and the protection of the law as guaranteed by the
1
Constitution of the Republic. The apparent non-investigation of the role 
of MCCs, PPS and DGs, whose functions are notoriously known to sometimes 
impinge on the liberty of the citizens, is evidence that because of its 
elusive legal status UNIP is still a political party notwithstanding its 
'supremacy' : it is an odd 'public body'.
CONCLUSION.
This Chapter has considered the meaning of 'administrative law', 
the recent developments in English administrative law and rules of procedure 
vis-a-vis judicial review of functions of public institutions and judicial 
review of the activities of UNIP's organs in Zambian administrative system. 
The role of UNIP in administrative law is a novelty brought about by the 
One-Party system. Accordingly, it is not possible to find a precedent in 
English authorities or Zambian authorities based on English law for the 
judicial review of the role of a political party by the High Court. The 
jurisdiction of the High Court in Zambia, however, should be adaptable and 
the Court should not shrink from entertaining applications on the role of 
the Party merely because UNIP had no statutory origin. Judicial review of 
the functions of the Party should, however, be restricted to functions 
performed under the provisions of both the Constitutions of the Party and 
of the Republic, which might be described as public functions, and, 
quasi-judicial functions. Hie rest of the functions of the Party should be 
considered as internal affairs of the Party not susceptible to judicial
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 13.
review.
Judicial review involves legal technicalities. It is costly and 
suitable for the elite living in the affluent emerging urban society.
The elite are rarely victims of maladministration as they are often well 
served and treated by their fellow elite in public administration. It is 
the 'common man and woman' who receive a raw deal. Legal aid should be 
made available to persons seeking judicial review of administrative action.'*' 
Although the Leadership Committee and the Commission for 
Investigations have yet demonstrated their potential,there is a need for 
decentralization of these public bodies to enable them 'go to the people' 
and operate among the people at provincial or district level, where there 
are often reports of administrative arbitrariness both on the part of the 
Party and Government leadership. One cannot exaggerate what such institutional 
arrangements alone can achieve. It would be naive to conclude that formal 
arrangements alone can safeguard the interests of the weak in society. But 
such arrangements could offer the poor and the peasants an opportunity to 
seek redress (from the Government) against the 'Government'; a term used
to refer to any official action or decision of public officers.
Control of administrative actions and decisions for the sole 
purpose of safeguarding interests of members of the public cannot be easily
achieved because public institutions ostensibly constituted and empowered
to protect, inter alia, interests of the members of the public e.g. by 
investigating and reporting on allegation of misconduct or abuse of office 
or authority by persons holding public office, have been turned into 
watch-dogs for the Government. Consequently, the effectiveness of the 
Leadership Committee, Anti-Corruption Commission and the Commission for 
Investigations is, negligible in as far as their role of being watch-dogs 
against maladministration, particularly in the Party, is concerned.
1. Zambia: The Legal Aid Act, 1967, No. 30, Cap. 546 does not expressly
provide for legal aid in such cases and there is no case
in which legal aid was either granted or denied.
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CHAPTER VII.
THE ROLE OF UNIP IN THE CONSTITUTION AND FUNCTION OF PARLIAMENT.
Approval of Candidature, Conduct of Election Campaigns and the 
Role of Backbenchers.
Introduction.
The NCEOPPDZ did not make a recommendation on the role of 
UNIP vis-a-vis the constitution and function of Parliament, however, it 
expressed the view that the door to the National Assembly should be open 
to all citizens 'without the Party vetting them'.^ That view of the 
Commission has been ignored by the Party. Although during the last two 
National Assembly elections (1983 and 1988) the Party introduced electoral 
devices aimed at allowing more people to stand for election, e.g. the 
abolition of primary elections and the allocation of constituencies to the 
candidates by the Party's Central Committee, it however, intensified its 
vetting mechanism to the point that it is still conducting a form of 
primary election. Primaries and vetting are, among other things, aimed at 
constituting a Parliament composed of people who are most likely to work 
in accordance with Party policies and respect Party leadership.
National Assembly elections under a One-Party system are not 
conducted to solve political, social or economic problems, but to renew 
and give legitimacy to the permanent and continuous leadership of the Party. 
The people participate in the electoral processes not because they are 
compelled or intimidated to do so, but because it is the political system 
of the country and it does provide them with an opportunity for political 
activity and expression. The electoral process can be conceived as having 
four major dimensions; first, registration of voters by the Electoral 
Commission, a Government Department, second, the self-nomination by the 
candidates and their approval by the Party, third, the election campaigns 
and the election of MPs, and fourthly, the role of the National Assembly.
1. Infra, p. 286.
Section 1. The Relationship between the Party and the National Assembly.
The adoption of a One-Party Constitution in Zambia in 1973
elevated the position of UNIP above that of a political party under a
multi-party system. The Party could be described as a 'Constitutional
organ1 in that its presence in the administration of Zambia is recognized
by the Constitution of the Republic. Although one might hypothesize that
decisions and actions of the Party might be subject to judicial review,^-
that is not because the Party has the status of an organ of the State, but
it is because the principles of good administration, which bear a strong
resemblance to the substantive rules of judicial review, require that
contractual as well as non-contractual rights of persons dealing with
organizations be protected, either by public or private law. The
relationship between the Party and Parliament is not similar to that
between two Ministries of the Government, e.g. the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the Ministry of Youth and Sports. The relationship between
the Party and Parliament is that between a political party and an
institution of State. Consequently, while Ministries operate on equal
basis, the Party purports to assume a superior position to that of the
Government, that is over Parliament and Ministries.
(a) Parliament not an 'Opposition Party1.
In the middle of 1977 President Kaunda addressed a
special meeting of Parliament and asked the National Assembly to consider
a programme of action aimed at making Zambia survive the effect of the
economic situation brought about by (a) the overall world economic
2
situation, and (b) the rebellion in the neighbouring SR. The National 
Assembly appointed a Special Parliamentary Select Committee to examine
1. Supra, p. 251.
2. Zambia: Report of the Parliamentary Special Select Committee;
14th October, 1977, p. 19. Government Printer, Lusaka. 
(Chairman: J.M. Mwanakatwe) .
the President's speech and make recommendations thereon. In its report
the Select Committee, inter alia, criticised the mode of the election of
MCCs at the General Conference of the Party and the appointment of the
Prime Minister and recommended that MCCs be elected provincially and
the Prime Minister should be appointed from among elected members of
the National Assembly only, respectively. Addressing a meeting of the
National Council of the Party, the President said that if he had sought
to address himself to changing the rules in the constitution of the
Party on the election of MCCs, he would have called a meeeting of the
National Council which was the relevant body to recommend such matters
to its General Conference which was the only competent body to amend
the constitution of the Party. Parliament, he said
is not an opposition device to the Party itself or 
to other Party institutions under our One Party 
participatory democracy. I regard Parliament as a 
Committee of the National Council charged with the 
responsibility of enacting laws- of this country. 1
It could be objected that Parliament whose members are directly 
elected by the general electorate, should be said to be a committee of 
an organ of the Party which is itself unelected and unrepresentative of 
the people of Zambia, m  a multi-party system it would prima facie be 
'wrong' to say that Parliament composed of members from several parties 
is a committee of one of the parties, for instance, the ruling party.
I n  a one-party system, the contention simply means that all the members 
of the National Assembly are accountable to the one party to which, they 
belong. Accordingly, the President said that all the members of the 
National Assembly were members of the. National Council and the General 
Conference which were organs which had "correct and balanced representation 
of the full Party leadership" and the appropriate body to discuss 
Party matters.
1. UNIP: 11th National Council, 12th—15th December, 1977. See
also President Kaunda^s remark, to backbenchers'- speech 
in Parliament that they" "have left some of us with the 
impression that they are seeking to be an Opposition 
Party in our One Party participatory democracy", National 
Council, 30th June, 1975, 'Watershed Speech', p. 23.
What was in issue in the 'conflict' between the President
and the National Assembly, was Party supremacy; the Party was contending
that the National Assembly should not discuss natters pertaining to the
organization of the Party: a point which indicates that the Party was
not perceived as an organ of state otherwise the National Assembly is
free to discuss any matter of institution of state. In Tanzania the
relations between the Party (CCM) and Parliament is clearly spelt out; viz
All members of Parliament shall be a Committee of the 
National Conference whose function shall be to ensure 
the implementation of Party policy in all activities 
carried out by Parliament.1
This provision^ is also contained in the Constitution of 
2 1
Tanzania and thus leaving no one in doubt about the role of the National 
Assembly and/or its relationship with the Party. One of the reasons why 
such political parties as CCM and UNIP insist in claiming that the 
National Assembly is 'a committee' of one of its national organs, is 
that the claim provides the means or justification for the approval or 
disapproval of candidates for election to the National Assembly. If the 
link, between the party and the National Assembly were severed, there 
would be no basis upon which the Party vets Parliamentary candidates.
The fact that a National Assembly is referred to as 'a committee' of an 
organ of the Party is not of any significance. What is crucial Is whether 
the vetting and electoral system is democratic In its practical 
operation and effect so that the people are afforded the opportunity to 
elect their representatives without hinderance, and, that Parliament 
carries out its functions independent of the Party and/or its national 
organs. The constitution of the National Assembly is therefore, an 
aspect of the ligitimation of the exercise of power by the Party 
leadership in general.
1. Tanzania: Art. 59(11) CCM constitution, 1977, now Art. 67(11)
Katiha ya Chama cha Mapinduzi, 1984.
2. Constitution, 1977, Art. 50(7).
(b) The Approval of National Assembly Candidature.
In Tanzania there are national members elected by the
National Assembly and there are members who represent mass organizations 
affiliated to CCM in addition to those elected by the general electorate:
in a Parliament of 238 members, 127 non-elected and 111 elected members,
that is 53% are appointees of the executive and 47% elected. In Zambia
the NCEOPPDZ recommended that chiefs, churches, the civil service,
commercial, professional and educational institutions, the security
forces and the labour movement, should be directly represented in the
1 2 
National Assembly. This recommendation was not accepted by the Party.
Accordingly, the National Assembly is composed of 125 elected and 10
nominated (by the President) members. Ihe election of the 125 members
is held every five years^ and a citizen of Zambia above the age of
twentyone years, a member of the Party, literate in the official language,
is, unless otherwise disqualified, qualified to stand for election. The
disqualifications include being under allegiance of another country other
than Zambia, having been declared of unsound mind or bankcrupt or having
been convicted of a prescribed offence.^
1. Zambia: NCEOPPDZ Report, 1972, p. 16, par. 61(3).
2. NCEOPPDZXSRAG, 1972, p. 7 V
3. Constitution, 1973, Art. 93(3).
4. ibid. Art. 67 (a) to (d) . Almost all Commonwealth
African Independence Constitutions provided that the 
business of Parliament be conducted in the English 
language, for instance the Constitution of Ghana,
(1957) Sec. 27, later removed by Art. 20 of the 
Republican Constitution of 1960; Tanganyika (1961)
Secs. 18 and 19, later removed by Art. 24 of the 
Republican Constitution of 1964; Kenya (1963) Sec. 40(1)(b) 
and Nigeria (I960) Art. 254.
5. ibid. Art. 68(1) (a) to (e) and secs. 3 and 8(a) to (f)
of the Electoral Act, 1973, No. 44, Cap. 19, as amended 
by sec. 3 of the Electoral (Amendment) Act, 1983, No.2. 
Prescribed offences include treason, murder, rape.
NCEOPPDZ was of the view that there would be no Party 
vetting of Parliamentary candidates; see Report 
loc. cit., p. 17 par. 67.
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UNIP has not produced a settled policy on the role of public
servants in Parliamentary politics. The number of public officers, which
include officers from the army and the police, standing for election to
the National Assembly, had been on the increase during the 1978 and 1983
General Elections. After the 1983 election, the Central Committee ruled
that public officers should resign their posts before they stood for
election and that policy was reflected in the amendment to the Constitution
to the effect that persons holding or acting in any office in the defence
forces, the police reserve or the police, intelligence, Service Commissions,
parastatal organizations and the Party, were not qualified to be elected
as members of the National Assembly unless they resigned from such posts
or offices or appointments prior to standing for election.^" The intention
behind this policy besides the control of public officers engaging in
active politics, was also to prohibit unsuccessful public servants
returning to their posts after suffering defeat some of whom had shown
bitterness against the Government. The principle was acceptable in as far
as it concerned successful public officers elected to the National Assembly.
There was pressure on the Central Committee that unsuccessful public
servants should be allowed to return to their posts.
Before the 1988 General Election the Constitution was amended;
the provision that a public officer "shall not be qualified to be
elected as a member of the National Assembly unless he has resigned
from such post, office or appointment" was deleted and substituted by
"shall vacate such, post, office or appointment immediately upon being 
2
declared elected." A public officer intending to stand for election
should proceed on leave fourteen days after the dissolution of Parliament or 
after the date of the publication in the Gazette of a date of a by-election.
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act, 1986, No. 3,
Art. 7 amending Art. 68(5) of the Constitution of 
Zambia Actf 1973, No. 27.
2. Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, 1988,
No. 23, Art. 2 amending Art. 68(5), aforementioned.
3. ibid. inserting a new Art. 68(6).
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This amendment showed that UNIP was inclined to allow more open
election and to expose the political system to popular scrutiny. This
effort marks a renewed quest for legitimacy of the One-Party system. The
leadership realizes the centrality of elections as a means of closing the
gap between those in the leadership and the electorate. This development
clearly distinguishes recent liberalization in the Zambian electoral system
compared to that operative at the introduction of the One-Party system in
1972-1973. Prior to the 1983 Parliamentary election, the Party held primary
elections to select three candidates in each Constituency who were presented
to the Central Committee of the Party for approval or disapproval.^ The
electors in the Primary Elections were Party officials at the Regional,
2
Constituency and Branch levels. Primary Elections were abolished before
the 1983 General Election ostensibly on the ground that Party officials who
constituted the electoral colleges, were open to bribery. The system, however,
had been criticised as restrictive and undemocratic in that the nomination of
Parliamentary candidates was at the mercy of Party cabals.
The primary election system had been 1copied' from CCM's system in
Tanzania where the Special Annual District Conference considers applications
for elections to the National Assembly^ and expresses its preferences -
4
through preference certificates - to the National Executive Committee of
CCM. The National Executive Committee approves a maximum of two candidates
5
per constituency to fight an election to the National Assembly. The 
primary election or nomination system works against those who the Party 
leadership at the grassroots level might consider a potential threat to 
their positions of leadership.
Following the abolition of primary elections in Zambia after
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Arts. 67 and 75,
2. ibid. Art. 75(3)(a) to (c).
3. Tanzania: Elections Act, 1985, No. 1, secs. 38 and 41(1).
4. ibid. sec. 41(4).
5. ibid. sec. 43 and CCM Constitution, 1977, Art.
61(6), now Art. 69(9), Katiba ya Chama Cha 
Mapinduzi, 1984.
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the 1978 General Election, a prospective candidate delivered his
application for adoption by the Central Committee to the Returning Officer
appointed by the Electoral Commission, and
Unless the Central Committee is satisfied that the adoption 
of any particular candidate would be inimical to the 
interests of the State, it shall adopt every applicant for 
adoption as a candidate.1
Before 1988 adoption was made on the basis of this provision in the
Constitution of Zambia. During and after the 1988 General Election, the
adoption was and will be done by the Committee of Chairmen and not by the
Central Committee as a whole on the basis also of the provisions of the
Party Constitution which provide that the Committee of Chairmen would not
adopt any person in whose opinion was engaged in corrupt practices, or
smuggling, or trafficing in drugs, or poaching, or was a drunkard or was
in breach of the Leadership Code or consistently committed offences
2
against the Constitution of the Party.
There is no definition of the word 'inimical' or the phrase 'inimical
to the interests of the State'. There is no judicial interpretation of
either the word or the phrase because there is no judicial review of the
role of the Central Committee (now the Committee of Chairmen) in its
3
adoption function: the Courts' jurisdiction is ousted. Hie phrase has a
sinister connotation and prima facie covers serious allegations of criminal
misconduct that would justify placing such a person under a detention or
4
restriction order under the Preservation of Public Security Act. Persons 
advocating a re-introduction of a multi-party system or those critical of 
Party policies and leadership - including former MPs - have had their 
applications for adoption rejected; thus equating such acts as acts 
'inimical to the interests of the State'.
In Tanzania the National Executive Committee of the CCM acts
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 73(3) as
amended by the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) 
Act, 1983, No. 1, Art. 75(3).
2. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 85(2)(a) to (i).
3. Zambia: Electoral (Amendment) Act, 1983, No. 2, sec. 5.
4. Supra, p. 247.
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under the provisions of the CCM constitution which provides that
At the time of election, the National Executive Committee 
shall do the following: It shall consider and make final 
nomination of names of candidates for election to Parliament.
The principle behind primary elections and the vetting of candidates
by the Central Committee in case of UNIP or the National Executive Committee
in case of CCM, is the same, namely to create an opportunity for local
and/or national party leaders to encourage persons of their liking and
political orientation to stand in the primaries or for the national
assembly with a guarantee of easy passage. The most unfavoured candidate
(by the party) might not necessarily be the most unpopular person in the
constituency. In Zambia of the successful candidates at the first primary
election held on 1st November, 1973, 26 were disqualified by the Central 
2
Committee. These disqualified candidates were considered 'undesirable' 
mainly because they were suspected of leanings with proscribed political 
parties. In 1978 the Central Committee vetted 30 of the 348 candidates 
selected by the Party through the primary election system. In 1983 
General Election in which there was no primary election, the number of 
seats allocated to each Province, number of approved and disapproved 
candidatures and the number of old and new members, of Parliament, were 
as shown in the following Table:
3
TABLE D: 1983 National Assembly General Election Result.
Province Seats Vetted Approved New: MPs Old MPs Total MPs
Central 11 1 73 4 7 11
CopperbeIt 19 16 138 10 9 19
Eastern 16 2 104 9 7 16
Luapula 12 4 64 7 5 12
Lusaka 8 4 51 6 2 8
Northern 18 12 138 9 9 18
North—Weste m 10 1 45 9 1 10
Southern 16 3 88 8 8 16
Western 15 4 84 7 8 15
9 125 47 781 69 56 125
1. Tanzania: CCM constitution, Art. 61 C6} op. cit.
2. Legum, C. (Ed.) Africa Contemporary Record; Annual Survey and
bocuments 1973-74, London, B329-30.
3. Zambia: Compiled from figures in Presidential and Parliamentary
Elections Results, 1983; Elections Office, Lusaka, 1983.
In 1983, 828 persons applied for approval to stand for election 
to the National Assembly. The Central Committee approved the candidature 
of 781 and disapproved of 47 persons. In 1988 the Committee of Chairmen 
approved 609 of the 747 prospective candidates; thus vetting 138 persons.^- 
Among the vetted applicants were seven former MPs and a former Zambian 
ambassador. Supporters of one of the vetted applicants marched to the 
DG's office in Kitwe on the Copperbelt, to protest against his disapproval. 
The number of persons vetted in the 1988 Parliamentary election shows 
that the Party is increasingly becoming a subject of public criticism 
and the Party leadership was in turn becoming sensative to such criticism. 
Most of the people who become victims of vetting are those intelligence 
reports reveal (correctly or wrongly) to be critical of Party policies 
or leadership. The figures also show that there was a decline in the 
number of prospective candidates for the National Assembly in the 1988 
Parliamentary election from 828 in 1983 to 781 in 1988. The fear of 
being vetted contributed towards such decline. The march to the DG's 
office is a new development indicating a deep resentment against the 
vetting system. The increasing number of persons being disapproved for 
election to the National Assembly might increase the demand for the 
abolition of the vetting system, or, a return to a multi-party system.
(c) Voters' Choice of National Assembly Representatives.
Notwithstanding some shortcomings in the electoral system, 
Zambia has been ruled through the ballot box. The 1962 Legco and 1963 
Legislative Assembly elections were held under colonial electoral system. 
After Independence, one general election was held under a multi-party 
system in 1968 and four have been held under the One-Party system, namely 
in 1973, 1978, 1983 and 1988. Although the Committee of Chairmen adopted 
National Assembly candidates, the Party is expected to remain neutral 
except organizing election campaign meetings at which the candidates
1. Times of Zambia; 26th September, 1988.
2. Times of Zambia; 28th September, 1988.
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seek the support of the voters and Party officials impress it upon the 
voters that all candidates are approved and acceptable to the Party and 
that it was the duty of the electors to choose their representatives to 
the National Assembly. The Party policy is that candidates should be 
treated equally and should be given equal opportunity to present 
themselves to the electorate. Thus, private canvassing, production of 
personal campaign posters, information, name cards and financial 
expenditure in the electioneering, are forbidden.^
The One-Party system, unlike the multi-party system in
which the Party candidate and constituency were selected by the Party, 
encourages 'home standing', that is, candidates tend to stand in their 
tribal constituencies, and, in urban areas, in the constituencies with a 
concentration of their ethnic people. That has in some cases resulted in 
the election campaigns degerating into personal or family conflict or 
feud unheard of during the 1962, 1963 and 1968 general elections held 
under a multi-party system. Although the Party tries to ensure that 
candidates adhere to fair practices in their election campaigns to allow 
the one-party electoral system to operate equitably, the candidates' 
attitudes in most cases are full of tricks revealing a spirit of 'each 
man for himself and UNIP for us all'.
2
The abolition of primary elections, on the eve of the 1983 
Parliamentary election, has removed the restriction on the number of 
candidates per constituency that the Chairmen of Committees may approve. 
Since elections in a One-Party system are not held as a means of appealing 
to the electorate for a mandate to solve specific social, economic or 
political problems, but merely representative selection, it could be said 
that it does not really matter how many people contested or
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, 85(2).
2. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 75(4) as
amended by the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment)
Act, 1983, No. 1, Art. 4.
stood as candidates per constituency. The number of candidates standing in 
each constituency in the first non-primary election General Election was 
quite high as the following Thble shows:
TABLE E: Candidates per Constituency in 1983 Parliamentary Election.^-
Candidates: 1 2 3 4-5 6-10 11-15 16-18
Constituencies: 0 9 16 41 50 5 4
This Table shows that all the seats were contested: the minimum 
number of candidates per constituency being two and the maximum number 
being eighteen candidates. The constituencies with the largest number of 
candidates were Kabwe (18) , Roan (16) Chipangali and Mporokoso (15) 
candidates each. Chipangali is a rural constituency while the other three 
are urban constituencies. Ihe above figures show that the voters are 
presented with a wide range of candidates - although not of policies - from
which to choose their favourite candidate. To assist the voters assess the
candidates, each candidate is required to address campaign meetings 
organized by the Party and to speak on a number of subjects chosen by the 
Party and these include Humanism, national unity, crime in the constituency, 
self-reliance, the meaning of the patriotic song Tiyende pamodzi ndi mtima 
umodzi ('moving forward in national unity') and the national motto of 'One 
Zambia, One Nation'. Although candidates are required to refer to problems 
in their constituencies, major issues such as unemployment, lack of places 
in schools, annual austerity ('tighten-your-belts') measures and foreign 
debt which might be considered by some candidates as worth discussing, are 
excluded from the list of topics candidates are required to speak upon.
There are probably two reasons why candidates are assigned
what are prima facie elementary subjects? first, the electorate itself is
1. Zambia: Compiled from figures contained in the
Presidential and Parliamentary Election Results; 
op. cit., pp. 1 - 51.
composed mainly of less educated voters who probably would not follow
or be interested in speeches on e.g. Zambia's international debt. Secondly,
the less elementary subjects such as unemployment, industrial or foreign
relations would probably lead into criticism of the Party and its Government
and turn election campaigns into controversial meetings at which Party
politicies and leadership might be open to public criticism. Accordingly,
to ensure that candidates confine themselves to the selected subjects,
Party election guide-lines provide, inter alia, that
The election itself should focus on the issues which 
concern you and the nation and not on personalities.
It must be based on the desire to bring together all 
our communities instead of dividing them; it must be 
used to integrate rather than fragment, to build the 
nation instead of dividing the people.1
The guide-lines highlight the philosophy behind election under a
One-Party participatory democracy: elections are not intended to effect
an upheaval of the social order but to harness the existing social forces
in the society and consolidate the political system. Viewed from a
two-party or a multi-party system angle, it could be said that elections
have no meaningful role in a contemporary African one-party system since
they do not, and are not intended to, solve any social problems. To the
people concerned, the elections are seen as exercises in the choice of
their representatives in the National Assembly. The system does enable the
people to freely elect their representatives.
The Franchise.
Every Zambian national is entitled to register as a voter if he
2
or she is above the age of eighteen years and not otherwise disqualified.
In the 1962, 1963 and 1968 general elections held during a multi-party system,
1. UNIP: Presidential and National Assembly Regulations, 1983,
Reg. 4.
2. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 72.
3. For the Legco, the Legislative Assembly and the National
Assembly, respectively.
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party contest encouraged voting. The first one-party State general 
election witnessed a drop in voting almost to confirm the contention 
that African political parties soon after independence have tended to 
decline in both influence and organizational ability.^ The decline was 
more of a reaction to the introduction of the one-party system than 
a decline in the organizational ability of UNIP. The following Table 
shows that the number of voters has been rising but the number of 
persons not registering as voters and of those registered as voters who 
do not participate in voting, is correspondingly high. The number of 
voters registered at each general election is about half of the adult 
population. The majority of the voters are not members of the Party.
2
TABLE F: National Assembly Election Voters' Participation 1968-1983.
...
Year Electorate Valid Votes Invalid Votes Not Voting
1968 1,587,916 1,079,922 63,490 444,504
1973 1,736,107 581,249 34,464 1,120,394
1978 1,971,883 1,194,989 77,392 699,502
1983 2,377,610 1,572,333 104,834 700,443
When registration of voters closed on the 14th. November, 
1987, for the 1988 Presidential and Parliamentary General Elections
3
(October) 3.3 million persons had registered as voters. The British
electoral system based on the. single-member constituency and a
4
single-majority election - 'first past the post* - favours a two-party 
rather than a multi-party system. The result, however, is the same as
1. LaPalombara, J., and Weiner, M., -Political Parties and Political
Development; Princeton, i9&6, p . 207.
2. Zambia: Compiled from figure contained in Presidential and
Parliamentary Election Results, 1983; op . citv,
Appendix B Ca) and UNIP; Presidential and Parliamentary 
Election Results, 1978; Section D.
3. Times of Zambia; Tuesday, 24th November, 1987: "3m Registered: Votes
Drive Pays off", p. 1.
4. de Smith, S.A., Constitutional and Administrative Law; Fifth ed.,
1985, Penguin Books, p. 260.
in an election under a one-party system in that the candidate with the
majority of the votes cast, is declared the winner notwithstanding the
f
fact that£ the electorate in his constituency might have voted against
}\
him. For instance, in the Kabwe constituency which had eighteen candidates,
the winner polled 6,226 votes while the other seventeen candidates
together received 17,824 out of the 24,050 valid votes cast. The Western
assertion, however, is generally that a one-party system is not a democratic
system because democracies are characterized by the presence of a two or a
multi-party system: "political parties created democracy and modern
democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties".^ In the same
context, it has been stated that "democracies universally are
2
characterized by the institution of political parties" to mobilize the
people. In a similar bluntness, it has been said that "Every democratic
state has at least two political parties, its party system - the integral
3
part of its institutional structure." The multi-party system is,
therefore, seen as the touch-stone of a democratic system, the "litmus
4
paper test for the presence or absence of democracy in a country."
According to these, views, the one-party system in practice
in such, countries as Tanzania and Zambia is. and cannot be the basis of a
party system or a democratic government or the presence of a democracy;
ipso facto, the system of government pursued in the Union of South Africa
would qualify as a 'democracy1 and its. electoral system as a 'party
system' since it is based on a multi-party system. If democracy meant
a 'government of the people by the people' quaere whether a system as
that pursued in Zambia which allows eighteen candidates to contest a 
■ * 1       ■■■  . >   '< ■
1. Schattschneider, E.E., Party Government; Holt, N.Y., 1942, p. 1.
2. Pennock, J.R., Democratic Political Theory; Princeton, 1979, p. 275.
3. Casselini, C.W., The Politics: of Freedom: An Analysis of the Modern
Democratic State; Washington UP, Seatle, 1961, p. 20.
4. Dahl, R.A., Pluralist Democracy in the United States:; Rand McNally,
Chicago, 1967, p. 203.
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single Parliamentary seat would be described as 'undemocratic' because 
the contest were not carried out by different contestants belonging 
to eighteen different parties.
The great majority of countries in the world call themselves 
democracies. These democracies range from systems which evolved over 
hundreds of years to those created out of the territorial re-adjustments 
after the Second World War and the demise of European colonial empires 
in Asia, Africa and other places. These democracies range from systems 
where very little is written and much is implied, to those where human 
rights and freedoms are clearly stated in a document, such as the USA 
and Zambia. These democracies range from countries where there are 
strong liberal traditions of tolerance to those where the power of the 
state is exercised in such an autocratic way verging on personal rule.
In ancient Greece where politics were b o m  and flourished in the small 
city states, 'democracy' meant government by the people: direct democracy 
where everyone was required to participate in the process of government.
In modern times, 'democracy' has become synonymous with 
'constitutionalism', that is, a political system where the government is 
genuinely accountable to an entity or organ distinct from itself, where 
elections are freely held on a wide franchise at frequent intervals, where 
political groups are free to organize and campaign in between as well as 
immediately before elections with a view to presenting themselves as 
alternative governments, and, there should be effective civil liberties 
enforceable by an independent judiciary. That is not a definition of a 
'democracy' but a description of a particular system of government, e.g. 
that of the UK or the USA.
Under the One-Party system the electoral arrangements have 
been designed to allow candidates, albeit from the same party, who 
aspire to be elected to the National Assembly, to be selected by the
people on the assumption of their capabilities as potential members of 
the Assembly. That arrangement differs from the previous system under 
the multi-party where in a constituency parties could put up only one 
candidate and the contest was basically between the political parties 
and not the contestants. Under a one-party system voters have a wider 
I range of candidates to choose from than under a multi-party system. An 
electoral system is a demise for consensual mobilization of the population 
designed to achieve national stability and integration and the ultimate 
legitimization of the system of government of a state; it encourages the 
people to believe that they live in a democracy and gives them a strong 
impression that they are in charge of their own affairs. Electoral devices 
enable the unscrupulous politicians to manipulate the power of the 
state while hiding behind a smokescreen of legitimacy and respectability.
The practical successor to direct democracy was indirect
representative democracy, and this has become the most popular form of
self-government to-day. The most obvious forms of representative democracy
in Africa to-day are parliamentary systems of government, most of them
derivations of French or British models. The One-party system adopted and
being tried in a number of countries, including Zambia, is intended to
involve the majority of citizens in democratic process notwithstanding
the absence of competitive political party activities. The system does
1
eliminate political party thuggery, corruption, intimidation etc., which 
were prevalent under a multi-party system tried in most African states in 
the immediate post-independence era. The One-Party system is, however, a 
transitional phenomenon; when the environmental constraints caused by 
ethnic politics changed the political culture, then a sound basis for 
operating a democratic multi-party system will eventually emerge.
1. On corruption in One-Party electoral system, see 
infra, p. 299 et seq.
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Section 2. The Party's Dissatisfaction with the Courts1 Handling 
of Election Petitions.
Although under the one-party system inter-party thuggery
and violence has ceased, UNIP is still confronted with the problem of
corrupt practices in elections, be they Party or Parliamentary elections.
There are two major causes for the Party's failure to control electoral
malpractices; first, notwithstanding the achievement of independence and
introduction of a one-party system, electoral laws have remained as
devised during the colonial era, that is basically English imported
electoral law. Secondly, the presence of 'the Party1 and 'the Government'
each with its own constitution and electoral commission,^ has resulted
in the courts refusing to enforce Party rules designed to combat some
electoral malpractices on the ground that Party rules are not 'law' to be
enforced by the courts of law.
In the UK by 1868 the electoral law had provided that any
dispute relating to election results should be heard by the QBD in the
constituency from which the petition arose and before a single judge, who
dealt with both law and facts involved in the case and whose decision was 
2
final. Af^er 1879 election petition jurisdiction was vested in two 
judges who must. be in agreement if an election were to be avoided. 
Initially, courts showed some hesitation at being concerned with a 
subject so intimately connected with party politics and not everywhere 
considered appropriate to their jurisdiction. But the experiment 
vindicated itself when a number of petitions failed, for it was easy to 
bring a petition on frivolous or vexatious grounds. Stricter observance 
of the law relative to elections was forced on candidates and their agents.
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 73 and
Constitution of UNIP, 1988, Reg. 62.
2. Keir, Sir David L., Constitutional History of Modern Britain Since
" 1485; 9th ed. 1969, 1971 reprint; Adam and 
Charles Black., p. 467.
3. ibid. p. 467* The law was provided by the
p-
^rliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices 
Act, 1879, 42 & 43 Vic. c. 75.
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Through a number of Ordinances passed by the NR Legco
between 1924'*’ and 1964, English electoral principles were introduced into
the Zambian law. These were mainly electoral principles contained in the
Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act, 1879 and the
2 3
Representation of the People Act, 1918 and 1948. After Independence
4
these laws were consolidated into the Electoral Act, 1968 which was
repealed and replaced by the Electoral Act, 1973^ later amended by the
6 7
Electoral (Amendment) Act, 1983 and the Electoral (Amendment) Act, 1986.
It is pertinent to point out that although the contest is said to be
between or among political parties, English law of elections does not
assign any role to political parties; the emphasis is on the candidate
and his election agent. The candidate is not an agent of the party.
Consequently, neither the pre-independence electoral laws nor the
Independence Constitution of Zambia attempted to assign any role to
political parties, vis-a-vis the conduct of election campaigns.
One other factor contributed to the absence of law assigning
any electoral role to political parties. The British colonial administrators
in NR viewed the activities of political parties, in particular the African
political parties, as dysfunctional to the working of the colonial political
system, e.g. through their agitation for an early termination of colonial
rule. Accordingly, political parties working at variance with the interests
of the colonial regime could not be assigned a role in the constitutional
system designed to perpetuate colonial rule. Notwithstanding the introduction
of the One-Party system the situation has not changed; the law on electoral
malpractices is still as designed during the colonial era and concerned
mainly with the candidate and his agent and not with the political party.
1. NR: Legislative Council Ordinance, 1925, No. 25, Cap. 19,
secs. 24 - 31.
2. UK: 1918, 7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 64
3. 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 65
4. Zambia: 1968, No. 24, Cap. 19
5. 1973, No. 44
6. 1983, No. 2
7. 1986, No. 19
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(a) Electoral Offences.
When the Legco was established in 1924, if the validity of an
election was queried by any person qualified either to be elected or to
vote at such election, he applied to the Governor to set aside the
election result. The Governor, after an inquiry declared the person duly
elected or nullified the result.'*’ On the other hand, the Governor could
refer such a question to a judge of the High Court, who conducted the
2
inquiry and referred his finding to the Governor. The latter procedure
was followed in most cases. The final decision was that of the Governor.
The jurisdiction to hear and determine any question whether
any person has been validly elected a member of the National Assembly was later
vested in the High Court. An election petition may be presented by a
person who lawfully voted or who was a candidate or who had a right to
be nominated as a candidate^ or the Attorney-General. The phrase 'a
person who had a right to be nominated as a candidate' includes a person
whose candidature was vetted by the Committee of Chairmen; it is, however,
provided that a person whose candidature is disapproved by the Committee of
4
Chairmen, cannot challenge the decision in a court of law.
The Party cannot present an election petition; consequently 
its role in preventing electoral offences is weak. The dreaded Committee 
of Chairmen's vetting exercise takes place before election campaigns are 
conducted during which period alleged electoral offences, e.g. bribery, 
are committed by the candidates or their election agents. Vetting of 
candidates after the campaign - by which time the Committee of Chairmen 
would have known how each candidate conducted his campaign - would be 
tantamount to the Committee itself conducting a primary election. Electoral
offences are often in the form of corrupt electoral practices or offering
1. NR; Legislative Council Ordinance, 1925, No. 25, Cap. 19,
sec. 34 (2)
2. ibid. sec. 34(4)
3. Zambia; Electoral Act, 1973, sec. 18(a) to (d)
4. Electoral (Amendment) Act, 1983, No. 2, sec. 5?
supra, p . 289.
302.
or giving of a bribe in exchange for the vote. The Electoral Act, 1973, 
provides that
The election of a candidate as a member shall be void 
on any of the following grounds which if proved to the 
the satisfaction of the High Court upon the trial of 
election petition, that is to say:
(a) that by reason of any corrupt practice or 
illegal practice committed in connection 
with the election or by reason of other 
misconduct, the majority of voters in a 
constituency were or may have been prevented 
from electing the candidate in that constituency 
whom they preferred; and
(b) that any corrupt practice or illegal practice 
was committed in connection with the election 
by or with, the knowledge and consent or 
approval of the candidate or his election 
agent or his polling agent. 1
2
Subsidiary legislation made under the Electoral Act, provides
inter alia, that any person who, directly or indirectly by himself or
any other person gives, lends and procures or offers, promises or agrees
to give, lend, procure any money to or for any person in order to
induce any voter to vote or refrain from voting or who corruptly does
any of such act as aforesaid on account of such, voter at any election,
3
shall be guilty of the offence of bribery. The Constitution of Zambia 
and the electoral law do not regulate the role of the Party in the conduct 
of elections beyond the vetting point.The registration of voters and 
the conduct of elections whenever Parliament is dissolved or bye-elections, 
is the business of the Electoral Commission appointed by the President
4
under the Constitution of Zambia, which functions independently of the
5
Party. The Chairman of the Commission, appointed by the President, has 
often been a civil servant; Chairman of the Public Service Commission or the
1. Zambia: Electoral Act, 1973, sec. 17 (2).
2. Electoral (.General) Regulations', 1983, S.I. No. 78.
3. ibid. Reg. 59 (.11 .
4. Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 73(3)
5. ibid. Art,. 73(4)
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Deputy Chief Justice. Any electoral malpractice committed by a
candidate or his agent is not a matter to be considered by the Party
or the Electoral Commission, but by the High Court through an election
petition. The position, therefore, is unsatisfactory as regards any
attempt to prevent electoral corrupt practices. Although as an aspect
of the one-party system the Party officials organize election campaign
meetings, legally such gatherings are conducted not under the auspices
of the Party but under the authority of the Chairman of the Electoral
Commission who is responsible for the supervision and conduct of the
1
elections. In fact, immediately the Central Committee releases the names 
of candidates allowed to lodge their nomination papers, the Director of 
Elections, who works directly under the Chairman of the Electoral 
Commission, assumes the actual responsibility for the conduct of both 
the Presidential and National Assembly elections. This arrangement was 
devised during the multi-^party system under which one Qf the functions 
of the Electoral Commission was ensuring that political parties did not 
interfer in the conduct of elections. Ideally, under a one-party system 
the role of the Party and the Electoral Commission should be complementary 
in seeing that fair play thrives and the voters' choice of representatives 
is freely exercised. This may require, some intervention by both, bodies in 
the conduct of candidates during the election campaign period.
Under the present system, however, both, the Party and the 
Electoral Commission adopt a laissez faire attitude towards the conduct 
of candidates leaving any electoral malpractices to be sorted out by 
the High Court through election petitions brought by a dissatisfied 
voter or candidate or the Attorney-General. Where none of these 
prescribed petitioners act, prima facie corrupt practices and illegal 
conduct used by a successful candidate go unchallenged.
1. Supra, p. 289.
(b) The High Court and Election Petitions.
Influenced by English law as earlier stated, previously 
only one judge sat to hear an election petition. However, due to the 
Party's dissatisfaction with the judiciary's attitude to allegations of 
electoral malpractices, the number of judges to hear an election petition 
has been increased to three. There are three main determinations that a 
High Court can make in an election petition, first, it may declare the 
election result null and void, second, confirm and decline to avoid the 
election result, and third, order a recount of votes. An order for a 
recount of votes is not a relief but it helps to clarify uncertain
situations as in the case where there is evidence of discrepancies in the
counting of votes, cancellation of figures of votes cast for each of the 
candidates.^" A recount, however, might result in the nullification or 
confirmation of the election result.
2
The Council for Law Reporting in Zambia rarely reports
election petition cases except on appeal, hence, most of the cases cited
in this Chapter on the election petitions were unreported but made
available to the writer by the Registrar of the High Court, Lusaka, as
part of the field-work in the preparation of this study.
In 1983 of the onehundred and twentyfive constituencies.,
there were allegations of corrupt electoral practices in thirtyfour
constituencies;. This is a high incidence of allegation of electoral
malpractices compared to Tanzania where in 1980 there were ten petitions
arising from an election concerned with, a National Assembly of onehundred
3
and eleven elected members. In Kenya there were fortythree election
4
petitions in the 1974 General Election. The nature of the allegations
1. Loongo v. Shepande (1983) ZR 59.
2. Zambia: established under the Council for Law Reporting
Art, 1967, No. 57, Cap. 55.
3. Donge, J.K. and Livinga, A.J., "In Defence, of the Tanzanian Parliament"
P.A., Vol. 39, No. 1, January , 1986, 230 p. 232.
4. Mutungu, O.K., The. Legal Aspects of Witchcraft in East Africa with
particular Reference to Kenya? East Africa 
Literature Bureau, Nairobi, 1977, p. 79.
305.
in the petitions in these countries is the same: wealtly candidates
obtaining votes through giving of money, beer, essential commodities such
as food and building materials etc., on one hand, and, accusations of
witchcraft and other natural powers, on the other hand. For instance, in
Luywa v. Sianga^ the petitioner, who polled 462 votes as against the
respondent's 3,399 votes, asked the High Court to nullify the respondent's
election as the member of the National Assembly for the Sikongo constituency
on nine grounds. Among these were that the respondent, who was a minister
of state in the out-going administration, had an unfair advantage over
him in that he had campaigned using a Government vehicle and flying a
ministerial flag, and, that the respondent had distributed blankets and
building materials to persons and institutions to induce them to vote for
him. He further alleged that for a good measure the respondent had told
2
people that the petitioner was a witch.
Of interest to the Party in this case was the allegation
that contrary to Party rules, some Party officials instead of maintaining
neutrality, had assisted the respondent in his election campaign. Party
Regulations provided that the organization and conduct of the election
campaign in every constituency was under the supervision of the District
3
Governor and his Party district officials, who were required to be
neutral. Prima facie, there is conflict between this provision and
the provision of the Constitution considered earlier to the effect that
supervision and conduct of election shall be under the Chairman of the
Electoral Commission and his officials', in particular the Director of 
4
Elections. In reality, however, District Governors have the effective 
control of election campaigns in that there is a District Governor in
1 . x (1983) ZR HP/EP. 3 (unreported).
2. Kenya: In the 1974 General Election of the 43 election
petitions 5 were based on accusation of witchcraft: 
Mutungu, O.K., op. cit., p. 79,.
3. UNIP: 1983 Presidential and National Assembly Regulations,
1983, Reg. 4(5).
4. Supra, p. 302.
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each of the fifty-five districts while there is only one Director of 
Elections and most of his returning officers, mostly school teachers, 
are appointed ad hoc whose functions are concerned with the conduct of 
the election poll rather than the election campaigns. The petitioner's 
contention therefore, was that by soliciting and obtaining the support 
of the Party officials, the respondent was not only in violation of the 
Party Regulations, but was by that fact in breach of the 'law'. What 
were in issue on this point were questions, first, whether the general 
law for the time-being regulating election assigned the Party any role, 
and, secondly, whether Regulations of the Party vis-a-vis the conduct of 
elections, were enforceable by the High Court. Hie Court's view was 
expressed as follows:
There is no law that I know of that prohibits anybody 
campaining on behalf of a candidate of his choice.
The evidence in support of paragraph 3 (a) of the 
petition is by the petitioner and some witnesses.
The District Political Secretary campaigned on behalf 
of the respondent, it is not unlawful to do so. May 
be it is a breach, of Party Regulations but certainly 
does not amount to a conduct that amounts to 
misconduct that falls under section 12(a) of the 
Electoral Act,, Paragraph 3(a) is not proved.^
This decision has the. effect of denying the Party any meaningful
role in election campaigns and illustrates one of the causes of UNIP's
failure to combat electoral malpractices. The Courts cannot enforce Party
rules because these are considered not as part of the law of Zambia. On
the other hand, UNIP cannot nullify an election result on the ground that
the candidate had breached the Party Regulations during the election
campaign: a situation which clearly shows that the National Assembly is
not a committee of the National Council of the Party; if it were, Party
Regulations could apply to the election of its members.
A distinction, however, should be drawn between this decision
and what was said in the Supreme Court in Nkumbula and KapwepWe v.
2
Attorney-General to the effect that the purpose of the Party promulgating
1. Luywa v. Sianga, op. cit., per Chirwa J., at J(7),
2. (1979) ZR 267.
a constitution to which it is expected that every member of the Party 
will adhere, must be taken by the law as meaning that if any member of the 
Party does not adhere to the Constitution, or if the rules as to 
giving of notice of meeting of the Party or any such other matter are 
not observed any court is bound to acknowledge that such rules have 
not been observed. Where the Party were to complain to a court that 
one of its members had not observed its Constitution or rule the court 
would be bound to give a decision upholding the Constitution.^ The 
distinction lies in the fact that the National Assembly is not an 
organ of the Party constituted under the Party's constitution and 
accordingly, Party regulations cannot be applied in Parliamentary 
elections. The court accordingly found that the matters complained of 
had taken place before the election campaign and refused to avoid the 
result.
2
In Syamujaye v. Munkombwe, the petitioner made the typical 
allegations in these election petitions, that the respondent gave money 
to a voter to induce him to vote for the respodent contrary to sec.
17(2) of the Electoral Act, and, had called him a thief, contrary to 
Reg. 59 of the Electoral (General) Regulations. The ruling of the court 
was also typical in these cases, namely that the giving of money did 
not itself amout to an electoral offence which is commited only where 
the giving was intended to induce any voter to vote or refrain from 
voting and that there was no evidence that money was given to induce 
a voter to vote for the respondent. Accordingly, of the thirty four 
election petitions, thirty were dismissed and in these the court used 
the language contained in the Electoral Act (Sec. 17) which, seems to 
imply that the decision whether to uphold or avoid an election result
1. Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. Attorney-General, op. cit., per Gardner,
AG-DCJ, at p. 273.
2. (1983) ZR HP/EP. 16.
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is at the discretion of the court:
I am not satisfied that any illegal or corrupt practice 
or misconduct on the part of the respondent has been
proved; thus I cannot say that the majority of voters
in the constituency were prevented from electing a 
candidate of their own choice.1
The effect of bribery and/or corrupt practice in English law
of elections is basically that proof of bribery should not be so
strigent. Due proof of a single act of bribery or with the knowledge
and consent of the candidate or his agent, however insignificant that
act might be, is sufficient to invalidate the election. The judges are
not at liberty to weigh its importance, nor can they allow any excuses,
whatever the circumstances may be, such as they can allow in certain
2
conditions in cases of treating or undue influence by agents. The
position is different when it comes to mere irregularies: a court
hearing an election petition if it found that irregularies occured during
an election campaign, it might determine that the result ought to stand
since they were unlikely to have affected the result: "There are other
reasons, including the maxim that dog does not bite dog."^
The Zambian judges' attitude in election petition cases
in 1983 resembled that of the judges in England in the 1880's who were
reluctant to get involved in election petition matters which they
perceived as political controversies and thus outside their judicial
function. In_the Zambian cases no distinction was drawn between claims
of irregularities and allegations of corruption and bribery. In some
cases the court simply declined to avoid the election result, for
4
instance, in Chilekwa v. Matanda, where the petitioner proved to 
the satisfaction of the court that corrupt practices had been committed
1. W.H. Banda v. M. Chulu (1983) ZR HP/EP. 29 (unreported), per Mumba,J.,
at per p. J. C19) .
2. Halshury's Laws' of England; Vol. 15, 4th ed. p. 245 par. 780.
3. de Smith, S.A., Constitutional and Administrative Law; op. cit., p. 272.
4. (1983) ZR HP/EP. 31 (unreported).
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by the respondent's agents, the court refused to nullify the result
on the ground that the petitioner had not established the agency
between the respondent and the perpetrators of the illegal activities.
Of the remaining four election petition cases, a recount was ordered
in two and the other two cases were declared null and void on ground of
corrupt practices, bribery. In one of these latter cases, that of
Chileshe v. Mpundu,^ concerned the Roan constituency which had sixteen
candidates. The respondent had won the seat with 3,063 votes and the
petitioner was second with 2,946 votes. The petitioner alleged that the
respondent had given voters free beer, food at his restuarant and other
commodities and money to induce them to vote for him. On the day of the
election, the respondent was alleged to have transported some voters to
the polling stations and while there, his agents had made some of the
2
voters to produce 'goat noise', the goat being his election symbol.
The court held, nullifying the result, that
Looking at the facts of this case and in the light 
of this law, there is no doubt in my mind that it 
has been established that treating and corruption 
took place and the person who perpetrated them was 
Mpundu (the Respondent) by himself and by his agents. 
Having said this, my decision is that there was no 
election in Roan Constituency. What was there were 
business deals between voters and Mpundu to sell the 
seat to him. A Parliamentary seat is* not for sale.
It cannot therefore, be a subject of the apparent
auction that was conducted in Roan Constituency.
That election is therefore null and void.3
The success or failure of the one-party system in Zambia 
will, to a great extent, depend on the success or failure of the electoral 
system adopted in Party and State elections. The abolition of the
primary elections in Parliamentary election was a move in the correct
direction, however, it has resulted in the inflation in the candidature:
1. (1983) HP/EP. 11 (unreported), per High Court Commissioner Kabamba,
at p. J. (351 • Brackets: supplied.
2. Zambia: To assist illiterate voters candidates are assigned
electoral symbols such as a bicycle, chicken, hoe, 
hut or goat.
3. loc.^cit., per Kabamba, High Court Commissioner,
at p . J . (35); brackets supplied.
more candidates chasing few votes; consequently, the strujnble for the votes
was bound to result in bribery and corruption. UNIP's leadership viewed
the courts' refusal to nullify most of the election results queried in
the election petitions, as a move that might encourage corrupt practices
in National Assembly elections. The Party was of the view that one of
reasons why the High Court did not upset most of the election results,
was that there was no appeal against a decision of the court in election
petition. Appeals were allowed with the leave of the Supreme Court in so
far as they involved any question as to the interpretation of the Constitution.
Appeals against High Court decisions in election petitions are restricted
in many jurisdictions, for instance, in Malawi the determination by the
2
High Court of an election petition is not subject to an appeal.
In Zambia the Party demanded that there should be changes in the
law. Consequently, the Electoral Act, 1973, which is the principal Act on
election matters, was amended to provide that an appeal shall lie to the
Supreme Court on a point of law or mixed law and fact from any judgement or
3
order of the High Court in election petition matters. A further amendment 
provided that an election petition "shall be tried in an open court by a
4
High Court of three puisne judges". There was merit in the law which 
restricted appeals in election petitions. An appeal in any matter takes 
time to be heard and settled. It is possible that an election result might 
be nullified after a person had sat in Parliament and had received a salary 
and allowances as an MP for over a year. It was, therefore, essential to 
quickly settle election disputes once and for all. With the increase in the 
number of judges and availability of appeals, the High Court is expected to
1. Zambia; Constitution of Zambia Act, Art. 77(3).
2. Malawi; Constitution of Malawi Act, 1966, No. 23, Art. 32(3).
3. Zambia: Electoral (Amendment) Act, 1983, No. 2, inserting
a new sec. 29A(1) in the Principal Act.
4. Electoral (Amendment) Act, 1986, No. 19, amending 
sec. 26(2) of the Principal Act; the underlined 
being the amending words.
play a more responsive role in ensuring that allegations of corrupt 
practices in elections are closely scrutinized. Hie increased number 
of judges and the right of appeal to the Supreme Court will not deter 
most candidates from engaging in corrupt electoral practices since it is 
assumed that under the competitive one-party system of unlimited 
number of candidates per constituency, the chances of winning a seat 
without financial or material inducement to some of the voters, is near 
impossible. The electorate is now expecting candidates to give out 
inceptives in exchange for votes. Consequently, in most election 
petition cases there is ample evidence before the Court showing that 
even the petitioners engaged in corrupt electoral practices. Although 
the Courts are concerned with the allegations against the respondent, 
it is natural that they are bound to be reluctant to nullify an election 
result where it is obvious, that the petitioner came to court 'Without 
clean hands'. Some petitioners admit in court of having committed 
worse acts of corrupt electoral practices than the respondent. There are 
bad cases in which the Party should otherwise be the petitioner.
According to John Stuart Mill, Political institutions are the 
work of men; owe their origins and their whole existence to human will.
Men did not wake on a summer morning and find them sprung up.. Neither 
do they resemble trees, which, while planted, 'are aye growing,' while 
men 'are sleeping''. In every stage of their existence they are made 
what they are by voluntary human agency."^ Of all the areas of the 
role of UNIP, the institution of elections fits well with this truism. If 
election results are to be respected, the Party would have to mount an 
extensive campaign in each election year against corrupt electoral 
practices. The elimination of electoral malpractices should not be left 
to be sorted out by the Courts: f®r prevention is better than cure.
1. Mill, J.S., Representative Government; 1st ed. 1865, p. 4
Section 3. The Role of the One-Party Parliament.
The hypothesis is that compared with the Westminster model of
Parliament, the role of Parliament in a One-Party seems receding. The
enactment of laws is still vested in the legislature consisting of the
President and the National Assembly.^ In Tanzania it was once said that
"This Parliament belongs to TANU. That the Parliament is supreme is a
colonial way of b e h a v i n g....... In a One-Party democracy the party is
2
supreme all the way." That view was based on the Tanzanian principle
that the National Assembly is a committee of the National Conference of 
3
CCM. In Zambia the National Assembly can reject a Government bill or
pass a vote of no confidence in the Government notwithstanding the
provisions of Art. 8 of the Constitution of the Party. The Party, however,
might not stand aloof in the face of such insubordination by the National
Assembly irrespective as to whether the rejected Bill or the cause of the
vote of no confidence concerned an important matter or not.
A member of the National Assembly has a dual status, that of
a member of the Party and a member of Parliament. Membership of the House
4
is dependent on the membership of the Party, and that entails acceptance
and upholding of the objectives of the Party. By voting against a Government
Bill, or, supporting a motion of no confidence in the Government, a member
might be exposing himself to being vetted by the Committee of Chairmen in
5
the next parliamentary election. The fear of being vetted plays havoc on the
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 63.
2. Tanzania: Second Vice-President, Rashid Kawawa, speaking on
a debate on Tanzania's recognition of secessionist 
State of Biafra: Parliamentary Debates, 19th June,
1968, Col. 2534.
3. Art. 59(11) Chama Cha Mapinduzi Constitution, 1977,
now Na 57(11) Katiba ya Chama Cha Mapinduzi, 1984.
(art. 57(11) Constitution of Chama Cha Mapinduzi, 1984)
4. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 67(c).
5. Supra, p. 286.
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mind of some of the members of Parliament and operates as a psychological 
warfare between the National Assembly and the Party. It is, however, 
important to point out that although by voting against a Government Bill 
an MP might thereby be disobeying a Party directive or rule and thus in 
breach of the Party's disciplinary Rules, members of the National Assembly 
are protected by law against disciplinary action by any person or body 
of persons for what they might have said or done in the National Assembly. 
Hence, all the Party can do against those MPs considered critical of the 
Party, is vetting them and thereby stopping them from returning to the 
House. Conduct in the National Assembly is included among acts considered 
'inimical to the interests of the State' by the Central Committee in its 
vetting exercise. This development inhibits free speech in the Bouse.
(a) Security of Membership of the National Assembly.
■ ■ ‘ " ' " ‘ ■ '■ " 1 - " " ' ' ■ v ■ ---------
The principle that loss of party membership should result in
loss of a Parliamentary seat, was. introduced in Zambia two years after
Independence, that is during the multi-party system.^- All that was required
then was that the leader of the political party whose membership had ceased
informed the Speaker of that fact. Such, an allegation was investigated by
a tribunal upon whose report the Speaker based his action: if the allegation
was proved to be true, the seat was declared vacant and a bye^election was 
2
ordered. In Nigeria before an election certain political parties used to 
obtain from the candidates standing on their tickets, a signed but undated 
resignation letter from the Party and House of Representatives which, 
immediately the person resigned from the Party or was- expelled from the 
Party, the resignation letter would be dated by the party and sent to
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) (No. 2) Act,
1966, No. 47, sec. 3(4) inserting a new sec. 65(4) 
in the Zambia Independence Order, 1964.
2. The People v. The Speaker of the^National Assembly, ex parte
H.M. Nkumbula (1970) ZR 97, in which a seat won 
on ANC ticket was declared vacant after the 
MP had resigned from the ANC to join UNIP.
the Speaker of the House of Representatives. There were two main
reasons why political parties wanted a former member vacate a seat
in the National Assembly, first, the seat was regarded as belonging not
to the member, but the party, and, second, parties did not want to lose
their strength in the House through their former members swelling up
the membership of the opposition party. Under a One-Party system the
seat belongs neither to the party nor to the member: the latter is
merely an incumbent during the life of that Parliament. His membership
of the House per se is not of immediate consequence to the Party vis-a-vis
the party's ability to remain in power and forming the Government of the
day. Ideally, under a one-party system the party should not resort to
such severe method of punishing critical members of the National Assembly
such as expulsion from the membership of the party.
In Zambia there was one case of expulsion from the membership
of UNIP and consequently from the National Assembly during the 1983-1988
Parliament. In 1984 a member of the National Assembly while in the bar
of the National Assembly Motel in Lusaka (where members of the National
Assembly stay while attending Parliament), denounced the Speaker and
other top Party leaders. The member was formally charged by the
Appointments and Disciplinary sub-Committee of the Central Committee,
2
which exercises disciplinary jurisdiction over MPs. The Constitution
of the Party provides that offences against the Party include
(c) acting in a manner likely to bring the name of the
Party into ridicule or contempt or disregard;
(e) being in a state of drunkenness at a Party meeting, in
case of an ordinary member of the Party, or in the
case of an official of the Party, being in a state of
drunkenness at any time.^
1. Obi v. Waziri (1961) All NLR 371
2. UNIP: Constitution, 1978, Art. 55F and Reg. 37(a) (i)
to (iv)
3. ibid. Reg. 32(c) and (e)/ now Constitution,
1988, Art. 64 (3)F (d) and Reg. 15(1).
A member of the National Assembly is deemed to be an official
of the Party, accordingly, having been given an opportunity to exculpate
himself and appeared before the sub-Committee, he was found guilty and
the sub-Committee having considered his offence serious, ordered his
immediate expulsion from the membership of the Party.^ The Speaker having
been informed of the expulsion, declared the member's seat vacant and
ordered a bye-election to be held to fill the vacancy.
The Constitution of Zambia provides that a member of the National
Assembly shall vacate his seat in the Assembly, inter alia, if he ceases
2
to be a member of the Party. A person whose membership of the Party has
3
been terminated (now by the Central Committee ) may appeal to the Committee 
4
of Chairmen and thencefrom to the National Council's ad hoc Appeals 
Committee whose decision is f i n a l . S i n c e  the National Council's ad hoc 
Appeals Committee exercises quasi-judicial role, an 'appeal' in the form 
of judicial review of the Committee's decision, should lie to the High
g
Court. Although a member is given an opportunity to exculpate himself and 
appear before the disciplinary organ, that does not adequately meet: the needs 
of natural justice in that the proceedings are held in secrecy and the 
accused member is not afforded legal representation. The secret hearing 
shields any shortcomings in the disciplinary proceedings from publicity.
Consequently, it would be difficult in any case for members of the public 
to tell whether the facts of the case warranted an expulsion of a person 
from the membership of the Party with the subsequent loss of his membership 
of the National Assembly; a matter of national importance. It is important
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1978, Art. 20(g) and Reg. 33(l)(iv)(f)
2. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 71 (2) (b).
3. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 59(h)
4. ibid. Art. 63(l)(n).
5. ibid. Reg. 18.
6. Supra, p. 251 et seq.
to note that expulsion from the membership of the Party is the most 
severe sanction that the Party can impose; there is, however, no laid 
down rules and procedures on how the Party chooses which sanction to 
impose. The Party Constitution merely provides that each disciplinary 
organ at the Section, Branch, Ward, District, Provincial and national 
level shall impose any of the prescribed sanctions which rang from oral 
warning or caution, written reprimand, suspension from office to expulsion 
from the membership of the Party.^ What sanction is applied is at the 
discretion of the Party organ and it all depends on the seriousness of 
the error or offence committed by the member.
(b) The 'Supremacy1 of the One-Party Parliament.
Notwithstanding the establishment of a One-Party system, the
Parliament of Zambia is designed on the Westminster pattern vis-a-vis its
legislative powers and procedures. But as it was once observed that
"constitutions are easily copied, temperaments are not; and if it should
happen that the borrowed constitution and the native temperaments fail
2
to correspond, the misfit may have serious results." A One-Party State's
Parliament is not to the Party's dictates or controls, once constituted,
the National Assembly falls under the control of the Speaker, elected by
the members of the National Assembly from among persons qualified to be
elected as members of Parliament who are not members of the National 
3
Assembly. The role of the National Assembly is regulated by the
provisions of the Constitution of Zambia and its own Standing Orders
which regulate the frequency of legislative sittings, conduct of debate,
number of stages in the reading of bills, motions, budget, adjournments,
4
divisions and the composition of Committees of the House. The 'supremacy 
of Parliament' and the role of UNIP under the One-Party system in
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Arts. 21 and 22, Regs. 10 to 24.
2. Bagehot, W., The English Constitution; Oxford, 1933, introduction by
the Earl of Balfour, p. xxii.
3. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 69(1)
4. ibid. Arts. 79 to 94 inclusive.
Zambia could be considered in two ways, first, the independent role 
of Parliament in carrying out its functions, and/or, the role of Parliament 
as an organ of the Party.
(i) Parliament as an Independent Institution.
In countries with written Constitutions such as Zambia
has, the Constitution is the supreme law, any other laws are made subject
to the provisions of the Constitution. Parliament is said to be •'supreme1
in the sense that it can legislate on any matter without challenge from
any other legislative body within the jurisdiction. The political notion
of the ultimate sovereignty of the electorate is distinguished from the
legal doctrine of the legislative supremacy of Parliament: the courts
owe their allegiance to the latter and take no notice of the will of
the electors (or political parties). Parliament's supremacy to legislate
on any matter is, however, limited in some ways, for instance, it cannot
legislate laws that are fundamentally contrary to the wishes of the
people concerned or laws intended to control the manner and form of
future legislation, or laws that are contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution unless such legislation has been passed in accordance with
the procedure as: laid in the Constitution. Thus, in Mumba v. The People,^ -
the applicant was charged with, corrupt practice by a public officer,
2
contrary to sec. 25(1) of the Corrupt Practices Act, 1980 which provided
that "An accused person charged with an offence under Part IV shall not,
in his defence be allowed to make an unsworn statement, but may give
3
evidence on oath, or affirmation from the witness box."
This provision was contrar y to the provision of the
Constitution which required that "No person who is tried for a criminal
4
offence shall be compelled to give evidence at the trial".
.. -  ............ V " .......... , , —  .I-- —  .
1. (1984) ZR 38
2. Zambia: 1980, No. 14
3. i^bid., sec. 53(1).
4. Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 20(7) ’•
supra, p. 250 and infra, p. 422.
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Parliament had legislative power to enact both the Constitution
of Zambia, 1973 and the Corrupt Practices Act, 1980; under ordinary
interpretation of statutes one would contend that the latest Act
impliedly amended or repealed the old Act but there is no implied
amendment of the Constitution. The Constitution is sacrosanct and
cannot be amended by implication.^ In Zambia the amendment of the
Constitution is carried through special constitutional amendment 
2
procedure and every Bill intended to effect amendment to the Constitution
should ke accompanied by a certificate signed by the Speaker or Deputy
Speaker when presented to the President for assent confirming that the
Bill was passed by the National Assembly in accordance with the provisions
3
of the Constitution. Since the provisions of the Corrupt Practices 
Act were not passes as special provisions intended to effect amendment 
to the provisions of the Constitution, the court held that there can be 
no implied amendment of the Constitution, and, accordingly, the accused 
person charged under the Act could not be compelled to give evidence on 
oath if he elected to make an unsworn statement. This decision does not 
mean that Parliament is not 'supreme1 because the courts can declare its 
enactment contrary to the a provision of the Constitution and to that 
extent of no effect. The courts interpret what Parliament has
enacted; it is up to the legislature to change the law it enacted.
The Corrupt Practices Act, 1980 is one of those laws 
enacted by Parliament as a result of pressure from members of the public 
and resolutions of the National Council of the Party that law should be 
passed to curb corruption in public office. Notwithstanding that fact, 
Parliament alone acting independent of the public and the Party has the
1. Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe /1964/ 2 All ER 785, see judgement
of Lord Pearce at p. 790*
2. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 80 in particular
and Arts. 20(7) and (12), 26 and 29(3) in general.
3. Acts of Parliament Act, 1964, Cap. 16, secs. 5(3) and
(4) and 9 (c).
legislative power to amend the Corrupt Practices Act or the Constitution. 
Parliament as a matter of law, can repeal Art.4 of the Constitution and 
abolish the One-Party system in Zambia. There is no provision in the 
Constitution or in any other legislation which makes Parliament an official 
rubber stamp of Party policy or show that the role of Parliament is 
moulded so as in part to diminish its distinct features or of depriving 
it of its legislative powers.
The absence of the opposition does not deprive Parliament of
its legislative faculties; opposition party or parties do not play a
legislative role in the enactment of Bills. The role of opposition is
that of criticising Government measures. Opposition at Westminster is
neither created nor sustained by statute. Government in the UK is possible
without opposition; opposition is simply one of many conventions and 
usages that have grown up and around the British Constitution. In Zambia,
by requiring that political parties register with the Registrar of
Societies under the Societies Act, opposition was institutionalized by
law and hence its demise could only be achieved through law; Art. 4 of
the Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973. Notwithstanding its close links
with the Party, Parliament has the legal basis to assert itself and act
independently of the Party. Some form of independence - and tension - is
essential between the Party and Parliament to safeguard the interests of
the nation as a whole from the citadel of the supremacy of the Party.
(ii) Parliament as an Organ of the Party.
Although the Constitution of UNIP requires that every person 
seeking election to the National Assembly should a member of the Party,^ 
it does not designate the National Assembly as an organ of the Party.
The National Council does not initiate legislative measures as such, it 
merely resolves on policy matters. The statement of the President should 
be understood in that context or sense when, commenting on the role of MPs,
UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 18(2)(a) to (e)
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said that as Party members, members of the National Assembly should at
all times observe Party rules and defend Party policies, and that
If the National Council decides that certain action 
has got to be taken by the Central Committee or by 
the Government, in order to implement a given policy 
programme, that has got to be done. If it is legislative 
action that is needed to implement a policy decision of 
the Council, the National Assembly, as an arm of the 
Party, must act accordingly, without question.1
The reason given why members of the National Assembly should
act - without question - according to the dictates of the National
Council, is that the "policies and decisions made by the National
Council are expressions of the people's will - they are the wishes of
2
the majority and therefore they should be respected". In reality,
however, it is the National Assembly, composed of the elected
representatives of the people and not the National Council, which is
composed of mostly Party functionaries, that expresses the will of the
majority tjie pSOpie Qf Zambia. The above statements might give 
the impression that the National Council is the originator of
'legislative proposals' which are thoroughly discussed by the members
of the Council before they are sent to be enacted into law by the
National Assembly. If that were the case, it would be proper to assume
that all members of the National Assembly being members of the National
Council, having had an opportunity to express their views on any such
'legislative proposals', should, when such measures come before the
National Assembly, simply endorse and support them.
Ctee of the reasons why backbenchers criticise legislative
measures introduced in the National Assembly is not because they purport
to show their 'independence' but because in reality the National Council
is not the originator of legislative proposals. For instanee, the
1. Zambia: The 'Watershed? Speech, by His Excellency the
President, Dr K.D. Kaunda, 30th June-3rd July, 
1975, p. 23. Government Printer, Lusaka.
2. ibid. p. 23.
backbenchers' vote against the Local Administration Bill, 1980, was to 
some extent due to the fact that that measure had not been introdueed 
and discussed at the National Council. Following that defeat President 
Kaunda pleaded with MPs at the National Council to support the Bill when 
re-submitted. It was only then that the Bill went through. In most cases 
the National Council, as a political forum, discusses matters in general 
terms; its resolutions are not in the form of legislative proposals. It 
is left to the Central Committee, now the Committee of Chairmen in 
particular, to decide which resolutions of the National Council should 
be backed by legislation. The Government implements Party decisions.
Unlike the Party Congress whose convenor is the Committee of
1 2 
Chairmen, the National Council can be convened by the President, who
3 4
is responsible for Its agenda, and chairmanship. Ihe National Council
is, therefore, an effective organ of the President. Changes in Party and
Government leadership announced at the National Council are matters
confined to the President alone. In the formulation of Party policies
before they are presented to the National Council, the President, through
his chairmanship of the Central Committee, has gareat influenbe in their
content and orientation. On the face of it, the President plays an
influential role in the determination of matters that come before the
National Council and the National Assembly. The President is a component
5
part of Parliament. This dominant role of the President creates an 
intolerable situation in which no organ of the Party or Government dare 
criticise or oppose any policy 'of the Party'. Hence the boycott of the 
10th Party Congress held in August, 1988, by the Speaker of the National
1. UNIP:
2.
3.
4.
Constitution, 1988, Art. 50(2)
ibid. Art. 54(2)
ibid. Art. 74(d)
ibid. Art. 74(b)
5. Zambia: Constitution, 1973, Art. 63
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Assembly, who, incidentally, was often 'in attendance' at Central
Committee and National Council meetings. The protest was against the
re-statement that the National Assembly was an arm of the Party.^ The
controversial provision states that
It is hereby declared that no Act of Parliament, 
regulation, rule, or by-law shall be enacted or passed 
by any State organ which is in conflict with this 
Constitution or the National Policies of the Party.^
Under a multi-party system Parliament is a forum for working
out of diverse interests, to the end that the laws which emerge therefrom
are expected to reflect the power relationships of various interests
represented in the House although in the final analysis they embody the
political aims and objects of the ruling party. Under both the One-Party
and multi-party systems Bills are prepared in secret. Cabinet debates
the Cabinet Memorandum setting out the policy behind the introduction of
the Bill, In practice legislative proposals emerge from Government
ministries and departments. Only when the Bill is ready and published,
do members of the National Assembly (and the public) come to see it. In
practice, therefore, there is no possibility of Parliament passing a
Bill that the Central Committee or Cabinet, presided over by the President,
would be ignorant of. The above provision, therefore, is intended merely
to assert the 'supremacy of the Party'. That provision cannot override
a validly enacted Act of the Parliament of Zambia. To that, it is another
3
scare-crow; there to frighten or terrorise members of Parliament.
A glance at the range of Acts passed by Parliament each year 
shows that most of them are not implementation by Parliament of, or,
1, "When the Soldiers Come Marching In", Africa Events^ Vol. 4, No. 10,
October, 1988, p. 8. The Speaker, Robinson Nabulyato 
was retired and Mufwanyanga Mulikita elected the 
Speaker for the Parliament of 1988-1993.
2, UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 8.
3, ibid., the view that this provision purports to
spell out the 'Zambian grundnorm'', see supra, p. 188.
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bn any matter discussed at the National Council. The view that it
is "most unprincipled and undemocratic for a Member of Parliament who
has had the chance to discuss Party policy in the National Council to
somersault in the National Assembly and begin condemning a collective
decision to which he was a p a r t y " a p p l i e s  to a minority of bills that
are presented to Parliament. The policies contained in a majority of
Bills are discussed in Central Committee and Cabinet and are made known
to backbenchers when bills are made public. The structure and procedures
are as a result of the decisions of the 4th and 6th National Councils
which called for amendment to the Constitution of Zambia in order to
give practical expression to the principle of Party supremacy over all
other institutions in the land. This expression was given effect in the
2
Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act, 1975, which, enshrined in the 
Republican Constitution both the role of the Central Committee as the 
policy-formulating body for the Government and revised the functions 
of Cabinet in relation to policy formulation. On the face of it, this 
amendment has the effect, or, gives the impressionf of placing Parliament 
vis-a-vis policy matters, under the Central Committee. However, the 
implementation of policy is the function of Cabinetfi consequently, 
Parliament operates under Cabinet.
The conflict between the Party and Parliament is not very much 
about whether the latter is an arm or organ of the former, but whether 
the latter can act 'as Parliament of Zambia'; pass or reject bills 
presented by Cabinet independent of Party influence. At the 6th National 
Council of the Party President Kaunda stated that "from now on the 
Party and Government will not stomach any indiscipline among Members of 
Parliament masquerading under parliamentary privilege.. And so I am now 
instructing Mr Speaker to take action in making disciplinary rules of
1. Zambia; The 'Watershed' Speech., op . cit., p. 23.
2. Constitution (Amendment) Act,’ 1.975, No. 22,
Art. 47A, 47B and 47C.
the Party, of the Standing Orders for which Members of Parliament could
be punished for their breach within the precints of Parliament."^ That
2
the National Council resolved accordingly. The Standing Orders Committee
of the National Assembly considered the Resolution together with the
President's directive and resolved that Standing Order 137 be amended to
incorporate a new Standing Order which now provides as follows:-
137A. The Standing Orders Committee is empowered to enforce
the relevant disciplinary rules of the United National 
Independence Party for breaches of the rules within the 
precints of Parliament.
On the other hand, the legislation under which some members of the
National Assembly were accused of 'masquerading under parliamentary
privilege', provides that
There shall be freedom of speech and debate in the Assembly.
Such freedom of speech and debate shall not be liable to be
questioned in any court or place outside the Assembly.^
The amendment of Standing Order 137 to empower the National Assembly 
Standing Orders Committee to enforce disciplinary rules of the Party, did
not violate this provision in that although the freedom of speech and
debate is curtailed in relation to (critical) matters pertaining to the
Party, any breach of a Party rule could only be raised by and/or in the
Committee and within the precints of Parliament. The overall effect of 
this amendment is that any criticism of the Party in Parliament is 
subject to the scrutiny by the National Assembly Standing Orders Committee. 
Criticism of the Party hy members of the National Assembly outside the 
National Assembly, is subject to the examination of the appropriate 
disciplinary committee at the Section, Branch, Ward, District, Provincial 
or Central Committee level.
It is, however, pertinent to point out that from the point of
1. Zambia: The 'Watershed' Speech? op . cit., p. 22
2. UNIP: Progress Report, December, 1975; Resolution No. 11,
p., 18
3. Zambia: National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act, 1970,
No. 6, Cap. 17, sec. 3.
the Party, what was in issue in 1975 was not 'freedom of speech' but
'freedom to criticise the Party' in Parliament. Consequently, an MP is
free to praise the Party or its leadership or policies in or outside
the National Assembly. There was and there is no restriction in that? the
restriction is on 'attacking' the Party. So far there has been no report
of an MP appearing before the National Assembly Standing Orders Committee
charged with an offence under Order 137A. The Party's perception, however,
of the role of the National Assembly is simply different from what is
actually obtaining in the country at the moment. The Party's view is that
debates, or 'controversies' as they are referred to by the Party, are
conducted in the National Assembly on very trivial and unnecessary matters.
It was, accordingly, projected that -
It is important that during 1979 - 1989 period Zambia frees 
herself from the traditional ideas of formal bourgeois 
democracy, and from the customs and habits of alien 
Parliamentary practice. The State administration and 
Parliament must be the executive organs of the will of the 
working class (the workers and peasants). It will be the 
duty of the Party during this period to -
(a) establish a socialist Parliamentary system whose 
representatives should be workers and peasants, 
as the main classes of State power;
(b) Parliament should no longer be just a source of 
income to individual members of Parliament but 
must be transformed into a real people's house, 
where laws, aimed at facilitating socialist 
construction for the common good of the people, 
must be passed. Hie Party and its Government 
should, therefore, review the present Parliamentary 
procedures with a view to abolishing certain 
capitalist tendencies and colonial practices.^-
The General Elections of 1983 and 1988 have not produced a 
Parliament of socialist workers and peasants. As long as the membership 
of the Party remains open to every Zambian, the membership of the National 
Assembly will also remain open to every citizen of Zambia. A 'socialist 
Parliamentary system' cannot be achieved as long as UNIP remains a mass 
organization: it could be achieved with the restriction of the membership
1. UNIP: Programme (1979 - 1989 : Transition from Capitalism 
to Socialism; 1978, pp. 134 - 135.
of the Party through a 'vanguard party' membership to achieve a Parliament 
composed of socialist workers and peasants *. There is an apparent 
contradiction between this policy and what is actually happening in 
practice. By abolishing primaries in National Assembly elections in 
1983,^ which the Party used in choosing three candidates per constituency, 
it threw away a possible tool through which it could have influenced the 
composition of Parliament. However, the 'free-for-all' electoral system 
introduced in 1983 is still subject to severe vetting of candidates and 
enables the Party to determine the composition of the National Assembly, 
for instance, by keeping out of Parliament those persons whose membership 
of the House, were, in the opinion of the Committee of Chairmen, inimical 
to the interests of the State.
The Party's wish appears to be that the National Assembly 
should be composed of members committed to Party policies and who were 
always ready to endorse and acclaim the virtues of the Party, its 
Government and the political leadership. Although in practice there is 
no way in which Parliament can pass any Bill that is in conflict with 
the wishes of those in the leadership of the Party, if, however, any 
such an Act were enacted, it would be a valid law notwithstanding the 
provisions of Art. 8 of the Constitution of the Party. The provisions of 
Art. 8 are a device to muzzle MPs. Legislative supremacy in Zambia still 
resides in the Parliament of Zambia.
(iii) A Vote of No Confidence in the Government.
Backbenchers are not privy to Government secrets or 
information. The convention which developed during the multi-party system 
which barred opposition members access to Government information, is 
applied in barring backbenchers from Government information. In addition
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act, 1983,
No. 1, Art. 75(3) repealing and replacing 
Art* 75(3) of Constitution of Zambia Act,
1973, No* 27? supra, p. 288.
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to its legislative function, the National Assembly perforins other 
functions, for instance, those of being the overseer of the Executive, 
or of seeking information or explanations from Ministers. Under a 
One-Party system the role of 'criticising' the Government can be played 
only by backbenchers; that is, MPs not holding ministerial posts. Of 
the 135 MPs in the Parliament of 1983-1988, 21 were Ministers and 23 
Ministers of State and 91 were backbenchers, including two MCCs who 
are often included mmong the Nominated MPs but excluded from Cabinet. 
After the 1988 General Election the Cabinet has been reduced to 16 
members,^ though the number of Ministers of State has remained the same.
in exposing the realities behind the facade of Government actions by
providing critique of Government activities. It is a risky business which
could and does result in the critical MP's application for re-election
being vetted by the Central Committee and now the Committee of Chairmen.
Between 1974 and 1980 the Government suffered two defeats when backbenchers
did not support the Constitution (Amendment) Bill, 1974, which, inter alia,
purported to curtail an individual's right to sue the State for wrongful 
2
detention, and the Local Administration Bill, 1980, which purported to
introduce a decentralized form of local administration. The former Bill
was passed when the right to sue the State was retained and denied only
in certain cases.. The latter Bill was supported only after President
Kaunda had addressed the National Council and pleaded with the MPs to 
4
pass the Bill. In 1985 a backbenchers' motion of no confidence in the waY
1. Times of Zambia, 3rd November, 1988: 'Cabinet Reduced - Cost saving
a must - KK* f p. 1.
The role of the backbenchers is nowhere spelt out; some engage
the Government handled a land deal in Chief Chiyawa's area, was
4.
2* Zambia:
3.
Parliamentary Debates  ^ No. 36, 31st July, 1974,
Col. 344. The Bill was passed and became the 
Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act, 1974, No. 18 
ibid. Art. 29(8); supra, p. 255.
Local Administration Act, 1980, No. 15. 
infra, p. 357.
carried by 50 votes to 42. Commenting on the Government's defeat, the
then Prime Minister, Nalumino Mundia, said that "the result of the vote
2
has no binding on the Government decision". On the 27th March, 1985,
the then Speaker, Nabulyato, censured the Prime Minister and wondered
whether "we have reached a stage where we begin to deface our own
3
designed One Party Democracy". Whatever that meant, if the Government
were bound by the vote of the National Assembly, that might have meant
either that it rescinded the land deal or it resigned. It did neither.
Commenting on the role of Parliament under Tanzania's One Party,
it was observed that "unless the concept of a one party state is also
challenged, the question of empowering the House to move a vote of no
confidence against the Government cannot arise,- this is a preserve of the
4
multi-party system." In Zambia the President's and Government's tenure
of office is not affected by an adverse vote in the National Assembly.
Even under the British (unwritten) Constitution it is a customary practice,
a conventionf and not a rule of law that a defeated government should
resign and that the Monarch dissolve Parliament. The Constitution of
Burundi (1981), of Mali (1974) and Zaire (1974) contained the principle
of independence of both the President and Government, of Parliament.
Ministers are responsible to the President only. The Constitution of
Rwanda, on the,other hand, provides (Art. 78) that when a motion of censure
is carried against the Government, Ministers and Ministers of State must
offer their resignation to the President. If such a motion is rejected,
5
the initiators must not propose a new; one during the same session.
1. Times of Zambia; 15th February, 1985: 'Chiyawa Land Row in Twist', p. 1
2. Times of Zambia? ibid.
3. Times of Zambia; 28th March, 1985; 'Speaker Censures PM'
4. Donge, J.K. and Livinga, A.J., "In Defence of the Tanzanian Parliament",
PA, Vol. 39„ 1986, 230 at p. 238.
5. Reyntjens, F., "Reeent Developments in the Public Law of Francophone
African States", JAL, 1986, Vol. 30, No. 2, p. 81.
Under the Zambian system, the Government, which has complete 
executive authority in the management of the affairs of the country, 
includes the President. The provisions of the Constitution which vest 
executive functions in the President,'*' give the impression that the 
President can receive a resignation from the whole of his Cabinet and 
thereafter swore-in a new one. Since Cabinet Ministers are well briefed 
on policy add decisions of the Party and Government, there is often little 
room or posibility for Cabinet Ministers to differ with the President 
to the extent that they might decide to resign en block from the Cabinet.
In any case resignation from a Cabinet post is something not heard of in 
African politics; mainly because the Party would take such an action as 
tantamount to rebellion against the President and the Party warranting 
expulsion from the membership of the Party and membership of the National 
Assembly. Backbenchers are, therefore, often met with Cabinet solidarity; 
a solidarity not based of fear that Government defeat would result in its 
resignation, but to some extent fear of the Party's reaction against any 
Minister who failed to support Government decision or policy.
The usefulness in the backbenchers' criticism or defeat of 
the Government in a vote on a matter before the National Assembly, does 
not lie in forcing the Government to resign, which it cannot do, but in 
demonstrating the majority's feeling. In the final analysis. Government 
depends on the support of a majority in the National Assembly; if the 
Government was too heedless to criticism or gave inadequate explanation 
to questions raised by backbenchers or it was subjected to frequent 
defeats, it would certainly lose credibility and confidence of the nation 
as a whole. If the Government were to continue in office notwithstanding 
such, constant criticisms and defeats it would convert itself into a 
dictatorship, ruling willy-nilly the views in Parliament and the country.
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, provides that
53(1) The executive power of the Republic shall 
vest, in the President and, subject to the provisions 
of this Constitution, shall be exercised by him 
either directly or through officers subordinate to him.
Although the defeat of the Government in 1974 and 1980 on two
major legislation and in a vote of no confidence in 1985 did not result
in the resignation of the Government or the cancellation of the Government
measure in dispute, the backbenchers ' stand showed that there was still
some room for freedom of speech and criticism in Zambia's one-party
parliament. The backbenchers' failure to influence Government decision
might have sent some of them back into their backwall seats to remain
silent in frustation, but content with the feeling that "we told them
of the demerits of the Government measure". Although in theory neither
the Party nor the President can intervene on the side of either the
backbenchers or the Government, the President did intervene (prima facie
on the side of the Government) in the Chiyawa land deal case when he
told a press conference that inspite of the stand taken by the backbenchers
in Parliament, the project would go ahead because he was interested in
encouraging investment in Zambia.'*’ The real cause of conflict between
the Government and backbenchers in such matters as the Chiyawa land deal
is lack of information; backbenchers are IlI^Lnformed and operate on
'rumours'. There is an unfortunate tendency among African governments to
regard everything the Government is doing as~ 'secret'. Properly briefed,
backbenchers would be less critical of government actions. Commenting on
the constitutional system in Zambia, it has been observed as follows:
In early 1979 Zambia stood out among the countries of 
Africa as one of the small minority still maintaining 
elements of a democratic societyr Although legal 
opposition has been banned by the establishment of a 
one party sysrtem in 1973, the courts maintained a 
measure of Independence fi members of the National 
Assembly spoke out against the government and party,
and the press continued to report opinions of the
opposition, if in a highly critical tone.2
The one-*party democratic state system is not a subject of 
controversy in Africa to-day. What Is still of controvery in each case
1. Times of Zambia; 25th. April, 1985.
2. Kaplan, I., Zambia — a Country Study,^Foreign Area Study;The American
University, 1979, P- 14Ch
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is whether institutions such as the Party, the National Assembly and the 
Presidency which claim to represent the sovereign will of the people, are 
democratically constituted and run. There is no doubt that the One-Party 
systems practised in most African states are transitional and experimental. 
They should, therefore, be open to public debate, scrutiny and criticism 
in order to allow them to evolve new indigenous features and gather local 
roots. The clear division between the Party as the policy-formulating 
body and the National Assembly as a legislative body, denies the latter the 
opportunity to discuss its own features and role as these are considered as 
matters of policy falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the former.
The One-Party system operating in some African States are 
different from those existing in Eastern European socialist countries with 
one dominant political party, the Communist Party. There, for instance, the 
ruling political party can initiate legislation: Art. 65(1) of the Germany 
Democratic Republic Constitution (1968) , Art. 113 of the USSR Constitution 
(1977) and Art. 86 of the Vietnam Constitution, (1980) . ^  UNIP, for instance, 
cannot initiate legislation (draft Bills) to the National Assembly through 
the Party Congress or National Council or the Central Committee; something 
which the Communist Party of the USSR can do. That is tantamount to reducing 
Parliament into a sub-committee of the Party.
It is not accurate to say that the National Council of UNIP is 
the initiator of legislation in Zambia. The National Council can resolve on 
any subject including changes in the law, but the initiator of legislation 
is the Cabinet. The trend to expand the role of the Party should not extend 
to initiation of legislation as that would signal the demise of Parliament. 
The present freedom to criticise, legislation would disappear if Bill came 
direct from the Party. And not only that, the constitutional convention of
1. Loeber, D.A. (Ed.) Ruling Communist Parties and Their Status Under Law;
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1986, p. 441.
collective ministerial responsibility could be undermined as ministers 
could be freed from supporting or defending draft legislation originating 
from the Party. The most cynical members of the National Assembly would 
wonder why the Party did not simply assume legislative role itself.
There are many reasons why the Party cannot do that, for instance, most 
of the political leaders are aware that the law of any State means that 
body of rules designed to regulate the conduct of people and affairs 
living in that state and which the courts recognize and enforce. Often 
Parliaments or National Assemblies are the traditional institutions whose 
enactments are recognized as 'law' by both the people and the courts. Some 
resolutions or decrees of a political organization would most likely not 
enjoy such recognition.
No UNIP organ drafts or sends Bills to be enacted into law by 
the National Assembly. The National Assembly is said to be an organ of 
the Party only in the sense that it is composed of members of the Party 
and that the legislation it enacts originate from an Executive composed 
of members of the Party. In reality, the National Assembly is a national 
representative body composed of members elected by the people of Zambia, 
the majority of whom are not members of the Party. Consequently, no organ 
of UNIP can resolve on the dissolution of Parliament. That is a matter for 
Parliament. The role of UNIP in as far as the day-to-day functioning of 
Parliament is concerned, is, or should be, nominal. But the provisions 
of the Constitution of the Party,^ and the practices that ensure that no 
utterances are made in the National Assembly critical of the Party, have 
compelled Parliament to function under the dark shadow of the Party. The 
Party displays pessimistic distrust of the popularly elected MPs. This 
pessimism has retarded the growth of a genuine democratic culture albeit 
under a One-Party system. Unless and until there is freedom of speech 
in the Party itself, there cannot be freedom of expression in Parliament.
1. UNIP; Constitution, 1988, Art. 8; supra, p. 322.
Section 4. Removal of President from Office: Role of Party and Parliament.
Although the Constitution of UNIP provides that in the event
of the President of the Party resigning or being removed from office of
the President of the Party or of the Republic, he shall cease to be
President of the Party and the Secretary-General of the Party shall act as
President until a new President is elected,'*’ the procedure to be followed
and the body to remove the President from office is not expressly provided
for. Presumably, being an MCC, the Appointments and Disciplinary sub-Committee
of the Central Committee which exercises disciplinary jurisdiction over MCCs,
would be the body to prefer a charge against the President. In Tanzania, the
CCM Constitution provides that the election and removal of the Chairman of
the Party (who is equivalent to UNIP's President and Chairman) shall be done
by resolution of the National Conference (which is the equivalent of UNIP's
Party Congress) supported by at least two-^thirds of the members from the
2
mainland Tanzania and two-thirds of the members from Zanzibar. So far,
both UNIP and the CCM have not removed the Chairman or President of the
Party on disciplinary grounds.
Nigeria has had experience in removing top political party
leaders and State Governors, from office. In Rimi (Governor of Kano State)
and Musa (Governor of Kaduna State) v. Kano, S. Ikoku^md People's 
3
Redemption Party, the plantiffs were expelled from the respondent 
political party by the first and second defendants whom the plantiffs 
alleged had flouted the provisions of the Party's Constitution. They sought 
Court's declarationsf inter alia, that the expulsions were null and void.
Since evidence showed that the procedure as laid down in the Constutiton of 
the party was not followed in making the expulsions, the Court held that 
the expulsions were unconstitutional and therefore, null and void.
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 78(a)
2. CCM: Constitution, 1977, Art. 65(b)
3. (1982) 3 NCLR 478
In Zambia the Constitution of the Party provides that a
member of the Party who violates the Party Constitution, Regulation or
Rule or who does not fulfill the decisions and directives of the Party
or misuses his Party or State position or in any way acted in a manner
prejudicial to the prestige of the Party or State^ shall have sanctions
applied against him. The sanctions include expulsion from the membership 
2
of the Party. Under the Constitution of Zambia the President can be 
removed from office for inability to perform his official functions due 
to incapacity or for violation of the Constitution or gross misconduct or 
loss of the membership of the Party. 'Gross misconduct' includes a breach 
of the Leadership Code. We shall consider the legal effect of the removal 
of the President, first, where the former President remains a member of 
the Party, and secondly, where he is expelled from the membership of the 
Party.
(i) Where the Former President Remains a Member of the Party.
Once a person has been elected the President of the Party and
of Zambia, he ought to retain the necessary qualifications of the President,
3
e.g. the citizenship of Zambia and membership of UNIP. It would appear 
that if a person was removed from the Presidency of the Party but remained 
a member of UNIP, such a removal would not terminate the Presidency of the 
Republic because the President of Zambia can only be removed from office 
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of Zambia. Although 
the Constitution of Zambia provides that the Party Congress elect the 
Party President who becomes the sole Presidential Candidate, it does not 
expressly provide that one of the essential qualifications for the President 
of Zambia is the presidency of the Party. It is, therefore, possible for 
the President of the Party to be removed from office while remaining the 
President of the Republic. Both the Constitutions of the Republic and the
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 21 and Reg. 8(1)
2. ibid. Reg. 15 (5) (f)
3. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 38(2)
Party are silent on the effect of a removal of a person from the presidency
of the Party while he remained the President of Zambia. Only the converse
is provided for that when a person is removed from the office of the
President of the Republic he ceases to be the President of UNIP.^ It is,
however, very unlikely that a person who has been removed from the office
of the President of the Party would be allowed to continue as President of
Zambia. The Committee of Chairmen is bound to call an extra-ordinary
Party Congress to elect anew President of the Party. The legal problem in
that case would be that the new President would not be a Presidential
2
Candidate1 unless the President dissolved Parliament. If he refused to do 
so, the Party and country would be thrown into a constitutional crisis. The 
solution to the problem would be expulsion of the President from the membership 
of the Party.
(ii) Where the Former President is Expelled from the Party.
Where a former President of UNIP is expelled from the membership
of the Party, he would automatically cease to be President of Zambia because
he would have lost one of the essential qualifications for holding the office
of the President of the Republic, namely membership of UNIP. The Secretary-
General becomes the Acting President for a maximum of three months and he
is not empowered to dissolve Parliament or revoke any appointment made by 
3
the President. The consequence of that provision is that Parliament (that 
is the National Assembly and the Acting President) would continue and the 
Party Congress would be convened to elect a new President of the Party who 
becomes the sole Presidential Candidate and a 'Yes' or 'No* election 
would be conducted solely to elect the President of the Republic. Once 
duly elected, he is the only person who can dissolve Parliament.
1. UNIP:
2. Zambia:
Constitution, 1988, Art. 76(1)
Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 31(1)
The cases of Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. Attorney-General,
2
arid Rimi and Others v. Kano, S. Ikoku and People's Redemption Party,
show that Courts of law can intervene in political party matters in
an attempt to safeguard members * rights and interests. Due to their
rather weak legal position, it is very unlikely that political parties'
rules can effectively oust Courts' jurisdiction from Party matters.
State Constitutions have at times ousted Courts' jurisdiction from
cases involving membership of the House of Representatives. For instance,
the Constitution of Nigeria of 1978 had provided that
170(10) No proceedings or determination of the Committee or of 
the House of Assembly or any other matter relating 
thereto shall be questioned or questioned in any court.
4
In Musa v. Hamza and Others, the applicant for a writ of
prohibition against a seven-man committee appointed by the Speaker of
the Kaduna State House of Assembly to investigate allegations of gross
misconduct made against the applicant when he was Governor of the Kaduna
State, failed to persuade the Court to entertain his application. The
Court held that the exercise of the power of removing a Governor from
office under sec. 170 of the Constitution of Nigeria of 1978, was
purely legislative constitutional affair quite outside the jurisdiction
of the courts by virtue of sec. 170(10) of the Constitution,^ cited above
Although the Constitution of Zambia dees not contain some
provisions, similar to those in sec. 170(10) of the Constitution of
Nigeria of 1978, the removal of the President of Zambia for violation
of the Constitution or gross misconduct, is a legislative constitutional
affair in that the President ought to be removed by an affirmative
resolution of the National Assembly supported by the votes of not less
6
than three-quarters of all the members of the Assembly. Such, a 
resolution cannot be questioned in a Court of law or any other place.
1. (.1979) ZR 267; supra, p. 159.
2. (1982) 3 NCLR 478; supra, p. 333.
3. Nigeria: Constitution of Nigeria (Enactment) Decree, 1978, No
4. (1982) 3 NCLR 439
5. ibid. per VJO Chigbue, J., at p. 449
6. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 41(5)
CONCLUSION.
This Chapter has considered the relationship between the Party and
Parliament, the manner in which UNIP's Committee of Chairmen approves or
disapproves the candidature of prospective members of the National Assembly,
the role of the judiciary in election cases, and, the role of the National
Assembly in general and of the backbenchers in particular. The controversial
aspects of the relationship between the Party and the National Assembly are
the vetting system and the purported restriction on the power of Parliament
to enact laws as it saw it. Although the jurisdiction of the Courts has
been ousted in matters pertaining to adoption of Parliamentary candidates
by the Committee of Chairmen, the Committee is obliged to act fairly as
it exercises quasi-judicial function. It is difficult to define a quasi-
judicial function or capacity as observed in the following comment:-
What however is a quasi-judicial capacity has, so far as I 
know, never been exhaustively defined. It seems to me to 
cover at any rate a case where circumstances in which a person
who is called on to exercise a statutory power and make a
decision affecting basic rights of others, are such that the 
law impliedly impose on him a duty to act fairly.^
The Committee of Chairmen exercises statutory powers and the rather 
large number of persons vetted, e.g. in the 1988 General Election, gives 
the impression that the Committee might in some cases not act fairly.
The increase in the number of judges and the availability of 
appeal to the Supreme Court against a decision of the High Court in National 
Assembly petition cases will not eradicate corrupt electoral practices.
These will continue until an effective machinery is devised to lessen or 
eliminate bribery during the election campaigns. A law could enable the 
Party to play an active role in preventing corruption. Caution, however, 
should be exercised in giving the Party such a role lest unscrupulous 
politicians used such a law in frustrating the election of their opponents. 
One of the merits in the present law is that all cases of alleged 
electoral malpractices a<£i not handled by the Party but are decided
1. Re K (H) (and Infant) /1967/ 1 AER 226, per Lord Justice Salmon.
by the courts of law. Unfortunately the courts have failed to assert 
their role, hence the recent changes in the law. It is hoped that the 
courts will now and in the future stand-up to the challenge posed by 
corruption in elections. The courts' usefulness is, however, very 
much like that of a sentinel called upon not to keep guide before 
the event, but after the event has taken place.
The sovereign will of a people is expressed through elections 
and the representative assembly. No political party in any society can 
claim to rival it. There shall always be a Parliament in a one-party 
system. If the function of any such parliament is to be meaningful and 
not being (seen as) a ceremonial rubber stamp of the Party, it should 
assert itself and show its true potential. Backbenchers, unlike Ministers, 
should not be scafred or deterred from criticising Government measures.
In order to enable them perform such a role effectively and not ignorantly, 
they should be provided with basic information on the work of the Party 
and the Government. Under a One-Party system the Party and the Government 
should be more liberal than under a multi-party system in supplying MPs 
with information. Under a multi-party system there is fear of leakage of 
confidential or secret information to opposition parties. One of the most 
serious causes of failure of Party and Government decisions and projects 
in Zambia is that fundamental decisions are arrived at or made by important 
bodies or persons who are denied vital information by the Party or the 
Government mainly on the ground that such information is confidential or 
secret. Backbenchers are also victims of such 'black-out*.
One of the unsatisfactory aspects of the one-party system 
is the want of individual accountability of MPs. The electorate has no 
power to recall its MP to answer or explain his deeds (or absence of 
them) or to move a vote of confidence (or no confidence) in him regarding
his performance in Parliament as their representative. The body which 
has power over an MP is the Party itself. The majority of voters in 
any Parliamentary constituency are not members of the Party. In practice 
an MP cannot call a 'general meeting' of his constituents; he can only 
address a political meeting convened by the Section, Branch or Ward 
Committee or Council of the Party. There is, therefore, a need for a 
machinery through which voters -members and non-members of the Party - 
can come together to receive reports from their MP and to review his
performance and should a need arise, to move a vote of confidence or
cr
no confidence in him or her. * ^ 0 A .  ^
It is not yet opportune for a return to a multi-party Parliament
in Zambia because there are indications that such a system could be
exploited for tribal ends. A multi-party system requires political
maturity and patience; qualities which are still wanting among those
engaged in political activity in Zambia to-day. Ideally, there should
be one Constitution under a One-Party system providing for a President,
a National Assembly and a 'national cabinet' in place of the Central
Committee, Committee of Chairmen and Cabinet. There should be Ministers
responsible for Party and Government affairs. Such a streamlined Party
and Government administration would necessiate drastic changes in the
present law on Parliament and 'societies'. Such an arrangement would
probably be opposed by the politicians as it would remove the mask of
the 'supremacy of the Party' behind which they masquerade. And yet it
would reflect the reality of the Zambian situation under which the
Secretary-General and the Prime Minister are Presidential appointees
responsible for Party and Government affairs, respectively. The Central
Committee, Committee of Chairmen and Cabinet are composed and dominated
by the President and could be reduced into a single body which might 
perform more efficiently than the present institutions.
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CHAPTER VIII.
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION : INTEGRATION OF UNIP AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES.
The Party, District Administration and Maintenance of Law and Order.
Introduction.
Although UNIP functionaries were deployed in provincial and district
1
administration immediately following Independence in 1964, the Party did not 
attempt a review of local government system until late in the 1970's. The 
One-Party system introduced in 1972 though devoid of a definite ideological 
basis, it was influenced by a combination of factors drawn fron nationalism, 
socialism, party popularism and quasi-traditionalism. The One-Party-Government 
was portrayed as the expression of the unity and the general will of the 
nation, the people: it represented the organic moral community whose 
interests it interpreted. Therefore, order and unity were paramount and 
all cleavages and all conflicts were illegitimate.
Structurally, the one-party apparatuses did not prove to be strong 
mobilization and transformation instruments. Rather, they tended to become 
public relations agencies for the central government and for propagating 
Party policies than for the implementation of social and economic projects.
That was understandable. At Independence Zambia inherited a social system 
under which the Government left much of the provision of social and 
economic services such as education, housing, health and public transport 
to private enterprise, the huge Mining Corporations and the Christian 
Churches. Local Government authorities also provided social services and 
amenities such as water, housing and sanitation, ihe Party, however, had 
no role in the social or economic field; its role was confined to the 
political mobilization of the people. The Party was, therefore, concerned 
with 'participatory democracy* at the local as well as the national level.
1. Supra, p. 189.
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This Chapter looks at the historical background of local authorities 
in Zambia, the integration of UNIP and local authorities and the role of 
the Party in the maintenance of law and order at the grassroots level. The 
hypothesis in this Chapter is that the One-Party system has generally 
meant the emasculation, but not necessarily the elimination, of the liberal 
democratic structures with the use of Party plebscite and other forms of 
elections and controlled representation on local authorities.
Section 1. The Development of Local 'Government' and 'Authorities'.
Local government in Zambia was not a colonial product; for it was 
there in the form of indigenous tribal authority which was cleverly exploited 
by the British colonial administrators through the indirect-rule system.
Where there was no viable indigenous tribal authority to save and serve 
colonial interests, for instance among the Tonga of the Southern Province, 
such an authority was deliberately created: a chieftainship was instituted.
The early system of local administration in NR was based on 
'urban' and 'rural' areas. During the period between 1890 and 1911, the 
BSAC in accordance with the terms of its Royal Charter, promoted the 
'good* government and preserved the peace, of the Regions under its 
administration. Although the North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1900, 
referred to 'settlements by natives','*’ that simply stated the situation as 
it existed at the time and did not create segregated areas for natives and 
non-natives. As a matter of fact, the whole Region was settled by natives.
The Village Management Proclamation of 1900, however, empowered Village 
Management Boards to administer small communities around the sidings along 
the railway line which was progressing across the country from the southern 
border (Livingstone) to the Copperbelt. The rest of the country was left to be 
administered by the BSAC officials and through chiefs and headmen who were 
responsible for carrying out some administrative duties and functions such as
1. UK: The North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1900, 
Art. 41; Statute Law of Northern Rhodesia, 1917; 
p. 37, Supra, p. 40 et seq.
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collection of taxes, control of the movements of natives from rural
to urban centres and maintenance of law and order.*- Legislation on
the administration of 'urban' and 'rural' areas was in the form of
Orders in Council, op. cit., amplified by the Proclamations of the
2
High Commissioner, and Regulations of the Resident Commissioner. The 
Orders in Council were to prevail over the BSAC's Charter of 29th 
October, 1889, as amended, and the powers conferred by the Orders 
in Council were in augumentation of the powers conferred upon the BSAC 
by the Charter. Legal segregation or the creation of natives and 
non-natives areas was formally introduced by the Natives in the Townships 
Regulations, 1909, made by the Resident Commissioner, which provided that 
no native other than a native permanently employed by a European or an 
Asiatic employer should reside within 'a township' to which, the Regulations 
applied.^ ihe effect of that legislation when read together with the 
provisions of Art. 38 of the 1900 Order in Council, which provided that 
a Secretary for Native Affairs, a Native Commissioner and Assistant 
Native Commissioners should be appointed "for the administration of 
natives", established in the territory two distinct systems of local 
administrations; one in the areas around and along the line of rail, 
village management areas, copper-mining sites and farmlands occupied by 
non-natives - mainly areas of non-subsistence economic activity — and 
the rest of cotmtry settled by the natives. The former came to be 
referred to generally as 'urban areas', while the latter became the 
*rural areas'.
1. NER: Administration of Natives Proclamation, 1916, No. 18,
Secs. 3, 4, 11(2), 14 and 15.
2. NR: See Proclamations No. 1 of 1907, No.11 of 1911 and
No. 48 of 1913 regarding the management of Livingstone 
and Lusalta areas.
3. NER: Natives in the Townships Regulations, 1909 as validated
by the Natives in the Townships Regulations (Validation) 
Regulations, 1909, No. 6. The Regulations were declared 
invalid having been assented to the Governor (of 
Nyasaland) without the prior approval of a Secretary 
of State as required by the Order in Council of 1900.
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(a) Rural Administration.
The administration of 'rural areas' was vested in the
Administrator whose functions in this regard were summarised by the
legislation which empowered him "to exercise over all natives political
power and authority, subject to such powers as might be reserved by an
Order in Council or Proclamation to the Secretary of State or to the
High Commissioner'.^ The assumption of direct control of NR by H.M.'s
Imperial Government in 1924 from the BSAC administration, did not bring
about a significant departure in both policy and practice vis-a-vis
the administration of natives, except that the person to exercise over
all natives political power and authority was the Governor assisted by
the Secretary for Native Affairs, the Native Commissioner and his
Assistant Native Commissioners, Provincial and District Commissioners<
and, Chiefs and Headmen. It is quite obvious that a population of less
than two million natives in 1924 must have been over-administered with
such a large number of administrators at every level. A major change
in native administration came in 1929 when the Governor was empowered
2
to create superior and subordinate native authorities; the functions of 
the native authorities, however, remained those as laid down in the 
Administration of Natives Proclamation, 1916, namely the collection of 
taxes, maintenance of law and order and upholding of native law and 
customs. Chiefs were allowed to perform some judicial functions mainly 
in non-criminal matters between natives.^ A system of full-^-fledged 
native authorities began to emerge when native authorities, were empowered 
to collect revenue through fines, fees, taxes and licences and allowed to 
receive ten per cent (10 %1 of native tax collected by the central
1. NR; A dministration of Natives Proclamation, 1916, op. cit.,
sec. 3.
2. Native Authorities Ordinance, 1929, No. 32
3. Native Courts Ordinance, 1929r No. 33
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Government from tax-payers who originally came from their district.
Native treasuries were accordingly set up to administer such funds and
thus a system of native authority gradually got established. It was
1
obvious that the Native Authorities Ordinance Of 1929 and of 1936 which 
replaced it, purported to introduce in NR 'indirect rule' principles 
adopted by the British administrators in West Africa. According to these 
principles, native authorities, re-vitalized and reformed ought to have 
been encouraged and indeed required, to shoulder the responsibility, on 
behalf of the colonial administration, to administer native affairs in 
native settled parts of the country: such liberty and self-development 
could be best secured to the native population by leaving them free to 
manage their own affairs through their own rulers, proportionately to 
their degree of development and advancement, under the guidance of the
2
British staff and subject to the laws and policy of the administration.
In NR the system of native administration was heavily under
British CO and BSAC officials, emphasis being laid on the development
chiefs' rule subordinated to district and provincial commissioners. The
system was therefore, non-slsctive and unrepresentative. There was
therefore no room for political organization. The Native Authorities
Ordinance, 1936, remained in force until repealed by the Local Government 
3
Act, 1965.. Notwithstanding the emergence of the native welfare societies
4
in urban areas in the 1930's, administrators found districts in NR easy 
to govern, people being committed to their cattle wealth, agricultural
activities more than to political activity.
1. NR: 1936, No. 9.
2. Lugard, F.D., The Dual Mandate in British. Tropical Africa;
Blackwell, London, 1926, p. 24.
3. Zambia: 1965, No* 69, Cap. 480..
4. Supra, p. 58.
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(b) Urban Administration.
Constitutions establish a framework within which the government
and administrative agencies of the State operate. The colonial system of
administration was based on the British model which is not founded upon a
written Constitution. Flexibility is often seen as one of the great virtues
of the British Constitution which allows adaptation to changing situations
without loss of the fundamental respect that prevails for the country's
institutions. In NR although there was the Legco and the Executive Council,
the system of government was not based on a party system; consequently,
there was no responsibility to an electorate on the part of the governors.
Although the country was divided into nine Provinces, there was no overall
legislation providing for 'local government' of these areas. Instead, the
territory was administered through a series of legislation designed to
regulate each area in accordance with its historical, geographical and
economic background or activity. Ihus, the Municipal Corporation Ordinance,
1927,^ applied to urban areas with a cosmopolitan population concentration,
for instance, such centres as Lusaka, the capital (after 1935), Livingstone
(the capital in 1927) and Ndola, the largest town which developed outside
2
the Copperbelt; the Townships Ordinance, 1929, which applied to centres
with fewer people than municipal areas, e.g. provincial capitals such as
3
Fort Jameson (Chipata); and, the Mine Townships Ordinance, 1932, which 
applied to towns and townships established by the giant mining corporations 
for their economic activities including the housing of their labour force. 
The relationship between the Municipal Corporations, Townships and Mine 
Townships Boards on one hand and the Government on the other hand, was 
dominated by the Executive (the Governor and his Executive) which was 
ultimately responsible to H.M.'s Government in the UK through a Secretary 
of State (for the Colonies).
The colonial policy in NR was against the urbanization of the 
African ostensibly on the ground that that would lead to 'detribalization'
1. NR: 1927, No. 16, Cap. 470
2. 1929, No. 53, Cap. 471
3. 1932, No. 11, Cap. 472
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which would in turn result in ' disstabilization' of the African society
and colonial administration in the country. Following the emergence of
African political and labour organizations soon after the end of the
Second World War, which demanded recognition of Africans' presence and
property rights in urban areas, areas began to be set aside for African
townships in urban areas and the Department of Local Government and
African Housing was established in 1947 to coordinate, among other things,
the settlement of Africans in urban areas particularly on the Copperbelt.
But Africans1 presence in these areas was regarded as an exception to the
rule that they should not be there. As a result, Africans were not entitled
to participate in the civic or administrative affairs of the municipal
councils or townships boards. Instead, African Housing Boards and African
Advisory Committees were established composed of African town--dwellers to
advise municipal councils and townships boards on African interests. This
arrangement continued throughout the period of the Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland 11953-63) and prompted the Advisory Commission on the Review
of the Constitution of the Federation, to observe that
We think. Africans: should be able to qualify for the vote 
in municipal and other local council elections.
We also think that they should be directly represented 
on the councils themselves and not merely on advisory 
bodies associated with them.l
Africans did not have the vote and could not participate in 
local council elections either as voters or candidates. The vote was 
restricted to property owners, including corporations and persons who 
paid rates. Most. Africans lived in municipal or mining companies1 
compounds and did not own property or pay rates. The forces which devised 
the policy which denied the vote to the African at the national level,
1. UK: Report of the Advisory Commission on the Review
of the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland;
1960, Cmnd. 1960/1148, p. 76, par. 224. supra, d . 77.
were the same forces that determined who should or should not have the
vote at local government level: the settlers and the CO officials. A
grant of the vote to Africans at the local government level could only
come with a change in policy vis-a-vis the enfr achisement of the Africans
at the national level. Consequently, UNIP's fight for the control of the
national Government based on one-man-one'rvote, was waged simultaneously
with that of the control of local government councils and the grant of
the vote to Africans in local council elections. Accordingly, the grant
of the vote to Africans at the national level which resulted in the
formation of a UNIP-ANC Coalition Government in 1962, brought changes
in local council elections though not in local government system itself.
The Local Government (Elections)<No. 2) Ordinance, 1963,^ passed by the
coalition government, provided, as an interim measure, for African direct
representation in local councils on racial parity basis. Kenneth Kaunda's
first government post was that of Minister of Local Government, and,
commenting on the enactment of that Ordinance, said, inter alia, that
In the field of local government we are shortly to 
hold elections which, will, for the first time, bring 
parity between elected African and non-African councillors 
This is in my view, a big step in the right direction.
3
After Independence the Local Government Act, 1965, placed 
Native Authorities under the Ministry of Local Government and renamed 
them Rural Councils. The first national election for urban and rural 
councils were held in December, 1966 and both UNIP and the ANC took part. 
The second election took, place in July, 1970. In most. of the districts 
UNIP captured the majority of the seats except in Southern Province in 
which virtually all seats went to the ANC and in most: cases with very
1. NR: 1963, No. 23.
2. Legum, C., Zambia; Independence and Beyond; Nelson, 1966, p. 11.
3. Zambia: 1965, No. 69, sec. 2 defined 'Council' to mean the
Municipal Council, the Townships Council and the 
Rural Council.
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substantial majority, for instance, in Namwala, the results were as 
follows:^
UNIP ANC
Votes % Votes %
1966 1,265 18 5,612 82
1970 1,491 30 3,425 70
The electors were persons resident in the council ward registered
as voters for the purposes of the election of members of the National 
2
Assembly; the vote was granted to all adult Zambians, unless otherwise
disqualified. That meant that local councils became objects of political
party contest. UNIP's drive to control local authorities began early. It
has been said that UNIP's desire to change administrative structures in
the later years was influenced by apprehension when it began to lose
3
support from industrial workers and villagers. That statement is not
supported by any evidence. However, even in the Southern Province where
UNIP was 'weak' , it was gathering rather than losing support as the above
figures show. In fact it was the ANC that was losing ground to UNIP.
The period between 1970 and 1980 was dominated by two major
problems for UNIP; how to reconcile the local government system based on
cities (three of them), municipalities (five), townships (sixteen) and
4
rural councils (fortythree), and how to eliminate the ANC's persistent 
control of councils in the Southern Province. Hie following Section 
discusses how UNIP went about to solve these two major issues.
1. Zambia: Local Government Election Results, 1966 and 1970;
Director of Elections, Elections Office, Lusaka.
2. NR: Local Government (Elections) (Amendment) (No. 2)
Ordinance, 1963, No. 23, sec. 14(1), repealed by 
the Local Government Elections Act, 1970, No. 1, 
Cap. 482, secs. 14(1) and 16.
3. Lungu, G.F., Administrative Decentralisation in the Zambian Bureaucracy:
An Analysis of Environmental Constrants; Institute 
of African Studies, UNZA, 1985, p. 32.
4. Simmance, A.J.F., "The Structure of Local Government in Zambia" in
Hawkesworth, N.R. (Ed.), Local Government in 
Zambia; Lusaka City Council, 1974, pp. 4 and 9.
Section 2. Early Deployment of Party Functionaries at District Level.
The continued and persistent existence of the ANC in the
Southern Province contributed a great deal to the form of government
at district level UNIP adopted in its transition from being a
'freedom-fighting* political party to a ruling party. At district
level in order to establish a firm and institutionalized control by
UNIP over the bureacracy and the inhabitants and to implement what
1
President Kaunda called 'decentralisation in centralism1 - which 
actually meant allowing local people to conduct their daily affairs 
under the leadership of party officials centrally appointed - the 
Party set out to assert its leadership.
(a) Economic Change, Social Class and Political Formation.
During the colonial era economic change differentiated the 
regions of NR economically and resulted in sections of the population 
developing differing experiences and interests. In most of the country 
opportunities through the traditional economy were closed off by European 
and Asian control of manufacturing industry and trade. Labour migration 
became the primary means of obtaining cash with, which to purchase the 
manufactured goods and to pay the taxes demanded by the government.
Where there were few opportunities at home able-bodied men were syphoned 
off through free migration or compulsory labour contracts to work on 
mines, farms and line of rail in SR, South. Africa and the Congo (Zaire) 
reducing rural production to mere subsistence far those who remained 
at home. The Copperhelt, on the other hand, was incorporated into 
underdeveloped economy of the north, centre and east of the country, 
providing work, wages and goods for their migrant workers. These areas 
formed an integrated system of substence and urban migration; men and
1. UNIP; President Kaunda opening UNIP National Council, 
9th November, 1968.
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later whole families spending the best of their most productive years 
of their lives away from their tribal areas. The same pattern was also 
largely true for the North-Western and Barotseland (now Western) 
Provinces although urban employment from these areas was sought mainly 
in the Congo and SR. Before independence a further development was 
taking place among a smaller section of the African urban population; 
the emergence of a stabilized urban population, a young generation that 
knew nothing of the rural areas and would not be interested in retiring 
to them. But there was one large part of the country and some smaller 
ones, where there developed a different pattern of incorporation into 
the colonial economy, and consequent different experience and political 
alignment. In contrast with the subsistence-migration economy which had 
arisen in most of the country, the Southern Province saw instead a 
transition from traditional subsistence towards a cash-crop oriented 
peasant economy. In social terms that means that at independence the 
Southern Province had developed a deep-rooted peasant culture — a 
nascent class — to which most rural inhabitants aspired; a culture based 
on land and cattle ownership and cash crops. That contrasted with other 
rural areas of comparable size and political importance, for instance, 
the northern Province.
A further crucial social category w.as also in formation
during the later colonial period. The men who had gone furtherest in
education became a small class of professional men. These became
teachers and administrative personnel. A category which failed to
develop significantly until after independence, was that of small
businessmen and traders; an absence due to the monopoly of trade by
Europeans and Aslans. The split in the NRANC in 1958 and the formation
1
of ZANC and later UNIP was not mere a 'tribal' or 'regional' affair, 
but had deeper implications. The NRANC of the early 1950's had derived
1. Supra, pp. 72-75.
its leadership from teachers or ex-teachers and its initial stimulus 
from towns. The rural areas at first provided only passive, though 
mass, support. The formation of UNIP then drew off the bulk of the 
urban and more educated supports and activated the majority of those 
subsistence rural areas which provided most of the country's industrial 
workers. The ANC changed its nature, intensified its rural activity 
particularly in the southern and central provinces and developed 
increasingly the characteristies of a party of small-scale cash-crop 
farmers and petty rural entrepreneurs. It was led by men who, although 
some were educated, nevertheless understood and shared the conservative 
values of its supporters. The ANC became essentially a homogeneous 
single party, a peasant party. UNIP, on the other hand, was enlarging 
itself to become the party of government incorporating different social 
categories, gaining virtually undivided support in the urban areas 
and rural areas so closely linked to those in the migration-subsistence 
economy. As its success became assured, the members of the embryonic 
administrative class comprising most of the educated population, were 
bound to support it because they were assured of opportunity to utilize 
their acquired western education and skills in co-operation with the 
dominant majority party. Thus. UNIP became the 'ruling party'.
(b) Problem of Being a Ruling Party*.
At independence and thereafter there was competition 
for the limited resources and positions in government and the party, 
UNIP. Secondly, there were the divisions created by 1he Party and the 
Government having to rule its own supporters as well as the rest of 
the inhabitants; some of the Government decisions and actions were 
bound to be against the interests or wishes of those who put the 
Party into power. Authority came frequently no longer from the people fi 
but from the top. These problems were often referred to as the 
'post—independence crisis of ^expectation', but they were not confined
to Zambia alone, but to most of the newly independent states of Africa.
The other 'problem' was that of the 'opposition' to the ruling party, 
e.g. the persistence, though on a declining scale, of the ANC in Zambia.
One of the solutions to these problems was sought in the adoption of 
the philosophy of Humanism; but Humanism could not solve such problems. 
Before UNIP became Government, the fight was against colonial rule, racial 
discrimination and the Federation. After Independence, President Kaunda 
proclaimed that the fight was against poverty, ignorance and disease. The 
ANC's opposition, however, compelled UNIP leadership particularly at the 
district level, to contradict the policy on the eradication of poverty, 
e.g. there were several cases in which District Councils dominated by
UNIP councillors resolved against trading licences being held or granted
1 2 
to ANC supporter unless and until such a supporter joined UNIP.
Much of the ANC's criticism highlighted UNIP's difficulties and
accusations that UNIP was incompetent to govern, although if the ANC had
ever gained power there was nothing to suggest that it would have been
exempt from similar problems of ruling because governing is in itself a
divisive process. However, such propaganda - and how to counter it - was
one of the reasons for UNIP's early deployment of Party officials at the
district level. Internally, UNIP had to resolve tribal identification not
caused by the masses due to loyalty to their primordial ethnic groupings,
generated at the top by politicians competing for position, influence and
resources. The Party resorted to careful tribal balancing in the allocation
of offices in the Party, the Government and parastatal organizations. That
meant that gradually the personnel, machinery and the resources of the
1. Chilufya v. City Council of Kitwe (1967) ZR 115, the Council's resolution
was held ultra vires sec. 3(a), Market Ordinance
See also The People v. Livingstone Municipal Council 
Ex Parte Simioti (1969) ZR 53.
2. The People v. Luanshya Municipal Council, Ex Parte Chendaeka (1969) ZR 69;
the Court ruled that the Council's order should be
removed into the High Court to be quashed as ultra vires 
the Trades Licensing Act, 1968, No. 41, sec. 15(1).
government were brought to support the party.
(c) Party Structure and Organization.
At independence UNIP's formal structure at the district level 
was headed by a full-time official paid direct from the Party's headquarters 
in Lusaka; the Regional Secretary. He was the key person in party 
organization and in 1966 in a Presidential directive he was appointed 
chairman of the District Development Committee which was composed largely 
of civil servants, replacing the District Secretary, who was a civil 
servant, who became the Secretary of the Committee. In most districts the 
Regional Secretary was a local man, e.g., an active party member who was 
asked to give up a teaching post to become a full-time organizer. Later, 
men from the line of rail were sent to some districts as Regional 
Secretaries. In 1968 the importance of the Regional Secretary was 
diminished by the appointment of a DG by the President to each of the 
districts. These were high-level political activists with responsibility 
over the civil servants, e.g. the District Secretary and over party officials, 
e.g. the Regional Secretary and his colleagues, the Branch officials.^
The close identification of UNIP with the Government was a central 
aspect in the Party's policy and effort to win over all the districts.
Before independence party Landrovers were painted on their doors with 
the slogan: 'UNIP IS POWER', i.e. organizational strength. In the 1966 
local government election, the painting changed to 'UNIP IS GOVERNMENT', 
and in the 1970 election, the painting was simply, 'UNIP' . The opposition 
ANC had no DGs, although it had district organizers and Landrovers painted 
'ANC'. Predictably, much of ANC's criticism of UNIP was against that 
identification: of civil servants working for or under UNIP and of 
government machinery being used to promote the interests of the ruling 
party and the manner UNIP had increasingly utilized its political power,
1. Supra, p. 189.
especially the way that both Party and Government decisions had emanated 
from State House - the authority of the President himself. The ANC was 
opposed to the purported integration of UNIP and the Government. The 
egalitarian people of the Southern Province who solidly stood behind the 
ANC, subservience on the face of authority was despised. A large area of 
the Province had no traditional chiefs and where they existed, the majority 
had been installed by the British administrators^" and these were regarded 
as equal amongst their subjects or at most as primus inter pares. Hence, 
leaders in the ANC were not dominant figures but they were regarded as 
senior members of the party who had achieved a leading position.
The deployment of UNIP functionaries into district administration 
was, in addition to 'keeping the party going' to spread the Party's 
philosophy of Humanism, weaken or eliminate the ANC opposition and to 
harmonize the relationship between and among UNIP leaders and the Chiefs
2
and Headmen and the hierarchy in the civil service. The Chiefs Act, 1965,
provides for the recognition, appointment and functions of Chiefs, Deputy
Chiefs or Sub-Chiefs and Kapasos (assistants). The President may, by a
statutory order, recognize any person as being a Paramount Chief, Senior
Chief or Sub-Chief with a prescribed area.^ Such a person must be entitled
to hold that office under 'African Customary Law'. However, the President
may withdraw or suspend the recognition of a Chief, if the Chief has lost
his entitlement to the position or in the interests of peace, order and
good government. Chiefs perform 'traditional functions' allowed under
Customary Law, except where these infringe the constitution or any written
4
law or are repugnant to natural justice or morality. 'Traditional functions' 
do not include political organization, consequently, political mobilization 
was and is left to political parties such as the ANC and UNIP.
1. NR: Native Authority Ordinance, 1936, No. 9, sec. 3(1).
2. Zambia: 1965, No. 67, Cap. 479.
3. ibid. sec. 3.
4. 'repugant' or 'unjust' customary rules included such matters
as betrothal for prepubescent girls, widow inheritance, 
institutionalized wife lending and adultery, and forced 
matrimonial reconciliation in husband-wife disputes.
Although there is no system of local government that is without 
its own patent and latent defects or shortcomings, the view prevailed 
that there should be introduced a new system of local government in 
Zambia consonant with the established One-Party system. The new system 
was intended to rectify some identified shortcomings, in particular the 
poor co-ordination between the Government and Local Government authorities, 
lack of statutory powers among provincial and district Party functionaries 
and development committees, the multiplicity of public officers in
the local government system and the role of UNIP in local administration.
UNIP's aim at controlling the new system was revealed by a
prolonged debate in the Party on the future application of the phrase 'Local
Government' . The Party leadership was concerned by continued use of the term
m  Zambia's public administration. The phrase was objected to on the
ground that it implied the presence of more than one 'Government' in the
country. The new system was intended not to create 'Local Governments' but
decentralized 'local administration' : the difference was said to be that
the former implied the existence of independent and autonomous self-governing
bodies, while the latter meant a body of persons administering their local
affairs under the control of the (Party and its) Government. The objection
to the phrase 'Local Government' was in line with the Party's policy that/ e.g.,
the word 'President', should not be used to refer to any other office-holder
in any organization in Zambia, except to the holder of the office of President
1
of the Party and the Republic of Zambia. Consequently, 'Government' should 
be restricted to apply or refer only to the Government of Zambia. The debate 
on the use of the phrase 'Local Government' also revealed the Party's 
perception of the composition and role of local authorities and the form of 
electoral system to be adopted in the election of councillors: local 
authorities were not to govern but administer their districts.
1. Zambia: Consequently, e.g. the President of the ZCTU is now
Chairman-General; infra, p. 423. Similarily, the title 
Secretary-General is restricted to the Secretary—General 
of UNIP and the Secretary-General to the Cabinet is now 
Secretary to the Cabinet: Constitution, 1973, Art. 115(1) (d).
The view that the Proposals for Integrated local administration in 
Zambia originated from the Research Bureau of the Party, enjoyed the 
support of the Party but were less known and had little support outside 
that body,^ calls for comment. That the Proposals were compiled by the 
Research Bureau of the Party is correct. However, the Proposals were 
submitted to the Central Committee by the then Political and Legal 
sub-committee of the Central Committee. The Central Committee referred 
the Proposals to the Committee on Decentralisation which was composed 
of representatives from the Party, the Government, trade unions, Churches, 
Local Government Association of Zambia and parastatal organizations which 
met under the Chairmanship of Fitz-Patrick Chuula, then Minister of State 
for Decentralisation. The writer served on that Committee. Figures I and II 
on the then existing and proposed district administration, respectively, 
used by Lungu, were contained in the Decentralised Government Proposals 
for Integrated Local Government, 1978, (pp. 71 and 72). These were devised 
by the Ministry of Local Government in conjunction with the Committee on 
Decentralisation. The proposals and the diagrams were distributed to all 
districts and the Committee on Decentralisation received comments from 
Local Government councils; most supporting the proposals.
A serious criticism on the introduction of the decentralization 
in Zambia, however, should be that decentralization being a major policy
2
matter, should have been discussed at the General Conference of the Party. 
The Proposals should have been formally adopted by the Conference which 
conveniently met in September, 1978. The failure to present the Proposals 
to the General Conference was caused by the opposition from the trade 
unions and lack of agreement in the Party leadership on the proposed 
changes. The mood was for postponement of the introduction of the system
1. Lungu, G.F., op. cit., p. 71.
2- UNIP; Constitution, 1978, Art. 70(d) provided that one
of the functions of the General Conference of the 
Party was to "defend and orientate general policies 
for the nation's development".
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of decentralisation contained in the Proposals. Following the Government's 
failure to pass the Local Administration Bill, 1980, President Kaunda 
presented the Proposals to the 15th National Council in November, 1980 
and pleaded with the National Council in general and MPs in particular, 
to support the Proposals. The National Assembly subsequently passed the 
Bill in December, 1980. If the Proposals were 'less known' as alleged,
they should not have generated so much timely opposition from members of
the general public in general, and MPs, in particular.
Section 3. The Present Local Administration System.
The present local administration system introduced by the
Local Administration Act, 1980,^ (to be referred as the 1980 Act), 
involves the transfer of staff and finance from the abolished local 
government councils, plus the establishment of discretionary power at the 
local level, a form of devolution of power. The scope of the reform is 
three-fold; the first structure is to foster rural development, the second 
to improve the provision of basic needs of the people through a uniform 
system of local administration, and, third, to strengthen participatory 
democracy in local decision-making; under the umbrella of the Party,
(a) Integration at the Provincial Level.
The basic principle upon which the present system is arranged
is of converting UNIP organs at Provincial and District levels into 'local
administration' organs performing such functions as are assigned to them
by the Constitution of the Party and/or the 1980 Act. Accordingly, sec. 85
of the 1980 Act which constitutes the Provincial Council for purposes of
provincial administration, incorporates the provisions of Art. 42 of the
2
Constitution of the Party. The functions of the Provincial Council as 
laid down in Schedules I and V of the 1980 Act, are the functions of the
1. Zambia: 1980, No. 15, came into force on 1st January,
1981: Local Administration Act (Commencement) 
Order, 1980, S.I. 1980/171, Reg. 2.
2. UNIP; now Art. 47, Constitution of UNIP, 1988 which
replaces Art. 42 of the repealed Constitution 
of 1978 which was in force when the 1980 Act 
was passed.
Party's Provincial Council as provided in Reg. 64 of the Party Constitution
The Provincial Council is composed of the provincial MCC, as the Chairman,
the PPS, as Vice-Chairman, DGs, Political Secretaries, M.P.s, District
Chairmen of the Women's and Youth Leagues, one representative from each
of the mass organizations, trade unions operating in the Province and from
2
each of the (four) Security Forces. The Provincial Council is composed of 
representativesof institutions and it is a non-elective body. The 
arrangement does not provide for citizen participation. The reason for 
that is mainly historical: UNIP had never developed provincial Party 
democracy. The Party's structure and administration below the national 
bodies centred on the 'Region', which was smaller than the Province but 
bigger than a district. The deployment of Provincial Ministers between 
1964 and 1978 was done within the framework of the Ministry of Provincial 
and Local Government without any supporting UNIP structures and secretariat 
The deployment of Provincial MCCs since 1974 has also not resulted in the 
establishment of any UNIP independent secretariat at provincial level. The 
Party operates within the framework of the Government machinery.
Government Ministries and Departments and the Provincial 
Permanent Secretary operate under the over-all supervision of the MCC 
who is accountable to the appointing authority, the President on all 
matters and to the Secretary-General on Party matters. Although the 
Prime Minister is the head of Government administration, MCCs in the 
Provinces are regarded as 'senior' Party officials and as such do not
take instructions from him or report to him. Consequently, the Party
is more informed on the administration of the country than the
Government. Although the Provincial Councils' role of formulating and
1. UNIP: now Reg. 46, Constitution, 1988.
2. Zambia: Local Administration Act, 1980, sec. 85(a) to (i).
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implementing Party policies is fairly carried out, that of administering 
the Provinces has been fairly weak. For instance, they have been unable 
to control 'their' District Councils or border smuggling of essential 
commodities, or poaching in the game reserves, or illegal mining of 
precious stone. In fact during the period when the Proposals on the 
Decentralization system were under discussion, there was pressure to 
either down-play provincial administration or to altogether abolish it 
so that the country was divided into Districts only. It was feared that 
provincial administration would continue to provide an unnecessary 
super-structure between the Government and local authorities. Border 
control, for instance, is the responsibility of provincial administration 
and not District Councils;hence the weakness in the control of cross-border 
smuggling into or out of Zambia.
The recently adopted Constitution of UNIP shows that 
provincial administration is being strengthened. The highest organ now 
is the Provincial Conference, whose composition is larger than that of 
the previous Provincial Council by the inclusion of members of the Ward 
Committees.^ The Provincial Permanent Secretary (a civil servant) is 
now the Secretary to the Conference. Zambia, however, would be better 
administered without provincial administration. Abolition of Provinces 
would go a long way in eliminating 'provincialism' , ethnic or tribal 
identifications which are, to a great extent, influenced by provincial 
boundaries. The present appointment of the Litunga of Western Province 
and the Chitimukulu of Northern Province as MCCs and as Provincial MCCs 
in their tribal Provinces and their heading of provincial administration, 
makes it difficult to abolish Provinces as these are now turned into 
influential power bases - mini states. Paradoxically, the bogey which 
was feared of establishing 'local government' at district level, might 
actually emerge at provincial level.
1. UNIP; Constitution, 1988, Art. 46.
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(b) Integration at the District Level.
In the previous sub-section it was pointed out that the 
basic principle in the present local administration system, is the 
convertion of Party organs into structures of local administration. 
Accordingly, sec. 10(1) of the 1980 Act incorporates into the Act the 
provisions of Art. 37 of the Constitution of UNIP which provides for 
the composition of the District Council, which is as follows:-
(a) the DG, appointed by the President, as the Chairman;
(b) the District Political Secretary, appointed by the 
Central Committee;
(c) two District trustees, appointed by the Provincial 
Committee;
(d) all Councillors in the District, that is all Party 
Ward Chairmen;
(e) MPs whose Parliamentary constituencies fall within 
the District Council area;
(f) one representative from each of the mass organizations, 
that is Women's and Youth Leagues and Cooperatives 
Federation;
(g) one representative from each of the trade unions 
operating in the District Council area;
(h) one representative from each of the security forces, 
that is the army, the police, prison services and 
intelligence; and
(i) one Chief elected by all the. chiefs in the District 
Council area, to represent all the chiefs.
No person can sit on a District Council unless ^
(a) he is a member of UNIP,
(b) he is not disqualified for election to the National
Assembly under the provisions of Art. 68(1) of the 
Constitution of Zambia; and
(c) the Central Committee of the Party has given prior 
approval of his membership.1
This provision requiring prior approval of the Central Committee
is applicable only to persons falling within categories (g), (h) and (i)
of the members listed above who hold their official posts- without the prior
2
approval of the Central Committee. The rest assume their official posts 
following formal approval by the Central Committee of the Party. The 
requirement for formal approval of local government election candidates
1. Zambia: Local Administration Act, 1980, sec. 12(1). Article
37 of the Constitution of UNIP is now Art. 42 of 
the 1988 Constitution.
2. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 84 provides that adoption
of candidates shall be conducted by the Committee 
of Chairmen.
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was introduced by sec. 11A(2) (i) and (ii) of the Local Government 
(Amendment) Act, 1975,"^ which also introduced primary elections in 
local government elections. Primary elections in local administration 
1 not included in the 1980 Act mainly because the present system is
Ward Chairman, who becomes the councillor of the ward, is elected. UNIP's
same as that for election of members of the National Assembly, namely 
2
one-man-one-vote. That policy was retained under the One-Party system,
however, the local administration system restricted the vote to members
of the Party Ward Council, that is Party Branch Committee members and
these are the people who composed the electorate that elected ward
chairmen in 1981. The system was widely condemned as a deliberate attempt
to disenfrachise not only non-members of the Party, but all residents in
the ward except a handful of members of the Ward Council. The 1980 Act
was accordingly amended to broaden the electorate. Hie electors for the
3
ward chairmen are all members of the Party resident in the Ward. The 
election is, therefore, still a Party affair in which non-members of 
the Party do not participate although they might live in the Ward.
Decentralization in the Government of Zambia, is that the election of the 
ward chairman should be seen "first and foremost as an internal matter for 
the United National Independence Party (UNIP), in exactly the same way as 
other designated institutions, given seats on the District Council are left 
to decide on the. method they will adopt for nominating persons to represent
1. Zambia: 1975, No. 16.
2. Local Government Elections' Act, 1970, secs. 14
not really based on election but institutional representation. Only the
policy in local government vis-a-vis qualifications for voters was the
The view of Mr Lavu Mulimba, a former Minister of State for
3.
and 16.
Local Administration (Amendment) Act, 1985,
No. 17, sec. 3. The registration of voters and 
and the conduct of the election of the Ward 
Committee is conducted by the Party's Electoral 
Commission under the provisions of the UNIP's 
Constitution, 1988, Art. 38.
them on the District Council. For example, the Councillor representing
all other chiefs in the district is elected by a Chiefs only electorate."^
It could be argued that while chiefs and trade unions nominate their
representatives on the district council under their own rules and/or
procedures, the ward chairmen do not represent members of the Party but
all persons resident in the ward; ipso facto, the electorate should be
composed of all residents of the ward registered as voters for the purpose
of the elction of the members of the National Assembly.
Before Independence and during the two-party system, there
was great enthusiasm for voluntary Party work among Party officials in
UNIP. The introduction of the One-Party system and the bureaucratization
of the Party service, witnessed a marked decline in enthusiasm for
voluntary Party work. The NCEOPPDZ had anticipated this development when
it recommended that Party workers under the One-Party system should be
2
given reasonable financial incentives for Party work. Ihe provision that 
the Party ward chairman becomes a ward councillor, is intended to achieve 
two things, first, it gives the Party a full-time field worker at ward 
level, and, secondly, it enables the ward chairman to receive a
3
'reasonable allowance* not from the Party, but from the District Council. 
This arrangement has injected some interest in party work at ward level 
particularly among the ward chairmen; it has destroyed that voluntary 
political organization upon which the freedom struggle was founded.
(i) The Status of District Councils.
Under the 1980 Act, the word 'council* means a district
4
council established or deemed to have been established under the Act,
1. See Appendix 'B', Answer to Question No. 34 infra, p. 557.
2 V Zambia; NCEOPPDZ, Report, 1972, p. 48, par. 152 and the
NCEOPPDZ—SRAG, 1972; p. 25.
3. Allowances paid in accordance with locality of duty
from the District Council headquarters: K15 a day
(15 Kim) to K50 (30 klm.) and US$ 110 a day abroad;
Local Administration (Councillors* Allowances) Order, 
1987, No. 6, Reg. 3 and the Schedule.
4. Local Administration Act, 1980, Sec. 3.
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that is, a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal,
capable of suing and being sued in its corporate name, and with power,
subject to the provisions of the Act and any other written law, to do
all such acts and things as a body corporate may do as are necessary
for, or incidental to, the carrying out of its functions and powers as
set out in the Act.^ This means that although in fact the District Council
is constituted under Art. 37 of the Constitution of UNIP, the District
Council, the body corporate, is established under secs. 3 and 7 of the
1980 Act. The body corporate is an independent body from that
provided for under the Constitution of the Party. Consequently, although
UNIP is not included among 'parastatal bodies*', that is a statutory
corporation or body or company in which the Government has a majority or
controlling interest, the District Council is included among parastatal 
2
bodies whose books of accounts can be audited by the Zambia National Audit 
3
Corporation. Ihe Corporation cannot audit UNIP books of accounts for 
the reason stated above. This means that the district council provided 
for under the Constitution of the Party 'disappears' and emerges as the 
District Council under the Act. It is important, however, to point out 
that the ward chairmen are not elected under the 1980 Act provisions 
(which are not there anyway), but under Art. 37 of the Constitution of 
UNIP, now Art. 42, Constitution of UNIP, 1988.
The local administration system was opposed by many sectors 
of public life in Zambia, including MPs, public officers and trade union 
leaders. Local Government officers' fears of Party interference was 
unrealistic in that Party interference had began as early as 1968 with the 
deployment of DG in district administration. Trade union opposition was 
based on selfish ends in that some unions, for instance the MUZ, feared 
that convert!on of Mine Townships Boards into District Councils would
1. Zambia; Local Administration Act, 1980, sec. 7.
2. Zambia National Audit Corporation Act, 1982, No. 32,
sec. 2
3. ibid. sec. 6
extend the jurisdiction of the mining townships authorities and 
consequently extend social and welfare facilities intended for miners 
to persons not engaged in the mining industry. That was an attempt to 
deny fellow-Zambians not engaged in the mining industry the fruits of 
industrialization. The MPs1 fears were mainly influenced by reports 
that such a system of local administration had 'failed' in certain 
African countries; in particular, Tanzania. The present local authorities 
system is structured as follows:-
FIGURE II: Present Provincial and District Administration.^
The President 
Minister
Provincial MCC 
Local Administration Board
I
PPS (politician)
Provincial Permanent 
Secretary (civil servant)
Provincial Conference 
(political)
Provincial Administration District Governor 
(civil)
District Council
I
District Secretariat
Executive Political Admn. Financial Security Financial Social Legal
Secretaries
1. UNIP: The Provincial Conference and Council delegate
administrative functions to the Provincial 
Committee comprising of the Provincial MCC,
PPS, Provincial Permanent Secretary, DGs, one 
representative from each of the Defence and 
Security Forces and Provincial Chairmen of the 
Women's and Youth Leagues and Provincial 
Co-operative Union: Constitution, 1988, Art. 48.
The diagram on the previous page shows that provincial and
district administration are both dominated by Party functionaries, all
appointed by the President. In essence the 1980 Act establishes Party
control of provincial and district administration. However, among the
nine Secretaryships in the District Council secretariat, only one is held
by a politician, the Political Secretary, who is appointed by the Central
Committee (now the Committee of Chairmen). The rest of the Secretaries
are either civil servants or officers employed by the District Council.
(ii) Status of Local Administration Personnel.
The 1980 Act provides for the merger of Party and governmental
organs at the district level in order to create an integrated administrative
structure, the District Council, in each of the fifty-five districts.^- Each
Council acts through a district secretariat comprising former central
government field officers and local government officers, constituting a
single unified national public service, and, Party officials. Persons
employed in the abolished local government service on coming into force
of the 1980 Act, were, as a transitional measure, deemed to have been
seconded to the Civil Service for a period of not less than three years
and not more than five years, and at the expiry of the maximum period,
they were deemed to have voluntarily transferred to the Civil Service
unless during that period they gave notice to the Public Service Commission
stating that they did not want to transfer and should be retired in the 
2
public interest. There were no reported cases of such retirements. The
3
maximum period was later extended to six years; thus, by 1st January, 1987, 
all such officers should have transferred to the Civil Service. The 
permanent arrangement is that a contract of service entered into prior 
to 1st December, 1986, between a local authority officer and the Public 
Service Commission, is deemed to have been made between such a public
1. Infra, p. 383 (footnote No. 3).
2. Zambia: Local Administration Act, 1980, sec. 91(2).
3. Local Administration (Amendment) Act, 1985, No. 17,
sec. 2(a) and (b).
and the local authority concerned. There is now established the Local
Administration Service covering all persons employed by and receiving a
2
salary or wage from a local authority. The local authority has the
power of recruitment, inside or outside Zambia, appointment, promotion,
transfer of officers and their dismissal. Any officer aggrieved by the
decision of a local authority may lodge his appeal with the Provincial
Service Board whose decision is binding upon the parties concerned but
3
subject to appeal to the High Court.
Under the 1980 Act an 'officer' of a council means a
public officer employed in a permanent establishment (the Minister for
decentralization decides which, posts should be classified as permanent)
of a council and an 'employee' means a person employed by a council
other than an officer. A 'councillor' on the other hand, means a member
4
of a council who is, neither an officer nor an employee. The appointment 
of the District Secretaries was delayed for nearly two years following 
the introduction of the decentralized system of local administration 
because the Central Committee could not approve the deployment based on 
'home districts' arrangement. Mr Mulimba, afore-mentioned, explains that 
the arrangement was intended to post Secretaries to districts where 
they could combine the advantage of knowing the local language and areas 
well.'* Ironically, it were the officers, themselves who in the majority 
of cases objected being deployed in their tribal districts. The Central 
Committee intervened and deployed Secretaries in any district irrespective 
of their ethnic origin. The localized recruitment and appointment into 
the Local Administration Service will envitably result in 'home-boy*
1. Zambia: Local Administration (Amendment) Act, 1987, No. 21,
sec. 3 and Reg. 4(1) of the Local Administration 
Service Regulations, 1987, No. S.I. 1987/101.
2. ibid. sec. 3/ and Reg. 5, respectively.
3. ibid. sec. 92 and Reg. 35(1), respectively.
4. Local Administration Act, 1980, sec. 2
5. See Appendix 'B' Answer to Question 2; infra, p. 555.
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appointment. Some of the conservative District Councils, e.g. those in
the Southern Province previously dominated by the ANC, would welcome
secretariat personell appointed locally and without Party interference.
In January, 1982, President Kaunda appointed sixteen MPs as DGs
and deployed them as DGs within their Parliamentary constituencies There
were three main reasons behind this experiment; first, it was the President's
response to the criticism made in Parliament and elsewhere during the
passage of the 1980 Act, that the Act provided for the chairmanship of
District Councils by unelected persons, namely the DGs. Secondly, it was
a cost-saving measure in that it resulted in a large number of DGs being
retired. The MP-DGs receive only one salary (from Parliament) and only
allowances from the District Council in accordance with the Leadership 
2
Code. Thirdly, it was anticipated that people would assume that an MP-DG
would be more responsive to their demands than an ordinary DG. Members of
Parliament and DGs are all politicians; all aiming at becoming PPS, Ministers
or MCCs and accordingly they are often concerned with satisfying the
expectations of those in the top leadership than those of the people they
represent in the National Assembly or they are appointed to serve. The MP-DGs
have not, therefore, performed differently from the ordinary DGs.
Although the District Council is a body corporate, UNIP's role
is assured through the chairmanship of the Council by the DG and the
3
presence of the Ward Chairmen and District Trustees and to some extent
of the MPs most of whom are strong supporters of the Party. The integrated
administrative system has not blurred the distinction between the public 
officer and the politician, but the relationship between the Party and the 
District Council has been brought much closer together than before, e.g. 
District Councils are now responsible for providing funds and office
1. Times of Zambia; 19th January, 1982.
2. Zambia; Leadership Code, S.I. 1976/88, Reg. 33; supra, p. 269.
3. UNIP; Constitution, 1988, Art. 42(1).
accommodation for the Party's District Political Committee.
The system of appointment of officers in the local administration 
system is different from that followed in the civil service, e.g. the 
appointment into the Civil Service by a single centralized authority, the 
Public Service Commission. The appointment of officers by each District 
Council might not bring about the projected 'single national public service'. 
The appointment of officers by each District Council might vindicate the 
fears expressed by public officers in 1979-80 of possible political 
interference in the appointment in the local administration service. The 
present local administration system is, however, yet another example of
a development in which UNIP has utilized the law to achieve its central 
role. The pattern of the leading role of the Party at the district level 
is similar to that at the national level, namely through the deployment of 
Party funcationaries in a dominant position in the system, e.g. the DG's 
chairmanship of the District Council. That, together with the composition 
of the District Council, have significantly changed the nature of 'local 
government' in Zambia. Under the present system Party and Government 
decision-making is dominated by the appointee of the President, the DG.
(iii) Vicarious Liability of District Councils.
Since a District Council is a body corporate, capable of suing
2
and being sued in its corporate name, it has legal capacity at law. A
District Council can act only through persons in its service. The basis of
vicarious liability is not wrongful-doing or wrongful command of the local
authority, but, simply founded upon the principle of public policy requiring
that an employer or master who obtains the benefit of his servant or agent
should hold the rest of the world harmless from the servant's or agent's
3
lawful activities. Accordingly, no logical opposition or difficult need
1. UNIP; National Policies for the Decade 1985 - 1995, Aims
and Objectives of the Third Phase of the Party 
Programme? 1985, p. 14.
2. Zambia; Local Administration Act, 1980, sec. 7.
3. Houldgworth v. City of Glasgow Bank (1880) 5 AC 317 at p. 326.
prevent a statutory corporation from being liable to compensate any
person injured by its servants or agents while acting in their employment,
even in cases where a tort committed required as one of its elements the
presence of malice.^ English decisions have gone as far as to hold that a
statutory body may be liable for torts committed by its servants when
2
engaged in an undertaking which was ultra vires the corporation. An
officer or employee of a District Council is not personally liable in
respect of any act done by him in the execution or purported execution of
3
his functions under the Act or any other written law. That, however, does
not mean that the Council is relieved of its vicarious liability in
respect of the acts of its officers and/or employees. The Councillor is
neither an officer nor an employee of the District Council; consequenly,
if a ward chairman were to commit a tort, e.g. allegedly defamed someone
at a UNIP or a District Council meeting, or, in his official correspondence,
the Council would not be vicariously liable. The Party, on the other hand,
due to want of legal capacity, cannot be sued in its name or joined as a 
4
co-defendant. The Councillor can be sued personally. The DG can be sued 
in his personal capacity or through the Attorney-General, in his official 
capacity, being an appointee of the President.
There has been no court case so far on the relationship between 
the DG and the Councillor on one hand, and, the District Council, on the 
other hand. What has been stated said above is, therefore, based on mere 
speculation of what the courts are likely to decide.
1. Citizens1 Life Assurance Co. v. Brown /1904/ AC 423. A local authority
may be liable in defamation: De Buse v. McCarthy and 
Stepney Borough Council /1942/ 1 KB 156.
2. Campbell v. Paddington Corporation /1911/ 1 KB 869.
3. Zambia: Local Administration Act, 1980, sec. 77.
4. Chipimo v. Chona, Secretary-General of UNIP and Attorney-General
(1983) 2R  125; supra, p. 249.
(iv) Challenging Local Authorities' Actions.
The general principle of law is that local authorities 
should act lawfully only through their delegated legislation and that 
everything done outside their statutory powers is ultra vires. The 
statutory powers are often granted in wide terms thereby allowing local 
authorities room for manoeuvre in the implementation of their policies, 
projects and programmes. The challenge of local authorities' actions can be 
with regard to matters that are expressly provided among the functions
of the local authorities, or to matters inplied or incidental to the
express statutory powers or where it is alleged that the local authority 
has exceeded its statutory powers. There are three main methods by 
which an act of a local authority might be challenged:
(a) by an application for judicial review in the High Court/ e.g. 
by an application for a declaration or an injuction,
topics already covered in Chapter Y;
(b) indirectly where an individual is prosecuted in a 
criminal court for alleged failure to comply with some 
order, notice or licence: the individual may attempt to 
avoid conviction by establishing that the order, notice 
or licence as the case might be, was ultra vires the 
Authority so that he could not be convicted for failure 
to comply with something which did not exist in law;l
(c) by means of audit, where an auditor finds that an item
in the local authority's accounts is contrary to law.
If this finding is confirmed on application to the High 
Court by the auditor (or person aggrieved by the surcharge) 
the amounts involved may be surcharged to the members 
responsible. 2
Control of local authorities by courts is crucial, but that 
is on rare occasions. In practice, great deal of control is exerted over 
local authorities by the Ministry of Decentralization in particular and 
the Party in general. The former's control is in the area of finance, 
while the latter's control is in the political area concentrated on the 
role of the DG in his capacity as Chairman of the District Council.
1. Zambia: Local Administration Act, 1980, sec. 59, criminal
offences can be created through By-Laws; penalty 
limited to K600 and/or six months imprisonment.
2. ibid. secs. 40 (on audit report), 41 (powers of
disallowance and surcharge), and,42 (appeals against 
disallowance and surcharges.)
3. Supra, p. 352.
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The Commission for Investigations - the office of the Investigator-
General (the Ombudsman) - exercises some control of local authorities. Ihe
Ombudsman is empowered to inquire into the conduct of any person or member
in the service of a local authority in the exercise of his office, authority
or in abuse thereof.'*' The role of the DG and the Ward Chairman can be
investigated by the Ombudsman, however, all the Ombudsman can do is to make
a recommendation to the President. It is the President who can reprimand a
DG for reported abuse of office. Local Authority officers are often summoned
to appear and have appeared before the Investigator-General to explain
their actions or that of their subordinates complained against either by a
member of the public or an employee of the Local Authority.
The role of the Investigator-General is more effective in
investigating complaints against local authorities than with the inquiry
into allegations against the Party and the Government: the latter are
sensitive to investigation on the grounds of Party or State secrecy or
security. The whole range of security matters are placed outside the area
of investigation by the Ombudsman. District Councils are empowered to
administer the affairs of their district in matters touching on politics,
economics, science and technology, social and culture and defence and
security. However, although District Councils are said to be responsible
2
for defence and security in their area, in reality defence and security
are matters for the Government: District Councils have no armies or police
force or intelligence service of their own, except for the Secretary for 
3
Security. In most cases, however, most people aggrieved by actions of 
the DG, the Ward Chairman or an officer of a District Council, are not 
aware of the existence of judicial review procedures or of the office of 
Investigator-General that can 'defend' their rights or interests when
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 117(4)(c).
2. Local Administration Act, 1980, sec. 43, Schedule,
Part I, 15.
3. ibid. sec. 83(2).
threatened or infringed by a decision or action of a local authority.
Consequently, some questionable decisions or actions of local authorities
go unchallenged, e.g. demolition of 'squatter' houses.
The Party Control Commission has been assigned a number of
functions, however, the Constitution of the Party in this regard does
not expressly refer to 'local authorities', instead reference is made to
'the Party, Government and parastatals as the institutions whose
functions shall be subject to the scrutiny of the Commission. Legally the
phrase does not include local authorities. It is most unlikely that the
Party intended that local authorities should not be subject to the
monitoring of the Party Control Commission. The Zambia National Audit
2
Corporation Act, 1982, defines a 'parastatal body' to mean a statutory
Corporation, body or a company in which the Government has a majority or
3
controlling interest, and includes a local authority. In the context
of such legislation, it could be argued that the Party Control Commission
has jurisdiction over local authorities. The Commission is empowered to,
inter alia, monitor and ensure that the Party, Government and parastatals
understand and actively implement Party policies, decisions, plans,
directives and programmes. The Commission can require any person in
charge of a local authority department to produce or furnish any document
under his control, or answer questions concerning the duties of any other
public officer or other person or call any official before it whose
performance or that of his enterprise or surbodinate is below expectation
and shall draw the same to his attention and to the attention of the
4
appropriate authority as to the action that may be taken. In accordance 
with these provisions, local authority decisions or actions could be open 
to challenge through the Party's Control Commission. It remains to be seen 
how the Commission will carry out its inspection functions.
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 70(1) (a) to (h).
2. Zambia: 1982, No. 32.
3. ibid. sec. 2.
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(v) Prospects for the Integrated Local Administration.
District Councils as bodies corporate, can perform only 
those functions delegated to them by legislation and cannot therefore, 
assume responsibilities or powers, or functions etc., which are not 
assigned to them by the 1980 Act. District Councils have ample legal 
powers to discharge their scheduled functions/ and, in addition to 
that they are allowed to do 'anything necessary for or incidental to 
the discharge of any function conferred' on them by the 1980 Act. The 
scheduled functions are numerous and include general administration of
the council area; agricultural and forestry undertakings; communication, 
traffic and streets; community development, public health; acquisition 
and maintenance of land and buildings; provision of social amenities 
and education; allocation of trading facilities, water and sewage. Local 
authorities receiwe Government funds to enable them carry out these 
functions. In addition to that they raise their own revenue through rates, 
rent, charges, fees and borrowings. The criticism that local authorities 
are unable to borrow money because there are no lending institutions in 
District council areas, save the post office,^" is not supported by the 
fact that almost all commercial and State lending institutions have
branches outside Lusaka, the capital; for instance, Barclays Bank had 
32 branches, Zambia National Commercial Bank,. 30, Standard Bank, 23, 
Grindlays Bank 6 and the State lending institutions such as Development 
Bank of Zambia, Zambia National Building Society, Zambia Provident Fund 
and the Lima Bank have branches in most centres of commerce. Each of
these institutions reported to Bank of Zambia substantial lending to
2
local authorities mainly for housing, water and road construction.
The aspiration of any people can be summarised as the need 
for improved quality of life manifested through appreciable improvement
1. Lungu, G.F., op. cit., p. 73
2. Zambia: Bank of Zambia Research Bureau of Annual
Reports of Commercial Banks and Lending 
Institutions-, 198CH81; See also UNIP's A Review 
of the Implementation of the National Policies 
tor the Decade 1974-84; 1984, p. 141.
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in the quality and amount of social services such as education,
employment, health and housing. In the developing countries such as
Zambia such facilities can be supplied mainly by the Government
through local authorities, the local authorities themselves and the
people through self-reliance. The need for self-reliance projects
at local level arises from several factors, and among these is the
fact that although the majority of the people in Zambia live in rural
areas, both .the colonial and post-independence governments showed much
concern and interest in the development of urban than rural areas.
Self-reliance creates self-confidence and no one institution can do
more for the promotion and sustenance of a community than the people
themselves. The role of UNIP has. been rather weak in leading the rural
people in self-reliance projects. Rarely is it reported that a UNIP
leader has spent a day helping villagers engaged in self-help project.
The spirit of self-reliance is lacking among the majority of the Zambian
people and ward chairmen are often men devoid of initiative and only
appeal for funds from the Government for every project.
The local administration system adopted in Zambia under the
1980 Act was to some extent influenced by the local administration
system adopted in Tanzania following the introduction of a One-Party
system, under which, every council, urban or rural, was placed under the
chairmanship of a TANU official, ex-officio. Government nominated
councillors dominated the council membership in the same manner that
non-elective seats are allocated to Party and Government officials on
the Zambian District Council. There was also a pre-election of elected
members- by TANU,"*" that is a form of primary election.. The revolutionary
Tanzanian system necessiated the posting of senior Party and Government
officials to Regions (similar to Zambian Provinces) and resettlement of
2
persons in collectives called ujaama settlements. The system which was
1. Mawhood, P., Local Government in the Third World; John Wiley & Sons,
1983, p. 91
2. Tanzania: See, Ujaama Villages (Registration, Designation
an<  ^Administration) Act, 1975
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development oriented, was based on 'local administration' at the upper 
level of the regions and districts, there were three institutions; the 
Regional Commissioners, TANU Branches and District Development Committees.
The Tanzanian system appears not to have worked well, and, as 
a consequence local government was re-constituted in 1982 to what it 
was at the time of independence. Some of the changes included the 
re-introduction of a majority of elected members on district councils, 
thus moving away from the bureaucratic representation and nomination 
on development committees and ex-officio mayors, chairmen and chief 
executive officers. The CCM representation is retained but redueed and 
not as the dominant component on the councils. One of the reasons that 
caused some opposition to the introduction of the local administration 
system in Zambia in 1980, was that Zambia was adopting a system of local 
governmentuhhat was reportedly failing and was being discarded by CCM.
What are the prospects of the local administration system 
introduced in Zambia by the 1980 Act? This question will be answered 
only in relation with the prospects of the Councils on their own, or in 
regard to their relationship with, the Party, the Government and the 
parastatal organizations.
(c) District Councilson their own.
The integrative provisions of the 1980 Act go beyonfl the 
assertion of the supremacy of the Party or implementation of the national 
ideology of Humanism: they are intended to achieve socialr economic and 
political development and national security. The 1980 Act established an 
unrepresentative local council system, dominated by ex-officio members, 
an arrangement found unworkable in Tanzania; now abandoned. Mr Mulimba's 
reply to one of the questions put to him on the local administration in 
Zambia,^" makes the point that the distinguishing characteristic of local
1. See Appendix 'B' , Answer to Question No. 8, infra, p. 567.
administration is its 'localness'. The rural local authorities and
local government authorities which existed during the colonial era in
NR were based on the principle of 'localness' in that the district
commissioner, the district magistrate, the village and township
management board and municipal corporation operated under local
officials or residents. But they lacked local representativeness, for
instance, by the exclusion of Africans from councils or boards. The
present system re-introduces non-representative councils. The ward
chairmen are petty bourgeois cliques who have remained in Party offices
unchallenged for many years. Given the control by the Party hierarchy
over the selection of ward chairmen, the lower Party officials who are
chosen to fill those posts are more concerned with impressing their
political superiors on their fitness for office of leadership and
probably promotion, than with the social and economic problems of their
wards. The prospects for a bold and effective representation of the ward
is~ therefore, negligible. Since the Central Committee approves the
candidature of every person seeking election as a ward chairman' in the
same manner it approves the candidature of candidate for the National 
2
Assembly, there should be no fear that ward chairmen elected by the 
general electorate would be less sympathetic with. Party policies or 
programmes at grass-roots level. District Councils' performances will 
continue weak as long as they remain undemocratically constituted.
(d) Re1ati on ship wi th the Party.
District Councils, are structural entities of the Party and 
their success or failure or effectiveness or otherwise, is tied up 
with the role of the Party. Ihey implement Party policies, coordinate
1. Zambia: Local Administration Act, 1980, sec. 12(l)(c),
2. Constitution of Zambia Act, 1972 f Art.. 75 C5) as
amended by the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) 
Act, 1983, N o v 1, Art. 75(3)
and promote Party work. As corporate bodies, District Councils are 
required to carry out their statutory functions only subject to Parliament 
and independent of the Party. The Chairmanship of District Councils by 
the DG, who is required to carry out such functions as are assigned 
to him by the President and the Central Committee of the Party, means 
that there is a day-to-day close relationship between the Party and 
District Councils. There is no room for political conflict between the 
Party and District Councils as presently constituted. Devoid of popular 
participation, District Councils have become institutions for recruitment 
of new leadership and political 'socialization' while entrustigg the 
task of decision-making in the DG. In practice there is centralization 
of decision-making power in the DG who is the President's personal 
appointee and representative at district level.
(e) Relationship with the Government.
The relationship between the Government and local
1
authorities is both unclear and unsatisfactory. The dissatisfaction
is caused by the presence of provincial administration departments
whose main role is that of referring district matters to Government
Ministry headquarters. The Government's view is that District Councils'
performances have been so poor that the Government is reluctant to
2
assign more power to them. The past seven years of local administration 
system have shown that some local authorities and provincial permanent 
secretaries were not ready for additional responsibilities. For 
instance, the Minister for Decentralization told a recent conference 
of District Council councillors that some Councils had failed to pay 
their workers or having their accounts audited unless the Ministry
1. See Appendix 'B', Answer to Question No. 8, p. 567.
2. Zambia Pail Mail; 17th May, 1988: 'Inept councils worrying, says
minister', p. 5.
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headquarters stepped in. Councils which failed to pay their workers 
could not be trusted and given more responsibility, for instance, to 
pay teachers and civil servants in their service, their salaries, 
because they might abuse it. Because of shoddy performance, Government 
retains overall supervision of District Councils through the Ministry 
of Decentralization. The relationship between District Council and the 
Government is not as cordial as that between the Councils and the Party.
One of the causes of the conflict between the Government and District 
Councils is the DG's refusal to be subordinated to Government officials 
such as Ministerial Permanent Secretary or Provincial Permanent Secretary 
Under-Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries whose ministries and departments 
operate within the District Council area. District Governors, who 
are junior officials in the Party, purport to dominate every institution 
in the district on the ground that they are Presidential appointees, and, 
refuse to be accountable to any other person except senior political 
leaders such, as PPS, provincial MCC, the Secretary-General or the 
President himself. The conflict between the District Councils and the 
Government arises from the somewhat 'jaclc-of-all—trades' role of the DG. 
Until and unless that is sorted out and the powers and functions of the 
DG are spelt out, the relationship between the Government and District 
Councils will continue tense and unsatisfactory.
(f) Relationship with. Parastatal Organizations.
The relationship between'parastatal bodies1' (a terminology 
which, sometimes includes local authorities)^ is governed by their 
statutory powers and functions. District Councils have power to issue, 
grant or revoke trading licences of companies and parastatal bodies 
operating in their district area. They allocate land and/or business 
or trading premises to parastatal organizations. There is, therefore,
1. Zambia: Zambia National Audit Corporation Act, 1982, 
No. 32, sec. 2, supra, p. 372.
close working relationship between these two institutions. However,
parastatal organizations are not represented in Party organs. The recent
appointment by President Kaunda to the Central Committee of parastatal
1
organizations chief executives, was not based on any provision of the
Constitution of the Party. Parastatal organizations are not represented
on District Councils : a missing essential link between District Councils
District Development Committees and parastatals operating in the district
council area. Parastatal personnel should otherwise assist District
Councils in the formulation and evaluation of their economic strategies.
In the urban areas, parastatal organizations send their periodic and/or
annual reports to the District Councils usually at the request of the
District Councils.In the rural district council areas parastatal bodies
operate simply as commercial enterprises without any formal working
relationship with the District Council of the area of their operation.
The poor performance of Zambia's economy and the chronic
shortage of foreign exchange during the period 1973-1989 adversely
affected the role of the public sector. Parastatals' economic activities
have been on the decline. low production of agricultural commodities
such as maize, groundnuts, cotton, sun-flower etc., has resulted in
parastatals concerned with the storage and transportation as well as
processing of these commodities, to close down some of their depots or
offices in many districts. Some District Councils are assuming some of
the functions which were abandoned by parastatal organizations.
Notwithstanding the egg-shell legal status coating the
District Councils as bodies corporate, they are in fact UNIP organs and
their relationship with any other institution is depended on the policy
of the Party. In the absence of a clear policy on the relationship between
UNIP and parastatal bodies, the relationship between these organizations
2
and District Councils could hardly be clearer.
1. See supra, pp. 227 - 228
2. Supra, p. 223.
Section 4. The Role of the Party at Grassroots Level.
The nerve ends of any political organization is at the 
interface between the party and the general public; members and 
non-members of the party. The character of that interface determines 
the effectiveness of the party^s role in the community. The major 
difference in the role of UNIP at the national and the district levels 
and its role at the grassroots level, lies in the fact that in the former 
the Party merely deploys its leading cadres in certain institutions 
established under the Constitution of Zambia, while in the latter, the 
Party operates through organs established under its own Constitution.
Under the One-Party system UNIP's functions at the grassroots level are 
legion compared to its role during the multi-party system. This Section, 
however, looks at the membership of the Party which is effected at the 
grassroots level. Party organization below the District and the role of 
UNIP in the maintenance of law and order at the grassroots level.
(a) Membership of the Party.
The Government of Zambia (UNIP) accepted the recommendations
of the NCEOPPDZ on the membership of the Party under a One-Party system
and among these recommendations was one that membership of the Party should
be voluntary and open to any Zambian citizen who accepted the objectives and
rules of the Party.^ That recommendation was similar to that made by the
Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a One Party State in
Tanzania which rejected the idea of TANU as an elite group and recommended
2
mass participation in the affairs of the Party. Ihese recommendations 
were merely confirming the fact that TANU or UNIP was historically a mass 
organization and the One-Party system was not to change that characteristic. 
The legislation which introduced the One-Party system in Zambia
1. Zambia: NCEOPPDZ, Report, 1972, p. 48, par. 154 and the
NCEOPPDZ-SRAG, 1972; p. 26
2. Tanzania: Report of the Presidential Commission on the
Establishment of a Democratic One Party State;
1965; Appendix IV, Part I, IV (1) and Part II 
(36).to (38) .
provided for a non-elite membership of UNIP as follows:-
12(1) There shall be one and only one political party in 
Zambia, namely the United National Independence Party 
(in this Constitution referred to as 'the Party').
(2) Every citizen who complies with the requirements 
laid down, from time to time, by the constitution of the 
Party, shall be entitled to become a member of the Party.^
Hie provisions of sec. 12(2) quoted above, were omitted from the
provisions of Art. 4 of the Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, which now
contains the One-Party Constitution of Zambia. The Constitution of UNIP,
however, provides that
Membership of the Party is voluntary and open to all 
politically conscious and active Zambian revolutionary 
peasants, workers, students and progressive intellectuals 
who accept the philosophy of Humanism and the Party's 
policies and programmes of action.2
Ihe requirement that applicants for membership of the Party should
be persons who accept the philosophy of Humanism, does not hinder persons
from joining the Party mainly because the Party is anxious to enrol as
many members as possible and hardly rejects any applicant on the ground of
him being ignorant of the philosophy. In practice membership of the Party
is open to all Zambians above the age of eighteen years. Under a One-Party
system a citizen who is interested in politics has to join the only available
political organization. The system obviously restricts the right of those
who, for whatever reasons, do pfot want to join the ruling party, to form
or belong to any other party. Consequently, only members of UNIP can contest
an election or can be nominated to an office which is open only to members
of the Party, e.g. the National Assembly or the District Council. However,
non-members of the Party participate in political affairs of the country,
3
e.g. they can vote in Presidential and Parliamentary elections.
The One-Party system adopted in Tanzania and Zambia has not 
turned CCM and UNIP, respectively, into 'vanguard parties', that is,
1. Zambia;
2. UNIP:
3.
Constitution (Amendment)(No. 5) Act, 1972, No. 1. 
Constitution, 1988, Art. 10.
Supra, pp. 144 and 294, respectively.
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political organizations whose membership is selective and restricted 
to a few dedicated ideologically tested persons. That is the model of 
the political organization first given legal backing by Art. 126 of 
the USSR Constitution of 1936 which guaranteed to Soviet citizens 
'in comformity with the interests of the working people' , the right to 
unite in mass organizations; the most active and political conscious 
citizens voluntarily unite in the Communist Party which was the vanguard 
of the working people, the 'leading core of all organizations of the 
working people, both governmental and non-governmental'.^ Although the 
Constitution of UNIP talks of the membership of the Party being open to 
'revolutionary peasants, workers and intellectuals'", in practice the 
recruitment for membership is open to all Zambians. In fact the problem 
has not been whether the membership of the Party is or is not open to 
all Zambians, but whether people should be compelled to join the Party. 
'Freedom of association and assembly1, includes the freedom not to 
belong to an organization, hence the emphasis made during the multi-party 
era in Zambia that persons should not be forced to belong to any party.
For instance, provisions of the Cane-Farmers' 
incorporation and Cess. Act, 1965, as amended in 1973, of Trinidad, 
provided for compulsory membership in the Trinidad Island^Wide Cane
2
Farmers* Association Inc. In Attorney-General v. Prakash Seereeram, 
it was; contended, inter alia, that that provision of the Act infringed 
Art. 1 (j) of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago,"^ which protected 
freedom of association and assembly. The Act provided for compulsory 
membership of the Association and conferred on the Association the sole
1. Loeber, D.A., (Ed.) Ruling Communistr^Parties and Their Status Under
Law; Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1986, p. 439.
2. (1975) (unreported) Civil Appeals Nos. 11 and 14; cited by Okpaluba, C.,
in "Constitutional Guarantee <f»f Freedom of Association", 
PA, (1977), p. 217.
3. UK: Trinidad and Tbbago (Constitution) Order in Council,
1962, S.I. 1962/1875, repealed by the Repuhlic of 
Trinidad and Tobago Act, 1976, No. 4.
bargaining rights on behalf of all cane-farmers notwithstanding the presence 
of relevant trade unions. Seereeram's contention was that because of the
provisions of the 1965 Act, he could not exercise his fundamental right of
not belonging to an association. The State's response to that was that the
freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution was not absolute and
that when the State sought to regulate a business such as the sugar industry
of Trinidad and Tobago (the ' sugar-belt') , there can be no infringement of
the fundamental right to associate and assembly if the State required a
person engaged in that industry to be a member of the Association. Rejecting
the State's contention, the Court observed as follows:-
If this contention is correct it seems to me that this can 
be a mortal blow to the heart of the democratic process in 
the country because citizens may find themselves being 
compulsorily to join religious associations, commercial 
corporations, trade unions, trade associations and even 
political parties under the guise of regulating the affairs 
of some particular activity. Bearing in mind that a 
constitutional instrument must not be construed in a 
narrow and pedantic sense, I would have thought that the 
only implication to be drawn from the words 'freedom of 
association' is that a person should be free to join with 
others and not compelled to do so.^
The One-Party system is contrary to freedom of association and assembly 
as enjoyed in some democratic states, first, because it obviously denies 
the citizens the choice to belong to another or other political party or 
parties, and, secondly, by implication, it compels citizens to join and 
belong to the only available political organization. Membership of UNIP, 
however, is voluntary and consequently, many Zambians have opted not to
join the Party. In 1983 the membership was 461,219 spread throughout 55
2 3
Districts , 1,177 Wards, 5,010 Branches and 36,329 Sections. The term
'UNIP' or 'the Party' includes the Women's and the Youth Leagues and the
1. Attorney-General v. Prakash Seereeram; op. cit., per Rees, JA, at p. 223.
2. There is an ungazetted and disputed 56th District of
Chizera, North-Western Province, which local ethnic 
factions have disagreed on the citing of its Boma - the 
District headquarters.
3. UNIP: Secretary-General's Annual Report, 1983? p. 30.
Young Pioneers although these wings of the Party operate under their 
own separate constitutions and maintain their own membership records.
The membership of the Women's and Youth Leagues in 1983 was 159,422 
and 102,325, respectively. There are two important points to be made 
regarding these membership figures, first, young persons (i.e. persons 
between 18 and 35 years of age) can join the main body and the Youth 
League or Women's League, if female, and thus being liable to be counted 
twice or thrice, and, secondly, membership of main body UNIP is, once 
secured, for life.^" The membership figures reflect the number of persons 
who paid their annual membership subscriptions. The average annual active 
membership of UNIP should,therefore, be around 730,000 members out of an 
adult population of around four million Zambians.
Depending on how one looks at that membership of the Party, 
one could conclude that the figure confirms the point that the One-Party 
system leaves a large segment of the population 'politically frustrated', 
that is, without an alternative form of political organization. The 
figures might also be seem as a confirmation that membership of the Party 
is voluntary otherwise if it were compulsory, it could be higher. Still 
further, it could be argued that the membership shows that the One—Party 
system does not enjoy the support of the majority of the inhabitants. There 
is no evidence that the membership is~ low because the Party is being run 
as a vanguard party; there has been no case of an Zambian being refused 
membership of the Party.
Some Causes for Low: Party Membership.
The introduction of the One—Party system made the Party 
ignore the difference between the administration and organization of the 
Party; emphasis was placed on the bureaucratization of the Party 
administration at the expense of Party organization, particularly at the
1. UNIP; Constitution, 19 88, Art. 11; membership lapses if
annual subscription is not paid.
385.
grass-roots level. Party administrative functions were centralized.
For instance, all Party finances were controlled centrally by the Party 
headquarters in Lusaka. In most districts delays in payments for goods 
and services rendered to the Party occured and resulted in the Party 
being refused fuel or repairs to vehicles. Besides being an embarrassment 
to the Party organizers, such incidents grounded Party organization and 
adversely affected membership campaigns.
Secondly, the establishment of a full-time Central Committee 
in 1974 necessiated the establishment of a Party Service which resulted 
in the deployment of a large number of highly paid civil servants. That 
affected the erstwhile spirit of voluntary political organization which 
was the birth-mark of African political mobilization from the days of 
the native welfare associations of the 1930's and of the NRANC and ZANC 
in the 1940's and 1950's}  After the introduction of the One-Party system 
Party work came to be looked upon from the point of view of financial 
benefits and high office. Field workers: are unwilling to organize gratis. 
Consequently, voluntary membership drive has lessened. The deployment of 
civil servants in Party service (from the District up to the Central 
Committee) has created a sense ©f withdrawal among the old Party 
stalwarts who seem convinced that they are being regarded as being 
intellectually ill-equipped for organizing the Party under the One-Party 
system. In their withdrawal, they seem to say, 'well, let the intellectuals 
come and organize the Party even here in rural areas*. The 'intellectuals' 
have tended to be office-bound, unaccustomed to tought political field 
work.. This has resulted in stagnation in Party membership and Party 
organization; consequently, a decline in the effectiveness of the Party.
Thirdly, most citizens publicly question the usefulness 
of the membership of the Party under a One-Party system. The leading role
1. Supra, pp. 58 and 61.
of the Party is seen as the domination of society by a handful of Party
officials whether they were supported by the majority of the citizens
or not. Such talk has contributed a great deal to the apparent lethargy
in Party membership mobilization. Some members of the public 'see no point'
in joining the Party as they cannot influence the entrenched Party
policies, including that of the One-Party system itself. This feeling
that UNIP belongs to a clique of politicians, has been criticised by
President Kaunda who has said that
UNIP belongs to no one person, not even to the most active 
members of it. It does not even belong collectively to the
members alone. It belongs to the whole people, even those
who are not members so long as they are people of Zambia.
Every Zambian is a shareholder in this institution. They
have all entrusted the welfare of their lives to it. No one
owns UNIP and no one can take it away from anyone. For our
sake, we must all support the survival and active role of
UNIP as part of us.l
The gist of this statement is that no one section of the population
should dominate the leadership or membership of the Party and that a
collapse of UNIP would destroy the prevailing national unity. The statement
does not mean that membership of the Party does not matter as long as
one was a Zambian citizen. There are times, many times, when the Zambian
citizen is required to show hia/her 'shareholder's certificate' in this
institution. For instance, President Kaunda himself once told a UNIP
National Council that he was 'shocked' when he discovered that some
Zambians he had appointed as High Commissioners and Ambassadors did not,
2
at the time of their appointment, possess UNIP membership cards. He 
accordingly directed that, first, these should not leave the country unless 
and until they were in possession of membership caods, and, second, that
in future no person sent to a Zambian foreign mission should leave the
country without a valid membership of the Party.
1. UNIP: Blueprint for Economic Development (A Guide on How
to Clear Obstacles); 14th National Council, 8th 
October, 1979, p. 26. Emphasis supplied.
2. 6th National Council, 30th June-3rd July, 1975.
Such directives have the effect of compelling people
to become members of the Party. This point will be considered together
with the fourth reason why some Zambians refrain from joining the Party.
Some are genuinely opposed to some policies of the Party, for instance,
Socialism or socialist economic programmes. Others, such as Watch Towers
and Lumpas are just opposed to politics in general. The Constitution of
Zambia provides that no law should make any provision that is
discriminatory in itself or its effect, and, 'discriminatory' means
affording different treatment to different people attributable wholly 
or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, tribe, place of
birth, political opinion, colour or creed whereby persons of one such
description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which
persons of another such description are not made subject or are
accorded privileges or advantages which, are not accorded to persons of
another such description. ^  It is pertinent to note that the restriction
is~ only- applicable to law that is discriminatory. Practices such as
the President's requirement that only persons in possession of Party
cards should be sent to work in Zambian missions abroad, is not covered.
All 'classes' are represented in the membership of
UNIP, although, the majority are general workers, market women, peasants 
2
and the youth.. It is these that wear Party colours, wave flags, sing and 
dance for the leaders and make up the bulk of the Party militants. The 
' revolutionary' intellectuals, and businessmen and women tend to come into 
the Party membership through Presidential nomination or 'tribal push', 
that is-, those who are encouraged to enter into Party leadership to 
fill 'tribal balancing' posts. Although the bulk of the members of the 
Party genuinely support the Party, there is a quite a large portion of 
the members who are members simply because their employment requires 
them to be members of the Party.
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 25(3)
2. See Baylies, C., and Szftel, M., The dynamic of one-party state-d.n
Zambia; Manchester UP, 1984, on what sort of 
man and woman joins UNIP, pp. 58-74.
(b) Party Organization Below the District.
It is pertinent to point out that African political organization
in Zambia - in fact in most African states - originated at the national and
not the grassroots level, e.g. the native welfare associations in NR during
the colonial era.^ Grassroots organization was 'encouraged', to some extent,
by the colonial policy which viewed nationalist movement as potentially
subversive and required that every 'society' should be registered with the
2
Registrar of Societies. The 'society' included the mother body and every 
and single of its branches formed at the grassroots level. Caution should, 
therefore, be exercised in concluding that an African political organization 
is weak simply because it might not be well organized at the grassroots 
level because the strength of most of the African political parties depends 
mainly on the strength of the national leadership.
UNIP has existed under different circumstances: it existed as 
a party outside the pale of power, or as a party struggling for national 
consensus, or struggling to operate along ideological lines, or as a party 
dominated by a strong charismatic leader. The answer to the question 'what 
keeps the organization of a political party going?' is, in the case of a 
ruling party, usually obvious: in case of UNIP, the Party controls the 
Government and it has resources of patronage and persuasion of any other 
party in power. Although the expectation for financial rewards and high 
office have prompted a number of people to engage in the leadership of 
the Party and some have acquired fame, financial rewards and high office, 
the majority of Party organizers below the District level, work in Party 
organs which can offer neither high office nor financial rewards. The 
party ideology, to some extent, has helped the Party to keep going: the 
people at the grassroots level believe in Humanism's principle of no
1. Supra, pp. 58 - 65.
2. NR: Societies Ordinance, 1957, No. 65, secs. 2(1) and
6(1); the latter required that a 'society' of seven
and more persons should register with the Registrar
of Societies: supra, pp. 70 - 71.
exploitation of man by man. The persistence of the Party at the grassroots
level, however, cannot be explained on the basis of the ideology, which is
not accurately understood by the majority of the people any way, but in
terms of loyalty to UNIP and some of its national leaders particularly those
who were engaged in the Independence struggle. UNIP has continued because
there are still many Zambians who have confidence in the Party and sincerely
believe that the Party is the appropriate machinery for economic and social
development of Zambia. The proscription of all other political organization
has, obviously, contributed towards the continued existence of UNIP since
the law expressly (and literally) provides that there shall be one party
and that Party is UNIP.^ It is within this protection that the Party,
although guided by its Constitution, organizes its organs below the District.
The Constitution of UNIP establishes Sections, Branches and Wards 
2
as 'local organs' below the District, each composed of two bodies, the Council,
consisting of all the members of the Party at that level, and, the Committee,
consisting of office-bearers, namely the Chairman and his Vice, the Secretary,
and his Vice, the Publicity Secretary and his Vice and the Treasurer. The
Ward Committee contains one and the District Committee two Trustee and
3
Trustees, respectively. The trustee is the custos morum of the Party
charged with the responsibility of detecting any conduct contra bonos mores
the quality or creed of the Party leadership and membership. A lot of
importance is attached to the role of the trustee; hence any person elected
or nominated a trustee at the grassroots level, requires the prior approval
4
of the Committee of Chairmen before he assumes his duties. It is often the 
older members of the Party that are appointed trustees. The office of 
trustee - and its importance - is a legacy carried from the days of multi-party
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 4(1).
2. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 25
3. ibid. Arts. 38(1) (e) and 43(d), respectively
4. ibid. Arts. 41(e) and 42(1) (e) . The Ward Committee
Trustee is approved by the Provincial Committee:
Art. 38(1) (e).
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system when one of the functions of the trustee was to 'spy' on party
'rebels' and to act as the confidant of the Central Committee. Under the
One-Party system members cannot afford being disroyal to the Party or the
Party leadership. The role of the trustee is now that of a 'consultant'
on the Party ideology and policies etc., and to act as a peace-maker between
or among squabbling Party members, particularly at the Branch level where
the style of Party organization is highly authoritarian.
In the rural areas, the Registration and Development of Villages
Act, 1971^ places responsibility for the management of villages in the Ward
Councils, working through the Ward Development Committee and the Village
Productivity Committee. It also confers on Chiefs powers regarding their
respective villages in addition to those conferred on them by the Chiefs 
2
Act. Every village containing twenty or more households, or in the case
of smaller settlements a combination of villages (not exceeding five), must
3
establish a Village Productivity Committee (V.P.C.) headed by a Chairman
4
who is the Village Headman , that is in the case of a village, or, an 
elected Chairman, that is in case of a combination of villages.^ In the 
latter case, the chairman is elected by the members of the V.P.C. The members
of the V.P.C. are elected by a majority vote of residents present at a
meeting called by the local Chief. Hie V.P.C. has a wide range of functions 
and duties including planning the growth and development of the village 
and the promotion of the well-being of the villagers, and in particular to 
build, improve and maintain school buildings, health centres and roads and 
provide and improve water supplies in the village.
The duty of the Chief is to preserve the public peace in the area
1. Zambia: 1971, No. 30, Cap. 483.
2. 1965, No. 67, Cap, 479, supra, p. 354
3. 1971, No. 30, Cap. 483, loc. cit., sec. 6{1).
4. ibid. sec. 6(2) (a) (i).
5. ibid. sec. 6(2) (a) (ii).
and to take reasonable measures to quell any riot, affray or similar
disorders.^" Each Chief and Deputy Chief has a kapaso or a number of kapasos
to assist him in keeping the peace. While in uniform, a kapaso may call on
any available male to assist him in quelling any riot, affray or disorder.
He may also arrest any person he suspects to have committed an offence in
connection with disorder, and detain him until he is able to hand him over
to the police or a court of law. No prosecution can be instituted under
2
such arrest without the written consent of the DPP. The Chief and the
Headman remain the community leaders who play the significant role in the
resolution of disputes; however, their roles are now affected by the role
of the Party at the grassroots level.
Where the Village Headman is also the chairman of the UNIP Branch
and the V.P.C., he becomes the most authoritarian person in the area. Where
the Village Headman is not the Chairman of the Party Branch and the V.P.C.,
e.g. where residents of a combination of villages elect a UNIP chairman as
the chairman of the V.P.C., there is often tension between the UNIP Branch
chairman and the Headman with the former purporting to deal with all the
aspects of the village politics and asserting his authority over all village
matters, e.g. settling of disputes. The Chief and the Headman, however,
retain the adjudicatory functions of the village and not the Party chairman.
Any appeal against a judicial decision of the Headman lies to the Chief and
from the Chief to the Local Court. The role of the Party chairman at the
village level is political mobilization of the people and where he is also
the chairman of the V.P.C., in the implementation of local projects. He is
3
accountable to the Ward Chairman who is in turn accountable to the DG.
1. Zambia: Chiefs Act, 1965, No. 69, sec. 11; supra, p. 354.
2. ibid. sec. 13.
3. The Registration and Development of Villages Act,
1971, No. 30 establishes Ward Development Committees, 
chaired by the Ward Chairman, a UNIP official;
sec. 11; supra, p. 360.
(c) The Party and Maintenance of Law and Order at Grass-roots Level.
Zambia has a national police force which was established as 
part and parcel of the British colonial administration of the region 
which later became NR and finally Zambia. The North-Eastern Rhodesia Order
in Council, 1900, among other things, authorized the formation of a military
1 2 
police, which was established by the Police Proclamation, 1901, of the
High Commissioner. A formal non-military police was established by the
3
Northern Rhodesia Police Proclamation, 1912, following the creation of
NR. Thus, although the 1980 Act provides that one of the functions of a
District Council is
To maintain law and order and ensure national security 
and good administration of the council,4
District Councils do not have their own police force and any offence
committed in a district council area, is investigated and prosecuted by
the national police under the general law of the land.
Colonial administrators in the 1920's and 1930's appointed 
'tribal elders' in urban areas, particularly on the copperbelt, to hear and
settle certain disputes among African town-dwellers which the authorities
5
considered not amenable to police or courts1' intervention. Following the 
emergence of African political organizations, political leaders assumed 
and played the role of 'tribal elders' and heard and settled disputes among 
residents in their Branches. UNIP has no police force of its own, but since
1. UK: 1900, Art. 20. supra, p. 43.
2. NER: 1901, No. 19, sec. 10.
3. NR: 1912, No. 17, sec. 3; Northern Rhodesia Gazette,
Vol. 2, 18th. December, 1912, No. 13, p. 106. The 
police force was composed as follows:
Europeans: 16 (1909), 18 (1910), 24 (1911)
Africans :392 (1909),370 (1910), 366 (1911): 
Memorandum by Administrator on the First Six Months 
of NR (1911); BS/3/134 ; NAZ-L.
4. Zambia: Local Administration Act, 1980, sec. 43 and Reg. 15.
5. NR: Report of Commission appointed to enquire into the
Disturbances in the Copperbelt, Northern Rhodesia;
Cmnd. 1935/5009. (Chairman: Sir William Alison Russell) 
supra, p. 61.
the introduction of the One-Party system, it has purported to consolidate
the system whereby people take their disputes to be heard and settled
by Party officials. At the same time Party 'special constables' were
deployed to perform policing functions. It is common practice that
people - members and non-members of the Party - take their complaints
to UNIP offices for attention:
A man was brought before a 'UNIP court' for beating his 
wife. 'My youths used to patrol the area under my 
instructions to keep order in the township. If my court', 
explained Mr Tembo, the chairman of the area, 'found you 
guilty, we usually took you to the police station for 
further action. You will be within the law in New Kanyama 
if you channel your grievances through UNIP office. It may 
seem wrong to let a political party run a township but 
residents at New Kanyama are happy about it. Those 
landlords who charge more than K8 a room can be brought 
before the 'Court' if discovered'.1
Historically, UNIP leaders took it upon themselves the role of
peace-makers and in controlling and initiating development particularly
at the grass-roots level in the squatter^settled areas. Subsequently,
"no building was erected without permission from the local Branch Chairman.
The leaders tried to control rents, arbitrate in civil disputes and
intervened in criminal cases (which, was implicitly recognised by the
state appointing UNIP leaders as special constables.) Thus the leaders
were playing the role of the town clerk, magistrate and city engineer
2
combined; possibly the simile of the chief is more apt." These activities 
of the Party leadership are now formally provided for under the Constitution 
of the Party leaving the question of the legal status of such provisions 
and role of such Party functions, for instance, vis-a-vis, judicial review, 
unsettled, it is important to bear in mind one fact that in evaluating the
1. Scott, I., "Party Functions and Capabilities: The Local-^Level UNIP
Organization During the First Zambian Republic, 
1964—1973", African social Research, 1975, No. 22, 
p. 115; University of Zambia Institute of African 
Research, 1975. Brackets supplied.
2. Pasteur, D w  The Management of Squatter Upgrading: A Case Study to
Organization, Procedure and Participation;
Saxon House, 1969, p. 11. Brackets supplied.
role of UNIP at the grassroots level and in particular with regard to 
patrolling of residential areas by the Party's 'special constables' and 
the settling of disputes by the Party offocials, one should not perceive 
such activities in the context of any European country where people have 
access to police protection at short notice. These UNIP activities are 
carried out in residential areas without public telephone communication, 
no street lighting and the nearest police station might be twenty or more 
kilometres away. On the other hand, some Zambians prefer referring their 
disputes to 'elders' for 'judgement' or 'reprimand' or 'reconciliation'. 
The police are associated with handicuffs, cells, brutality, fines or 
imprisonment. That perception of the 'police force' contributes a great 
deal towards the masses' reference of some of their disputes to Party 
officials who are local men and women, available day and night, and, in 
their intervention do not lock-up people but merely reprimand them and 
ask for ire conciliation in 'an African way'.
There are some apparent dangers in this system of maintenance of 
law and order, for instance, some Party officials' intervention impede 
normal investigations by the police by prematurely settling complaints. 
Although the Party Constitution provides/ e.g. that the Section
Committee shall maintain law and order and monitor the movements, presence 
or activities of criminals in the section,^" the procedures to be followed 
in carrying out such functions are no where spelt out or laid down. There 
is therefore, room for abuse of office, bribery, corruption and denial of 
natural justice. In addition to that the system does not provide for 
appeals. This is a serious defect because it is not in all cases that the 
parties agree that the case should be heard by Party officials; it is 
essential under such circumstances that a person who has been 'dragged' 
to appear before the Party officialshave the right to appeal against any
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 29 and Reg. 29(l)(e).
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decision he felt was unfair to him.
Usually the maintenance of law and order is carried out by the
Party's 'special constables' who patrol residential areas apprehending
trouble-makers who are brought before the Section or Branch Chairman.
Although the Party Constitution assigns the function of maintaining law
and order to the Section or Branch Committee, in practice complaints or
reports are made to the Section or Branch Chairman who attends to them
alone. The decision is that of the Chairman alone. Ihe deployment of the
special constables is not without legal difficulties as the case of
Bweupe v. Attorney-General, Zambia Publishing Co., and Times Newspapers Ltd.,^
showed. The plaintiff in that case was a High Court judge who, in the course
of delivering a judgement, said that 'UNIP special constables did not exist
in law'. Reacting to that observation, the then Minister of Home Affairs, under
whose ministerial responsibility special constables fell, made certain
statements which were published by the second and third defendants which
the plaintiff considered defamatory of him. The Minister had, inter alia, said
that the judge was misinformed or had not read his law volumes properly
and that in fact special constables had existed during the colonial days
2
under the Police Ordinance which provided that
Every special constable under this Ordinance shall have 
the same powers, privileges and protection and shall be 
liable to perform the some duties and shall be amenable 
to the same penalty and to be subordinate to the same 
authority as police officers.^
It was this colonial device that the Party utilized in the
maintenance of law and order. The Minister stated that the President (of
Zambia) had directed that special constables be deployed under UNIP and be
responsible for the eradication of crime and wondered whether the Head of
State could have given instructions that something
1. (1984) ZR 21
2. NR: 1926, No. 16, Cap. 4 (new Cap. 44).
3 . ibid. sec. 10.
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should be done that was illegal. He accordingly asked the judge to 
apologize. The Court ordered nominal damages to be paid to the plantiff 
on the ground that to demand an apology from a judge or judicial officer 
went beyond the defence of fair comment and that it was improper that a 
member of the public should take it upon himself to call upon a judge to 
apologize, no matter how wrong that judge or judicial offiber might be.
What was in issue in this case was public concern at the
manner Party special constables were deployed. Initially the constables
worked under the supervision of the police, but gradually they began to
operate under the Party chairmen and the DGs. Their role shifted from
patrolling residential areas to policing urban areas. There was therefore,
a divergence between the law which required that special constables worked
under the police officer-in-charge of the area and the practice which
allowed the constables to work under the Party. Since the Party could not
impose any penalties, in some cases special constables issued reprimands
or confiscated property, for instance, in cases of property belonging to
persons engaged in illegal trading; contrary to the provision that in
Zambia no property of any description should be compulsorily taken
possession of except as provided by law.^
Even the new law which has been passed in an attempt to
remove the 'special constables' from the Party, will in fact not be
differently enforced. It is now provided that in every Section, Branch and
Ward there should be established a vigilante group of such number of
2
persons as may be necessary to maintain law and order; protect persons 
3
and property, with power to arrest any person who, in the presence of
a vigilante, commits a cognizable offence, or whom he reasonably suspects
4
of having committed a felony.
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 18
2. Zambia Police (Amendment) Act, 1985, No. 23, sec. 48(1)
3. jbid. sec. 48(5)
4. ibid. sec. 51(1)
According to the new legislation the vigilantes are appointed
by the Inspector-General,^ who incidentally appointed the UNIP special
constables, in consultation with the Ward Security Committee, which is
composed of Party and Government security personnel. The Inspector-General
may delegate his powers of appointment to the officer-in-charge of the
police under whose jurisdiction the Section, Branch or Ward falls. The
Act does not define the Sections, Branches or Wards; it is however,
understood that these refer to Sections, Branches and Wards as provided
2
for in the Constitution <bf UNIP. A  person is not qualified to be 
appointed as a vigilante unless he
(a) volunteers for service as a vigilante;
(b) is resident in that Section, Branch or Ward;
(c) is at least eighteen years old;
(d) is of good moral conduct;
(e) is physically fit; and ^
(f) has no previous conviction.
It is anticipated that a vigilante will not operate in isolation 
but in a cell under a Section, Branch and Ward leader who is responsible 
for discipline arid internal administration under his leadership. These 
legal provisions do not solve the real problems existing in the 
administration of urban areas in Zambia. The first problem arises from 
the notion that the Constitution of UNIP is not 'a law', and, as such 
its officials cannot maintain law and order. Accordingly, the vigilantes 
are in reality the same persons who operated as UNIP 'special constables'.
In practice the vigilantes will operate not under the police off icer-in-charge 
but the Party chairman at Section, Branch and Ward levels, and only in 
those cases where the matter is too serious to be handled by the Party 
officials, will formal police intervention be sought. The other problem
1. Zambia;
2. UNIP;
3. Zambia;
Zambia Police (Amendment) Act, 1985, sec. 49 
Constitution, 1988, Arts. 27, 31 and 35, respectively. 
Zambia Police (Amendment) Act, 1985, sec. 49
is that Zambia is said to be one of the most urbanized countries in
Africa with nearly 43 per cent of its population living in urban
areas.^ This urbanization has resulted in the mush-rooming of 'shanty'
2
or'squatter compounds' in urban areas at an alarming rate since Independence. 
The colonial system which empowered Chiefs and Headmen to control the 
movement of their people, has broken down and there is to-day free 
movement of persons particularly from the rural to the urban areas. This 
has caused shortage of employment, housing and social amenities and an 
increase in crime. The deployment of UNIP special constables and the 
vigilantes is one of the means being employed to contain an otherwise 
explosive social and political situation.
The Party and Its Government, however, have failed to contain 
the situation. This has led President Kaunda to announce that some of the
provisions, of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of movement and
3
settlement anywhere in Zambiaf might be amended or legislation passed
to provide for compulsory repatriation of unemployed persons to rural
4
areas of their chiefly origin. Such a policy would probably meet with 
little success mainly because most of the unemployed young men and women 
- the 'bom-free* post-Independence generation - have no real roots in 
or connection with, any tribal area. Their roots are in the urban areas.
The only workable policy would be that of the Party coming out with 
appropriate economic and social plans and programmes, effectively implement 
such programmes, and, encourage Party members and all people of Zambia 
to work hard to advance their own political, social and economic welfare 
and thereby eliminate the social evils that necessiated the
deployment of special constables or vigilantes in the first place.
1. Zambia: Zambia: Country Profile, 1964; Central Statistical
Office, Lusaka, 1984; Zambia being being third most 
urbanized after South Africa and Algeria, p. 48.
2. Housing (Statutory and Improvement) Act, 1974,
No, 30 f Cap. 441, refers to them as ^development areas'.
3. In particular Art. 24 Cl) which guarantees and protects
freedom of movement and residence.
4. Times of Zambia; 13th July, 1987.
(d) Review of Party Activities at the Grassroots Level.
Local administration in Zambia is governed mainly by the 1980
Act and District Councils are subject to the usual controls under
administrative law such as Parliamentary scrutiny^- of delegated legislation
. 2
and through judicial review based on the doctrine of ultra vires to 
determine whether a District Council had exercised its statutory powers 
excessively or unlawfully or unreasonably. These are the ultimate safeguards 
for the citizen against unlawful action by a District Council. Most people, 
however, have no knowledge of the legal limits of the powers of District 
Councils to enable them to determine that a decision of a District Council 
was ultra vires the 1980 Act. Consequently, there has been no cases 
reaching the High Court requiring a review of local authorities' decisions. 
The chairmanship of District Councils by a DG and close identification of 
District Councils and the Party is bound to deter some people from 
challenging decisions or actions of District Councils fearing that such a 
challenge might be construed as a challenge of the Party itself.
There is no clear machinery for the review of Party decisions or 
actions at the grassroots level except through the Party itself. Organs of 
the Party are answerable and are required to periodically submit account 
of their work to their superior body and the decision of the superior body 
is binding upon the subordinate organs.^ In practice the Section, Branch 
or Ward Chairman hardly submits reports of cases heard by him or his 
Committee to the superior organ. The mode and manner of the Party's 
maintenance of law and order in some cases involve the exercise of some 
quasi-judicial powers by Party officials. The traditional remedies such as
4
the prerogative orders which, inter alia, facilitate the review of the 
proceedings of an inferior court, tribunal or local authority, or, the 
release of a person wrongfully detained, have not been tried against a 
Party organ or official. In some cases a certain amount of physical force
1. Supra, p. 266.
2. Supra, p. 254.
3. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 24 (1) (b) to (c).
4. Supra, p. 241.
is exerted in compelling persons to appear before the Section or Branch 
Committee, where convened, or the Chairman. The proceedings before the
Committee or the Chairman are highly authoritarian and sometimes rules of
natural justice - including the requirement of audi alteram partem (that 
a person should not be condemned unheard) - are often not observed. At 
the Section, Branch or Ward level where 'everybody knows everybody' it 
is easy for the Party officials to pre-judge any issue basing their 
decision on their knowledge of the parties involved. As with the case at 
the district level, most people at the Section, Branch and Ward levels 
do not know their rights, for instance, whether they can refuse to appear 
before the Party Section Chairman or challenge his decision within the 
framework of the Party, e.g. by asking for the intervention of the DG.
Some Section or Branch Chairmen or Committees can make very serious 
decisions, e.g. ordering that a person cease to reside within the Section 
or Branch. Being contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of Zambia,^ 
such a decision should be open to an application for an injunction, mandamus 
or prohibition. But because most people do not know of such protection, 
they comply with decisions of Party officials whether they are in agreement
with them or not. There is no laid-down procedure for such 'eviction' .
The maintenance of law and order by the Party at the grassroots 
level provides the Party with a machinery to impose its authority. Some 
form of checks and balances are essential to protect individual rights.
The difficult is that the Government is not strong enough to command 
obedience and to administer the country effectively without the assistance 
of the Party. Ironically, at the grassroots level it is the Government 
that assists the Party in the maintenance of law and order.
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 24(1)
protects freedom of movement and the right to 
reside in any part of Zambia and immunity from 
expulsion from Zambia.
CONCLUSION.
This Chapter has traced the evolution of local government system 
in Zambia and showed that after Independence in 1964 UNIP did not effect any 
revolutionary changes in the system left behind by the colonial administrators. 
Major changes in the local administration system was introduced in 1980. 
Pressures for decentralization stem from a variety of causes including, e.g., 
nationalist demands, geography, ethnic diversity and political considerations. 
Zambia is a unitary State and the question of provincial governments in the 
form of provincial assemblies, does not arise. Since Independence provincial 
administration has been retained mainly for historical reasons but also 
because some provincial traditional rulers, elites and the like, feel that 
their welfare and that of their province could not be secured if the present 
provinces were abolished. Otherwise Zambia could be better administered 
without the Provinces and provincial administration. The present hierarchical 
institutionalization of UNIP from the Party Congress to the Section, directly 
consolidates provincialism. The integration of the Party and local authorities 
at the provincial and district levels, however, should not be viewed wholly 
from the perception of African political parties as agents of national 
integration and development^” but from the angle of a political party that 
is anxious to evolve a system of administration at the local level through 
which conflict, intrusion of divisive tendencies and ethnical cleavages 
are abandoned in favour of national unity through the One-Party.
Notwithstanding its commitment to Humanism through Socialism,
UNIP is not organized on revolutionary socialist centralism, hence it has 
not successfully effected social transformation of the Zambian society.
UNIP's role at the provincial and district levels has, on the contrary, been
1. See for example, Coleman, J.S. and Rosberg, C.G., Political Parties and
National Integration in Tropical Africa; Berkeley UP,
1966, p. 127 and Emerson, R., "Party and National 
Integration in Africa", in LaPalombara, J., and 
Vfeiner, M., (Eds.) Political Parties and Political 
Development; Princeton, 1966, pp. 267-301.
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more on practical problems than ideological rhetoric encountered at the 
national level. Socialism is synonymous with democracy but socialism 
calls for State-intervention; the State must leave no stone-unturned in 
its drive to bring social, economic and political change in society. 
Socialism could be totalitarian, consequently if law and order is not 
to break down to a point that anarchy sets in in Zambia, more stern 
measures would have to be employed beyond the appointment of a handful 
of vigilantes. The enactment of the legislation on the vigilantes 
although it might contribute towards the suppression of crime at the 
grass-roots level, it was unaccompanied by legislation or any other 
measure on the elimination or emoleration of the major causes of crime 
such as unemployment, lack of housing, education and fuither training 
particularly among the youths. Notwithstanding the creation of District 
Councils with their well spelt out functions, the Government remains 
principally responsible for the social, economic and cultural welfare and 
development of the people of Zambia. The local authorities, therefore, 
should not be turned into scapegoats for any failure on the part of the 
Party and its Government in providing the people with, adequate social 
facilities and national security particularly protection from crime.
The Party actually plays a vital role in the maintenance of 
law and order at the grass1-roots level. However, the view persists that 
UNIP is nothing but merely a political organization, and as such, no 
statutory powers should be given to it. Paradoxically, the Constitution 
of Zambia does provide that the Party Congress shall elect the President 
of the Party who becomes, the sole Presidential Candidate.^ Prima facie, 
legal powers could be allocated to the Party so that there is no further
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 38(3),
supra, p. 144.
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confusion about the role of the Party at the grassroots level.
The Constitution of Zambia establishes principles and shapes 
the system of government. Hie Zambian local administration system 
cannot be understood except by reference to the Constitution and the 
1980 Act, It is possible for one to decry as formalistic a study of 
the local administration system in Zambia which lays emphasis on the 
provisions of the Constitution and the 1980 Act. It could be argued 
that processes are more important than institutions and that political 
realities play important role than legal principles; accordingly, mUch more 
importance should be placed on the occupants of public office than on the 
rules that regulate administrative institutions. The role of the Party 
functionaries at the grassroots level supports that view. However, the 
provisions of the 1980 Act should not be underrated; they play a major 
part in shaping and limiting governmental process. The Zambian society 
is governed by law and through institutions. If one wanted to improve 
that society, one ought in the last resort amend laws and alter some 
institutions and through that change the attitudes of men and women who 
manage those institutions. Only the most optimist would pin his hope of 
changing man's behaviour through moral exhortation and criticism 
unsupported by formal action.
In order to protect and safeguard the welfare of the ordinary 
citizens, it is essential that the law accurately portrays what goes on 
in the Zambian society. At the moment there is a divergence between what 
happens and what the law provides for, e.g., in the control of the 
vigilantes, who are in fact controlled by the Party and not by the 
police officer-in-charge of the area of their deployment as stipulated 
by the law. Machinery for the control and review of UNIP activities at 
the grassroots level can only be laid down when the law takes cognizance 
of the Party and its activities.
CHAPTER IX.
THE CENTRAL ROLE OF THE PARTY AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT IN ZAMBIA.
Some Legal Obstacles to Cooperation and Subordination. 
Introduction.
One of the basic natural rights of man, next to that of
acting for himself, is that of combining his efforts with those of his
fellowmen and acting in common with them. For this purpose, it is the
right of an individual to join his associates so as to fashion their
public or private life or for the purposes of the promotion and the
protection of their interests, and, for other purposes not prohibited
by the law of the land.
In NR the legal recognition of trade unions was made by
the Imperial Acts Extension (Amendment) Ordinance, 1937,^ which extended
2
to NR the British Trade Union and Trade Disputes Acts of 1913, and 
3
1927. This legislation was intended to deal with European trade unions
which began to emerge between 1936 and 1937. The point that the
legislation was intended to control European trade unions was made by
the Chief Secretary who, during the debate in the Legco on the draft
Ordinance, said that the application of the Ordinance to African labour
4
movement had not been considered. The first signs of African labour
movement appeared in 1935 when Africans employed in the copper mining
industries staged their first major shrikes for improved working
5
conditions, wages and housing. This- was during the period of the native 
welfare societies but before the emergence of African political parties.^
1. NR: 1937, No. 12? supra, p. 90.
2. UK: 1913, 2 & 3 Geo. 5f c. 30.
3. 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, c. 22
4. NR: Legco Debates, 21 s h  September, 1942, pp. 327-328.
5. UK: On the strikes see: Report of the Commission appointed
to enquire into the Disturbances in the Copperbelt, 
Northern Rhodesia, 1935; Cmnd. 1935/5009.
(Chairman: Sir William Alison Russell) .
6 . Supra, p. 58.
Although the copperbelt disturbances of 1935 had caused
some alarm to the colonial administrators, they were essentially
pre-trade union reaction to grievances about taxation, low wages and
poor housing. But they had showed a unity of purpose among African
workers. In 1943 a committee composed of African Shop Assistants and
Tailors was set up on the copperbelt which in 1947, with the assistance
of Mr W.M. Comrie, a trade union advisor from the CO, converted itself
into the African Shop Assistants and Tailors Union of NR thereby
signaling the emergence of African trade unionism in NR. The Trade
Union and Trade Disputes Ordinance, 1949,^ was in general terms and
defined a trade union as "any combination, whether temporary or
permanent, under the constitution of which the principal objects are
the regulation of the relationship between employer and employee, or
2
between employees and employees, or between employer and employer"
3
and registered with the Registrar of Trade Unions.
A number of Africans were sent to the UK to train in
trade union organization. Africans were thus encouraged to form trade
unions mainly because a well organized and efficient African labour
movement guaranteed peaceful labour relations in industry, particularly
the copper industry. On the other hand, political organization of 
Africans did not receive the same encouragement probably because a well
organized African political movement was likely to be a source not of
political peace but political agitation and unrest.. The colonial
administrators' tough, task, however, was how to stop the convergence
between African political organization and labour movement, for fear of
the 'politicization' of the labour movement which-was considered
1. NR: 1949, No. 23, Cap. 507.
2 . ibid. sec. 6 .
3. Nyasaland Trade Union Congress v. Nkolokesa (1963) R & N LR 184,
Cram, J., held that the NTUC which, had not registered 
under the Trade Union Ordinance, Cap. 87, sec. 3 (of 
Nyasaland, now Malawi) was no more than an unincorporated 
association, that £s~ not a trade union.
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harmful to the trade union movement. Notwithstanding the colonial 
policy of keeping trade unions separated from the political movement, 
some working relationship did develop between the two movements.
(i) The NRANC and the Labour Movement.
The view that the extent of the politicization of the
African trade union movement in NR was limited to the rank and file of
the trade unionists who joined the NRANC and that little labour pressure
could be identified with African nationalism,^" is not accurate in that
the NRANC and the NRAMU set up the Anti-Federation Action Council composed
of political and trade union leaders to fight against the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland and to coordinate political as well as industrial
action. Between 1958 and 1960, Lawrence Chola Katilungu, the president
of the NRAMU was vice-president of the NRANC, and acted as president
in 1960 when the NRANC president, H.M. Nkumbula was serving a six months
prison sentence for causing death by dangerous driving. Katilungu was
acting president of the NRANC when he was: killed in a car accident in 
o
1960. There was, therefore, a close link between the NRANC and the NRAMU.
(ii) The ZANC and the Labour Movement.
3
In 1958 when a split occured in NRANC and ZANC was formed, 
Katilungu sided with the former against the latter whose existence was 
short-lived. Although ZANC did not live long enough to establish any 
relationship with the trade Union movement, Katilungu's remaining with 
the ZANC provided a turning point in the relationship between the 
labour movement and political parties whose effects are s.till being 
felt to-day. The emergence of ZANC meant that some trade union leaders 
besides: Katilungu, who had dominant role in NR African labour movement, 
preferred to joing ZANC or seeing the labour movement side with. ZANC.
1 . Henderson, I., "Wage-Eamers and Political Protest in Colonial Africa;
the Case of the Copperbelt"; AA, Vol. 72, No. 288, July, 
1973, 296.
2. Mulford, D.C., Ihe Northern Rhodesia General Election, 1962;
Oxford, 1964, p. 3Ek
3. Supra, p. 72.
For instance, at the All-African People's Conference in Accra,
Ghana, in 1958, J.M. Nkomo, President of SRANC signed the Charter of Unity
on behalf of the SR delegation and Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda, President of
the NANC signed on behalf of the Nyasaland delegation. But when it came for
the NR delegation to sign the Charter, Kenneth David Kaunda signed for ZANC,
Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula signed for NRANC and Gordon C. Chindele, signed for
the NRIUC.^ That incident could have meant either that the NRTUC wanted to
be seen publicly identified with the political organizations in the
independence struggle, or, that it claimed an independent role from that
of the NR political parties. The latter and not the former, was probably
the case. ZANC and the NRTUC, however, worked well together in that there
was no conflict in their policies on racial discrimination, abolition of
the Federation, One-man-one-vote and 'African advancement' , a phrase which
included anything from acquisition of the vote to promotion under-ground
in the copper mining industry. The passage of the Race Relations (Advisory
2
and Conciliation) Ordinance, 1957, which provided a machinery through 
which Africans could get redress against discriminatory practices in public 
places, was as a result of combined ZANC and labour movement opposition to 
racial discrimination, particularly on the Copperbelt.
Although the law and practices favoured trade unions and purported 
to place a wedge between trade unions and political parties by treating 
the former as useful and legitimate combines of men recognized by law, and, 
the latter as societies or as unincorporated members' associations, the 
prevailing political and social circumstances under which Africans lived, 
made a linkage between African trade unions and African political parties 
unavoidable. The labour and political movements were part and parcel of a 
general African national mobilization against colonial rule.
1. Krishnamurthy, B.S.,Cha Cha Cha, Zambia's Struggle for Independence;
Oxford UP, Lusaka, 1972, File 2 Doc. 15.
2. NR; 1957, No. 49, later repealed by the Race Relations
Ordinance, 1960, No. 32, established the Central 
Committee and District Committees on race relations 
to advise the Governor on how to improve race 
relations in the country; secs. 8 and 9.
(iii) UNIP and the Labour Movement.
When UNIP appeared in 1959, Katilungu was the leader of both 
the NRANC and the NRAMU and he was serving on the Advisory Commission on 
the Review of the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (the Monckton 
Commission).^ His membership of the Commission caused a split in the nrtuC 
of which he was the President. The split resulted in the formation of the 
RTUC which identified itself with UNIP. By 1963 when it became clear that 
the country was moving towards independence, a new mineworkers' union was 
launched aimed at combining the European and the African mineworkers1 
unions into one union, the UMU. UNIP supported the UMU. The RTUC and the 
UMU failed to replace the NRAMU (which on the eve of independence was 
renamed the ZMU) and the NRTUC (which was renamed the ZCTU) respectively. 
Thus, UNIP backed both losers: the UMU and the NRTUC disappeared while 
the ZMU and the ZCTU are still in existence to-day. There was a consensus 
between UNIP and the NRANC and the labour movement on such matters as the 
termination of the Federation and colonial rule, the broadening of the 
franchise and independence for NR. But there was no consensus on the nature 
of the relationship between the political parties and the trade unions. At 
independence UNIP "qua party sought to bring about unity within the trade 
union movement, while the party qua government started the process of
2
legislation against the freedom of the trade union movement as a whole".
UNIP showed quite early after independence a desire to control the labour
3
movement, e.g. the Trade Union and Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1965, 
provided that ZCTU office bearers should be appointed by the Minister (of
4
Labour and Social Services). That was aimed at giving UNIP some influence in
1. Supra, p . 82.
2. Harries-Jones, P., Freedom and Labour, Mobilization and Political
Control on the Zambian Copperbelt; Blackwell, 1975, p. 166.
3. Zambia: 1965, No. 3.
4. ibid. sec. 21.
the selection of the leadership of the ZCTU. The legislation, however, 
was not aimed at curtailing the freedom of the trade union movement in 
Zambia as a whole, as claimed. The Industrial Relations Act, 1971,^ 
which repealed the Trade Union and Trade Disputes Ordinance (Amendment)
Act, 1965, no longer requires that ZCTU office-bearers should be appointed 
by the Minister; instead these are elected for a five-year term by the 
ZCTU general conference attended by delegates from all the affiliated 
trade unions.
Commenting on the post-independence relationship between political
parties and trade unions in Africa, it has been said that in Tanzania
Julius Nyerere's Government took advantage of the presence of British troops
putting down an army mutiny to take over the Tanganyika Federation of
Labour (TFL) "an objective long desired by Michael Kamaliza, president of
2
the TFL from 1960 and the Minister of Labour from 1963". In Ghana, after
'the take-over' of the Ghana TUC by the CPP, Kwame Nkrumah asserted that
"nobody has a right to call himself a true labour fighter if he is not an
honest loyal member of the Convention People's Party because fundamentally
the Convention People's Party is the political expression of the Ghana
3
Trade Union Movement". Thus, the trend after independence was that more 
and more African political parties were assuming a firm control of the 
trade union movement by turning the national labour movement (the TUC) 
into an integral part of the party in power. Ghana and Tanzania have been 
popular 'fishing grounds' for political ideas for the UNIP leadership; 
the ZCTU was accordingly bound to be turned into an integral of UNIP.
The NCEOPPDZ, however, reported that most of the petitioners who spoke on 
the role of the labour movement under Zambia's One-Party system, preferred 
that trade unions operated independent of and free from interference from 
the Party and the Government. The Commission recommended that ZCTU should be
1. Zambia: 1971, No. 36, Cap. 508.
2. Henderson, I., op . cit.,
3. ibid. p. 290, quoting Meynand, J., and Salah-Bey, A.,
Trade Unionism in Africa; london, 1967, p. 96.
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answerable to the Government and the Party on behalf of individual trade
unions for the implementation of policies pertaining to labour matters
1 2 
in the country. The Government (UNIP) accepted that recommendation.
This Chapter is concerned with the relationship between UNIP and the ZCTU
in particular and the labour movement in general in the context of the
accepted recommendation of the National Commission.
Section 1. UNlP's Line on the Economy.
There have been two major aspects to the relationship between
UNIP and the labour movement in Zambia; first, the Party has purported to
impress upon the labour movement its central position arising from its
possession of political power, and, secondly, the Party's wish to see that
the labour movement toes the Party's line on its economic policies and
programmes. The labour movement played an important role during the struggle
for independence: fighting for the economic well-being of the workers as
well as the political emancipation of the country and the achievement of
a workers' and peasants' alliance. The independence struggle became possible
by the combination of economic and political aspirations of the African
people as a whole; hence, workers and non-workers drew important
revolutionary experiences and conclusions from the events which in the
3
end led to Independence on 24th October, 1964. Before Independence UNIP
had declared that a UNIP Government would encourage the formation and
management of strong trade unions and employers' associations in all major 
4
industries. But there were some contradictions in the economic policies 
and developmental structures inherited at independence, e.g. economic 
laissez faire carried out by private companies, which the Party tried to 
solve through economic planning and reforms, for example, the first 
economic reforms announced on the 19th April, 1968, and the second economic
1. Zambia: NCEOPPDZ, Report, 1972; p. 61, par. 183.
2. NCEOPPDZ-SRAG, 1972; p. 30.
3. Supra, p. 82.
4. UNIP: When UNIP become Government| 1960; p. 13.
reforms of 11th August, 1969 which introduced State capitalism in the 
Zambian economy. These economic reforms, however, were influenced by 
principles enunciated in Humanism in Zambia and a Guide to its 
Implementation Part I, adopted by the National Council of the Party 
at its meeting held on 26th April, 1967. The ideology was aimed at 
giving the people a revolutionary consciousness in the post-colonial 
rule era. The establishment of a one-party participatory democracy in 
1972 gave the Party a dominant role while relagating the labour 
movement further into the political background. The political line of 
the Party vis-a-vis the economic policy of the land, was said to be 
Humanism through Socialism: "Capitalism is not our political line. 
Therefore, those who promote the line of capitalism are acting outside 
the line of the Party.
The Zambian economy is based on mixed State and 
Private ownership of means of production and distribution UNIP itself 
is not a socialist party guided by ideas of Marxism-Leninism; it is a 
mass party guided by an ideology that is quasi '-political and also 
quasi-religious, humanism. Although the labour movement is not opposed 
to the socio-economic transformation introduced by the Party through 
the economic reforms that have resulted in State ownership or State 
participation in major industries, the labour movement is resisting 
the creation of a socialist democratic party of the working class and 
peasants preferring instead maintaining a clear separation of the Party 
and the labour movement.
During the period 1975-85 a number of Zambians have 
been trained in the Eastern European socialist countries. Most of these 
have returned home. The Zambian political party situation is, however, 
not considered ' ripe' yet fojr organization of an independent vanguard
1. Zambia; The 'Watershed* Speech, hy His Excellency the
President, Dr K.P« Kaunda, 30th June-3rd July,
1975, p. 6 : Government Printer, Lusaka, 1976.
Underlining supplied,
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proletarian party, but these 'advanced workers' participate in UNIP's
activities in the hope of influencing progressive socio-economic changes.
That has led to criticism of Humanism as an ideology to be achieved through
Socialism on one hand, and, of the role of the labour movement, on the other.
The labour movement is accused of failing to spread ideas of socialism among
the workers and of not supporting the Party in the implementation of its
socio-economic policies and programmes. The labour movement is perceived not
only as an instrument of the mobilization of workers, but also as an instrument
through which to spread and instil the Party's ideology in general and its
economic policies ('the Party line'), in particular.
Although the Constitution of the Party provides that the main task
of the Party and the working people of Zambia is to accomplish a victorious
transition from capitalism to Socialism,^ the Constitution of Zambia is
2
silent on that matter instead it contains a Bill of Rights which guarantees
and protects fundamental human rights and among these is the right to property:
no property of any description can be compulsorily taken possession of, and
no interest in or right over property of any description can be compulsorily
acquired, except under the authority of an Act of Parliament which provides
for payment of compensation for the property or interest or right taken
3
possession of or acquired. The Constitution does not, however, guarantee
social or economic development. The 'Party line' on the economy is not backed
by any law but ideology, consequently, its success (or failure) depends, to
some extent, on the support Party policies receive from, inter alia, the
labour movement. In order to secure that support, UNIP appears to pursue
methods, first, to allow trade unions to operate as constituted and empowered
4
by legislation, in particular the Industrial Relations Act, 1971 ; secondly,
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 4. Emphasis by the writer.
2. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Preamble states that
the One-Party system is established under Humanism.
3. ibid. Art. 18(1).
4. 1971, No. 36, Cap. 508, sec. 5.
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to influence the selection of leaders of the trade unions in particular 
the key ones such as the MUZ and the ZCTU, and, third, to covert the 
ZCTU into a wing of the Party. But each of these devices is transitional; 
finally, it is projected that a 'humanist democracy1 will enhance the role of 
mass organizations such as trade unions, women's and youth leagues and 
the Party would then assume a new quality and "would be transformed into 
a vanguard Party of workers - the only class in humanism."^
Although in Zambia no attempt has been made to assimilate trade 
union leadership into the Government bureaucracy, attempt has been made 
to turn the labour movement, through the ZCTU, into a wing of the Party; 
but without success. The labour movement has resisted being turned into 
a wing of the Party for fear of Party intervention in the internal affairs 
of trade unions which could result in the unions being unable to function 
as independent institutions. The following Table shows the membership of 
the major trade unions in Zambia.
2
TABLE G:_______Trade Unions and Trade Union Membership in Zambia.
Name Registered Membership
1. Airways and Allied Workers' 1968 2,800
2. Builders, Engineering and General Workers' 1960 28,000
3. Civil Servants' 1969 18,683
4. Commercial and Industrial Workers'1 1971 25,000
5. Financial Institutions and Allied Workers' 1970 6,273
6 . Guards' 1972 15,520
7. Hotel and Catering Workers' 1966 5,000
8 . Local Authorities Workers' 1971 25,000
9. Mineworkers' 1949 53,000
10. Plantation and Agricultural Workers' 1962 13,000
11. Postal and Telecommunications Workers' 1964 4,000
12. Public Service Workers'- 1960 50,694
13. Railways Workers' 1950 7,495
14. University of Zambia Workers' 1976 1,760
15. Zambia Electricity Workers' 1971 4,002
16. Zambia National Union of Teachers 1962 15,520
17. Zambia Typographical Workers' 1971 2,000
1. UNIP: Programme (1979 - 1989) Transition from
Capitalism to Socialism; 1979, p. 32.
2. Ministry of Labour and Social Services, 
Lusaka, February, 1985.
The Table on the previous page showing the membership of the 
major trade unions in Zambia, illustrates the strength of the labour 
movement in Zambia. It is obvious that both the Party and the labour 
movement are well organized with quite a large membership. Consequently, 
both claim to be representative, champion and protector of the people's 
interests and welfare. The reality of freedom of association in non-political 
organizations under a One-Party system is attenuated by the fact that 
invariably the One-Party system displays a tendency towards co-opting every 
organization of any public significance like women's and youth organizations, 
co-operative societies and trade unions under the' ambrella of the ruling party. 
In Ghana and Tanzania the co-option was mainly of the Trade Union Congress.
In Zambia only the ZCTU was affiliated to UNIP;^ there was no affiliation of 
individual trade unions. The Party's policy has been the integration of the 
ZCTU and the Party. The failure of that policy has resulted in a new policy 
of affiliation of individual trade unions to the Party.
Section 2. The Designation of the ZCTU as a Mass Organ of the Party.
The previous Section noted that the Government accepted the 
recommendations of the NCEOPPDZ with regard to the role of trade unions 
under a One-Party system in Zambia. The Constitution of UNIP annexed to 
the Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, implemented only one of the NCEOPPDZ 
recommendations, namely the inclusion of one delegate representing each
2
trade union affiliated to the ZCTU to attend the Party's General Conference.
It was the Party Constitution adopted at the Eighth General Conference in 
September, 1978, which implemented most of the Commission's recommendations,
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1973, Art. 5(5) and Reg. 1 (1) (d) provided
that the ZCTU paid KlOO affiliation fee and K70 annual 
subscription.
2. ibid. Art. 32(3) (c). Six representatives selected by 
the ZCIU attended the National Council: Art. 29(1) (f) .
by providing as follows, that
(a) four representatives from the ZCTU and one from each 
of its affiliated trade unions attend the General 
Conference,^ and the National Council?2
(b) one representative from each of the trade unions operating
in the Province, to sit on the Provincial Council;3
(c) one representative from each of the trade unions operating
in the District, to sit on the District Council^ and the
District Conference^
of the Party. This representation of trade unions on Party organs was
considered by the Party not to have established an effective link between
the Party and the labour movement: the trade unions remained unaffiliated
to the Party. In 1978 UNIP tried to designate the ZCTU as a mass organ of
the Party and accordingly deleted from the Constitution the provisions on
affiliated membership of the ZCTU. UNIP purported to adopt a similar system
to that prevailing in Tanzania where the CCM Constitution provide that
80. (1) There shall be designated mass organisations, consisting 
of members who are united together for mobilization purposes 
in order to achieve certain objectives. Hie affairs of these 
organisations shall be conducted under the guidance and 
supervision of the Party.
(2) The following organisations are hereby designated 
as mass organisations:- g
(a) the Youth Organisation, ^
(b) the Union of Tanzania Women, g
(c) the Union of Tanzania Workers,
(d) the Union of Co-operatives
(e) the Tanzania Parents' Association.
The ZCTU resisted being designated a mass organization of UNIP on the 
Tanzanian model on a number of grounds which clearly revealed fundamental 
differences between UNIP and the labour movement. The ZCHJ contended
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1978, Art. 44(4)(a)
2. ibid. Art. 48(1) (g)
3. ibid. Art. 42(h)
4. ibid. Art. 37(g)
5. ibid. Art. 39
6 . Tanzania, CCM: Constitution, 1977, Art. 80:
(a) Umoja wa Vijana
7. (b) Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania
8 . (c) Umoja wa Wafanyakazi wa Tanzania
9. (d) Muungano wa Vyana vya Ushirika
lO. (e) Umoja wa Wazazi
among other things, that
(a) UNIP is already a mass organization and that her traditional 
and historical wings were the women's and youth leagues,
(b) labour movements are established under the Industrial 
Relations Act, 1971, and accordingly exist under that law,
(c) designation would be a derogation and contrary to the 
fundamental freedoms which embrace freedom of association 
to freedom to organize and freedom of expression,
(d) designation would be contrary to world community's notions 
of the role of trade unions and contrary to the principle 
of voluntary membership of the Party based on freedom to 
associate with full conscience to a political party,
(e) the link between the Party and other labour movements 
should be based on the the following principle which 
should be included in the constitution of the Party:
(i) Ihere shall be industrial workers' organizations 
affiliated to the ZCTU and shall participate in 
the political and national affairs of the country.
(ii) The leaders of mass organizations and the ZCTU 
shall have UNIP membership cards when attending 
the National Council and General Conference of 
the Party.^
These suggestions of the ZCTU found their way as Art. 59(1) of
the constitution of UNIP, 1973, adopted by the 8th General Conference of
the Party, 9th Septemher, 1978. Hie objection to designation of labour
organizations is based on the fear that they would be deprived of their
independence to run their affairs, free of the Party's interference. The
2
right to associate implies the right not to associate: those associations
should be left free to choose whether to or not to affiliate to the
Party in the same way an individual is free to join or not to join the
3
Party. But this comparison is misleading; the GTUC, the TFL, the M1UC 
and the ZCTU are not private but public institutions, performing quasi-public 
functions, financed by the State. The designation of trade unions as 
mass organizations of political parties is acceptable practice in a
1. Zambia: ZCTU Circular Letter, Ref. OD/19/1283/78; dated
14th September, 1978.
2. See: The Cane-Farmers' Incorporation and Cess Act, 1965 as. amended in
1973 of Trinidad and Tobago and the case decided 
on it; Trinidad and Tobago Island-Wide Cane-Farmers 
Association Inc. and Attorney-General v. Prakash 
Seereeram (1975) Civil- Appeals No. 11 and 14 
(unreported): PA, 1977, p. 217^ supra, p. 382.
3. Ghana TUC and Malawi TUC, respectively.
number of countries. What is important in each case in the real
intention of the designation: if the intention is to undermine/ curb
or swallow-up all such associations because the political party sees
them as a threat or source of independent power, then the designation
should be resisted. Where, however, the purpose is genuinely to bring
together national organizations/ designation actually helps the
designated organization to come to know how the party works. In practice,
designation produces alliance between the elite in the political party
and the labour movement; prima facie, designation can be freely
achieved where there is no conflict between the two. The failure to
designate the ZCTU as a mass organ of the Party in 1978 and the manner
the Party did not force or impose the designation was due to the delicate
background of the relationship between UNIP and the ZCTU which goes
back to the days when UNIP opposed the ZCTU in support of the RTCU.
The intention of UNIP in the aborted designation of the ZCTU was to
implement its projected policy of a politico-economic body corporate,
what President Kaunda described as "communalism, a community based on
the principles of a prosperous collective socialist life, free from
2
conflict between political party and labour movement".
The Legal Effect of Designation.
The constitution of UNIP as finally adopted at the
9th General Conference provided as follows:, vis-a-vis:, designation:
59. (.11 The following shall be designated as mass 
organisations of the Party:
(a) Women's League;
(h) Youth League;
Cc) Zambia Co-operative Federation, and
(d) any other organisation so designated by 
the Central Committee.
(2) There shall be workers' organisations affiliated 
to the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions.
(3) All persons representing a mass organisation or 
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions or any trade union 
at a meeting, council or conference of the Party 
shall be members of the Party.
1. Hooker, M.B., Legal Pluralism, An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-
Colonial Lawsy Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975, p. 418.
2. UNIP: 9th National Council, 14th-24th September, 1975.
Although the legal effect of the designation of an organization
as a mass organ of a political party depends on each arrangement, in general
designation subordinates the role of the designated body to that of the
designating organization. Where, however, the designated organization is a
statutory body such as the Zambia Federation of Co-operatives, established by
and operating under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1970^ the organization
continues to operate in accordance with the law of its incorporation. If the
2
ZCTU, which is established under the Industrial Relations Act, 1971 was
designated a mass organ of UNIP, its funds and property would not become the
funds and property of UNIP. The provisions which required the Minister to
3
appoint the office-bearers of the ZCTU were repealed by the Industrial 
Relations Act, aforementioned. Being statutory bodies, UNIP does not approve 
the constitution of the Federation of Co-operative Societies or the ZCTO.
The designation of the Federation enables the Federation to be represented
4 5
in all Party organs including the District Council. Consequently, by its
refusal to be designated a mass organ of UNIP, the ZCTO is not represented
g
in the District Councils, although it is represented at the National Council
7
and the Party Congress.
The designation of the ZCTO as a mass organization of UNIP would 
bring indirectly all trade unions under the influence of the Party because
g
the ZCTO represents the labour movement in Zambia; e.g. the Trustees of ZCTO
1. Zambia: 1970, No. 63, Cap. 689.
2. 1971, No. 36, Cap. 508.
3. Supra, p. 408.
4. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Arts. 41(f), 46(g), 51 (b) (v), 55(1)
5. ibid. Art. 41(f).
6 . ibid. Art. 55(1).
7. ibid. Art. 51(a).
8 . Supra, p. 413; practically all trade unions registered
with the Registrar of Trade Unions, Ministry of Labour
and Social Services, are affiliated to the Zambia 
Congress or Trade Unions as required by law: sec. 27, 
Industrial Relations Act, 1971.
sought a declaration that a S.I. issued by the Minister of Labour and
Social Services under the Industrial Relations Act, 1971, was null and
void. The State objected to the application, contending, inter alia,
that the applicants and/or the ZCTU had no substantial interest in the
proceedings, rather it was the trade union affected by the S.I. which
had the right to challenge its validity. The Court ruled that as the ZCTU
was concerned with all trade unions, it had a reasonable interest in the
S.I. and,therefore, had a locus standi, to bring the action.^"
The One-Party system has not affected the legal rights of
workers to associate in a trade union and the refusal of the ZCTU to be
designated a mass organ of the Party was not based on the fear that such
a close association between the Party and the labour movement would or
might result in a gradual or a systematic disappearance of trade unions.
On the eve of the 1983 and 1988 Party Congresses further attempts were
made to designate the ZCTU as a mass organ of the Party and on both
occasions the attempt failed. It is now provided that there shall be
2
workers' organizations affiliated to the Party and that the Committee of
3
Chairmen may designate any organization as a mass organ of the Party.
The effect of this provision is to introduce two systems of association 
with the Party, vis-a-vis organizations, i.e. either through affiliation 
or designation. Trade unions are consequently excluded from unilateral 
declaration by the Party as organs of the Party. The Party has been 
reluctant to unilaterally declare the ZCTU as a mass organ of the Party 
fearing that might probably lead to industrial strife. The new provision 
undermines the ZCTU as it enables the Party to secure the affiliation of 
of individual trade unions to the Party and isolate the ZCTU from the 
Party. That will work to the disadvantage of the ZCTU and not the Party.
1. Sichone, Fulilwa and Mbewe (as Trustees of ZCTU) v. Attomey-^General
(1985) ZR HN/227 (unreported)
2. UNIP:
3.
Constitution, 1988f Art. 81(2). 
ibid. Art. 81(1)(d).
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(b) The Relationship between the Party and ZCTU.
/ \
The rejection by the ZCTU to be designed a mass organ
of the Party in 1978 strained the relationship between the two bodies.
In 1980 the ZCTU mounted a strong campaign against the introduction of
a new system of local government. When the Local Administration Bill,
1980, was before Parliament, the ZCTU called for strikes of workers
against the Bill. There were riots and on the Copperbelt one person
died and there was damage to property. When the ZCTU refused to call
off the strikes, seventeen labour leaders were expelled from the membership
of the Party. The opposition to the Bill spread to Parliament where it
could not receive the support of the majority of the benchbenchers. By
mid-1981, the Party and the Labour movement relationship had deteriorated
by more strikes. On Monday, 27th July, 1981, in a dawn radio broadcast
in the fashion of the British Governor Sir Arthur Benson's dawn radio
broadcast of Thursday, 13th March, 1959, in which he announced the
banning of ZANC and the restriction of its entire top leadership,^"
President Kaunda announced that he had ordered the detention of a number
of labour leaders and gave the reasons;
The objectives of the leaders of ZCTU I have decided
to detain have not been to secure for the workers
better salaries and conditions of service. Far from
It. Theirs have been political objectives. In secret
meetings that Fredrick Chiluba has held with his
co-conspirators, he had stated that his ultimate
object and that of his* fellow leaders in the ZCTU
Is to take over the Zambian leadership. They have,
therefore, sought to use workers to achieve their 
political aims.2
The Party *s concern over the role of the ZCTU is usually in 
the context of the ZCTU being the watchdog of trade unions but not as
an Independent opposition organization. The idea of organising a trade
1. The Northern News; 14th March, 1959: 1 Zambia Banned: All Leaders
Arrested', p. 1; supra, p. 73.
2. Chiluha v. Attorney-General (1981) ZR HN/713 (unreported) Exhibit
'FJTC 21, p. 41.
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union congress did not originate with the government or political 
parties, but trade unions themselves. The RTUC was formed in NR before 
both independence and the one-party system. The ZCTU is not, therefore, 
a device of the one-party system whereby the activities of all trade 
unions in Zambia should be placed under close control and supervision.
Hence, the difficult of establishing a cordial relationship between the 
ZCTU and the Party. President Kaunda in his dawn statement stated that 
in addition to political ambitions, there were ideological differences 
between UNIP and the ZCTO leaders; the former, he said, stood for 
Humanism through Socialism, while the latter stood for Capitalism, which 
made him to conclude that "I am sure these must be some of the very few 
trade union leaders in the developing countries who think that capitalism 
is good for workers. Yet £  ^ history of trade unionism is one of 
struggle between capitalism and the workers.
Under Zambia's one-party system people are free to form 
and belong to non-political organizations such as trade unions provided
2
that such organizations are not "Prejudicial to the national interests". 
Although UNIP's political line vis-a-vis the economy, is projected as 
socialism, that does not make any organization that advocates capitalism 
'prejudicial to the interests' of the nation. Since its inception, the 
powers of the ZCTO have been laid down by statute and these are non-political. 
The problem has been that the ZCTU has not accepted Socialism as the 
economic policy to be pursued in Zambia, on one hand, and, the dominant 
role of UNIP, on the other. There is a conflict of ideologies between 
those in the top leadership of the Party and the ZCTO which appears to 
lack both an independent arbiter and universally acceptable solution.
1. (1981) ZR HN/713 (unreported) Exhibit ' FJTC 1', o p . cit., p. 28 par. 8.
2. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art* 4 and
NCEOPPDZ, Report, 1973, p. 8, par. 30.
3. See Tordoff, W. (Ed.) Politics in Zambia; Manchester UP, 1974, pp. 298-
300 on the establishment of the ZCTU and the 
enactment of the Trade Union and Trade Disputes
Ordinance (Amendment) Act, 1965> No. 3.
Judicial Intervention.
The impression given of the one-party system is that the
central role of the party has the effect of placing all public institutions
under the control of the party, for instance, the activities of the
national assembly, the courts of law and mass media. This is seen as
one of the contributing factors in the failure by the judiciary to
safeguard the enjoyment of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the
individual where these are provided for in the Constitution. The cases
cited as evidence of this failure are concerned with judicial failure
to invalidate certain legislative measures and with respect to executive
or administrative actions connected with detention and liberty of the
citizen* With respect to Zambia, judicial invalidation of a legislative
measure"*- and/or executive and administration action, are comparatively 
2
frequent. It could be argued that judicial review of executive power
does not involve the role of the Party. However, the President is the
President of the Party and the State, prima facie, his actions cannot
be divorced from the Party. The Government responsible for administrative
actions, is the Government of the Party; consequently the Party cannot be
isolated from administrative actions of the Government. Judicial review
under such circumstances means judicial intervention in political
wrangles between the Party and individuals; or, as in the detention of
the ZCTU leaders, into political controversies,
3
In Chiluha v. Attorney--General, the grounds of detention 
furnished to the applicant stated, inter alia, that he, as the Chairman 
General of the ZCTU, had told a rally on 1st May, 1981, that the leaders 
of the labour movement and workers had lost confidence in the Party
1. Zambia; Muraba v. The People (.1984) ZR 38 on invalidation
of sec. 53 Cl) of the Corrupt Practices Act, 1980,
No. 14, being contrary to Art. 20 C7) of the 
Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, No. 27.
2. See for instance; Kairct v. Attorney-General (1980) ZR, 172 and Chisata
and LOmhe y. Attorney-General (1901) ZR 35.
3. (1981) ZR HN/713 (unreported).
(UNIP) and the Government of Zambia, and as a result strikes of workers
followed on various Copperbelt towns. In his affidavit in support of his
application for a writ of Habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, the applicant
stated that the ZCTU and the labour movement in the country were
opposed to the introduction of the decentralized local administration
system in Zambia because it "had been tried elsewhere - notably Tanzania -
with unfortunate consequences to the economy of that country",^ and that
the labour movement did not want to see sums of money being spent
experimenting a system which had failed elsewhere. The applicant and
the rest of the other detainees were detained under Reg. 33(1) of the
Preservation of Public Security Regulations, made under the Preservation
of Public Security Act, 1960,which made it an offence for any person to
2
engage in activities which threatened public security.
Granting. leave for the writ to issue, Moodley, J., stated 
that the court's inquiry was not to make a finding of guilty or innocence,
but to establish whether or not there was a reasonable cause to suspect
that the applicant was engaged in activities that threatened public 
security as alleged. He made reference to Art. 22 of the Constitution 
of Zambia which provides., inter alia, that except with his consent, no■ ■ 1 1 ' k" 1
person in Zambia should be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of 
expression, that is to say, freedom to hold and express opinion without 
interference and freedom to receive and communicate information. On the
1. Chiluba v. Attorney-^General (1981) ZR HN/713, (unreported) Exhibit 
'FJTC 1', p. 28, par. 80.
2 k Zambia: 1960, No. 5, Cap. 106 now Cap. 109, whose
sec. 2 reads: "In this Act, the expression 
'public securityr includes the security of 
the safety of persons: and property, the 
maintenance of supplies and services essential 
to the life of the country, the prevention and 
supression of violence, intimidation, disorder 
and crime, the prevention of suppression of 
mutiny, rebellion and concerted defiance of and 
disobedience to the law and lawful authority 
and the maitenance. of the administration of 
justice."
meaning of the provisions of sec. 2 of the Act, the court stated that
the section prohibited acts of violence and overthrow of the Government
by unlawful means:
But that did not in any way suggest that citizens were 
denied freedom to discuss whether the Government could 
be overthrown by reasons of circumstances prevailing 
in the country. In these circumstances therefore, 
grounds one to four did not come within the provisions 
of the Preservation of Public Security Regulations. A 
person should not be prevented from aspiring to position 
of leadership if he wants. Similarly, grounds five to 
six concerning taking over of the leadership was not a 
matter of public security as it was not suggested that 
the taking over of the leadership was to be achieved 
by unlawful means.^
In practice, the phrase 'overthrow of the Government by unlawful 
means' can mean nothing or a lot of things. The colonial administrators 
who devised the provisions of the Preservation of Public Security Act, 
1960, detained African nationalist leaders for organizing boycotts of 
public and private institutions, strikes and demonstrations on the 
ground that their actions threatned public security and were intended 
to overthrow the Government by unlawful means. The nationalist leaders, 
ofcourse,used such, detentions as proof of lack of freedom of assembly and 
arbitrariness etc., of colonial rule. Hie inclusion of fundamental 
rights and protection of freedoms of the individual provisions in some 
of the Independence Constitutions, was supported by the African leaders 
and followers as safeguards against arbitrariness on the part of the 
executive or administration. It is political, economic, social and 
legal effects of such incidences as. those occuring in Zambia that 
decide the fate of bills of rights. The decision above showed that 
a well organized trade union movemeht as that existing in Zambia could 
bring the economic situation of the country through strikes to a virtually 
stand still without those responsible for such action being lawfully 
accused of engaging in actions likely to the collapse of the Government.
1. (1981) ZR HN/713 (unreported), per Moodley, J., at p. 72 pars. 15-20.
In Zimba v. Attorney-General/ the applicant was accused
of having conspired, in his capacity as the ZCTU General Secretary, with
the Chairman General of the ZCTU, aforementioned, and other labour
leaders to incite workers to condemn, humiliate and show disrespect to
the Minister of Labour and Social Services, and,as a consequence, the
Minister's official car was damaged by rioters. The Court noted that
although technically speaking, the provisions of sec. 2 of the
Preservation of Public Security Act, aforesaid, might affect public
security, but they did not fall within that section because isolated
incidents which did not endanger public security at large as contemplated
2
by the section and consequently the detention was unjustified. In the
3
third case, Samp a v. Attorney-General, the applicant was Vice-Chairman
General of the ZCTU arid his grounds of detention stated that he had told
May Day rally on 1st May, 198C, that the ultimate aim of the ZCTU leadership
was to take over the leadership of the country. Granting leave that the
writ of habeas corpus issue, the High Court Commissioner observed that
simply expressing an ambition to take over the leadership of the country
per se, did not make the author of the statement a public risk: "He might
be a threat to the politicians j_n their political jobs, but that is an
area of activity which is totally different from public security matters.
Unless it is shown that the fulfilment of political ambition touches on
public security and its preservation, people must be allowed to aspire
4
for the highest offices of the land."
The fourth case, also heard by the High Court Commissioner, 
was Walamha v; Attorney-General,'* in which the applicant was the Vice
  -------   ■ ■ ■ ■v- V -------^ -- "=---------
Chairman of the ZMU. He was supplied with, four grounds for detention,
1. (1981} ZR HN/715, (unreported).
2. ibid. per Sivanandan, J., at p. 36, par. 10.
3. (1981) ZR HN/716, (unreported).
4. ibid. per Musumali, HCC, at p. 109 pars. 10-20.
5. (1981) ZR HN/714, (unreported).
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accusing him, inter alia, of having called mine workers to go on strike 
telling them that "the strike was the best treatment which President 
Kaunda's rotten Government could be given, thereby inciting the mine 
workers to go on illegal strikes."^ The High Commissioner noted that 
some of statements alleged to have been made by the applicant were 
said to have been made in August, 1980 and January, 1981, that was at 
the time the labour movement was engaged in the fight against the 
introduction of a decentralized system of local administration which 
led to seventeen of labour leaders being expelled from UNIP. He 
accordingly found that the cause of the illegal strikes on the Copperbelt 
were the introduction of decentralization Bill in 1980 and the subsequent 
expulsion of the labour leaders and that there was no link between the 
applicant's speeches and the strikes. The detention was found unreasonable 
and the release of the applicant ordered.
Although the Attorney-General lodged appeals in all the
2
four cases, these were later abandoned on the ground that the relationship 
between UNIP and the ZCTU in particular and other trade unions in general, 
had meanwhile improved. That was in fact, far from the truth. The fact 
was that both sides preferred a truce; acknowledging that whatever 
decisions the Supreme Court were to made, would not bring any change in 
the relationship between the Party and the labour movement. Only the 
detention of the labour leaders had converted into a legal problem what was 
otherwise basically a political dispute between the two organizations.; 
the refusal of the ZCTU to be designated as a mass organization of UNIP.
The decisions cited above tend to show that judicial intervention may 
not provide solution to political differences though, presented in a
1. (1981) ZR HN/714 (unreported), Exhibit *W 4' Ground No. (2).
2. Attorney-*General v. F.J.T. Chiluha (1981) SCZ/8/384
Attorney-General v. N.L. Zimha (1981) SCZ/8/383
Attorney-General v. G. Sampa (1981) SCZ/8/385
Attomey-Generab v. T. Walamba (1981) SCZ/8/385 (consolidated
with the previous appeal case) .
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camouflaged legal context. Commenting on the attitude of the courts
in India in cases which touch on political issues, it has been said:
In the Indian constitutional jurisdiction it is rather 
difficult for the court to keep itself aloof from 
political questions. When the court considers the 
reasonableness of any statute, the court has to
examine the political philosophy behind i t .......
The court in India can play the role of a mediator 
to establish political and judicial balance. 1
In Zambia Art. 26 of the Constitution provides for the 
derogation from the observance of the fundamental rights and freedomd 
of the individual guaranteed by the Bill of Rights; nothing done under 
the authority of any law should be held to be inconsistent with or in 
contravention of the provisions of the Bill if it is shown that the law 
in question authorises the action taken unless it is shewn that the 
measure exceeded anything which, having regard to the circumstances 
prevailing at the time, could reasonably have been thought to be required 
for the purposes of dealing with the situation in question. Hie labour 
law of Zambia, on the other hand, is based on the principle that labour 
disputes should be handled according to law, that is, in an orderly 
manner through conciliation, arbitration or adjudication. That law, 
however, does not contain any machinery for solving political disputes 
of the nature arising between the Party and the ZCTU. The labour movement 
operating in and under any one-party- system will have to accept the 
fact that in a single-party- state it is around the Party and not trade 
unions: that all political activities take place. The Party asserts that 
its role Is through its central organs which are supreme compared to 
those of the Government such as Parliament and Cabinet. Under such 
circumstances, it is futile for the labour movement to claim Independence 
of the Party control, co-operation or subordination. The ZCTU’s refusal
- ■ / " ' x
to be designated as a mass organ of UNIP is seen as insyrhordination.
1. Jha, C., Judicial Review of Legislative Act; Tripathi, Bombay,
1974, p. 353.
428.
In a multi-party system, trade unions are free to align themselves
with any political party or remain independent. That situation makes it
much easier for trade unions to 'play politics' of their choice. Under
a One-Party system, the sitation is different. There, the ruling political
party calls the political tune to which all institutions, including trade
unions, are expected to stand-up and dance to. There are three main reasons
why the ZCTU has been reluctant to stand-up and dance to UNIP's tune? first,
the labour movement in Zambia is highly politicized; born not with a copper
spoon in its mouth, but a copper rock in its hand which it learnt early in
infancy to throw at colonial rule and settler domination. The spirit which
developed during the colonial era of fighting political as well as
industrial battles, lingers on in the labour movement. The fact that there
is now an African Government in office has had little impact on the labour
movement's notion of independence from government, employers and political
parties. Second, the conflict is historical. UNIP's support for UMU in
opposition to AMU and UNIP's support of RTUC in opposition to the ZCTU,
is still a source for mistrust between UNIP and the ZCTU. The inclusion of
the Chairman of the ZMU (Mr Timothy Walamba) and ZCTU Deputy General
Secretary (John Sichone) in the Central Committee at the 10th Party Congress
in August, 1988,^was the latest attempt by UNIP leadership to patch-up some
cracks between the Party and the labour movement.
Third, notwithstanding the provisions of Art. 4 of the State
Constitution which establishes the One-Party system, the Party remains
2
devoid of legal capacity. The ZCTU is established by law, and it can and does
3
intervene in inter-trade union disputes or refer the same to the IRC. This 
lack of a legal basis for the role of the Party in labour matters, weakens 
its claim for superiority over the labour movement; in particular the ZCTU.
1. Supra, p. 140, et seq.
2. Zambia: Industrial Relations Act, 1971, No. 36, sec. 26(2)
replacing sec. 211(1) of the Trade Union and Trade 
Disputes Ordinance (Amendment) Act, 1965, No. 3, Cap. 25.
3. ibid. sec. 98.
But one obvious point appears to have not yet dawned on
the labour movement namely that, although the Party might lack legal a
capacity as a Party, the Party and the Government are in fact one and
the same thing. Accordingly, what the Party cannot do as a Party, it
can do as a Government. Consequently the making of the Trade Union
(Deduction of Subscriptions) Regulations, 1985,^ was the Party's
retaliation through its government-wing against the ZCTU's stubborn
refusal to be designated an organ of the Party. The economic situation
in Zambia has been on the decline since the introduction of the one-party
system. The labour movement accuses the Party and its Government of a
mismanagement of the economy and 'wrong' economic policies. It is ofcourse
the function of the Party to explain (to the satisfaction of the labour
movement) its economic policies and whether those policies were
succeeding or failing. The Party appears unable to explain where the
economic problems emanate from or the remedies to be applied to those
problems except to blame the poor copper prices, on one hand, and,
frequent illegal strikes staged by the labour movement, on the other.
On the face of it, the economic decline in Zambia would result in
industrial unrest, but as a matter of fact, the people in the labour 
movement and the Party leadership are the most comfortable, in the
country compared to the peasants and the unemployed who constitute the
majority in the population who have suffered from lack of basic
commodities such as salt, sugar, soap, mealie-meal. Where some of
these commodities are found, people have to pay exorbitant prices
for them. These are not the issues the Party and the ZCTU are apparently
fighting about. The conflict is about the strength and persistent
refusal of the ZCTU be part and parcel of the Party.
The Trade Union (Deduction of Subscriptions) Regulations, 
1985 were intended to weaken the ZCTU and not to prohibit striking
1. Zambia: 1985, No. 6, made under sec. 20, Industrial
Relations Act, 1971, No. 36, Cap. 508.
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of workers as such. Ihe Minister (of Labour and Social Services) is
empowered to order an employer to deduct from the wages of those of
his employees who are members of a trade union such subscription as
are prescribed by the constitution of any such trade union of which
such employees are members.'*’ The employer is required to remit,
within fourteen days of making the deductions, the subscriptions to
2
the ZCTU and to the trade union's headquarters. This system enables
the ZCTU and the trade union concerned receive regular contributions
'without effort' and without fail. Consequently, the ZCTU and trade
unions are financially better-off than the Party, except for the
Government grant made to the Party each year. In a guise of discouraging
trade unions from calling illegal strike, the Regulations provided that
2. Any Deduction of Subscription Order made under 
sec* 20 of the Act shall be deemed revoked and shall 
become null and void from the day when a trade union
for the benefit of which such Order is made goes on
an illegal strike, whether official or unofficial.3
This was obviously a misleading provision in that 'official or
unofficial' strike might include a legal S-trike decided upon by a
4
positive ballot of the members of the trade union concerned. The 
Regulations were accordingly amended by the deletion of the phrase 
"whether official or unofficial"' and the substitution therefor of 
"whether or not such illegal strike is sanctioned by the officials 
or executive of the trade unio n " . T h e  Regulations therefore, cover 
only illegal shrikes whether the officials of the trade unions have 
agreed or not. Because of the bad economic situation in the country 
and the conflict between the Party and the ZCTU, there have been 
a spate of illegal strikes. It is pertinent to point out that the
1. Zambia: Industrial Relations Act, 1971, sec. 20(1).
2. ibid. sec. 21(1)
3 V Trade Unions (Deduction of Subscriptions) Regulations,
1985, Reg. 2
4. Industrial Relations Act, loc. cit., sec. 116(2)
5 % Trade Union (Deduction of Subscriptions) Regulations,
ZCTU although it is a 'trade union' as a matter of law, it has no membership
being a holding-organization of all the affiliated trade unions. It cannot, 
therefore, 'go on strike'. It can, however, encourage or discourage a trade 
union to or from going on a legal or illegal strike.^ It has been stated 
that since Independence in 1964, there has been only two legal strikes, the 
rest have been illegal. For instance, in 1979 there were 44 illegal strikes 
involving 10,846 workers, in 1980 the number of strikes doubled and involved 
21,921 workers and in 1981 there were 84 illegal strikes involving 46,399 
workers: "In all these wildcat strikes, a total of 205,681 man-days were lost. 
The impact of these illegal work stoppages on the economy has been disastrous".
There was suspicion that in its fight against the Party, the ZCTU 
encouraged trade unions to go on illegal strikes, hence the Party's persuation 
of the Government to make the Regulations to curtail funds from trade unions 
and workers going to the ZCTU. The suspension of the collection and remission 
of subscriptions from the workers to the ZCTU have had a real impact on the 
funds and role of the ZCIU. It was not probably a coincidence that by the end 
of 1988 the ZCTU leadership was in disarray; its credibility reduced and on 
the verge of submitting to the dominant role of the Party. That will signal 
the gradual demise of what was one of the remaining (the other being the 
Church) organized forum for dissent and criticism of the One-Party system in 
Zambia.^
1. See Chiluba v. Attorney-General (1981) ZR HN/713 (unreported) where
Chiluba, as Chairman-General of the ZCIU said: " In 
light of all this worrying state of affairs I directed 
at this seminar and in accordance with Section 27 of 
the Industrial Relations Act, that nobody else except 
me as Chief spokesman of Z.C.T.U. should make statements 
on strike action that I held the button to set any strike 
in motion if there was need for one and that I would not 
hesitate to press the strike button if we were compelled"; 
Exhibit 'FPTC 1', p. 32.
2. ibid. President K.D. Kaunda in his (dawn) address to the
nation, Monday, 27th July, 1981, announcing the detention
labour leaders: Exhibit 'FJCT 2', p. 38.
3. UNIP: Hie inclusion of the 31U Chairman, Timoth Walamba and the
ZCIU Deputy General Secretary, John Sichone in the Central 
Committee of UNIP at the 10th Party Congress in August, 
1988, will inhibit criticism of the Party in the labour 
movement in Zambia.
432.
Section 3. The Party Committee at the Place of Work.
The view in UNIP at Independence was that Capitalism created
a sort of cat-and-mouse industrial relationship between employers and
employees. Workers' participation in the management of their work-places
was seen as the answer to lessening tension between management and the
workers. The national philosophy of Humanism adopted in 1967 introduced
the notion of an industrial relations based on man-centred principles
of 'industrial participatory democracy' which required cooperation between
and among owners of capital and suppliers of labour, producers and the
consumers etc., in the struggle against inequality, exploitation and
mutual aggression.^" Neither management nor trade unions, for instance,
were to be permitted to behave as if they were above or a law unto
themselves. The ideal industrial harmony was, among other things, to be
achieved and maintained, through the establishment of Works Councils in all
major industrial and commercial undertakings to facilitate worker-
participation in management decisions, and, an Industrial Relations Court,
2
to regulate power-play of labour or management.. The Party Committee at 
the Place of Work (hereinafter to be referred to as the Party Committee), 
is an institution devised by UNIP to establish the Party's presence at 
places of work: in consultation with neither management nor trade unions,
(a) The Nature of the Place, of Work.
3
The 4th National Council of the Party, directed that the Party
Committees should he established at places of work. Towards the end of
that year it had become clear that the absence of clear instructions
the Party's resolution had been misunderstood; in some places of work
2.
3.
1. UNIP: Report of the Second National Convention on Rural 
Development, incomes, Wages and Prices in Zambia: 
Policy and Machinery; Kitwe, 12th—16 December, 
1969, p. 21
ibid. p. 23
25th April, 1974
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Party members formed Party branches instead of Party Committees. The 
difference between the two was that the former required enrolment of 
membership and election of office bearers, while the latter requires 
only the election of office bearers. Party branches aroused suspicions 
among management who saw these organizations as potential sources of 
unrest at places of work or would wrest control from them or even 
undermine their authority. The Party functionaries at the constituency 
level (the present ward), branch and even section levels, on their part, 
saw in the Party branches at place of work as possible substitutes to 
their own organizations. Under such suspicions and anticipations, the 
Party presence at place of work could not continue without clarification 
and regulation.
The national policies of the Party required that the Party 
intensified its efforts at strengthening good industrial relations in 
all the sectors of the economy and guarantee peace, stability and high 
productivity. The task, of achieving this was in part assigned to the 
Party itself, accordingly, the Party Constitution adopted in 1978, provided 
for the establishment of the Party Committee composed of a Chairman, a 
Secretary and two other members, to hold office for two years. The Committee 
works and is supervised under and by the DG on the area in which the 
enterprise at which, the Party Committee is established, is located.^" A 
place of work is difficult to define or describe; for instance, at a 
market place, a place where a group of men repair motor vehicles qualifies 
as' a place of work and a Party Committee could be formed there, while in 
the same place where men or women sell food-stuffs or cloth, might not 
qualify as a place of work; only a branch or section of the Party could 
be formed at such a place. Between 1983 and 1985 the Speaker of the National
1. UNIP; Constitution, 1978, Art. 30? now Art. 30, 
Constitution, 1988.
Assembly successfully resisted the establishment of a Party Committee 
at the National Assembly on the ground that Parliament was not a place 
of work for MPs. That was a curious argument because, prima facie, the 
National Assembly is_ an institution where a number of persons, together 
with MPs, work. It was obvious that the Speaker was opposed to the 
presence of UNIP within the precincts of Parliament. He succeeded mainly
because the decision as to what constitutes a *place of work', is made
by the local DG, who, although a Presidential representative at district 
level, is junior officer to the Speaker of the National Assembly.
(b) Functions of the Party Committee.
The Party Committee is now one of the important instruments of 
the One-Party system. Under a multi-party system it would be intolerable 
to all concerned if several political parties formed their party committees 
at places of work. The functions of the Party Committee also show that 
these can be carried out more effectively under a one-party than under a 
multi-party system. The Party Committees are formed in the Party, the 
Government and parastatal institutions as well as in private enterprises. 
The functions of the Party Committee are
(a) to work with management in ensuring that enterprises 
operate in accordance with the aims and objects of the 
Party;
(b) to assist management in strict business and enforcement 
of discipline at places of work;
(c) to work in close collaboration with trade unions to 
encourage hard work and high levels of production;
(d) to ensure that Party programmes are adhered to and 
implemented by enterprises;
(e) to ensure that Party members live by exemplary behaviour 
in accordance with Party discipline; and
(f) to instil political and ideological education in the 
minds of workers and security consciousness against crime, 
subversion and sabotage.1
2
The Party Committee's Chairman, Secretary and the other two members 
have to be employees of the enterprise where the Committee is formed. In 
order to be effective, the Committee members have to work in close contact
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Reg. 30
2. ibid. Art. 30(1)(a) to (c)
with the DG in order to be familiar with the aims, objects and programmes 
of the Party. In most cases persons elected to the Party Committee are 
often familiar with the Party policies because some of them already hold 
Party posts at either Section or Branch level in their residential areas.
(c) Multiplicy of Organizations at Place of Work.
The Zambian place of work is crowded with organizations; in 
addition to the Party Committee, every industrial and commercial enterprise
employing more than one hundred employees is required to establish a
1 2 
Works Council composed of management and trade union representatives.
Thus, at every work-place should have a trade union branch, a works council,
management and a Party Committee. While the Party, Government and parastatals
were,earner to establish the Party Committee, private enterprises were
lukewarm and in some cases resisted the formation of the Party Committees.
Private enterprises viewed Party Committees as bodies formed by the Party
to show its lack of confidence in private enterprise as an ally of the Party
in the implementation of its economic policies. The relationship between
the Party Committee and trade unions at a place of work would be anything
from cordiality to hostility.
The multiplicity of organizations at place of work has not
brought about industrial peace, harmony or high productivity. Instead,
illegal strikes have been on the increase. The Party Committee is composed
of workers employed at the place of work and as such they are bound to
support any strike action taken in the furtherance of the improvement of
workers' pay or conditions of employment. The Party Committee can keep the
Party well informed of the causes of illegal strike where it occurs but it
cannot stop any illegal strike.
1. On Works Councils see: Finch, R., and Zulu, G.;
"Labour and Participation in Zambia", in Turok, B.
(Ed.), Development in Zambia: A Reader; Zed Press, 
London, 1979, pp. 214 - 226.
2. Zambia: Industrial Relations Act, 1971, sec. 55.
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(d) Some Legal Problems.
One of the reasons why the Party Committees have not been able
to stop illegal strikes, is their want of legal status. The following
case will illustrate this point. The Minutes of a Party Committee at a
parastatal organization in Lusaka stated that when two vacancies occured
on the works council of the parastatal, the Party Committee nominated
two candidates to contest an election to fill the vacancies. A local
trade union objected to the Party Committee's nomination contending that
under the Industrial Relations Act, 1971, nomination to fill a vacancy on
a works council can only be made by a trade union, or with the approval
of a trade union. The Party Committee took this as a challenge to the
'supremacy' of the Party and an attempt by the trade union and management
to ensure that the vacancies were filled by 'counter revolutionaries'.
Although Art. 4 of the Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973,
establishes a One-Party system and the Party's supremacy is also backed
by law, ^  most of the laws of Zambia were not reviewed to facilitate the
smooth operation of the system. The Industrial Relations Act is one of
those laws which needed review. Its. provision that only the trade union
2
should nominate a candidate for election to a works council, was made
before the introduction of the One-^arty system and the establishment
of the Party Committee. The Party Committee i^l^ked on the provisions of
the Constitution of the Party which, provided that a Party member's
rights included the right "to elect or to be elected or appointed to the
3
leadership in the organ of the Party, the Government and the State", and
argued that in the context of the supremacy of the Party, the provisions of
the Industrial Relations Act should be read in conjuction with (or
subject to) the provisions of the Constitution of the Party.
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ -  ' ■ ■ '■  -
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia) Amendment Act, 1975,
No. 22, Art. 47C(2)
2. Industrial Relations Act, 1971, sec, 59(1)
3. UNIP: Constitution, 1978, Art. 15(a), now Art. 17(a),
Constitution, 1988.
The Works Council is not an organ of the Party, or of the
Government or of the State, although the parastatal organization itself 
is a State-owned institution. The cited provisions of the Constitution 
of the Party could not support the Party Committee's claim to nominate 
the two candidates. What was in issue in this case was the status of 
both the Party and the Party Committee. The ZCTU in rejecting being 
designated a mass organization of UNIP in 1978 and 1983 emphasised the 
point that the ZCTU operated under the provisions of the Industrial 
Relations Act thereby implying that it had a legal status independent (and 
superior to that) of the Party. The Party Committee was therefore, 
confronted with a legal problem it could not resolve. The Minutes of 
the Party Committee accordingly recorded that the Committee resolved 
as follows, viz
1
(1) Tbat whilst observing its given responsibility, i.e. 
being one of the supervisors for these subsequent 
works council elections, but fearing to be seen 
interfering with the functions of other organs, 
a legal interpretation of how Chapter I Article 15, 
constitution of the Party could be implemented, be 
sought in relation to eradieating the observed 
counter revolutionary act committed by abuse of 
the said legal right of the union.
(2) That the Party Committee appeal to the Party,
(3) That the two Party Committee members follow the 
laid down procedure under the Industrial Relations 
Act for a Court injuction and non-conduction of
election.2
According to the prevailing positivist view of law in Zambia, 
the Constitution of UNIP is not a source of law, accordingly, its Art. 15 could
not be envoked to modify or qualify or over-ride the provisions of
1. Zambia: Section 60, Industrial Relations Act, provides
that subsequent elections to works council can 
be supervised by persons appointed by the out-going 
members of the council. The Party Committee was 
accordingly appointed supervisor.
2. On Works Council elections and appeals to the
Industrial Relations Court, see Samusunse v. 
Printpak and Times Newspapers Ltd. Works Council 
(1979) 1 ZIRC (1979-81), 197, in which a works 
council election was nullified for irregularities 
in the distribution of election ballot papers.
the Industrial Relations Act, sec. 59(1). Accordingly, the Party
Committee could not nominate the candidates, or, could only do so with
the prior approval of the trade union. That was the 'supremacy' not
of the Party but of the trade union.
The legal position of the Party Committee remains uncertain as
that of the Party itself. One way of clarifying the role of the Party
Committee would be through its inclusion in the Industrial Relations
Act, that is, to 'legalize' it. Such similar approach has been adopted,
for instance, the insertion of the provisions of Art. 37 of the Party
Constitution as sec. 10 of the Local Administration Act, 1980.^ Such
devises might create rather than solve legal problems. If provisions of
the Constitution of the Party are included in statutes passed by Parliament,
Parliament would be in a position to indirectly amend the Constitution of
the Party, contrary to the provision of that Constitution that it can
2
only be amended by the Party Congress. So far UNIP has not been able to
resolve the question of the legal status of the Party.
3
The 4th National Council of the Party, resolved that the
system of registering Branches of the Party should be reviewed with a
view to exempting them from registration under the Societies Act. That
resolution impliedly queried whether, the Party itself should be subject to
the provisions of the Societies Act. Consideration was given to the
possibility of legislating that the Party be turned into a body corporate.
Enactment of such legislation would have meant that Parliament review the
very existence of the Party itself, "a measure which was regarded as not
4
in the best interest of the Party itself". The review-was accordingly,
not carried out and the Party Headquarters and Branches are still
    . ' •
1. Zambia: 1980, No. 157 supra, p. 357.
2. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 87(1)(a) to (c).
3. 25th April, 1974
4. Progress Report for the Years 1973-1978; p. 11
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subject to registration under the Societies Act, as societies.
The Party Committee performs political functions, among
these, that of ensuring that a place of work, be it in the Party, the
Government, a parastatal organization or a private enterprise, is not
used as a forum for activities contrary to State security or opposed
to the Party and its Government; hence, it is viewed by both bhe labour
movement and management as a 'spying agent * of the Party. In Tanzania
an equivalent body to the Party Committee received similar suspicion
from management, though it received support from the workers:
Despite the employer's policy of divide and rule, the 
workers attained maximum revolutionary consciousness.
This silent fire found manifestation in the primary 
workers' demand for the formation of a TANU Branch at 
the factory. This request was made by the workers' 
committee. For the first time in the history of the 
Workers' Committee, the Workers' Committee had demanded 
the coming of TANU near it. Often workers' Committees 
are hostile to TANU branches.
The employer knew, more than anybody, the dangers 
of opening a TANU Branch, at the factory. But it was not
in his power to say so.l
The political party as well as the trade union are organizations 
imported into Africa initially to serve European interests; their origins 
are deep-rooted in the Western political and economic traditions and 
philosphies based on t h e laissez faire In political, economic and social 
activities. In European democratic political theory and practice, a 
political party should represent only a section of the community in
which- it operates. A trade union, by its very nature, represents only
a section of workers engaged in a certain economic activity. In the 
African One-Party states, the national political organization which is 
called the 'party', is not built upon sectional interests, but purportedly 
upon a national basis. Ideally, the Party Committee could be used as
1. Mihyo, P.B., "Labour Unrest and the Quest for Workers' Control in 
Tanzania: Three Case Studies", EALR, Vol. 7, No. 1, 
1974, p. 31. In Tanzania the Workers' Committees 
were established under the provisions of the 
Security of Employment Act, 1964, No. 62, Cap. 574.
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an institution of liberal education for better citizenship, as an important 
organ of the Party in educating workers on the workings of the larger 
political system and/or economic management of industrial and commercial 
enterprises as well as the administrative machinery of the Party and its 
Government. It is for that reason that one would not support turning of 
a political party into a body corporate, e.g. ZANU-PF's constitutional 
provision to the effect that
The Party shall be a body corporate capable of suing and 
being sued; owning and disposing of property; and engaging
in all such lawful activities as are consistent with the
aims and objects of the Party.^
Trade unions are not bodies corporate; often they are only afforded
2
a limited legal capacity by legislation. They cannot be wound-up like a
company. A political party that possessed the legal status of a body corporate
might be a subject of winding-up proceedings, e.g. in Chipimo v. Chona, the
3
Secretary-General of UNIP and Attorney-General the High Court had awarded 
the plaintiff K1,000,000 for defamation. Hie Supreme Court ruled that the 
Secretary-General could not be sued in his official capacity. If UNIP were 
a body corporate and had failed to pay such damages, it might have ended 
in winding-up proceedings. Political parties and trade unions should be 
regulated by their own special legal regimes; in essence not as bodies corporate,
(e) Reform of Industrial Management.
Zambia's economy has been on the decline, coincidentally, since 
the introduction of the One-Party system; reportedly adversely affected by 
a steady fall in the price of copper, which is the country's chief earner of 
foreign currency. Zambia is still dependent on some imports of essential 
commodities such as fuel, medicines and food stuffs, e.g. wheat. Some of the 
major industrial and commercial enterprises at which the Party Committees 
are formed and operate are not State-owned but are still outposts of some
1. ZANU-PF: Constitution, 1984, Art. 2.
2. Zambia: Industrial Relations Act, 1971, sec. 3(2).
3. (1983) ZR 125, supra, p. 200.
foreign trading multi-nationals whose products are depended on inputs 
inported from outside Zambia. To make up for some shortfall in the 
foreign exchange requirements, the Party and its Government have to 
resort to loans and bilateral and multilateral aid or grants. Under 
these economic conditions, the Party and its Government have strived 
to curb undue consumption of foreign exchange and to withhold certain 
subsidies paid by the Government on consumer goods. That have resulted 
in price increases beyond the reach of most of the workers. Trade unions 
have advised the Party and Government on the performance of their 
enterprises, inflation, redundancies, closure of industries or factories 
and effects of shortages of essential commodities on labour stability 
and productivity. Trade unions play the critical role of telling the 
Party of the dangers or shortcomings in Party policies and in the 
performance of industrial and commercial undertakings. Hie Party's 
attitude, however, has been to regard the trade unions' criticism as 
opposition or hostility to Party's leadership or that the criticisms
give a bad impression of the Party *s performance in the eyes of the 
outside world and might work as a deterrence to attracting foreign 
investments in Zambia.
The Party Committee in most cases defends Party and/or 
Government measures. The Party Committee cannot monitor or represent 
workers * grievances or interests. A strong and well-^organized labour 
movement is still essential in Zambian economic fields. The Party's 
policy to achieve qualitative transformation of the social life of 
the Zambian people cannot be carried out without the support of the 
organized labour and management. The Party makes a number of proposals 
towards the achievement of ' industrial participatory democracy^; first, 
the Party proposes a reform of industrial and commercial management.
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The future management is projected to be a three-corner type 
of management consisting of
(i) Management,
(ii) Representatives of the Party Committee at Place of 
Work, and
(iii) Representatives of Trade Unions and Works Council.
These three, working together, would form a common management 
committee. This approach would be viable insurance against  ^
unmitigated problems that arise from failure of consultation.
The Party would, in all probability, assume the chairmanship of
such an organization to ensure not the efficiency of the management
committee, but its leading role. Foreign multi-nationals used to freedom
of action in the economic field, would find such an arrangement rather
restrictive. The second proposals is that the Industrial Relations Act,
1971, should be reviewed to ensure greater industrial harmony by
incorporating in it some of the Party's concepts of industrial participatory
democracy while rationalising the relationship between trade unions, the
works council and the Party Committee and streamlining the administration 
2
of the Act. This means bringing trade unions in general and the ZCTU 
in particular, under the leadership of the Party through legislation. The 
emergence of the Party Committee had, in most institutions, the effect 
of forcing trade unions to side with management, particularly in the 
private enterprises. In Government and parastatal organizations, the 
Party Committee was assimilated into the Government bureaucracy while 
local trade unions played the role of 'opposition'. Precisely because 
trade unions are highly organized, they have been able to act independently 
of the Party Committee. Any elimination of that independence will signal 
the end of trade unions' freedom of organization in Zambia.
1. Kaunda, K.DV, Economic Power to the People, Part One and Two;
Government Printer, Lusaka, 1983, p. 10.
2. UNIP; The National Policins for the Decader-1985-1995 : Aims
and Objects of the Third Phase of the Party Programme; 
Government Printer, Lusaka, 1985, p. 14.
CONCLUSION.
This Chapter has considered the collateral development of African 
political and labour organization in Zambia and their relationship before 
and after Independence and showed that trade unionism emerged in the context 
of legislation and practices which favoured the development of a neutral 
non-politicized labour movement. Hie convergence which occured between the 
two movements before Independence, was not Jiased on any precise theory of 
interactive political linkage but was necessiated by the prevailing colonial 
situation which compelled the Africans to combine their efforts in demanding 
some basic political and economic rights; that they could have done either 
by acts of individual persons or by relying on one dominant person or group. 
The political parties and trade unions provided some form of organs for 
the acquisition and protection of African interests. After Independence, 
the Zambians came to master their own environment; they were able to stand 
back a little and consider what they really wanted out of life beyond mere 
survival. It is evident that in every society different people demand 
different things, e.g. types of housing, education, clothes or system of 
government. That is, where there is freedom of choice.
Where one individual, or group, were dominant, some of these 
different demands are likely to be subordinated to the wishes of that 
individual or group. The establishment of the One-Party system in Zambia, 
subordinated the form of government to be practised in Zambia to the wishes 
of UNIP. The failure to designate the ZCTU as a mass organ of the Party 
arises from the ZCTU's refusal to accept the principle that subordination 
was the price public institutions were to pay for the protection provided 
by UNIP through its Government. The conflict persists because, first, 
the parties have not agreed on the ways of co-existing peacefully; each 
side will have to be pursuaded to give something up to accommodate the 
wishes of the other. Obviously, the ZCTU would have to accept the dominant 
role of the Party rather than being phased out.
Secondly, the failure to designate the ZCTU as an organ of
UNIP was not caused by ideological differences between the elite in the
leadership of these two organizations, but by the histpcical
background of the two movements and the ZCTU's opposition to the One-Party
system in Zambia. The designation is perceived by some of the ZCTU leaders
as an act intended to legitimatize a system they do not wholly support.
While the One-Party system continues in existence, some of the ZCTU
leaders would like to be seen as providing an independent alternative
leadership to UNIP's leadership. At the same time, there is a feeling
among some of the ZCTU leadership that in the event of the country reverting
to a multi-party system, the ZCTU should be free to retain its independence
or support any other political party other than UNIP.
The conflict, therefore, arises from many factors. The ZCTU
fails to realize that a one-party system, while it exists, is an
oligarchical system from which a popular labour movement cannot be allowed 
to exist independently of the ruling party. Under a multi-party system,
for instance as that existing in the UK, trade unions can exist independently
of political party affiliation. Thus, although the TUC and most of trade
unions are affiliated to the Labour Party, the National and Local Government
Officers' Association is not affiliated to the Labour Party.^ The recent
trends in the UK have been to weaken the relationship between trade unions
and political parties, in particular the Labour Party. For instance, in
2
Leigh v. National Union of Railwaymen, it was held that the defendant 
trade union was not entitled to demand that any candidate for the post of 
president of the Union should be a member of the Labour Party inspite of 
the Union's rule that the president of the Union had to attend TUC's and 
Labour Party's annual conferences. The Court's view was that that rule did 
not require that a person seeking election to that post had to be a 
member of the Party before nomination. He could become a member of the 
Labour Party after his election as the President of the Union.
1. Lewis, L. (Ed.) Labour Law in Britain; Blackwell, 1986, p. 304.
2. /I971/ 2 QBD 175
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The Trade Union Act, 1984, now provides that no candidate
for election to a trade union executive committee should be required
2
to be a member of a political party. Such provision clarifies the legal 
position vis-a-vis the requirement of membership of a political party 
and the holding of an executive post in a trade union in a multi-party 
system but under a one-party system based on the central role of the 
ruling party the loyalty of trade unions and their members is required 
to be committed to the one party. The ZCTU*s resistence to be designated 
a mass organ of UNIP is not on the basis that the latter is socialist 
and itself supports capitalism, but that it would prefer to exist and 
operate as an independent labour movement * The conflict - and contradiction - 
arises from the ZCTU's involvement in political confrontation with the 
Party. Designation is aimed at stopping just that confrontation.
Thirdly, the legal status of the ZCTU and UNIP contributes 
to the conflict between the two organizations. The labour movement has 
had a strong legal basis which the political movement has never had.
The judiciary's intervention in the conflict between the ZCTU and UNIP 
which it viewed as nothing but political and personalities-clash, was 
bold but it solve-d nothing. The courts upheld the rule of law and the 
freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to communicate ideas and information to the public or 
any person or class of persons again without interference. What was in 
issue in the ZCTU cases was not freedom of expression, but whether the 
ZCTU platform could be used for political agitation, for instance, the 
(lawful) overthrow of the Government. In the absence of alternative political 
organization to the ruling one party, the labour movement envitably 
becomes the only avenue for organized dissent to the Party.
1. UK: 1984, c. 49.
2. ibid. sec. 2(10).
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CHAPTER X.
UNIP's ROLE IN FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN POLICY.
Pan-Africanism and Legal Status of Liberation Movements. 
Introduction.
The foreign policy of any country, broadly conceived,
is a series of articulated principles regulating its role and demands
on the international system of sovereign states. These principles are
invariably internally generated and determined in the context of or
in response to external events and situations over which the country,
big and powerful or small and weak, has no control. A foreign policy
of any country, therefore, is determined by internal and external
factors. Usually the organ that formulates the foreign policy of a
country is a political party which it implements in its corporate
name of Government. Where there is no political party system, for
instance, under a military rule, the ruling junta alone or in
consultation with the civilian population^" determines the policy.
Although formulation and implementation of foreign policy is a matter
concerned with sovereign states relationship, this Chapter looks at
UNIP's role in 'international affairs' before and after Independence.
The emphasis, however, is more on the legal than political aspects of
the Party's role in these matters.
Chapter Two of this study has shown that Zambia is
a creation of British colonialism. As a unified 'country', its historical
evolution goes back to just eighty years. For it was in 1911 that the
British government, at the instance, of the BSAC, created NR as a
2
protectorate of Britain. The British Government took over the
1. Nigeria: See Nigerian Journal of Internal of International
Affairs, Vol. 12, Nos. 1 & 2, 1986, pp. 18-22 on 
Kuru Conference of the All-^Nigerian Conference on 
Foreign Policy at which civilians discussed the 
foreign policy to be pursued by the military or 
future civil administration.
2. Supra, p. 45.
administration of the country from the BSAC in 1924. The Imperial Power,
the UK, was responsible for the internal peace, order and good government
and the external defence and 'foreign affairs' or relations of NR. The
Crown was represented in NR by the Governor whose functions were spelt
out in the Royal Instructions.^ Foreign relations were, however, matters
reserved to the Crown, for e.g. a Governor's assent to legislation was
valid unless, among other things, the Bill was contrary to the Crown's
2
obligations "imposed upon US by Treaty". The Royal Prerogative, a term
which describes the residue of personal powers of the monarch, includes
the power to conclude foreign relations, for instance, entering into
treaties, control of the armed forces, declaration of war or conclusion
of peace. The exercise of such prerogative functions is done by the
Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet; the elected Government of
the day and the monarch merely assents. Colonial possessions had no
foreign policy of their own; the colonizing power's foreign policy was
the policy within which protectorates such as NR were administered. The 
Governor, however, being the representative of the Crown, possessed and
exercised some prerogative powers, for instance, he controlled the local
armed forces - the King's army - e.g. the King's African Riffles.
After Independence the Governor's prerogative powers were
assumed by the President.^ UNIP's role - or that of its President - cannot
be understood without a brief reference to the Party's experiences before
Independence. This Chapter is, accordingly, divided into three broad
Sections; the first Section looks at the pan-Africanist movement and
the colonial administrators' reaction to its spread to Central Africa,
the second Section examines UNIP's role in the formulation and implementation
of Zambia's foreign policy and the third Section is on liberation
movements and fraternal parties and their personnel in Zambian law.
1. UK: Northern Rhodesia (Legislative Council) Order in
Council, 1924, sec. 25; Chitambala v. The Queen 
(1957) NR LR 29 at p. 44*!
2. ibid. Clause 16(9) of the Royal Instructions, 1924.
3. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 7, Cap. 1,
Applied Laws.
Section 1. Pan-Africanism and its Spread to Central Africa.
Hie pan-African movement in Europe launched its first
anti-colonialism campaign in Paris in February, 1919, to coincide with
the Peace Conference at the end of the First World War and the
establishment of the League of Nations. At that Peace Conference, the
campaigners advocated for an alternative system to colonial rule as
regards the future administration of the former African territories
of Germany. That pressure contributed to the establishment of the
mandated territory system^ under which former Germany African territories
were placed under the administration of one of the victor nations, for
instance, Tanganyika was placed under UK administration. Prima facie,
mandated territory system was a mere change of colonial rulers.
The pan-African movement's conferences held between 1919 and 1945, were
concerned with, such matters as the allocation of land to indigenous
peoples and their right to participate in economic and political affairs
of their territory. The Fifth pan-African conference held in Manchester,
England, in August 1945, coincided with the establishment of another
international organization, the UNO, which introduced the Trusteeship
system in place of the mandatory system of the League of Nations. The
pressure in 1945 was for self-determination for the colonial people
as a whole and not necessarily for those in former colonial possessions
2
of the defeated European Powers.
The pan—African movement did not advocate policies 
which free African states should pursue. The movement, however, provided 
a forum for contact and exchange of views between and among future
■■ ■ ■ ■ ■■ 1 1 ■ ■ «.■■■■ pi u  I ■ I ■ ■ ■ ■ —  -  1 - ■
1. Louise, W.R., "The African Origins of the Mandate", 19 International
Organizations; 1965, 20.
2. DuBois, W.E.B. , "The Pan-African Movement", in Kedourie, E. ,
Nationalism in Asia and Africa; New: American Library, 
N.Y., 1970^ pp. 372-387. See also Padmore, G.,
Colonial and Coloured^Unity; Manchester UP, 1958, 
p p . 13-26.
African leaders some of whom on return to Africa formed or led 
political organizations that went into the actual struggle to achieve
self-determination for their country and people, for instance, in
1 2  3 4
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia. Some of the African leaders
began their agitation for the self-determination of their people while
still in Europe, for instance Dr Banda and Nkumbula in 1949 presented
to the British Government a memorandum in which they indicated that the
African people of Nyasaland (Malawi) and NR (Zambia) were opposed to
the projected federation of SR, NR and Nyasaland.^ The League of Nations
in its Covenant did not provide for self-determination of either those living
under the Mandatory system or colonial rule in Africa, instead, for
the former it was provided that those people, especially in Central
Africa, should be guaranteed freedom of conscience and religion subject
g
only to the maintenance of public order and morals. The UNO Charter,
however, provided that Member States of the Organization which had or 
assumed responsibility for the administration of non-self-governing
territories vhose people had not yet attained a full measure of
self-government, recognize the principle that the interests of the
inhabitants of those territories were paramount and accept as a sacred
trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, inter alia, the developmeht
of self-government, to assist them in the progressive development of
their political institutions according to the particular circumstances
7
of each territory. Colonial powers were, while in the process of
1., Ghana: Kwame Nkrumah, the CPP.
2. Kenya: Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, KANU.
3. Malawi: Ngwazi Dr Kamuzu H. Banda, MCP.
4. Zambia: Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, NRANC; supra, p. 63.
5. UK: Report of the Nyasaland Commission of inquiry;
Cmnd. 1959/814, p. 10. (Chairman: Mr Justice 
Patrick Devlin).
6. League of Nations: Covenant, League of Nations, 1919, Art. 22(5)
7. UN: United Nations Charter, 1945, Art. 73(b);
infra, p. 467.
450.
decolonization, required to assist the colonial people. Consequently,
the colonial powers could assist the colonial people only through
their political and economic policies and practices. Since almost
all colonial powers were capitalist, development towards African
self-government was to be on the basis of that system. Pan-African
cooperation, however, was something which the Africans had to pursue
on their own pattern.
On his return to NR, Nkumbula was elected President of
the NRAC which he renamed the NRANC in 1953. The constitution of the
NRANC provided among its aims and objects the following, ie
(b) To act, whether alone or in cooperation with other 
bodies and persons, as the mouth-piece and 
representative, whether inside the Territory or 
beyond, of all Africans in the Territory; and to 
affiliate with, kindred bodies or organisations, 
whether in the Territory or beyond.1
Article 2 (k) of the constitution provided that Congress
could send delegations to attend conferences and discussions whereever
held where matters of interest to Africans were to be discussed. The
central theme of discussion during this period among Africans was the
method of ending colonial rule and achieving independence. Questions
of what policy to be adopted after achieving self-government or
independence were premature. The ZANC, the splinter group from NRANC,
adopted in its 1958 constitution in toto the provisions of the NRANC's
Art. 2 and added three Clauses, one of which provided for commitment
to "pan-Africanism, inter-Commonwealth relations, and, international
cooperation in accordance with the Declaration of the Universal Human
2
Rights and the United Nations Charter." Most of these provisions were
■ ■ ■ H .M ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ,.■ ■  ■ ■ ■■■■ ■ ........
1. NRANC: constitution, 1953, Art. 2? supra, p. 63.
2. UN IP: ~Northern Rhodesia, Proposals for Constitutional
' Reform as Submitted by Zambia to the British 
Imperial Government,' 4th February,^1959; 
constitution of ZANC, 1959, Art. 5 Civ) (2) and C3). 
supra, p. 73.
aimed at contrasting the manner the colonial pcwer administered the
territory and the 'democratic way' the party would run it after
achieving self-government. Having never had any experience in
administering anything larger than the party annual conference, the
claim to administer the territory in accordance with Charter of the
UN was rhetoric. However, the provision on political cooperation was
realistic. At the All-African Peoples' Conference held in Accra, Ghana,
in 1958, J.M. Nkomo (SRANC), K.D. Kaunda (ZANC), H.M. Nkumbula (NRANC)
and H.K. Banda (NANC) , signed the Charter of Unity in which they
agreed to establish a broad-based united front linking up various
political and industrial organizations "in our respective countries and
also to coordinate our activities with those in East Africa to win
self-government and national independence for our people."^ But this
pan-African coordination or gesture was a reaction to white settlers'
pan-Sub-Sahara self-government and dominion status moves. DuBois had
in fact noted in 1945 that there was a paradox at the San Francisco
conference where UNO was launched and the provisions were formally adopted,
inter alia providing for self-determination for non-self-goveming
territories, that Jan Smuts, the South African leader had pleaded
for an article on 'human rights' to be included in the Charter:
The Pan-African movement which he represents is a 
union of the white rulers of Kenya, Rhodesia and 
the Union of South Africa, to rule the African 
continent in the interests of the white investors 
and exploiters. This plan has been incubating since 
1921, but has been discouraged by the British 
Colonial Office. Smuts is now pushing it again, and 
the white, legislatures in Africa have asked for it.2
In Central Africa in 1953 the British Government had given 
in to white pan-Africanism by the establishment of the Federation
1. Krishnamurthy, B .S ., Cha Cha-Cha, Zambia's Struggle for Independence;
File 2/Doc. 15; Oxford UP, Lusaka, 1972.
2. DuBois, W NE .B ., op. cit., p. 387.
3. Supra, p. 6 6.
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Charter of Unity marked the highest point
in pan-African cooperation among Africans in Central Africa; its actual
practical significance was, however, exaggerated by the colonial
administrators and settlers probably to justify the dracanonian measures
taken against the signatories of the Charter. African unity was forged
by the fact that European-rule was imposed on the Central African region
at the end of the nineteenth century which led to the influx of Europeans
and Asians who dominated the administration, the economy and political
life and subjected Africans to racial segregation and impeded their
participation in the social and economic as well as the political life 
of their country. Consequently, African unity or pan-Africanism, took
the form of anti-colonial nationalism. Settler domination and racism
contributed towards the unification of ideals of the nationalist movements.
(a) Nyasaland (now Malawi).
The signing of the Charter of Unity at the Accra, Ghana, 
conference, was cited as one of the causes of unrest in the Protectorate.^" 
The Governor in pursuance of his powers under the Emergency Powers Order 
in Council, 1939 and 1956, which gave him extensive control over persons 
and property in the country, on the 3rd of March, 1959, made the Emergency 
Regulations, 1959, to deal with the country-wide African opposition to the 
Federation and demand for self-government. The Governor in Council had 
power under secs. 70 and 72 of the Penal Code to declare any society to 
be dangerous to the good government of the Protectorate. Accordingly, on 
the 3rd of March, aforementioned, using the powers vested in him by the 
Emergency Regulations and the Penal Code, declared the NANC an unlawful 
society and any person who continued to claim to be a member of the NANC 
or carry out its functions, was liable under the provisions of the Penal
1. UK: Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry,
o p . cit., p. 41. The Commission was set up under 
the Nyasaland (Commission of Inquiry) Order in 
Council, 1959, S.I. 1959/624.
Code, to imprisonment for a period of up to seven years. Among the
accusations levelled against the NANC and the justification for its
proscription was that the NANC was engaged in arranging a 'summit
conference' to be attended by delegates from SRANC, NRANC, ZANC and
itself to coordinate African opposition to the Federation and colonial
rule in Central Africa in accordance with the Accra Charter of Unity.^
In reality the NANC did not need a 'bush conference' to coordinate its
activities with the other African Congress because Nyasaland's economy
being basically agricultural, a large number of Nyasas were working in
SR and NR in which countries it had some of its strongest branches both
in terms of membership and funds. The NANC, however, was the loudest
critic of the Federation and with the return of Dr Banda to the territory
on 6th July, 1958, the tempo of political agitation increased. Most
leaders of the NANC were placed under detention; Banda in SR. He was
released in April, 1960.
The Commission of inquiry found that there was no evidence
that there had been any conspiracy on the part of Africans to subvert
the government of Nyasaland as it had been been alleged by its Governor,
2
Sir Robert Armitage and the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky.
3
On the European side, the ruling UFP and the CAP were both united in 
their demand for immediate transfer of power into the hands of the white 
minority. It was the fear of political power being given to the settlers 
that united African political parties rather than mere implementation of 
pan-Africanism. To most African leaders pan-Africanism was seen as a
1. UK: Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry, 1959;
o p . cit., p. 84, sec. 3, par* 168.
2. ibid. Subversive activities' of NANC listed by the
Governor of Nyasaland in the Governor's despatch dated 
18th March, 1959, and later published sis a White Paper, 
included meetings of leaders of the four African 
Congresses; p. 70, par. 138.
3. Central Africa Party, later changed its name to the
Liberal Party; supra, p. 80.
tool with which to achieve international support for their struggle 
for self-determination and not as a weapon for territorial expansionism 
or interference in each others internal affairs before or after achieving 
self-rule; it provided a basis for future foreign policies and practices.
(b) SR (now Zimbabwe).
The contemporary erroneous view was that the African in
SR was in any case worse of under that country's Native Policy than the
African under CO rule in Nyasaland and NR that the imposition of the
Federation did not make any difference to his political future. The SR
Africans opposed the Federation as they saw the Federation as further
institutionalization of foreign settler rule. The leaders of SRANC who
participated in the Charter of Unity in Accra, mainly Nkomo and his
fellow officials were detained under the provisions of the Preventive
Detention (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1959, sec. 3(5). The grounds for
detention supplied to the detainees, stated inter alia,
(a) That the abovenamed detained person has been 
associated with or has supported directly or 
indirectly the activities of the Southern 
Rhodesia African National Congress which led 
to the state of emergency. 1
The SRANC was founded on 12th. September, 1957. The Tribunal 
appointed to review: the detention of the SRANC leaders stated that the 
SRANC cooperated with the. NANC, the NRANC and ZANC and that "Whether or 
not cooperation and coordination of activities with these organisations 
is a subversive object must depend on the activities of these 
organisations themselves" and observed that these Congresses had been 
proscribed (with the exception of the NRANC) as subversive organisations 
in their country of origin. The view of the Commission of Inquiry, 
however, was that the Government (of Nyasaland) "overestimated the
1. SR: Review Tribunal (Preventive Detention (Temporary
Provisions) Act, 1959) , General Report, 1959; 
p. 7, par. 17. )President; T.H.W. Beadle.)
455.
extent to which the idea of violence had penetrated Congress; and
underestimated the impact which their own emphatic action would have
on the minds of persons who were normally law-abiding."^ Basing its
conclusion on the fact that the Northern Congresses had been proscribed,
the Tribunal accepted
the fact that Nyasaland African National Congress and 
Zambia African National Congress are subversive 
organisations committed to a policy of violence in
achieving their objectives, the extent of which the
Southern Rhodesia African National Congress has been
working with these organisations become a matter of 
comment. ^
The Charter of Unity was signed on the 18th December, 1958 and
the Congresses were proscribed in March, 1959, before the 'sumit
conference' they had intended to hold and at which to launch a 'combined
action' was held. The authorities, therefore, adopted a preventive approach.
The Tribunal's view of the proscription of SRANC and the detention of its
leaders was that the organization was prima facie subversive and accepted
"as an established fact that there was a state of emergency, and that the
activities of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress were
responsible for declaring it" and that "all the allegations contained in
the Minister's statement of particulars in the general case against the
3
Southern Rhodesia African National Congress are proved."
The Tribunal divided the SRANC's activities into two groups; 
first, those which fell within its constitution, which it termed 'official 
objects', and, second, activities not provided for in its constitution, 
which it termed, 'subversive objects' . In the grounds for detention 
supplied to each of the SRANC detainees by the Minister (of Law and Order) , 
the detaining authority, SRANC's activities which involved some
1. UK: Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry, 1959;
op. cit., p. 127, par. 256.
2. SR: Review Tribunal, General Report, 1959;
op. cit., pp. 18 - 19, par. 45.
3. ibid. p. 24, par. 51.
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cooperation "with the Nyasaland African National Congress, the
Zambia African National Congress and the Northern Rhodesia African
Congress and to coordinate its activities with those organisations" were
branded subversive activities.^" Ihe actions of the authorities in
SR like those in Nyasaland purported to nip in the bud any pan-African
activities in the Federation. On the face of it, there was an aspect
of contradiction on the part of the Congresses' opposition of the
Federation which prima facie was a pan-African venture, the association
of three territories. The Federation had brought together 8,000,000
Africans and 260,000 Europeans. The raison d'etre for the establishment
of the Federation was given by its protaginists as mainly economic;
Nyasaland were to enjoy cash subsidy from the two Rhodesias and the
two Rhodesias would benefit from greater investiment attractions of 
2
the Federation. This possibility of a properous Federation was 
not disputed by those opposed to it. Their answer was that the Federation 
was a white settler-pan-Africanism established to twart African 
pan-Africanism. Africans therefore did not seriously address their minds 
to the economic benefits likely to accrue from the venture.
(c) NR: (now Zambia).
Although the Legislative Council was established in SR and
Nyasaland in 1911 and in NR in 1924 that did not stimulate immediate
African interest in formation of political parties or emergence of
pan-Africanism to consolidate African opposition to colonial rule.
3
The NANC appeared in 1944 f the NRANC in 1948 and the SRANC in 1957.
The appointment of the Bledisloe Commission in 1939 to examine the 
possibility of federating the three territories, triggered African 
political awakening which placed them in a rather awkward situation
1. SR: Review Tribunal, General Report, 19S9; op . cit.
p. 9, par. 24.
2. Supra, pp. 66 and 82.
3. Supra, p. 62.
in which they were united in order to be 'divided' . In NR the Safeguard
of Elections and Public Safety Regulations, 1959,^ made under the
2
Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1957, provided that if at any time the
Governor was satisfied that any action had been taken or was immediately
threatened by any person or body of persons calculated to create or
lead to a situation in which the Governor would be empowered to
declare a state of emergency or would probably create or lead to such
a situation, he might make regulations prohibiting, restricting or
3
otherwise regulating any such action. The Tribunal appointed to
inquire into the causes that led to the making of the Regulations and
the subsequent proscription of ZANC and the detention of its leaders,
4
found that the making of the Regulations was justified. The justification 
was based on the reports and events following the signing of the Accra 
Charter of Unity and the calling of a 'summit conference' by the four 
signatory Congresses at which it was anticipated joint action against 
the Federation was to be discussed. The Federation was therefore, the 
catalyst of pan-rAfricanism and 'foreign relations' in Central Africa.
There is no doubt that the enactment of the Emergency 
Powers Regulations, 1959f in Nyasaland, the Preventive Detention 
(Temporary Provisions) Act, 1959, in SR and the Safeguard of Elections 
and Public Safety Regulations, 1959, in NR, were not isolated acts or 
a mere coincidence or independent of each other, but concerted action 
by the three Governments to frustrate a unified African opposition to 
the Federation. The African opposition succeeded in breaking up the 
Federation. After 1963 the question was whether pan-Africanism could be 
achieved not in dividing but uniting the people of the region.
1. NR: Government Notice No. 18, 1959, 11th March, 1959.
2. 1927, No. 9 Cap. 400 as amended by No. 48 of 1957.
3. ibid.. sec. 4A.
4. Report of Inquiry into all the Circumstances which
gave rise to the making of the Safeguard of Elections 
and Public Safety Regulations, 1959; p. 18 par. 30. 
Government Printer, Lusaka, 1959.
(Chairman: N.C.A. Ridley) .
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UNIP's Pre-Independence Policy Formulation.
UNIP took over from where ZANC had left in its pan-Africanist 
activities. UNIP, however, appeared at a time when the pan-African 
movement was gathering memontum on a continental level and the theme 
was solidarity of all colonial peoples and the end of colonial rule and 
economic exploitation. The pan-African movement led to regional groupings; 
the major ones being the Casablanca Group (consisting of Egypt, Morocco, 
Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Algeria), and the Monrovia Group (composed of 
Cameroun, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzavile), Dahomey, 
Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Malagasy, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Upper Volta, Libya and Tunisia).
Between 1960 and 1963 there were break-aways and regroupings 
and emergence of new groups such as the PAFMECSA covering East, Central 
and Southern African regions. Among the aims of these groupings were 
the achievement of similar not necessarily unified or identical foreign 
policy and concerted effort in deplomacy and national economic policies 
independent of control from European ownership, aid or manipulation.
UNIP's policy formulation, including its 'foreign policy' when it 
'become government', took place during this period when Kenneth Kaunda 
became chairman of PAFMECSA. The proliferation of pan-African regional 
groupings ended with the formation of the QAU in 1963, whose Charter 
provides, inter alia, as one of its aims and objects, the promotion of 
the unity and solidarity of the African and Malagasy States.^”
UNIP's foreign policy formulation was, therefore, influenced 
by the political situation in NR, the Federation and Africa as a whole. 
The Party's policy formulation before Independence was, however, in 
general terms; the Party avoided ideological or specific policies fearing 
that might detract or sabotage its task of achieving independence.
1. OAU: Charter, 1963, Art. 2(1) (a).
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In its 'foreign policy' the Party stated that-
1. A UNIP Government will pursue a policy of 
non-alignment. A free Zambia will not
align itself with either the West or the East.
2. Zambia shall, however, maintain friendly relations 
with all countries not hostile to her irrespective 
of their political ideologies.
3. Zambian representatives will be established in 
foreign countries.
4. Zambia will be a member of both the Commonwealth 
and the Organization of African Unity. She will 
also seek admission to the United Nations 
Organi zation.1
This policy projection ignored local political, legal and 
economic factors and also the fact that the country's economy was tied 
to that of its colonial master. In the 1962 Legco General Election 
Manifesto the policy was slightly modified by the inclusion of the 
statement that "It is envisaged that the political system in this
2
country will be based upon what is suitable for the local conditions."
It is pertinent to note that Zambia's (or UNIP's) pan-Africanist
activities were to be all carried out within the ambit of the OAU.
This was intended to show that UNIP did not support regional groupings
opposed to the OAU aims and objects. Some of the aspects of the regional
groupings had began to create some anxlties among, e.g. some of Ghana's
neighbouring states about the suspected expansionist tendencies of
Nkrumahism. The Ghana-Guinea union, the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union, and
the Ghana^Upper Volta 'customs union', were snspected as a prelude to
situations under which weak, or small states might be 'taken over' by
3
their more powerful states in the region. Hopefully, it was expected 
that future 'unions' or exercise of pan-African functions or the 
creation of the 'United States of Africa' would be carried out in the
1. UNIP: When UNIP become Government; 1960, p. 12.
2. UNIP Manifesto, 1962; p. 32*
3. See for instance, Elias, T.O. f Government and Politics In Africa;
Asia Publishing House, London, 1961, pp. 250—274.
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letter and spirit of the o a u  Charter, namely that the member States 
of the Organization declare their adherence to and observation of the 
principles of the sovereign equality of all African States, respect 
for the sovereignty and territorial integrity and for the inalienable 
right to independent existence of each State.^ In considering UNIP's 
role in the formulation and implementation of Zambia's foreign policy 
it is important to bear in mind one important limitation on the Party's 
influence, namely that at independence in 1964 Zambia was born into a 
world which had already established the UNO, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) , the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization, the OAU, the 
Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, the Non-Aligned Nations, the Commonwealth 
and many other influential groupings. This web of international bodies
n x
and alliances is bound to deny any State a trullyj independent foreign
' - - ..y
policy: in reality under such circumstances the most that any State can
do is to 'behave' in accordance with the rules of the game of co-existence.
Only to that extent is the following statement understood, viz
Clearly Zambia'-s foreign policy will continue to 
reflect the interests of the state as well as other 
internal and external institutions, but the balance 
between President and the Party, class and copper, ^  
regional and global interaction remains problematic.
Section 2. The Party and Foreign Policy.
Unlike the American system in which certain institutions, e.g. 
Congress, are charged with the responsibility of checking on how the 
Republic's foreign relations were conducted, in Zambia the conduct of
3
foreign relations is not subject to scrutiny by any institution. Party 
members at the Section, Branch, Ward and District levels have no say
1. OAU: Charter, 1963, Art. 3(1) to (3).
2. Anglin, D.G. and Shaw, T.M., Zambians Foreign Policy: Studies in
Development and Dependence; Westview Replica, 
Boulder, 1979, p. 425.
3. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 65(3)B(g) merely provides
that the Political, Ideological and Legal sub­
committee "guide the Government on foreign policies 
and in matters of agreements and treaties"; 
infra; p. 463.
in the formulation of foreign policy. The organs of the Party with some 
influence on policy formulation in general are the Committee of Chairmen 
and the Central Committee. What was said in Tanzania, vis-^.-vis the role 
of Parliament in foreign affairs, could be said of the National Assembly
in Zambia to-day; "........ regarding the recognition of other states the
Government is completely independent of Parliament and owes no explanation." 
In Zambia Parliament has no role in foreign affairs.
The Party's national aims, objectives and policies for the decade 
1985-1995 adopted at the 9th Party Congress in September, 1983, cover a wide 
variety of subjects pertaining to the economy, culture, education, science, 
technology, land, defence and security. But nothing is expressly said about 
the foreign policy the Party would pursue during the decade. Instead, it is 
stated that
As long as the United National Independence Party remains 
the ruling Party in Zambia, there can never be any other 
or new UNIP programmes except suggestions to modify, 
amplify or re-interpret the 1962 Manifesto in order to 
meet the challenges of the changing circumstances inside 
and outside Zambia.2
The foreign policy of UNIP as adopted in 1960 and 1962 was in
general terms, e.g. non-alignment. That policy has been dominated by the
President and has been dented and tainted by the philosophy of Humanism
adopted in 1967 which is said to recognize the importance of Man where he
lived, whether he is black, white or yellow. On the basis of that policy,
UNIP advocates (a) Human rights and dignity; (b) International peace and
justice; (c) Non-alignment; (d) Good neighbourliness; and (e) Support for
3
liberation movements. These are of course, the Party's own guidelines
1. Tanzania; 2nd Vice-President Rashid Kawawa, Parliamentary
Debates (Hansard), 19th June, 1968, a debate on 
Tanzanian Government's recognition of Biafra.
2. UNIP; National Policies for the Decade 1985-1995, Aims
and Objectives of the Third Phase of the Party 
Programme; Government Printer, Lusaka, 1984, p. 56
3. President K.D. Kaunda, Opening the 19th National 
Council, 9th December, 1984.
to assist in carrying out its aims and objectives in a world dominated
by more powerful states than Zambia. The Party Constitution provides
that the President is the principal spokesman of the Party on national and
international affairs. As to the formulation of foreign policy itself,
the National Council does frequently pass resolutions on any international
matter, e.g. on Palastine, Namibia, apartheid in South Africa etc. Such
resolutions, however, merely reflect the feeling in the Party and are not
necessarily directives to the President to implement them. Decisions on
foreign affairs are taken either by the Committee of Chairmen, composed
of the President, the Prime Minister, the Secretary of Defence and Security
2
and twenty other MCCs appointed by the President, or the President alone.
The Committee of Chairmen is UNIP's 'Politburo1. The system is,
however, different from that existing in the one dominant party socialist
countries in which foreign affairs decisions are made by the leading organs
of the Party: political control of foreign policy flows from the Central
Committee^ though the implementation is carried out by the government
since international relations are, by their nature, relations between states.
In Zambia the President inherited the Crown's prerogative
powers, thus, at common law the President alone can decide on such matters
as conclusion of treaties, recognition of states, declaration of war or
peace without consulting the Party or the National Assembly or the Courts
of law. Although some prerogative powers have been expressly provided for
4
in the Constitution, e.g. the prerogative of mercy, the conduct of foreign 
affairs is still a prerogative of the President aloneP  The Party organs' 
roles are only of providing guidelines for the President to consider.
1. UNIP; Constitution, 1988, Art. 74.
2. ibid. Art. 62(a) to (e).
3. Loeber, D.A. (Ed.) Ruling Communist Parties and Their Status Under
Law; Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht,
1986, p. 275.
4. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 60.
5. See,, e.g. Dear Mr Vorster, Details of exchanges
between President Kaunda of Zambia and Prime Minister 
Vorster of South Africa; Government Printer, Lusaka, 
23rd April, 1971
Under such a system there is no room for conflict or drawing 
a balance between the Party and the President. The system should be 
viewed in its own context; the President is head of both the Party 
and Government administration. In theory he has no policy of his own; 
policies of the Party - and subsequently of the State - are adopted 
by the Party Congress. In practice, however, effective 'policies' do 
emerge in the amplification, interpretation and application of the 
broadly laid down policies of the Party. This study has demonstrated 
that under the One-Party system it is the President around whom all 
political and other activities in the country take place. Foreign 
relations are not exception to that rule. Although the National Assembly 
does scrutinize, among others, the budgetary allocation for the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, it does not debate the actual conduct of Zambia's 
foreign relations. The Political, Ideological and Legal sub-Committee of 
the Committee of Chairmen has no control over Zambian missions abroad: 
high commissioners and ambassadors report direct to the President. In 
Zambia, however, the sub-Committee acts as the link between the Party 
and foreign ambassadors and high commissioners. The contact is limited 
to political matters; e.g. implementation of party-to-party agreements,
(a) UNIP and Regional Relations.
Either under a multi-party or single-party system, foreign 
relations are regarded as matters falling under the jurisdiction of the 
Government. The government, however, also means the ruling party. The 
Constitution of the Party provides that the Party shall guide the 
Government on foreign policies and in matters of agreements and treaties. 
In practice that means that the Committee of Chairmen has to decide on 
all regional relationship before the Government can enter into any 
trading or economic co-operation agreement. The decision whether Zambia 
becomes a member of the SADCC is made not by the Cabinet but by the 
Committee of Chairmen: the decision is considered to be 'political' and
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 65(3)B (f).
accordingly should be made by that Committee.
Since its emergence, UNIP identified the eradication of colonial
rule from Africa in general, and, in southern Africa in particular, as one
of its most urgent and important challenges. UNIP's pre-occupation in the
sub-Sahara Africa has been with the liberation movements engaged in the
freedom struggles: although the majority of the states in the region are
now free, Namibia and South Africa are still under foreign rule. In addition
to that, South Africa's violation of its neighbouring States' sovereignty
through military incursions, has created an atmosphere of 'not yet free'
in the 'Front Line' states, including Zambia, which has compelled the
leaders of these states to combine their efforts in supporting liberation
movements, on one hand, and in regional economic organization such as the 
1 2
PTA and the SADCC whose major aims and objects are to accelerate economic
growth in order to reduce the dependence of the member-states on South
Africa, on the other hand. IP a great extent, therefore, UNIP's regional
policy is dictated by UNIP's commitment to ending of colonial rule in the
region and Zambia's geographical situation.
(b) UNIP's Continental Relations.
Although after 1963 African continental relations have been
purported to be organized around the OAU, political parties have concluded
a network of fraternal' agreements dealing with party-to-party matters.
Accordingly, UNIP has entered into agreements with, inter alia, the BCP
3
MCP, MPLA-WP, FRELIMO, MPR, UPRONA, NRMD, CCM and the PCT. UNIP appears to
1. Zambia: Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern
African States; Lusaka Declaration of Intent signed
in March, 1978, PTA established in December, 1981,
comprising fifteen member States and five potential 
member States.
2. Botswana: launched at the Lusaka Summit, 1st April, 1980,
comprising of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe.
3. Burundi: Union Party for National Progress.
hold the view that party-to-party agreements contribute towards world 
peace, security and understanding. Accordingly, such agreements have 
been concluded with political parties operating under a one-party, a 
multi-party or a military cum civilian system. UNIP's involvement in 
such agreements enables it to pre-determine the diplomatic and/or the 
foreign relations line the Government of Zambia should follow both in 
theory and in practice. Since the choice of the political organization 
with which UNIP should enter into fraternal agreements is made by the 
Central Committee of the P a r t y i t  is a political decision based on 
that body's contemporary perceptions of the friends of Zambia or UNIP.
(c) UNIP and Global Relations.
UNIP has entered into agreements with almost all ruling 
communist parties of Eastern European countries, including the Communist 
Parties of the Soviet Union and Cuba. In the Western European countries, 
however, UNIP has maintained relationship with the Labour Party of the 
UK and the Socialist party of France; relationship which began during 
the struggle for Independence.
The international system and scene is not composed of just 
States and international organizations, but political parties as well 
which are not only talking politics to each other, but exchanging ideas, 
political cadres, educational educators, delegations, publications and 
providing each other''s leadership with hospitality ranging from holiday 
to medical facilities. Political parties although not recognized by 
International Law, are prominant instruments in the conduct diplomacy 
and negotiations in the solution of many international issues. The 
capitalist system has tended to maintain a multi-party system which 
operates on a 'political party in power line', while the socialist system 
pursues a 'national political line' under a one-party or dominant party 
sys;tem. The party-to-party fraternal agreements have tended to be
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1978, Art. 54 (m), now Committee of 
Chairmen, Constitution, 1988, Art. 63(1) (1).
concluded and easily implemented under the latter than the former system.
These agreements, notwithstanding the close identity or the 
'oneness* of the Party and the Government (under a one-party system), are 
not treaties and any dispute or matter arising out of their negotiation, 
conclusion, implementation or termination, is expected to be settled 
through 'friendly consultation and mutual understanding', that is, not 
through judicial process. Under International Law only Governments and 
certain international organizations possess the necessary capacity and 
authority to enter into or conclude treaties or international agreements. 
In most communist countries treaties are signed by the Party leaders, 
acting as agents of both the ruling Communist Party and the Government.^ 
UNIP's agreements are signed by the President or the Secretary-General or 
an MOC (often a Chairman of a sub-Committee of the Committee of Chairmen) 
depending on who was leading the Party delegation at the meeting which 
ended with the conclusion of the agreement. But these are not treaties 
or Government agreements binding on the Republic of Zambia; there are 
simply party-to-party agreements. Of late the Eastern European bloc 
countries' political parties entering into agreements with UNIP - and 
it appears with other political parties - have been insisting on the 
inclusion of a ratification clause in party-to-party agreements so that 
the agreement would enter into force only following the exchange of the 
instruments of ratification. That practice will elevate party agreements 
to the level of 'international agreements'; though not enforceable by ICJ.
The party-to-party agreements clear the way for State (Government) 
agreements; thus through them UNIP plays the primary role in Zambia's 
foreign policy. Through inter-party commissions which supervise the 
implementation of these agreements, the Party participates in the regular 
machinery of Zambia's foreign relations.
1. Loeber, D.A., op. cit., pp. 275-276.
Section 3. Liberation Movements and Fraternal Parties in Zambian Law.
The right to self-determination of the colonial peoples as
recognized under the UNO Charter^ has been enhanced by a number of
2 3
Resolutions of the General Assembly passed in particular in 1960 , 1970 
4
and 1979. These Resolutions gave legitimacy to MPLA's and FRELIMO's
fighting against Portuguese colonialism in southern Africa, and SWAPO's
liberation struggle against South Africa's illegal occupation and
administration of South West Africa (Namibia) . The right to self-
determination is, therefore, a recognition of the collective rights of
a national entity under the Charter of UNO and International Law. The
recognition of the right to self-determination is important as it presupposes
that the right will be and/or can be pursued or vindicated through the
instrument of a public body such as a national liberation movement and
that the struggle itself is thereby accorded a legal basis or status in
international law. Zambia supported some of these UN Resolutions.
The Constitution of UNIP enjoins the Party to fight against 
5
imperialism and colonialism and to coordinate its role with that of the
g
liberation movements. In the implementation of these provisions, the 
Central Committee authorized a number of liberation movements to be 
stationed in Zambia. Liberation movements are basically political parties 
waging a political struggle against a foreign rule or rulers of their
7
country. Consequenly, a question could be asked whether the presence of a
1. UN: Charter, 1945, Arts. 1 and 55.
2. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples? G.A. Res. 1514(XV).
3. G.A. Res. 2625 (XX\T). requiring Member States to render
assistance to persons engaged in self-determination 
struggle.
4. G.A. Res. 34/42 (XXXIV), which recognized that self-
determination may be carried out through armed struggle.
5. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 4(2) (m).
6 . ibid. Art. 65(3)B(c).
7. Supra, p. 29 on the definition of a 'political party'.
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number of liberation movements violates the legislation to the effect that
Zambia is a One-Party State. The Constitution of Zambia provides that
4. (1) There shall be one and only one political party 
or organisation in Zambia, namely the United National 
Independence Party (in this Constitution referred to 
as 'the Party').
(2) Nothing contained in this Constitution shall be 
construed as to entitle any person lawfully to form 
or attempt to fori any political party or organisation 
other than the Party or to belong to, assemble or 
associate with, or express opinion or to do any other 
thing in sympathy with, such political party or 
organisation.1
There is also legislation to the effect that every society which is
a political party or organization or has for its objects or purposes
political activity of any kind, is an unlawful society in Zambia with the
2
exception of the Party - UNIP. Although the One-Party system was
introduced in Zambia at the peak of the liberation struggle (1972) in
Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) and West Africa (Angola), in the
British Colony of SR, in South West Africa (Namibia) and South Africa,
the NCEOPPDZ did not draw its- attention to the question of the
status of the liberation movements under a One-Party system in Zambia.
The Central Committee of UNIP which had the jurisdiction to recognize and
supervise the presence of liberation movements in Zambia (now the Committee
of Chairmen), at times recognized more than one of such organisations from
the same country, e.g. the African National Congress and the Pan-African
Congress of South Africa, ZAPU and ZANU from SR and MPLA and UNITA from
Angola. In case of UNITA, the recognition was terminated when its leaders
3
were expelled from Zambia by the UNIP's leadership.
(a) The Status of Liberation Movements.
In order to answer the question whether the presence of the 
liberation movements violates Zambian legislation, some references will 
be made to the legislation, court decisions and recommendations of
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, No. 27, Art. 4.
2. Societies (Amendment) Act, 1974, No. 9. sec.4 22A.
3. Ignatyev, 0., Secret Weapon in Africa; Progress Publications, Moscow,
~  1977, p. 69.
a commission of inquiry. To begin with the last, the International 
Commission on the Assassination of Herbert W. Chitepo,^ killed in Zambia
ion the 18th March, 1975, by a parcel bomb, who at the time of his death
>
was the National Chairman of ZANU and an enlarged African National Council
of Zimbabwe, that is a liberation movement of Zimbabwe operating in Zambia,
recommended that a host country to a liberation movement should respect
the independence and integrity of such a movement. The host country is
expected to help such an organization in maintaining discipline among its 
2
members. The liberation movement in turn is required to respect the laws
of the host country in every respect including the treatment of those
3
engaged in political activities.
Any organization recognized by the Committee of Chairmen as a 
'liberation movement1, is required to register as a 'society' under the 
Societies Act, under which UNIP is also registered as a 'society'. There is 
no decided authority on this matter; it could be speculated that the 
courts in Zambia confronted with the question of the status of a liberation 
movement's registration under the Act, would most probably hold that the 
registration was for administrative purposes only so as not to render 
the movement as an unlawful society and that such registration did not 
constitute such an organization as a 'political party' or 'political 
organization' under Art. 4 of the Constitution of Zambia, 1973 or sec. 22A 
of the Societies Act. Such, a finding could be based on the fact that 
a liberation movement, though present in Zambia, was not formed for the 
purposes of participation in electoral process in the Zambian constitutional
1. Zambia: Report of the Special International Commission
on the Assassination of Herbert Wiltshire 
Chitepoy Government Printer, Lusaka, 1976.
(Chairman: R.C. Kamanga) . The Commission was composed 
of representatives from Botswana, the Congo, Ivory 
Coast, Libya, Malagasy, Morocco, Mozambique, Malawi, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia and 
the OAU; p. xiv.
2.
3.
ibid. p. 52, par. 282.
ibid. p. 53, par. 288.
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law system. This argument takes into account the recommendation of the 
Special International Commission, aforementioned, that a liberation 
movement should observe the laws of the country in which it has been 
offered refuge. Such registration is an aspect of that observance. That 
argument, however, as the following section will show, explains the 
nature of the problem. It does not solve the problem itself. There is 
also an inherent contradiction in the argument in that while the 
liberation movements and their personnel are required to observe the 
laws of the host country, the laws of the host country in most cases 
do not recognize liberation movements and/or their personnel.
The creative developments in International Law in support 
of the rights and interests of subject peoples fighting against colonial 
rule, racism or apartheid^ have not been manifested in municipal law 
of countries that support liberation movements. Since liberation 
movements are stationed in one state or the other, one would have 
expected creative developments in municipal law in recognition of such 
organizationswithin their jurisdiction. The absence of such legislation 
is, however, understandable in that the legal status and role of political 
parties in general in such countries are in the main unsettled and still 
in the process of development. The development of laws on liberation 
movements is, however, hindered by the notion and practices which regard, 
for instance, the relation between UNIP and the liberation movements and 
their personnel, as 'secret',, and not subject of public scrutiny or 
legal control. That should not be the case because the role of supporting 
organizations and persons engaged in the fight for self-determination 
has become an international duty on all progressive states of the free 
world. There is nothing secret about it.Legal regulation might go only 
to perfect that international obligation.
1. Supra, p. 467.
(b) Status of Fraternal Organizations.
A fraternal party or organization is a political party on
friendly terms with UNIP operating in an independent state. Often
UNIP's fraternal parties are ruling parties although at times a political
movement opposed to the government of an independent state has been
1
allowed to station its officials in Zambia. UNIP's fraternal relations
are often forged through the party-to-party agreements considered in the
previous section. Political parties do not exchange representatives to
be permanently stationed in each other's country. Even a joint commission
established under such an agreement often meets once in a year to review
how the provisions of the agreement have been carried out. The presence
of such delegations do not create any political or legal problems. The
problems arise in those situations in which a fraternal party has been
overthrown from office and its leaders purport to constitute and organize
the party in Zambia. Although, such an organization is formed by exiled
political leaders who talk of 'mobilizing the people for the liberation
of our country'/ such an organization according to Zambia's practice, is
not regarded as a liberation movement; it is a fraternal party's branch
2
allowed by the Central Committee to exist in Zambia. Allowing a fraternal 
party to reconstitute itself in Zambia can lead to some political as well 
as legal problems. For instance, political organizations opposed to the 
fraternal party so recognized might also want to organize in opposition 
to it within the jurisdiction.
Following the overthrow of Dr Milton Apollo Obote as: 
president of Uganda on 25th. January, 1971, a number of Ugandans fled 
to Zambia % The UPC was a fraternal party of UNIP and Obote was a member
1. e.g. leaders of political parties opposed to the
MCP in Malawi; supra, p. 250.
2. UNIP: now the Committee of Chairmen; Constitutions, 1988,
Arts. 63 (1) (d) and 65(3)B(c).
of the so-called 'Mulungushi Club' consisting of the Presidents of 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Members of the UPC began to organize the 
Uganda exiles in Zambia and holding both private and public meetings.
UNIP was concerned with reports of clashes between UPC members and some 
Ugandans opposed to UPC who had also began to organize themselves in 
opposition to the UPC. The situation became complicated when the UPC 
and two of the opposition organizations applied to be registered under 
the Societies Act. The registration of such organizations would have 
created a serious problem under Zambia's One-Party system. It would have 
meant that Ugandans in Zambia could organize themselves into 
several political organizations while the local people are forbidden to 
form or belong to any other political party other than the Party, UNIP.
The application was accordingly not sanctioned and the purported 
registration aborted. That did not stop the political organization of 
Ugandan parties in Zambia.. The situation was saved by the overthrow of 
Idi Amin Dada, the Ugandan eccentric dictator on 11th April, 1979 and 
Obote's return to Uganda on 27th May, 1980, which made most Ugandans to leave 
Zambia and return home. Obote's second overthrow on 27th July, 1985 and 
his and his supporters fleeing to Zambia on 15th August, 1985, did not 
immediately revive the activities of the UPC and its opponents. The 
status of fraternal parties is, therefore, worse than that of liberation 
movements which can register under the Societies Act.
The concept of fraternal party has deep roots in African 
political organization. During the colonial era political parties
harboured each other in each other's country.^ In Central Africa 
during the decade of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963), 
settlers' political parties became 'federal'- with territorial branches.
Africans on the other hand, did not form federal political organizations;
their organizations remained territorial, though some formed branches
1. See supra, on NANC branches in NR, pp. 62-63 and UNIP's 
representatives in Ghana (p. 114) and Tanzania (p. 116) .
throughout the Federation. It is the introduction of the one-party system 
that has highlighted the present problem. The fate of fraternal parties 
existing in exile is tied up together with the right of the people of the 
host country to organize themselves in political parties or organizations.
Thus, out of thirteen Commonwealth African countries, Lesotho and Swaziland 
are party-less states. Five are de jure one-party states, namely Kenya,
Malawi, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zambia. Three, Botswana, The Gambia and 
Zimbabwe, are running a multi-party system. Three are under military rule.
In case of Zimbabwe, the Constitution Amendment (No. 6) Act,
1987^ effected the removal of the reserved White Roll seats from the House
2
of Assembly and the Senate after 21st September, 1987. One of the immediate 
effects of those changes was the demise of settler political organisation.
On the African scene, an agreement was entered into between the ruling 
ZANU-PF of President Robert Mugabe and the opposition ZAPU of Joshua Nkomo, 
to usher in a One-Party system in Zimbabwe in the 1990's. In Zimbabwe UNIP's 
historical fraternal party is ZAPU. There are difficulties for UNIP 
fraternizing with a party in opposition, accordingly UNIP has not concluded 
a fraternal agreement with either ZANU-PF or ZAPU.
As the multi-party system sinks into oblivion and its orthodox 
place is taken over by the one-party system, fraternal party-partnership 
will not necessarily recede into the background but will continue; political 
parties will continue fraternizing either as oppressive alliances collaborating 
in the supression of their people, or, as progressive alliances promoting 
a democratic, albeit a one-party system, representative system of government 
in their respective states. Although fraternal parties refrain from 
meddling in each others internal or external affairs, in practice they 
often expect support and encouragement from each other in whatever they 
do. Ideally, criticism should also be welcomed.
1. Zimbabwe: 1987, No. 15, repealing sec. 38(1) (b) of the
Zimbabwe Constitution Order, 1979, S.I. 1979/1600.
2. 1987, No. 16.
(c) The Status of Liberation Movement Personnel.
Although the decision allowing a liberation movement to
be stationed in Zambia was made by the Central Committee of the Party,
the responsibility for the safety and welfare of liberation movement
personnel - a generic word to cover combatants, politicians, students,
administrative staff and their families is shared between and among
the Party, the OAU Liberation Committee's representative in Zambia, the
Government of Zambia and the liberation movement itself. At the
international level the status of combatants of national liberation
movements struggling against colonial and alien domination and racist
regimes captured are to be treated and accorded the status of prisoners
of war.'*' In order to be accorded this status, however, the liberation
movement must make a unilateral declaration under Art. 96 of Protocol 1
of 1977 which is an additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 which contain the core of the law for the protection of
individuals in time of warr to observe the customary rules of war,
especially in relation to the treatment of prisoners of war. SWAPO,
for example, has already made a public statement that the 'Namibian
Liberation Army must and does - comply with the laws and customs of
war as set out, in particular, in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and
2
South Africa's armed forces are also bound by these Coventions.'
The African National Congress of South Africa has also made a similar
3
declaration. South Africa has not observed its obligations.
The legal status of liberation movement personnel is 
unsettled in Zambian law. The personnel do not enter Zambia as refugees, 
hence, they are not required to register as such under the local law,
1. UN: G.A. Res. Nb. 3103 of 1973 and see also the
International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 1973.
2. SWAPO: Statement made at Dakar International Conference,
Namibia and Human Rights, in International and 
Comparative Law; 1978, p. 389.
3. UN: General Assembly Doc. A/35/710 of 4th December, 1980.
mainly the Refugee (Control) Act, 1971,^ and not as regular visitors,
thus they do not enter or leave under circumstances regulated by the
2
Immigration and Deportation Act, 1965. Although there is no difference
between a political refugee and a liberation movement official, the law
draws a distinction. For example, under the Botswana Refugee
3
(Recognition and Control) Act, 1967, there is reference to a 'political
refugee', who is defined as 'an immigrant who has suffered or is likely
to suffer political persecution in the country from which he has
4
entered Botswana'-. That definition would include an official of a 
liberation movement. The difference between a refugee and a liberation 
movement official lies in the fact that the latter does not enter the 
country of refuge as an individual, but as a component part of or under
the/ambrella of an organization recognized by the host country.
In Shipanga v. Attorney-General,^ the applicant, for 
the writ of habeas corpus, was Information Secretary of SWAPO who had 
entered Zambia in 1972. Some differences arose between him and the 
SWAPO leadership recognized by both the UN and UNIP as the SWAPO 
Liberation Movement in Zambia. The Government of Zambia fearing that 
the conflict might erupt into violent internal clashes and mindful 
of the recommendation of the Special International Commission on the 
Assassination of Herbert Chitepo, placed the applicant and a number of 
his colleagues, under an armed Zambian guard in a small camp separate 
from the rest of the SWAPO personnel* Under the Constitution of Zambia, 
'every person in Zambia' is entitled to the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the individual, and among these rights is the protection 
of the right to personal liberty, that is that no person shall be
1. Zambia: 1971, No* 40, Cap. 112,
2. 1965, No. 29, Cap. 122,
3. Botswana: 1967, No. 8
4. -ibid. sec. 2.
5. C1976) Z^ 224.
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deprived of his personal liberty save as may be authorised by law.
The basic argument in this case by the Government was the contention 
that the phrase 'every person in Zambia' did not include a member of 
a liberation movement and that view prevailed in the High Court where 
the application was rejected. Four days before the hearing of an appeal 
by the Supreme Court, the applicant and his colleagues, about nine of 
them, were flcwn to a SWAPO camp in Tanzania. At the hearing of the 
appeal the Attorney-General submitted that the Government of Zambia 
regarded SWAPO liberation movement in Zambia as a Government in exile 
and its liberation army as. a visiting force, accordingly, the 
jurisdiction of the Zambian courts did not extend generally to members 
of such a force. That argument portrayed the Party line in the matter.
The Supreme Court noted that there was no legislation in 
Zambia providing for the status: of visiting forces similar to that 
existing in the UK.^ As regards the common law, the Court felt that it 
was unnecessary to decide whether and if so to what extent, the common 
law recognised the concept of a visiting force and the special
jurisdiction which, such a visiting force could be subjected to under
such a concept because to establish the exclusion of the jurisdiction 
of the Zambian courts on that ground, it would be necessary to show
by evidence, a number of things, inter alia, that
(a) the Government had accorded visiting force status 
to the army in question;
(b) it had recognised the tribunals of the visiting 
force to deal with, specific offences to the exclusion 
of the jurisdiction of the domestic courts';
(c) the appellant was a member of the visiting force;
(d) the activities alleged against the. appellant 
constituted an offence according to the law applicable 
to the visiting force.
■ . ■ ■v .> — -■ —  ■■ ■ ■     .
1. UK; Visiting Forces (British and Commonwealth} Act, 1933,
23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 6; Allied Forces Act, 1940,
3 & 4 Geo. 6, c. 51; United States of America 
(Visiting Forces). Act, 1942, 5 & 6 Geo. 6, c. 3; and 
Visiting Forces Act, 1952, 5 & 6 Geo. 6/1 Eli. 2 c. 69.
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The Court's approach showed how much the law had stood
still while the political situation in the country moved forward. The
common law requirements were not laid down for a guerrilla sort of a
visiting force such as SWAPCfebut for a regular visiting force under
sophisticated conditions. Besides that the Government had no say in the
recognition of a liberation movement that being the prerogative of the
Central Committee of the Party. Notwithstanding the fact that the
appellant had been moved out of the jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
observed that there was before Court ample evidence that the applicant's
fears that if he were handed over to SWAPO top leadership, he would be brought
before a tribunal on fabricated charges and executed, had at least some
foundation, and, that the possibility that the appellant might be
executed in circumstances in which a sentence of death would not be
passed by a Zambian court or military tribunal, "gives this court
jurisdiction and duty to intervene".^ The Chief Justice dissented;
stating that he had no difficult in holding the view that the liberation
army of SWAPO was in the same category as recognized as visiting force
in the UK and as such the appellant could not avail himself of the
jurisdiction of the Zambian domestic courts as the matter in issue
related to the internal discipline in SWAPO. He stated that the Court
was aware of the notorious fact that Zambia, as one of the 'front-line*
states committed to the liberation of southern Africa from foreign rule,
provided shelter to various, liberation movements, including SWAPO: "It
follows that for political expediency Zambia has allowed various armies
of liberation to observe their own rules of conduct in relation to
2
internal discipline and administration."
1. Shipanfta v. Attomey-KSeneral (1976) ZR 224, per Baron, DCJ at p. 247.
2. ibid., per Silungwe, CJ, at p. 232.
Contrary to the Chief Justice's perception of this case, 
the fact was that the appellant was placed under the armed guard not 
of SWAPO, but of the Government of Zambia. For that reason, all the 
old-problem of the individual versus the State, human rights and the 
security of the State, enjoyment of fundamental human rights and/or 
dictatorship or totalitarian regime, and the executive and the judiciary, 
all surfaced. The appellant proceeded on the assumption that human rights 
and fundamental freedoms contained in the Constitution of Zambia and 
guaranteed to Zambian citizens and to all law-abiding aliens within 
Zambia was the responsibility of the Government of Zambia and that the 
same could be extended to him. By arguing that the appellant was a 
member of a visiting force and that he could, therefore, not avail 
himself of the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, the State purported 
to avoid meeting that challenge: it was a matter of State security.
The Supreme Court by a majority ruled that the matter be 
investigated further and that in the meantime the appellant should be 
brought back to Zambia. On the subsequent hearing, the Court was informed 
that SWAPO had been approached and had declined to return the appellant 
to Zambia. On a further application that the Government of Zambia should 
approach the Government of Tanzania for the return of the appellant, the 
respondent objected and told the Court that it was the State's view that 
any suggestion that the Government of Tanzania should be approached on 
this matter, was not in the best interest of the liberation movement and 
that 'the Government could not go to the Government of Tanzania with a 
request to do something with which it did not agree'. UNIP as a party, 
was not publicly involved in the conflict which was engulfing not only 
the appellant, the judiciary and the executive in Zambia, but also the 
Government of Tanzania. Under a dictatorship courts cannot freely
question excesses of the executive or of the ruling political party.
Under such a system courts are expected to uphold actions of the
executive or ruling party. But a One-Party participatory democracy
as practised in Zambia and Tanzania is not a dictatorship; the courts
are not there to unquestionably uphold any action of the executive or
the ruling political party. The real difficult in this case was that
it involved the implementation of the Party's (and its Government's)
foreign policy of pan-Africanism. The pan-Africanism is a double-edged
policy as it entails both internal and external obligations. The State's
objection to approach the Tanzanian Government on the ground that such
an exercise was not in the best interests of the liberation movement,
also meant that the approach was not in the best interests of the Zambian
foreign relations* Ihe Supreme Court appeared to miss that point as it
courageously maintained that the Rule of Law prevailed:-
No litigant, whether the Government or a private litigant 
can be heard to say - and what is more in the very 
proceedings in which the decision was made - that that 
decision is not in the best interest of the liberation 
struggle and that he cannot do something with which he 
disagrees, or that high State policies are involved which are 
extremely sensative and not matters falling within the 
legal ambit.1
Although the judiciary prevailed over the executive by making
the executive file an affidavit deposing that the Government of Zambia
had approached the Government of Tanzania for the return of the appellant
to Zambia but that that request had not been acceded to, (and a document
to that effect was attached to the affidavit) that did not solve the
problem. The Court finally observed:-
That being the case, there is nothing further this Court 
can do in habeas corpus proceedings. But we must point 
out even if the appellant's departure was at his request, 
it was unfortunate for the executive to provide facilities 
for, or to have anything to do with the departure from 
Zambia whilst habeas corpus proceedings were in progress 
without the knowledge of his legal advisers.2
1. Shipanga v. Attorney-General (1977) ZR 53, per Silungwe, CJ at p. 53.
2. Shipanga v. Attorney-General (1978) ZR 71, per Silungwe, CJ at p. 72.
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What was in issue in this case was the legal status of 
a liberation movement and its personnel once the Party had allowed 
them to be stationed in the country. Courts are primarily sanctioning 
institutions, that is, they perform their function in the context of 
dispute settlement. They first explore the incompatibility between 
the matters in dispute. What was in dispute in this case was not the 
detention of the appellant but the conflict between him and his SWAPO 
fellow compatriots the conflict was the cause and the detention was 
the result. The fundamental question therefore, was whether the courts 
could adjudicate upon the cause of the dispute which involved the 
internal affairs of a liberation movement. The courts would not have 
succeeded in re-establishing amicable personal relationship between and 
among the disputants or the sanctioning of the breach of any SWAPO rule 
or norm. On the other hand, it is one of the established rules of the 
Rule of Law that courts should be open to the petition of anyone. This 
was not an easy case. However, the court should have accepted the State's 
stated position on the ground that the entry and presence and exit in 
and out of Zambia by liberation movement personnel is not regulated by 
any Zambian legislation, ipso facto, the activities of such organizations 
should not be subject of scrutiny in the courts of law.
In Tanzania when the British army was asked to intervene
in an army mutiny, the Visiting Forces Act, 1962,^ was enacted to
facilitate the British- army's presence in the then Tanganyika. The Act
defined a 'visiting force* as any body, contigent or detachment.: of
the forces of a country for the time being present in Tanganyika on the
2
invitation of the Government of Tanganyika. That law was not intended 
to cover liberation movement personnel. The African liberation movement
1. Tanzania: 1962, No. 70, Cap. 494.
2. ibid. sec. 3(1). On Liberation Movements in
International Law, see: Sagay, I.,"The Legal 
Aspects of Freedom Fighters in Africa", EALR,
Vol. 6, No. 1, 1973, p. 18, and Asmal, K., "The 
Legal Status of National Liberation Movements 
(with particular reference to South Africa)",
ZLJ, Vol. 15, 1983, pp. 37-59.
is a sui generis phenomenon, an end-product of colonialism in Africa. DNIP's 
pan-Africanism is not sanctioned by any law. That can be seen as evidence
of the One-Party system's tendency to rule not through Parliament or the
Cabinet but through the Party's central organs, e.g. the Committee of
Chairmen; a form of a dictatorship of the Party. In reality, liberation
movements' personnel are refugees escaping from oppression in their land,
and, as such, their entry, presence or exit into, in or out of Zambia,
can hardly be a matter of invitation: it is a matter of dire necessity?
a political issue to be handled by the Party. Giving of refuge to a
liberation movement is now acknowledged as follows:
20. (1) All peoples shall have right to exist. They shall 
have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self- 
determination. They shall freely determine their political 
status and shall pursue their economic and social development 
according to the policy they have freely chosen.
(2) Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right 
to free themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting 
to any means recognized by the international community.
(3) All peoples shall have the right to the assistance 
of the States Parties to the present Charter in their 
liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it 
political, economic or cultural.1
2
It is essential that Zambia's ratification of the Charter is followed 
by comprehensive legislation clarifying and formalizing the entry, 
the presence and the exit of refugees and liberation movements' personnel 
into, in or out of Zambia. Although soon liberation struggles shall cease 
with the independence of Namibia and South Africa, the problem of refugees 
shall continue as men, women and children flee from bloody conflicts 
orchestrated by political factions, ethnic magnates and foreign influences 
in their fight for the control of the new States, or portions of them.
1. OAU: African Charter on Human and People's Rights;
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 4 , 7th-27th January, 1981, opened 
for signature at Banjul, The Gambia? requires 26 
ratifications (Art. 63) to enter into force.
2. Zambia: Signed the Banjul Charter on 17th January, 1983,
ratified it on 10th January, 1984 and deposited the 
Instrument of Ratification on 2nd February, 1984: 
"Human and People's Rights in Africa and the African 
Charter", ICJ, Report of a Conference held in Nairobi, 
Kenya, from 2nd to 4th December, 1985, convened by 
the ICJ to discuss the Charter.
CONCLUSION.
This Chapter has examined the influence the pan-African movement 
in Europe had in the development of African leadership and the emergence 
of African national, regional and continental organizations. The colonial 
administrators' and settlers' resistence to the emergence of some form of 
African political coordination in Central Africa, was understandable since 
colonial governments were intolerant of any opposition on western and 
democratic lines because they considered it tantamount to the setting up 
of a rival authority. That perception was correct since the Africans were 
in fact organizing in order to assume governmental power from the colonial 
rulers and eliminate settler domination and exploitation.
As regards the role of UNIP in the formulation of policies, the 
Chapter has shown that according to the Constitution of the Party, policies 
are supposed to be formulated by the Committee of Chairmen, the Central 
Committee and the National Council and formally adopted by the Party 
Congress. The President is, prima facie, not empowered to formulate any 
policy. In practice, however, prerogative powers, particularly those 
touching on foreign relations, which were exercised by the Governor on 
behalf of the Crown, are to-day exercised by the President. In practice 
the conduct of 'foreign affairs' is Government responsibility and not 
the Party's business. However, bearing in mind the importance of foreign 
relations and their effect on domestic policies, the President should 
report at least to the National Assembly on the conduct of Zambian foreign 
policy. Although the National Assembly does debate the annual allocation 
of money to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it does not debate the pro 
and cons of Zambian 'foreign policy' as that is considered the prerogative 
of the President. Informing Parliament on how Zambian policy was being
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implemented would not undermine the President's exercise of his prerogative 
powers; instead, it would assist the President in assessing the feeling in 
the nation as a whole as to whether foreign relations were being conducted 
in accordance with the aspirations, goals and interests of the people.
On the other hand, although the Party has at times called a 
seminar or conference to review such matters as the economy, Humanism and 
religion etc., attended by representatives from the Party, the Church, and 
parastatal organizations as well as the Government, it has not seen it fit
to call a similar seminar or conference on Zambia's foreign policy. Once
in a while representatives of public institutions, the Party and the 
Government should come together to examine the successes and failures, the 
merits and demerits of Zambia's foreign policy. Such an exercise would not 
undermine the 'supremacy' of the Party, instead it would assist the Party
in its policy formulation role.
Zambia's support for the liberation movements has an aspect of 
self-interest: the total eradication of foreign rule or racist regimes in 
southern Africa assures Zambia of peace around its borders. The support 
is based on the realization that 'he who does not fight for his friends' 
rights, can be deprived of his own rights'. In the context of the principle 
that the Party is the policy-formulating body and the Government is the 
policy-implementing body, the control of liberation movements and personnel 
should be done by the Government. The Party should monitor the policy 
aspects of such control. The success of the African Charter on Human and 
People's Rights, vis-a-vis self-determination and the role of liberation 
movements, will depend on the steps the signatory States - including Zambia 
will take in adjusting the pre-existing legal and economic norms upon which
the law of the Charter will be built. In Zambia one area requiring such 
adjustment is that dealing with the legal status and role of liberation 
movements and their personnel.
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CHAPTER XI.
CONCLUSION : SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROBLEMS AFFECTING THE ROLE 
OF UNIP IN ZAMBIA AND SOME SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS.
This study has analysed, from a legal stand point, some 
aspects of the role of UNIP in Zambia. The main focus of the study has 
been institutional, more emphasis being placed on the presence or the 
absence of legal rules governing the role of the Party. However, some 
references have been made to the political role of those in the top 
leadership of the Party and to how Party politicies are formulated and 
implemented. The study has established at least three factors on the role 
of UNIP in as far as the law of Zambia is concerned, namely that:
(a) Zambia is governed through law and through institutions 
one of which is UNIP, but that there is an apparent 
ambiguity in the law on the legal capacity of the Party 
and that ambiguity has at times adversely affected the 
role of the Party or the interests of persons who felt 
injured by some acts of functionaries of the Party;
(b) notwithstanding its ambiguous legal capacity, UNIP has 
utilized the law in asserting its authority in the public 
administration of the country at both the national and 
lower levels; and
(c) although UNIP operates within the framework of its own 
Constitution in particular, and the Constitution of the 
Republic of Zambia in general, the role of the Party is 
shaped and dominated by the President of the Party and 
of the Republic.
These three major factors provide the background to the following 
observations on the problems affecting the role of UNIP and some suggested 
solutions.
(i) The Colonial Legacy.
The African leaders who formed the native welfare associations
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considered in Chapter II of this study, which laid the foundation upon 
1 2  3
which the NRANC, ZANC and UNIP were founded, were concerned mainly 
with African rights, interests and welfare. Their opposition to colonial 
rule was not based on any sophisticated theories about the nature or the 
function of the State or political parties. They worked on the assumption 
that self-rule was better than foreign-rule. However, the system of the 
government inherited at Independence was a system based on four factors - 
party, the electorate, Parliament and Cabinet. That system of the four 
factors involved the reconciliation of two different and conflicting 
necessities. One necessity was that each of the factors should think 
highly of itself and its duty, and act as if everything hung on itself 
and upon its own decisions. That was a condition of efficiency; but it 
might also have led, if it was not checked, to self-sufficiency and 
arrogance. The other necessity was that each factor should keep in touch 
and harmony with the rest, acknowledging that they too have the right 
and duty to do their work and to be left free to do it effectively. At 
independence there was an electorate which felt its own importance having 
won the 'one-man-one-vote' struggle, a Parliament which claimed exclusive 
sovereignty for itself, and, a Cabinet with collective pride. But colonial 
rule bequeathed a legacy of ambiguity in the legal capacity of the party. 
That has, paradoxically, weakened the role of the electorate, of 
Parliament and of Cabinet in the post-independence era and incidentally 
facilitated the dominant role of the Party in general and of the President 
in particular.
(b) The Law and Status of Political Parties.
The absence of law defining the capacity of the political 
party, at least in the Commonwealth African countries, was a result of
1.
2.
3.
Supra, p . 61
Supra, p. 72
Supra, p. 75
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British political tradition: the British (unwritten) Constitution is a 
reflection of existing principles, a description of institutions, including 
political parties. Processes are considered more important than political 
institutions, political realities than legal principles. In NR the 
Societies Ordinance'*' showed that colonial administrators, although aware 
of British ideas of freedom of association, turned their attention from 
finding a suitable legal vehicle for political activity to controlling 
political activity by repression and restriction of political party 
organizers. As a consequence, the Societies Ordinance was used to achieve 
maximum control of political leaders and that resulted in less freedom 
of organization, assembly and expression. The Societies Ordinance did not 
give political parties any legal capacity and its enforcement did not 
instil in the minds of the political leaders at any early stage in their 
political career the notion of a competitive political system. The subsequent 
failure of the multi-party system in Zambia was partly traceable to the 
fragility and ambiguity of the political party created by the colonial 
legislation and practices which treated African political organization as 
potentially subversive. The One-Party system is, to some extent, based 
upon and perpetuates the notion that opposition political organization 
is destructive and subversive.
Colonial administration played a significant role in introducing 
Africans to European forms of government and to concepts such as 'State', 
'Government1, 'Party', 'Vote', 'Election', 'Democracy' and 'President', 
some of which - if not all of them - have no equivalent word in most 
of the African languages. Although law in every country is enacted to 
apply generally to all the people and institutions within its jurisdiction, 
the Societies Ordinance in NR was applied mainly to eliminate African 
opposition to colonial rule. The justification for that apparent 
discrimination appears to have been that, in the context of the colonial
1. Supra, p. 68
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situation, Africans should not have concentrated on political activities
but on industrial, commercial, social and cultural ventures if they were
to benefit materially from the new social order. African demands for
freedom of organization, assembly and expression and the vote, were viewed
as exercises in irrelevancies. African political parties that have
introduced a One-Party system of government^ have justified the banning of
opposition political organizations on three major grounds, some of which
are similar to the grounds colonial administrators used in proscribing
African political parties fighting for self-rule; first, that of the need
for national unity, second, which is a corollary to the first, that of
the need for undivided national effort in economic, social and political
development, and, third, that opposition parties did not operate in the
best interests of the peace, order and good government of the country. Ihe
law used in proscribing opposition organizations was, in most cases, the
same law (the Societies Ordinance) which colonial Governors-in-Council used
2
in banning African political organizations.
One of the factors for the demise of the multi-party system in some
African states, was the ease with which political parties could be lawfully
proscribed.due to their lack of legal protection. It is, therefore, not
surprising that the role of political parties or a political party can be
equated to chieftainship: an institution that can be used for personal
aggrandizement of political power:-
African states are faced with two alternatives; m o d e m  
chieftaincy or anarchy. At this cross-road, democracy 
can only be built through the medium of a resuscitated 
and revitalised notion of chieftaincy expressing itself 
through the single party headed by the executive 
President of the Party.3
1. Zambia: Constitution (Amendment)(No. 5) Act, 1972, No. 1,
sec. 12A (1), Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, No. 27,
v Art. 4 and Societies (Amendment) Act, 1974, No. 9,
sec. 22A; supra, pp. 130-131.
2. Supra, pp. 73, 125 and 131.
3. Otuteye, S.C., "Constitutional Innovations in French West Africa - the
Experiences of Guinea and the Ivory Coast", UGLR,
Vol. X, 1973, pp. 33-34.
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That view does not reject the political party as an instrument of 
government, but it postulates only one political party as the embodiment 
of an African chiefly rule. This study has shown that there is nothing 
'chiefly' under a One-Party system and that it is not an incarnation of 
an African traditional rule. However, the governments of m o d e m  African 
states will be through a political party system dominated by a President 
who may purport to permanently remain in office and assume the role of a 
'traditional ruler'. The fact, however, remains that he is the President 
of a political party; hence the importance of the status of the party.
Whether under a multi-party or a one-party system, the law which only 
indirectly recognizes political parties as merely 'societies', is bound 
! to be outdated and a source of political instability.
j
The Constitution of Zambia, 1973, provides that in Zambia there
shall be one and only one political party and that Party is UNIP.^ Similar
provisions are contained in the Constitutions of other One-Party States
such as Malawi, Kenya and Tanzania. Such provisions have not solved the
problem of the legal status of the ruling party which remains at law a
'society'. But the problem is not confined to the One-Party regimes only,
as shown by the Malaysian case of Mohd bin Othman and Others v. Mohd Yusof
2
Jaffar, Secretary of UMNO Tangjung Division, Penang and Others in which
Harun, J., observed that the Societies Ordinance was introduced in Malaya
during the colonial era as a weapon with which to eradicate secret societies.
The provisions of the Societies Ordinance are retained in most formerly
British-ruled African states. That legislation is no longer suitable for
the regulation of a political system in a free society.
In Zambia there is a need for a clarification of the status
and legal effect of the Constitution of UNIP and the role of those who
3
implement it, that is officials of the Party. Mr Chona's view that a
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 4, supra p. 134.
2. (1988) HC Civil Case No. R8-22-28 at p. 18; supra, p. 157.
3. Infra, Answer to Question No. 10, Appendix 'A';
pT349. ----------
political party should be governed by flexible rules because political 
situations are volatile and not predictable, is theoretically worthy 
of support, but in practice that would leave unsolved the problems 
discussed in this study, for instance, that of a litigant being unable 
to sue the Party in its name.^
In Zambia the establishment of the One-Party system by sec. 12A 
of the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) (No. 5) Act, 1972 and Art. 4 of 
the Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, called for consequential changes 
in the general law of the country. Instead, the One-Party system was 
superimposed on the legal system as bequeathed at Independence which did 
not contain clear rules on the role of political parties. It is obvious 
that the introduction of a One-Party system called for an extensive law
reform. The failure of the Court to reach a conclusive in the cases of
2 3
Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. Attorney-General and Shipanga v. Attorney-General
was to some extent as a result of the failure to formulate principles on
the status and role of UNIP. Consequently, in Chipimo v. Chona, Secretary-
4
of UNIP and Attorney-General the Court simply applied English authorities 
without pausing to consider whether those authorities which dealt with 
'clubs' applied to the role of a political party under a One-Party system. 
Because of the Party's close identification with the Government the Courts 
will have to evolve new rules for the recognition of the Party as a legal 
entity under a One-Party system.
Although an aggrieved person may proceed against the tortfeasor 
or the Party in a representative capacity, legally the non-existent status 
of the Party means that establishing the vicarious liability of the Party 
through the acts of its functionaries becomes a problem in itself. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that the Party is seldom taken to Court.
1» Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. UNIP (1978) 2 R  388; supra, p. 156
2. (1979) ZR 267, supra, p. 158.
3. (1978) ZR 71, supra, p. 479.
4. (1983) ZR 125, supra, p. 200.
Giving the Party a certain limited capacity might also go a long 
way in clarifying the role of liberation movements and fraternal parties 
and their personnel in Zambian law. The provisions of the Societies Act 
which prohibit the presence in Zambia of any 'political organization' other 
than UNIP, require some qualification. It is a matter of utter indifference 
to political leaders whether or not the political party they lead has legal 
capacity; the legal ambiguities enable them to use the institution of the 
Party without challenge. Because the well-being and security of the people 
of Zambia is, so to speak, in the hands of the Party, it is quite legitimate 
to be concerned with the legal status of UNIP and to require that the legal 
status of such a vital institution should not be in doubt or a matter of 
speculation: it ought to be precisely spelt out.
The present 'confusion' is, among other things, caused by the fact
that while on one hand, the Constitution of UNIP produces some 'legal
effects', for instance, no person qualifies as a candidate for the office
of President of Zambia or a member of the National Assembly unless he meets
certain requirements as to membership of and approval by the Party, on
the other hand, the Courts refuse to enforce Party rules.^ It could be
argued from the fact that the Constitution of Zambia provides for only one
political party and that that Party should be organized in accordance with
2
its own Constitution, that the Constitution of the Party is indirectly 
incorporated into the Constitutional system of Zambia. The Courts have, 
however, adopted a legal positivist view that the Constitution of the Party 
is not 'law' because it has not been enacted by Parliament. Under a One-Party 
Constitution the Constitution of the ruling Party should be considered as 
a source of the Constitutional law of the land.
1. Luywa v. Sianga (1983) HP/EP. 3 (unreported); supra, p. 305.
2. Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 4(3), as
amended by the Constitution of Zambia 
(Amendment) Act, 1975, No. 22.
What is needed in most African states is a new definition 
of the political party backed by legislation that will give it some form 
of recognition, capacity and precise role. A face-lift is necessary to 
replace that which portrays a political party as a club, society, members' 
association on one hand, or as corrupt or subversive secret organization 
on the other hand. To begin with, transitional provision could be made 
giving a political party such as UNIP legal capacity similar to that given 
to the Commonwealth Secretariat under UK legislation, which is restricted 
to rights or liabilities in tort and contract.^ Eventually, law should 
provide for the separation of the organization from its organizers so that 
any allegation of corruption, abuse of office or repressiveness perpetrated 
by those in the leadership, should attach mainly to the persons concerned^ 
for which they should be removed from office and/or punished. In most of 
the developing countries political organizations are serious national 
institutions that justify the enactment of such a stringent legal regime.
(c) Law and the Internal Organization of UNIP.
The fact that the Party has been able to convene its Congress 
every five years, and its National Council annually since Independence, is 
evidence of the Party's continuity and stability. The way UNIP works 
depends on innumerable, and sometimes unidentifiable historical and 
environmental factors. President Kaunda's leadership is one single factor 
that has contributed to national unity and UNIP's entrenchment. So much
1. UK: The Commonwealth Secretariat Act, 1966, c. 10,
provides as follows:
1. The Commonwealth Secretariat, its privileges and 
immunities.
(1) The Commonwealth Secretariat shall have the 
capacity of a body corporate.
(2) The Commonwealth Secretariat shall have the 
privileges and immunities conferred by Part I 
of the Schedule to this Act.
Part I of the Schedule states that the Commonwealth 
Secretariat can be sued for damages in tort or on a 
written contract entered into on its behalf.
confidence has been placed in President Kaunda's leadership that members of
the public in general and of the Party in particular, have lost sight of
prima facie undemocratic manner the Party leadership has been chosen - and
at times dismissed. Soon after the adoption of the One-Party system President
Kaunda's view of the new system of government was that -
The United National Independence Party is supreme over 
all institutions in our land. Its supremacy must not 
be theoretical nor is it enough merely to reduce it to 
a constitutional provision. More than before, our task 
is to translate Party supremacy into something much more 
meaningful in the life of the nation. A great deal of 
progress has been made in bringing the Republican 
Constitution into line with our new political system.
The last sentence in this quotation is of both political and legal 
importance and interest. It portrays the State Constitution as merely 
reflecting a new political system established by and under the Constitution 
of the Party and not vice versa. The formal structures and procedures 
concerned with the internal organization of UNIP considered in Chapter IV 
correspond to the provisions of the Constitution of the Party. However, the 
role of the President in the selection and election of himself and MCCs is 
much more the deciding factor than the Constitution of the Party. That formal 
structures and procedures in political organizations might not correspond 
to reality is plain. However, the undemocratic selection of MCCs and their 
formal endorsement at the Party Congress is not a matter of discrepancy but 
a deliberate divergence caused by the dominant role of the President.
The procedures followed at the Party Congress or the National
Council are based on the provisions of the Party Constitution; prima facie,
the election of the President and MCCs is 'constitutional'; the elections are
undemocratic in that opposition to or contest against the Presidential
2
Candidate or Presidential nominees, is systemically suppressed.
1. UNIP: The * Watershed* Speech, 30th June-3rd July, 1975,
p. 3, President Kaunda opening the 6th National 
Council.
2. Supra, p. 158
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Although the Constitutions of the Party and of the Republic have
been amended to reflect the concept of the 'supremacy' of the Party, ^  the
internal organization of the Party is devoid of any discernible ideological
basis, hence the election of MCCs is not based on any principle other than
the identifiable policy of geographical representation, that all parts of
Zambia should be represented in the Central Committee. There are ample
provisions in the Constitution of the Party for a democratically chosen
2 3
President of the Party and MCCs. The implementation of these provisions 
is frustrated by the dominant role of the President, who effectively 
institutes his own re-election and appoints members of the Central Committee. 
What is needed to democratize the internal organization of UNIP's national 
organs, is not more rules and procedures but a change of attitude towards 
the holding of public office; political leaders should accept challenge 
and with challenge accept victory or defeat.
The preparation of the Constitution of the Party does not escape 
the close scrutiny of those in power who have to ensure that its provisions 
conform with their wishes. The Party's Constitution, therefore, embodies 
political and ideological ideas of those in the leadership of the Party as 
well as rules safeguarding their positions. Any reform is bound to strengthen 
the ideals and positions of those already in the entrenched leadership of 
the Party. The 1988 enlargement of UNIP's Central Committee bears out that 
testimony; a huge body constituted by the President to assist him run the 
country. But progressive reforms ought to be carried out otherwise any 
attempt to maintain the status quo might benefit not the Party but those 
who would like to see the internal organization of the Party continue to be 
undemocratic and the powers of the President remain unchallenged.
1. Zambia; Constitution of Zambia Act 1973, Art. 47C(2) as amended
by the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1975, No. 22 and 
Arts. 7 and 8, Constitution of UNIP, 1988.
2. UNIP;
3.
Constitution, 1988, Art. 73(2).
ibid. Art. 60(2).
A political party such as UNIP, though imperfectly recognized by
the law, operates among people who believe in law and a society with laws.
Those who supported the introduction of the One-Party system with its
corollary of the 'supremacy' of the Party would probably not have supported
the scheme if they realized that it meant the 'supremacy' of the President,
or that it was a mere political gimmick;
The fashion of the one party is becoming a popular political 
gimmick. But the one party state idea is foreign to African 
tradition. It is only an attempt by politicians to refuse 
to face realities of their countries by having open competition. 
It has been argued that in the African society there is no
existence of a permanent opposition as part of traditional
government. Therefore, an opposition party is an anomaly and 
a foreign imposition. This is a false doctrine.1
The opposition party, the one-party or the competitive party systems
are all foreign institutions to Africa. They have no relevance to any African
traditional system of government. They are governed by statute law or the
common law; in case of Zambia, both based on English law ideas. The analogy
to African traditional system of government or the 'traditionalization' of
the One-Party system, was intended to provide that system with a local
African cultural basis mainly to equate the permanent political party
2
leadership to the unchanging chieftaincy. The question whether UNIP is or 
is not democratically constituted, for example, cannot be answered by any 
reference to any Zambian traditional rule or rules, but to the provisions of 
the Constitution of the Party or to European ideas of 'democracy' or political 
party system. Chapter IV has shown that the President has skilfully used the 
provisions of the Party Constitution to the extent that practically all 
holders of Party and Government offices at the national level are his nominees 
to that extent it could be said that the supremacy of the Party has become 
the supremacy of the President.
1. Kesse-Adu, K., The Politics of Political Detention; Ghana Publishing
Corporation, Accra, 1971, p. 29.
2. See for e.g. Armah, K., Africa's Golden Road, Heinemann, London, 1965,
p. 72
(d) Judicial Review and Administrative Control of Party Activities.
UNIP in general and the Party Congress and the Central Committee
(now the Committee of Chairmen) in particular, have been recognized by the
Constitution of Zambia e.g. by assigning to them the duty to elect, every
five years, the President of the Party, who becomes the sole Presidential
Candidate for the election of the President of the Republic,'*’ and to adopt
2
candidates for election to the National Assembly. These constitutional
functions have to be performed; failure to do so should result in judicial
review of the failure itself or the manner in which they were purported
to be performed. The law has not expressly provided that the Party's or
its officials' activities are subject to judicial review or administrative
controls. The Party's pre-emptive move, by securing legislation to the
effect that the functions of the Committee of Chairmen in the adoption of
3
National Assembly candidates shall not be subject to judicial review, 
has enabled the Party to prevent a large number of people from standing 
in Parliamentary election. It is feasible that if the vetting of National 
Assembly candidates had remained open to judicial review, fewer candidates 
would have had their candidature disapproved.
It is pertinent to point out that vetting of Parliamentary 
candidates by political parties is carried out in one form or another in 
most electoral systems and what the law expressly provides for in Zambia 
is done elsewhere as a matter of convention. The principle is acceptable, 
except that at times it has been abused, for instance, where capable 
persons known to be critics of the Party have been barred from standing 
in Parliamentary elections. Judicial review of the role of the Committee 
of Chairmen would, however, be intolerable because vetting involves some
1. Zambia: Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 38(3).
2. ibid. Arts. 67 and 75; supra, p. 289.
3. Electoral (Amendment) Act, 1983, No. 2,
sec. 5; supra, p. 289.
political considerations of who should be encouraged to participate in the 
national leadership. Such considerations which are based on the opinions of 
those already in the leadership, are not suitable for judicial verification. 
That is not to endorse the 'supremacy' of the Party but to acknowledge the 
fact that there are certain matters which should be left out of judicial 
review as the sole prerogative of the Party. The functions of the Party's 
Committee of Chairmen are similar to those of the Cabinet of the Government 
and such functions are not normally subject to judicial review.
UNIP could have been instituted and operated under the direct
authority of a statute law, since it operates wholly in the public domain.
Its jurisdiction extends throughout Zambia. Its membership is open to all
Zambians although, as Chapter VIII has shown, only a minority are members
of the Party. UNIP is, therefore, a public institution whose activities
should be open to judicial scrutiny. However, as long as the Party remains
a 'society' under the law, any judicial review of its activities would
continue to be a matter of debate, doubt and speculation and a potential
source of conflict between the Party and the judiciary, as the following
observation shows:
With greatest respect therefore, it would appear to me 
that the United National Independence Party cannot be 
strictly equated with a members' club, granted that it 
is not incorporated. Meaning no disrespect, I have not 
come across a members' club which forms a government 
of a sovereign republic.1
UNIP is more than a members' club. In the absence of any statute law
expressly forbidding judicial review of the activities of the Party, persons
alleging that their rights or interests have been infringed or threatened
by activities of the Party, should be free to seek some redress from the
Courts of law. Judicial review is a deterrence against abuse of power. The
2
judicial review of the 1978 UNIP's Eighth.General Conference resulted in 
meticulous consideration and adoption of some amendments to the Party's
1. Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. UNIP (1978) ZR 388, per Sakala, J., at p. 391.
2. Nkumbula and Kapwepwe v. Attorney-General (1979) ZR 267; supra, p. 158.
Constitution and the election of the President and MCCs at the 9th General 
Conference held in 1983. The Party, like any person or institution would 
not obviously relish its activities being the subject of judicial review.
Although in theory the Party Congress, the National Council and 
the Central Committee can debate and pass a vote of confidence or no 
confidence in the President, in practice, by the nature of things, the fall 
of the President would mean the fall of the entire political leadership.
The fear of the total collapse of the leadership guarantees continued support 
for the President from his fellow-leaders: a sort of self-imposed domination 
of the Party leadership by the President. That to some extent makes it very 
difficult to impose administrative controls on the Party. There is, therefore, 
a need for an Ombudsman who can effectively intervene in matters involving UNIP 
and its members and members of the public, and, where appropriate, who can 
impose controls or sanctions without reference to the Executive. There is 
also a need for a detailed reporting to the National Assembly as well as 
to the Party by the Investigator-General. He should not, for example, merely 
give the number of complaints he declined to investigate, but also indicate 
the nature of the complaint, the complainant and the official or institution 
complained against. Such a synopsis would help in assessing the extent to 
which public officers, including those in the leadership of the Party, were 
investigated or shielded from investigation. At the moment investigations 
of abuse of office or authority by those in the leadership of the Party 
appears neglible. There should be incidents of maladministration in the Party.
The grant of damages, certiorari, injunction or declaration 
or the imposition of administrative controls through the Leadership Code 
will continue to be ineffective vis-a-vis those in the leadership of the 
Party or the Party itself - through a representative process - as long as 
the legal capacity of the Party remains unsettled.
(e) The Party, Parliament and Participatory Democracy.
Of all the organs of State, the National Assembly is the only one
which bears the physical marks of the One-Party system in Zambia: all the
members of Parliament belonging to the same political party. The National
Assembly elections held after the establishment of the One-Party system,
in 1973, 1978, 1983 and 1988, showed that the One-Party system has not
dampened the interest of the Zambians in politics, which they acquired
and demonstrated during the fight for one-man-one-vote and for African
representation in the Legco discussed in Chapter II.*" During the
multi-party system, political parties chose both the candidate and the
constituency in which he stood. There was, therefore, a form of 'vetting'
of Parliamentary candidates. The provisions under the One-Party system
that the Committee of Chairmen approves the candidature of prospective
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Parliamentary candidates, simply put into black and white what UNIP and
other political parties did as a matter of course during the multi-party
days. The criticism of the vetting system under the One-Party system
arises from the fact that it has been used as a weapon against, among
others, popular and capable persons who have in private or in public,
including the National Assembly itself, criticised Party policies or
those in the leadership of the Party.
Since the grounds for having one's candidature disapproved are
numerous, stretching from being considered inimical to the interests of
3
the State to the candidate being a drunkard, it would be desirable that 
disapproved candidates were formally informed of the precise grounds for 
the Committee of Chairmen's disapproval. It is possible for a person to 
be falsely accused of being a smuggler, a poacher, a drunkard or that he 
engages in commercial activities contrary to the Leadership Code, or in 
drug trafficking or consistently committed offences against the Party
1. Supra, p. 34, in particular pp. 58 - 82.
2. Zambia:
3. UNIP:
Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 75(5);supra, p. 
Constitution, 1988, Art. 85(2)(a) to (i); supra, p. 289
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as prescribed in its Constitution. These are serious allegations to be 
made against any person; consequently a person whose candidature for 
the National Assembly has been disapproved by the Committee of Chairmen 
is bound to live in anxiety as to the particular allegations made against 
him. The anxiety develops into fear when the vetted person realizes that 
the allegations are in fact made by the Party officials and members of 
the intelligence branch of government. In view of the prohibition of 
judicial review of the vetting exercise, a person whose candidature has 
been disapproved should be informed of the reasons to enable him ease 
his apprehensions and fears.
The abolition of primary elections in 1983 has enabled more 
candidates to stand in each Parliamentary constituency. In this regard,
UNIP is pursuing the policy of wider participation in National Assembly 
elections. Notwithstanding the vetting powers of the Committee of Chairmen, 
the Party's rule of non-interference on whom the electors chose, should 
be maintained as it allows the voters to freely chose their representatives. 
The fact, however, remains that in certain constituencies the Party denies 
the electorate a representative 'of their choice' through the vetting 
system. That occurs where the Committee of Chairmen vetted a popular 
former Member of Parliament for being critical of the Party.
The political power of Parliament lies in its close ties or 
identification with the Party, while its legal supremacy lies in its 
exclusive power to enact the laws of Zambia which cannot be ignored by 
any authority, person or the Party. Law, after all, is nothing but the 
legal formulation of the agreed policies of the ruling political party.
The provisions of the Constitution of the Party to the effect that no 
Act of Parliament, among other rules, shall be contrary to or inconsistent 
with, the Constitution of UNIP,*" is an unnecessary restraint on the role of
1. UNIP; Constitution, 1988,Art. 8, supra, p.322.
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the representative body of the Zambian people.
Although the Constitution of Zambia does not contain provisions 
to the effect that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, it 
is in fact the fundamental law of Zambia and all legal authority in Zambia 
derives from it. The Constitution provides that legislative power in Zambia 
shall reside in the Parliament of Zambia and shall be exercised by bills 
passed by the National Assembly and assented to by the President.^ 
Practically all the bills passed by the National Assembly originated in 
Government ministries and departments and the chances of the National 
Assembly deliberately passing a bill, which is assented to by the President, 
that is against Party policy, are slim. It is, however, possible that a 
Private Member's bill could be passed by the National Assembly with the 
support of the backbenchers who are in the majority. It is feasible that 
such a bill could be contrary to, or inconsistent with, the Constitution 
of the Party. The President could refuse to assent to such a bill which 
was contrary to the Constitution or the policy of the Party.
If the President were to withhold his assent to such a bill,
the bill would be returned to the National Assembly; the National Assembly
could within six months of the bill being so returned, resolve upon a
motion supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the
members of the National Assembly, that the bill should be presented for
assent. Where a bill is again presented to the President for assent he
shall assent to the bill within twentyone days of its presentation, unless
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he sooner dissolves Parliament. If the President assented to such a bill, 
it would become law and the provisions of Art. 8 of the Constitution of 
UNIP would not over-ride it.
In view of the manner in which legislation is formulated, 
drafted and enacted, it is obvious that Art. 8 of the Constitution of the
1. Zambia:
2.
Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 79(1). 
ibid. Art. 79(6).
Party is intended, in practice, as a deterrence to backbenchers' attempts 
at proposing bills which were contrary to Party policies. The vetting of 
a rather large number of prospective candidates for the election to the 
National Assembly in the 1988 General Election revealed that there was 
wide-spread criticism of, and opposition to, some Party policies and leaders. 
Such criticism and opposition would probably be manifested in some back­
benchers proposing measures not in line with Party policies. The blunt 
declaration that 'no Act of Parliament' etc., shall be in conflict with the 
Constitution of the Party, although of doubtful legal effect, if any, serves 
to give the One-Party system, a bad image. On the face of it, that provision 
contradicts the Party's claim that the National Assembly is a committee of 
the National Council charged with the responsibility of concerting Party 
policies into law. The provision foresees conflict between the Party and 
the National Council, with the latter claiming independence of the former.
A democratically constituted and run National Assembly is to the benefit of 
both Zambia and UNIP and any attempt to make Parliament subordinate to the 
Party might make a mockery of the Parliamentary system. Already there are 
indications, e.g. through the vetting system, that the independent-minded 
MP has become an endangered specie: schematically poached from political 
involvement and leadership.
At the root of this problem is the status of the Party which has 
led it to resort to all sorts of devices to assert its presence and authority 
in the administration of the country. The presence of the Secretary-General 
in the Cabinet and the Secretary of Defence and Security in the Government, 
considered in Chapter V,^ are some of the devices resorted to in the 
implementation of the concept of the supremacy of the Party. But the real 
problem is that the bulk of the law of Zambia does not mention the Party.
The backbenchers can pass legislation that can change the status of or 
abolish the sole role of UNIP. The Registrar of Societies, can, as a matter
1. Supra, pp. 186, 199 and 205.
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law, in his discretion, cancel at any time the registration of any of 
UNIP's Branches or of UNIP's headquarters (thereby declaring UNIP as a 
whole an unlawful society) if he was satisfied that it were expedient 
so to do on the ground, e.g., that any provision of the Constitution or 
a Rule of such a society was, in his opinion in any respect repugnant to 
or inconsistent with the provisions of any law for the time being in force 
in Zambia.^" That lack of recognition and protection by the general law of 
the land also contributes towards the Party's determination to assert its 
authority over the Government. The provisions of Art. 8 of the Constitution 
of the Party purports to 'vest' the Zambian supreme authority - the grundnorm - 
in the Party Constitution. The supreme authority, however, is the Republican 
Constitution under which the One-Party system is established and UNIP operates.
(f) The Integration of the Party and Local Authorities.
Under a multi-party system some people support the ruling party in
the belief that such support will bring patronage, resources and development
to their areas. Although members of the ANC retained solid support for the
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opposition party in their traditional area, the Southern Province, the
tendency has been, for the majority of the people to identify with the
victorious governing party; again with the hope that such identification
might bring patronage and resources to them.
The establishment of the only one administrative structure at the
district level in both the urban and the rural areas in Zambia, examined 
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in Chapter VIII, has simplified the local authority system in the country.
The people who supported the integrated local administration system hoped 
that the system would bring patronage and some resource allocation to their 
areas. The equal status of District Councils has not brought with it equal
1. Zambia: The Societies Act, Cap. 105, sec. 13(2) (a); see
Kausa v. The Registrar of Societies (1977) ZR 195; 
supra, p. 235.
2.
3.
Sugra, p. 348. 
Supra, p. 340.
patronage or resource allocation.
The Party perceived decentralization as a means of achieving and 
consolidating Zambia's Humanist socio-economic and political policies in 
particular of non-economic exploitation and participatory democracy.
In other words, decentralization for its own sake was of little use or 
consequence unless the objective of bringing all forms of power to the 
people was achieved. Decentralization was perceived as a tool to achieve 
participatory democracy. Participatory democracy in turn, was not perceived 
as an idea of involving the people in their local affairs, but it also 
included the idea of the people initiating, controlling and themselves 
taking a large part in their own social and economic betterment. By its 
origin and historical development, UNIP had always been the mobilizing 
force linking the grassroots level of the village dweller with Government 
organizations at all levels. While the Party leadership might claim that 
the present local administration system has vested power in the people, 
the reality is that power has become the preserve of UNIP and the present 
system is a means of confirming and extending that power base.
The Local Administration Act, 1980 has succeeded in establishing 
a District Council which is capable of being an effective instrument of 
communication between the District and the Government hierarchies or 
between the Council and the Party hierarchies, for instance, between the 
Council and the Minister for Decentralization or Provincial MCC, respectively. 
The Act has, however, failed to provide a structure through which local 
people can influence local decisions due to lack of elected representation 
on the District Councils. The Act has also failed to provide a machinery 
with which to check, balance and direct the Civil Service, parastatal and 
other organizations operating in the District so that their activities
and operations are together canalized towards one objective.
The circumstances under which the local administration system 
was established in Zambia were that the Party is supreme, as the highest 
policy-making body in the land. Consequently, whatever institutions 
exist in the Districts should operate as structural extensions of the 
Party and therefore bound to carry out Party policies in their respective 
operations. In an attempt to make District Councils structural extensions 
of the Party, two major defects have emerged in the local administration 
system. The first concerns the composition of the District Councils: 
composed of councillors the majority of whom are not elected but 
appointed to the District Council. The election of the Ward Chairman, 
which is restricted to Party members only, does not meet the claim that 
the system vested power in the people. 'Power to the people' should 
include the concept of participatory democracy, namely that all qualified 
voters, registered for the purposes of election of members of the National 
Assembly, living in the ward, should participate in the election of the 
majority of the members of the District Council, including its Chairman.
The heavy presence of Presidential appointees in the National 
Council, the Central Committee or the District Councils might destroy 
political spirit, dynamism and activities among the Zambian people. 
Notwithstanding the attainment of Independence and the establishment of 
a One-Party system, both apparently launched on a participatory democracy 
pad, the politicization of the population should continue if that 
participatory democracy is to be achieved and the liberty, rights and 
interests of the citizens are to be maintained and safeguarded. The 
District Council, with its grassroots basis, should be the appropriate 
forum in which to learn and practice participatory democracy. Ihat calls 
for District Councils whose members - at least the majority - are
elected by the local inhabitants.
The second 'defect' is that of the role of the DG, the Chairman 
of the District Council. The success or failure of the present system of 
local administration will, to great extent, depend on whether this public 
officer, the Party's most active local functionary, provides a viable 
link between the centre and the district. The DG is primarily the 
Presidential representative at the district level. The political role of 
the DG was more important during the multi-party system as the 'eyes and 
ears' of UNIP than under the One-Party system. Under the multi-party 
system the DG reported on the state of local politics, manipulated 
politics on behalf and in the name of UNIP. Under the One-Party system 
and under the Local Administration Act, 1980, the DG has open-ended 
functions that are essentially political but not necessarily partisan.
His general responsibility for the administration of his area matches 
the responsibility undefinable in advance, of the Party: there are many 
problems he must solve by his personal authority rather than on the basis 
of legal powers. There is, therefore, a need for improvement in the 
calibre of DGs. As representatives of the President and hierarchic 
superiors of all specialist chief officers, the DGs are more than 
co-ordinators primus inter pares Government or Party officials in the 
district: they are national leaders performing national duties.
The Local Administration Act provides the framework within which 
the DG asserts his authority in the name of the President. As such he is 
more responsive to the President than to the people in his district. He is 
not accountable to any electorate or the District Council, except to the 
President. That introduces or extends the dominant role of the President 
into local administration. A chairman of the District Council elected by 
the inhabitants would be more responsive to the local people than a DG 
who is in the district to represent the President.
The role of the Party in the maintenance of law and order at the 
grassroots level should be viewed in its true perspective. The Local 
Administration Act, although it makes reference to the ward chairman, 
has left the administration below the District level untouched. The 
consequence has been that local Party officials are left to determine 
how the day-to-day life of the Zambian people should be managed. Each 
rural and urban area has its own peculiar social, economic and political 
problems and characteristics that defy a blanket national prescription 
but which are best left to be handled by the local leaders. In certain 
parts of the country some villages are nothing but homesteads of few 
scattered families, while in other areas villages are expansive 
settlements. In urban areas there are a mixture of shanty and squatter 
compounds, medium, low and high-cost areas. The maintenance of law and 
order particularly in the shanty and squatter compounds cannot be left 
to the formal police alone. Under a multi-party system it would be quite 
difficult for several political parties to take it upon themselves to 
maintain law and order in the community. Under a One-Party system, the 
ruling Party assumes a 'national' role and it is in that context that 
UNIP officials perform administrative and quasi-judicial roles. The 
problem in this regard is not whether UNIP should maintain law and order, 
but whether a 'political party' should perform such functions. In that 
context the problem is tied up with the legal status of the Party.
In the meantime, pending clarification of the legal status 
of the ruling Party under a One-Party system in particular and political
parties in general, it is proper that a political party such as UNIP,
operating under a One-Party system and under circumstances in which the 
police cannot effectively police all areas, should assume the role of 
maintaining law and order. UNIP is a public institution and that would
be performing a public function.
(g) The Party and the Labour Movement.
The fundamental principle and objective of UNIP are that the
Party is the supreme organization and guiding political force in the
land. It was obvious that the prohibition of competitive political
association brought about by the One-Party system was likely to adversely
affect the formation and role of other groups such as trade unions, which,
though non-political, would come under the constant surveillance out of
suspicion that they might develop along political lines. The attempts by
those in the leadership of UNIP to ensure that no activity of any national
or local significance can take place in Zambia outside the auspices of
UNIP, do not come as a surprise. The accusation that certain leaders of
the labour movement are against socialist policies of the Party, is obvious
indication of the labour movements' rejection to conform to the all-
embracing role of the Party. At the same time the labour movements'
protest at the Party's interference in labour matters reveals the Party's
attempts to ensure that the labour movement does not develop along
certain political lines unacceptable to the Party.^
The ZCTU's insistence at engaging in political confrontations
with UNIP is, however, futile and probably more harmful to the labour
movement itself than to UNIP. There is no doubt that trade unions are often
freer under the capitalist and multi-party system than under a 'socialist'
and one-party system. In Zambia the role of the trade unions is laid
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down and regulated by the Industrial Relations Act, 1971, which does 
not assign the Party any role in labour matters. The Party, however, 
operates on the principle stated earlier that it is the supreme institution 
in the land and can interfere in the activities of subordinate organizations
1. Chiluba v. Attorney-General (1981) ZR HN/713 (unreported) Exhibit
'FJTC 1', p. 29, being the 'Address to the Nation 
by President Kaunda on Monday, 27th June, 1981; 
supra, p. 420.
2. Zambia: 1971, No. 36, Cap. 508.
including trade unions. It is, however, ’illogical' for the ZCTU to take
it upon itself the task of challenging the establishment or the continuance
of the One-Party system in Zambia. The ZCTU's resistance to its designation
as a mass organization of UNIP, has resulted in the deletion from the
Constitution of the Party of the provision which had stated that there
shall be workers' organizations affiliated to the ZCTU^ and the insertion
of the provision that there shall be workers' organizations affiliated to 
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the Party. One of the immediate consequences of this change shall be that
individual trade unions will be (pui)suaded - if not required - to affiliate
to the Party. That will, in theory, divide the labour movement in that some
trade unions might refuse to be affiliated to the Party. In practice, it is
very unlikely that any trade union would vote against being affiliated to
the Party. Consequently, as more or all trade unions affiliate to the Party,
the ZCTU would stand isolated; that might signal the beginning of its demise.
That would be a tragic lose to Zambia's labour movement because the ZCTU
has an important role to play as the cog in the trade union wheel.
A good working relationship between the Party and the ZCTU is
essential not necessarily for the same reason advanced by political leaders,
the supremacy of the Party, but for the sake of the economic prosperity of
the country and industrial peace and stability. Zambia's economic prosperity
is dependent on copper for labour utilization and the earning of foreign
currency. The Party, the Government and parastatal organizations with their
ever-increasing, relatively well-paid urban labour force, are dependent on
peaceful industrial relations in the copper-mining industries in particular
and the other economic sectors in general. The labour movement covers all
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the major sectors of the economy. Accordingly, a labour movement that toes the
1. UNIP: Constitution, 1978, Art. 59(2) and (3); supra, p. 417.
2. Constitution, 1988, Art. 81(2).
3. Supra, p. 413, TABLE G showing the major trade unions
in Zambia.
Party line is, therefore, essential to the Party.
A labour movement's exclusive control of worker-power is subject 
to the political party's exclusive control of political power. Under a
One-Party system, a labour movement, in order safely to protect the 
interests of the workers, should adopt a less defiant opposition to the 
ruling party. That does not mean that it should not criticize those 
party measures it considers contrary to the interests of the workers, but 
it should aim at influencing Party decisions rather than confrontation.. 
Confrontation with the ruling party might result in party-inspired 
conflicts in the labour movement, intended to effect a change in leadership 
in the labour movement so that leadership went to those inclined to work 
in harmony with the party. The loser in such a situation would be the 
labour movement. The appointment to the Central Committee of UNIP of the 
Chairman of the powerful ZMU, Timothy Walamba and the the Deputy General 
Secretary of the ZCTU, John Sichone, at the 10th Party Congress held in 
August, 1988, clearly shows that the UNIP leadership purports to isolate 
some of the ZCTU militant leaders such as Fredrick Chiluba and Newstead 
Zimba, the ZCTU Chairman-General and General Secretary, respectively, 
from the Party on one hand and the trade unions, on the other hand.^ This 
development shows that the Party has failed to resolve the conflict 
existing between UNIP and the ZCTU over the designation of the latter. In 
the final analysis the loser will be the ZCTU: the Party might either 
change its entire leadership or abolish it altogether.
Law is an instrument of social change. In Zambia the courts
will have to face the challenge and decide on matters that are steeped
in political controversies. The real world of the judge to-day is full
of quasi-political issues. The judicial attitude in the detention cases
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brought before the courts by the trade unions leaders in 1981 revealed
1.
2.
Supra, p. 428 
Supra, p. 422 et seq.
that a dispute between the Party and trade unions could not be 
solved through the courts of law. There is, therefore, a need for 
legislation to clarify the role of the Party in labour relations. Such 
legislation would also clarify the role of the Party Committee at the 
Place of Work.^ One advantage of such clarification would that it 
would provide a framework within which the Party, the labour movement 
and the judiciary, would exercise their respective roles. The recent 
developments in the relationship between the Party and the labour
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movement in which trade unions are required to affiliate to the Party, 
and the apparent isolation of the ZCTU might not solve the problem of the 
relationship between these organizations: these are temporary devices 
to suit the present leadership in the Party and the ZCTU. Long term 
solutions are required, hence the proposals that legislation should be 
enacted to clarify the role of UNIP in labour matters.
Whether in a multi-party or a single-party system, the ruling 
party cannot run the State a l o n e O t h e r  'national' organizations such as 
trade unions play a vital role in the economic affairs of the country. In 
Zambia UNIP cannot hope to run the affairs of Zambia alone without the 
support of the labour movement. The labour movement, on the other hand, 
cannot hope to function effectively without the support of UNIP. It is, 
therefore, essential that the leadership of these otherwise complementary 
organizations learnt to work together and build a democratic culture and 
peaceful co-existence between them. Without a spirit of mutual goodwill and 
understanding, laws alone will not create a cordial relationship between 
UNIP and the ZCTU in particular and other trade unions in general. In the 
final analysis the labour leadership will have to accept the leading role 
of the Party leadership: political leadership is a prerogative of the Party.
1. Supra, p. 432.
2. UNIP: Constitution, 1988, Art. 81(2).
3. Schapiro, L., "Can the Party Alone Run a One-Party State?”, in his
Political Opposition in One-Party States;
Macmillan, 1972, pp. 15-22.
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(h) The Party and Foreign Policy.
The study of institutions - such as this one on the legal 
aspects of the role of UNIP in Zambia - can give rise to theories about 
how they should operate and their relationship with other institutions.
The colonial situation in which UNIP emerged, was not circumscribed by 
detailed laws on the role of public institutions, let alone political 
parties, perhaps because the rational British mind did not like to define 
things clearly, prefering to leave institutions and their procedures to 
the discretion of the administrators. Law was restricted to the general 
principles embodied in legislation and rules developed by the courts. It 
was in the main limited to litigation and regarded as something of special 
interest to lawyers. Law was not considered as an aspect of the relationship 
between the Imperial Power and its dependency or between or among the 
dependencies themselves. The Imperial Power's conduct of 'colonial affairs' 
was one area which was not subject to legal control.
Throughout this study the dominant role of the President has 
featured in practically all aspects of the role of UNIP. The President's 
dominant role has of course permeated the formulation and implementation 
of Zambia's foreign policy. Two major factors have contributed towards 
the President's control of foreign policy. First, the fight against 
colonial rule in general and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland^ in 
particular between 1953 and 1963, introduced an element of urgency in the 
struggle for self-determination. There was during that period no room to 
question the methods those in the leadership of nationalist movements 
adopted in presenting African demands to colonial rulers. The dominant role 
of the President was, therefore, shaped by internal as well as external
1. Supra, p. 70.
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factors. Internally, the masses were united behind their leaders, 
convinced that whatever their leaders said or did were to their (the 
masses') interest. Externally, the leaders were given a 'free-hand' in 
the manner they demanded 'freedom now' from the colonial masters. After 
Independence the role of the President, though regulated by the provisions 
of the Constitutions of the Republic and of the Party, the 'free-hand' 
has continued with regard to foreign policy. The lack of an effective 
mechanism for imposing control or influence over the President's role 
in foreign affairs and the imprecise legal status of the Party - a 
subject which has featured frequently in this study - have enabled the 
President to decide unchallenged, what is suitable for the Party and for 
Zambia with regard to relations with other political parties or States.
Secondly, during the colonial era the conduct of 'foreign 
relations' of the Protectorate of NR fell within the prerogative powers 
of the Crown exercised by the Governor on behalf of the Crown. The exercise 
of prerogative powers was not subject to question in any Court or forum.
The President inherited the prerogative powers of the Crown at Independence 
for instance, he enters into any treaty or recognizes any Government or 
State or deploys the armed forces or diplomatic representatives in his own 
discretion in the exercise of prerogative powers. These two major factors, 
combined with President Kaunda's long leadership of UNIP, since 6th January, 
1960, and of Zambia, since 24th October, 1964, have contributed to his 
dominant role in the formulation and implementation of Zambia's foreign 
policy and the conduct of foreign relations.
In Shipanga v. Attorney-General^ the Supreme Court was 
confronted with several problems but the Court ignored the fact that the 
exercise of foreign policy involved political considerations and the 
application of prerogative powers and was accordingly not a suitable subject 
of judicial review. What was involved in that case was the question whether
1. (1976) ZR 227, (1977) ZR 53 and (1978) ZR 71, supra, pp. 475 - 479.
the courts could review UNIP's policy on the liberation struggle in 
Southern Africa. While other institutions of State and the Party organs 
implement Party policies as a matter of course, the judiciary stands in 
a different, difficult and unique position: it does not enforce Party
policies unless and until the same have been converted into law by 
Parliament. Much of what is referred to as 'foreign policy' cannot be 
converted into law, hence, much of the Party's activities touching on 
Zambia's foreign relations are matters left in the realm of the political 
role of the Party exercised prominantly by the President. The role of 
the courts is to determine any application or matter or question brought 
before them, and, to make such orders, issue such writs and give such 
directions as they might consider necessary.'*’ Foreign relations are, 
however, one of those activities of the State in which the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the Courts cannot be carried out without conflict with 
the Party and the Government; in particular the Executive.
Under the present law UNIP is not a State organ notwithstanding
the provisions of the Constitution of Zambia which recognizes it as the
sole political organization in the country. The provisions of the Party
Constitution that the Political, Legal and Ideological sub-Committee of
the Committee of Chairmen shall work as the principal link between the
Party and Liberation Movements and guide the Government on foreign 
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policy, can only be implemented in accordance with the laws of Zambia.
The Party cannot, for instance, carry out State functions such as
immigration controls. Although the Constitution of Zambia provides some
safeguards against abuse of power by the Executive and protects and
guarantees to all persons in Zambia the right to life, liberty, security 
of the person and the protection of law and freedom of conscience,
1. Zambia;
2. UNIP:
Constitution of Zambia Act, 1973, Art. 29.
Constitution, 1988, Art. 65(3) (B)(c) and (f).
expression, assembly and association, there is no protection from executive 
'abuse* of foreign policy. A 'wrong1' foreign policy can lead to shortages 
of essential foodstuffs through blockade or to insecurity through attacks 
on the population by foreign aggressors. Granted that the present method 
of formulating and implementing Zambian foreign policy is dominated by the 
President mainly by historical accidentf e.g. the inherited prerogative 
powers bequeathed by colonial rule, there should be regular consultations 
on foreign policy on a broad national basis so that all sections of the 
community are offered an opportunity to put across their views on a matter 
of national importance and public interest. For instance, members of the 
public should be given an opportunity to comment on the Party's consistent 
pre-occupation with southern African affairs. Under a Cne-Party system 
where there are no alternative foreign policies, a seminar attended by 
representatives of the Party, the Government and other interested public 
organizations should be regularly convened, say once in two years, to 
review Zambia's foreign policy and relations in general terms.
Conclusion.
At the beginning of this study it was stated that although 
political parties are among the most prominent organizations in those 
countries in which they are allowed to function, yet little has been 
written about their legal origins, status and role. This study has given 
some insights into the origins, status and role of UNIP in Zambia under 
law and showed that although Zambia is governed by law, one of its most 
prominent and leading institutions of government, UNIP, is only vaguely 
recognized by law: it can even be proscribed by a public officer, the 
Registrar of Societies. Proposals for reform of the Party - or the 
Zambian One-Party Participatory Democracy - to make it a more effective 
instrument of national reconstruction and unity as well as the servant of a
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democratic society by making it more representative, responsive and 
recognizable than it is at the moment, will, to some extent, depend 
on the status of the Party.
Given its size, significance and involvement in a wide range 
of social, eonomic and political and even quasi-judicial and some 
administrative functions, it is unsatisfactory that the legal status of 
such institution should be surrounded by ambiguity or to be matter of 
doubt or speculation. It is appropriate that the law explicitly provides 
for the status and role of UNIP and gives the Party a certain precise, 
however limited, legal capacity. Such a law would go a long way in 
removing some ambiguity and provide a clear relationship between the 
Party and other institutions such as the Executive, Parliament, vis-a-vis 
its legislative role, and, the judiciary, in particular in its role of 
judicial review of Party activities. The Party's opposition to Parliament 
enacting such legislation lest such an exercise confirmed the supremacy 
of Parliament at the expense of the supremacy of the Party, could be 
removed by a realization that Parliament is an organ of the Party and 
that such legislation would be the Party giving itself the status through 
one of its own specialized institutions.
Political system come and go. Political leaders come and go.
However, while a political system and a political leadership are in
existence, they should strive to work for the benefit of the majority in
the community. UNIP would be democratically constituted and run within
the context of its Constitution. However, the 'central role' of UNIP in
Zambia's One-Party Participatory Democracy is apparently played by the
President and the Party is a 'legitimizing agency' of that role. Hence,
one former Prime Minister of Zambia in bidding farewell to his staff said:
We serve in the name of the People,
We serve in the name of the Party, and
We serve in the name of the President.
The bite was in the tail!
*****
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Dear Sir,
You have duriag the past twenty-five years, beea closely 
associated with coastitutioaal development of Zambia as a 
freedbm-fighter, Party aad Goverament leader and diplomat.' Your' 
experience and views about Zambia's constitutional Development 
are not only important and of interest, but extremely useful to 
students of Zambia's Constitutional history. It is for this 
reason that the following questions are appropriately addressed 
to you:-
1* Multiple-Party System
If the 1963-1972 multiple Party System had continued 
to date, do you think Zambia would have developed 
a peaceful multiple-party system?
ANSWER NO. ONE (1)
I do not think that Zambia would have developed a peaceful multi-Party
System (vide my second reading speech in December 1972 on the Constitution for 
the second Republic). It has now been proved that UNIP and ANC were always one 
Party. Former ANC members and officials have been comfortably accommodated wi­
thin UNIP rank and file. If we had continued with a multi-Party System there 
would not have been any division based on principles or policy differences 
l>nt: ; • . purely on personalities.
It is differences based on personalities which usually generate personal 
hatred and violence.
It has been the experience of our region that South Africa is being 
engaged in destabilising neighbours. In Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho and
Zimbabwe, South Africa is engaged in supporting "opposition” or dissident 
groups fighting against the Governments of those independent neighbouring 
African States. By so doing, South Africa is reducing the rate of deve­
lopment. She wants to prove that Africans are worse-off under the rule 
of their own people.
In Zambia South Africa had already started to support certain 
elements in the ANC. Adamson Mushala was trained in South Africa by 
South Africans. No doubt more would have been trained if One Party 
State did not come.
South Africa was mentioned as having been involved in the organi­
sation of the 1980 attempted coup in Zambia. South Africa was also involved 
in connection with the second group that wanted to rescue the people who 
were facing the 1980 treason charges.
This clearly means that if we had an organised opposition political 
group, South Africa would have supported it both politically, materially and 
militarily and would have made use of it in the distabtLising campaign. Indeed 
other imperialist group of countries - west and east - would also have suppor­
ted this group.
I do not think that ANC or any other political group would have won 
against UNIP sooner or later; there would, however, have been a lot of inter- 
Party violence and a lot of loss of life as was happening before the introdu­
ction of one Party and as it is happening in Zimbabwe today. I strongly 
believe that the introduction of One Party State in Zimbabwe (if it was 
populary and lovingly done) would see an end to violence there.
2. Witnesses before the National Commission
As Chairman of the National Commission on the 
Establishment of the One Party Participatory 
Democracy in Zambia in 1972, what was your 
impression of the thousands of people who testified 
before the Commission?
ANSWER NO .2
The witnesses appear to know what they had come to propose. They 
wanted to see peace and development in our country. They wanted a Consti­
tution which would guarantee them and the posterity, freedom to live in 
happiness and contentment. They also wanted to see serious Party and 
Government officials dedicated to the welfare of the people. They thought 
these should be elected. They were genuine in feeling that we would elimi­
nate violence by being a One Party State. People wanted to be free to choose 
the best people for public positions.
Though the Terms of Reference did not permit us to hear evidence for 
or against the introduction of One Party Participatory Democracy, we allowed 
a reasonable time for those who wanted to expound on the advantages or disad­
vantages of One Party System. There were a few who expressed opposition to 
the introduction of One Party System. The over-whelming- majority were for 
it. They freely proposed the type of Constitution or administration they 
wanted to see under that System. The Commission also received evidence from 
some of the political detainees who appeared to represent the other detainees.
All in all I feel the National Commission had evidence from a cross- 
section of the Zambian Community who gave us valuable suggestions om which 
we based our Report.
3. Tanzania’s Influence
It has been alleged in some quarters that the 
decision to introduce the one Party system in 
Zambia was influenced by the introduction of 
the similar system in Tanzania. Is this correct?
ANSWER NO.3.
Tanzania and Zambia are neighbouring countries. Tanzania got independence 
before Zambia. It is clear that anything that was introduced in Tanzania and 
which worked well was considered by the Zambian leadership. This equally 
applies to other countries like Malawi and Kenya. Indeed Zambia has exchanged 
visits with various countries, has borrowed ideas from those countries and 
vice versa. It would therefore not be fair to say that we were not influenced 
by the success of one Party System in Tanzania. If it had failed badly, we 
probably would not have introduced it in Zambia.
However, the method of implementing it varied according to the political 
situation in our country. It seems that in Tanzania the other Party or Pqrties 
simply disappeared. In our case the National Commission was appointed which 
included leaders of the ANC the main opposition group. Though they did not 
take part in the work of the Commission, the Government at least showed that 
they wanted the Commission to be all-embracing.
As a first step towards introduction of One Party Participatory Democracy, 
from December 1972 all members of Parliament became members of the one and only 
political party, the United National Independence Party by operation of law - 
card or no card. ANC MPS were free to resign their s$ats if they did not want 
to become UNIP M.P.s. In fact none did. For over six months they continued 
to sit as non-card carrying members of UNIP. They continued to participate 
in the debates and were free to vote as they liked until the Choma Declaration 
in 1973 which dissolved ANC.
Speaking at the Mulungushi Conference in 198*t, President Nyerere stressed 
that each time he and his delegation attend UNIP Mulungushi General Conference, 
they learn a lot of things which they implement back in Tanzania* This shows 
that Tanzania learns as much from Zambia as we learn from Tanzania. However 
Zambians suffer from inferiority complex. They think that it is a one way 
traffic. This is not correct. A simple example is that Tanzania introduced 
the post of Secretary-General of the Party (senior to the post of Prime Minister) 
after we introduced our Constitutional set up in Zambia which was recommended 
by the National Commission.
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4. Fundamental Humaft Rights
Have you been cheered or disappointed by the last 
ten years of One Party system in Zambia in particular 
in connection with the enforcement of the Fundamental 
Rights and Freedom of the Individual provisions 
(Bill of Rights) contained in the Constitution 
of Zambia?
ANSWER NO.4.
Due to the fact that I have been in the Government it is clear 
I would be biased in answering this question. I should say that I 
have definitely been impressed by the way His Excellency the President 
Dr. Kaunda and the top colleagues have adhered to the constitution both 
in words and actions. I definitely believe that any excesses or breaches 
in the enforcement of the law has been due to the Police themselves.
There could be some cases where one would have preferred that 
the discretion was better exercised. On the whole, I am very satisfied
indeed with the way the One Party System has worked. Our situation is
a sharp contrast to very low standards in other countries. The Press 
and the Judiciary (partifculary ,the. latter) are independent. One feels 
proud about this. The press is less free due to lack of self-control
on the part of the press themselves.
5. Discipline in the Party
As a former Secretary General of the United 
National Independence Party were you satisfied 
with the
t
(a) . calibre of leaders in the Party;
(b) discipline in the Party and the Nation; and
(c) commitment of leaders to Party policies.
ANSWER N0.5«
(a) I feel that I am very satisfied with the calibre of leaders in the 
Party at Section, Branch, Ward, District, Provincial and National 
levels At the lower level the leaders are freely elected by. Party 
members. From the District upwards they are generally nominated 
by His Excellency the President. I am generally satisfied with the 
leaders. I do not think
that any other leader would find entirely different and better leaders 
than those that are there. Certainly there cure some who are 'black 
sheep'. This would be the case anywhere in the world.
(b) I am completely dissatisfied with the discipline in the Party and
the Nation. It is difficult to know what is the cause of this. Since 
I have not been asked to say why. I should just repeat that I am 
completely dissatisfied with the discipline in the Party and the Nation.
I should however, explain why I express satisfaction with (a) regarding 
calibre while expressing dissatisfaction with (b) regarding discipline 
and dedication* I interpret calibre in the widest sense of being entitled 
to hold the positions they hold; not in the 6ense that they are putting 
in their best. I do not feel that our Party officials and people in our 
nation are putting in their best in the tasks they are given.
(c) From what one hears I am also not satisfied with the commitment of the 
leaders to party policies. I do not read of leaders propounding on 
policies which have been announced. The Philosophy of Humanism is 
referred to in very loose terms of being humane to others. The practice 
or actions of the leaders appear to be different from what they pro­
claim. This is my impression. The solution seems to be to adjust party 
policies to be in line with the nature, propensity and the expectations 
of the ordinary party cadres. These seem to be very concerned about their 
own welfare when they get old or when they cease to hold office. They do 
not feel that the present policies are a guarantee for them. Due to the 
extended family system, the responsibilities of an African leader or a 
well to-do person is almost limitless.
6. National Philosophy of Humanism
Would you say the National Philosophy of Humanism 
has failed or succeeded in Zambia?
ANSWER NO.6.
The National Philosophy of Humanism has greatly succeeded in Zambia. 
Everyone is proud to proclaim Zambia's belief in Humanism. This is some­
thing which most of our people are proud of. However, the problem is that 
Humanism is, itself, ill defined and I do not think that the people know 
what Humanism is. Host of them feel that Humanism means considering other 
people as fellow human beings and treating them as such. To this extent• 
Humanism has succeeded because everybody*at least makes efforts to be 
humanistic towards other people. Our people are dedicated to this ideal 
as they feel it is inborn and comes from their old tradition.
I should add that, in my view, Humanism as contained in "Humanism in 
Zambia and A Guide to its Implementation Part 1 " is generally what people 
have generally believed even before the coming of the white man. Moreover, \ 
Humanism Part 1 is a practical . • outline of how rural people can develop
on the basis of self-reliance. The only problem is that there is no cal­
culated campaign to orientate people's .minds on the basis of the pamphlet. 
More should be done by National Guidance Ministry.
We should not talk in abstract or introduce too many phrases or 
schemes such as Green Revolution, Agrarian Revolution, Operation Food 
Production and more recently National Crusade. At least we should make 
it clear they are part of implementing Humanism. This makes people forget 
Humanism Part I which contains practical guidelines.
I would like to comment on "Humanism in Zambia Part II." I do not 
think our people have understood it. They have wondered where we are 
going. It is not clear whether it is a national philosophy or the thoughts 
of a forward-looking leader. I think it has made people not to be serious 
about Part I as well.
7. Election of President
One of your (Chona Commission’s) recommendations 
was that the President of Zambia should hold office 
for two Five-Year terms only (as in the USA). The 
Government rejected this recommendation. Why did 
the Government reject this recommendation?
ANSWER NO.7.
It is difficult to answer for the Government. Evidently they did 
not find it appropriate in the political circumstances of that time.
I cannot speak for other members of the Commission. I myself was 
delighted in that most of our recommendations were implemented. I did 
not expect all of them to be accepted as they were mere recommendations.
I believe in the power and indelibility of the written word. Our 
Report remains a shopping list which the future generations of Zambians 
will consult for possible and practical formulas. I am sure that the 
"two terms" proposal will be implemented at some future.
8. Duration Unlimited
In your opinion should the President of Zambia hold 
office for not more than two terms, or continue 
in office as long as the people elect him? Are 
powers of the President too wide or narrow?
ANSWER NO.8.
My own sincere opinion is that a President should serve a maximum of 
two terms. After that he should not stand as candidate. He should give 
chance to others. He should not succeed himself more than two times. How­
ever he should be eligible to stand for election after another person has 
been President - however short the term of the other person may be. I was 
converted to the "two terms" provision by reasons of the witnesses who gave 
evidence to our Commission.
I, however, agreed with the Government that this "two terms" clause 
could not be applied now as Kenneth Kaunda was a father figure. He is also 
not associated with strong link with any major tribe in Zambia.
The function of a constitution is to bring peace and stability. No
one could doubt that Zambia's peace and stability was assured as long as
Kenneth Kaunda was President. This argument outweighed the arguments in 
our Commission which did not have a particular President in mind.
As for the present powers of the President in our Constitution, on 
paper, they do not appear too wide. There are provisions for him to consult.
If these consultations continue to take place, they are not too wide. Other­
wise they are. The leadership changes in February, 1981 and April 1985 (when 
both the "No.2" and "No.3" were suddenly replaced at one time without suffi­
cient reasons) pfoved that under our Constitution only one person was in charge. 
There seems to be no collective leadership as was thought to be the case. There 
was no longer a real No.2 or No.3 as any of them can be removed at the stroke 
of the pen.
I understand that in the case of April 1985 changes, one of the top offi­
cials replaced had been elected at UNIP General Conference as a Member of the
Central Committee. Unless he asked to relinguish his membership of the Ceptral 
Committee, it means that our Constitution gives power to the President to remove 
elected Members-of the Central Committee. This widens the powers than was thought 
to be the case.
A further feature appears to be developing of the President publicly 
indicating support for a particular person as candidate for Membership of the 
Central Committee long before the Meeting of the National Council. The Consti­
tution has made provision for the President indicating to the (out-going) Central 
Committee in private the candidate whom the President of the Party intends to 
support. The person to be replaced should be present to prevent leadership split.
Admittedly the Presidential indication is not done as a fait accompli. 
However, unless strong statements can come from the Party stressing the freedom
/8 cont'd
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of any members to stand against a candidate selected by the President, 
the conclusion will be that under our constitution the President, is 
in effect, empowered to remove and replace Members of the Central 
Committee as he sees fit. That is to say, that he can remove any 
elected member he wants to remove and appoint anyone else of his 
choice.
The Presidential powers of detention without trial, of course 
are, too wide. From my experience as a lawyer, I found it was extre­
mely difficult even for an innocent person to win a Habeas Corpus 
application. We are lucky that Kenneth Kaunda is President. Another 
person could misuse the present unlimited discretion to detain practi­
cally anyone he wanted - however innocent that person is.
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9. Election of Members of the Central Committee
Are you satisfied with the present method of . 
election of Member of the Central Committee?
ANSWER NO.9.
Yes. A lot of people are calling for complete freedom of choice in 
the election of Members of the Central Committee. They are wrong. This 
method was tried in 1967* The Provinces formed pacts - Eastern with Western 
and North-Western while Southern Province formed a pact with the Northern, 
Central, Luapula and Copperbelt Provinces. The results were not respected 
by the people of the provinces from where defeated candidtes came. Zambia 
may never recover from the divisions created at that fateful 1967 Mulungushi 
General Conference.
The present system is good in that the President selects people he 
proposes to be on the Central Committee. He presents it privately to the 
out-going Central Committee. The people who are left out are present.
In drawing up the list he ensures that all parts of Zambia are represented 
as far as possible. This is a constitutional requirement which would not be 
observed if there were free elections.
After that, as a united group, the Central Committee presents the 
list to the National Council. This prevents divisions 'and pre-election 
campaigns before the General Conference.
The National Council as a United group then presents the list to 
the General Conference. The system ensures that leaders are united. This 
reduces to minimum the need for actual voting at a General Conference, which 
voting would result in divisions as in 1967* The voting should only take 
place if delegates are not satisfied about the provincial or ethnic bala­
ncing on the list presented or if a particularly popular candidate has been 
left out.
Admittedly, due to the trust and confidence in President Kaunda, most 
Members of the Central Committee, National Council and General Conference 
rarely make serious challenge to the list presented. But the right is there 
and I feel satisfied with the present method.
My only worry is the way the Members elected at Mulungushi are liable 
to be removed and replaced any time the President thinks fit. Future Pre­
sidents will regard this as their right and may over-do it. This would 
reduce all Members of the Central Committee to the level of mere nominees 
of the President.
10 . One or two Constitutions?-
At the moment there are two Constitutions, one for 
the Party and the other for the Republic. Do you 
support this arrangement or would you like to see 
one Constitution containing Party and State matters
ANSWER NO.10.
I have, hitherto, been too British in my attitude towards the 
question of "legalising** the Party Constitution* I have felt that 
the power of the Party Constitution has depended on the correctness 
of the Party policies* I have not shared the view that the Party 
Constitution should be spelt out as being supreme to the Republican 
Constitution* I felt that this did not matter* I have felt that the 
Party Constitution was politically powerful as it was an instrument 
for changing the Republican Constitution* I have felt that a political 
Party should itself be governed by flexible rules since political 
situations are volatile and not predictable*
I have felt that the Party was Supreme in terms of usefulness and 
as a father and mother of the Republican Constitution and any institu­
tion in the land* This is the position whether the Party be regarded as 
an association or otherwise*
Most Socialist constitutions merely state that the ruling Party 
is "the leading political force"* They are not as specific as we are 
in stating that there is one and only one Political Party - the United 
National Independence Party* Infact most socialist countries (including 
China) claim to be multi-party states*
Thanks to other Schools of thought,our Constitution is now a legally 
binding instrument which is part and parcel of the Republican Constitution* 
This is excellent* I have not hearc^ further suggestions that the Party and 
Republican Constitutions should be merged into one* I do not see any need
V
for this. ' c__— ------- ..
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11. Further Observations
Any other observations regarding the Constitutional 
development of Zambia.
ANSWER NO.11.
There should be a post of Deputy Prime Minister. The Party 
should be wholly funded by the State and should not engage in business. 
People are using the Party to make money and enrich themselves while 
tarnishing the image of the Party as an exploiter and profiteer.
Yours faithfully*
• jlAa.- <1. 2 c  
CL^ s.(Signed)
(Designation) — AMBASSADOR 
(Address) 5 ? - - 1_Zambia_*£JTung Sze Street, 
SAN LI TUN, PEKING. PEOPLE'S REP. OF CHINA.
(Date) — J§TH JULYl  1 985
APPENDIX 'B*
Being Answers to Questions put to Mr George Lavu Mulimba 
on recent developments in the Local Administration in 
Zambia.
(pp. 552 - 569)
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OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF STATE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
P.O. BOX 50268 
LUSAKA 
ZAMBIA
8th August, 1985
Mr. Anold M. Mtopa LL.B (Hons)LL.M (Lond) , 
Lincoln Inn, Barrister at Law,
School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London,
Malet Street,
LONDON_____ WC
Dear M r . Mtopa,
I refer to your letter dated 1st May, 1985 and 
a remainder dated 29th July, 1985. I apologise for 
submitting the replies to your questions late.
Please find attached my answers to the nine (9) 
questions asked on the Zambian Local Government. I 
hope that you will find them useful material in your 
preparation of your PHD thesis.
ZAMBIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Yours faithfully,
LAVU MULIMBA, MP. 
MINISTER OF STATE
Enel
1. TANZANIAN INFLUENCY
To what extent was the introduction of dece­
ntralised local administration in Zambia influenced 
by the introduction of:-
(a) similar system in Tanzania?
(b) one Party system in Zambia?
ANSWER
Let us first of all look at the dates of what 
happened in both Tanzania and Zambia in as far as 
decentralisation is concerned. Tanzania's system of 
decentralisation came into effect in July, 1972 and 
was abolished in 1983. Zambia's local administration 
system formally came into being on 1st January, 1981.
It can be seen from these dates that the Zambian 
system was being introduced at a time when Tanzania had 
made it known that it was taking steps to reverse its 
decision on decentralisation and revert to the previous 
regime of Mayors and Town Clerks. There were in fact 
references to the Tanzanian moves in the Zambian 
Parliament in 1980 when the local Administration Bill 
was being debated. It is therefore true that the fact 
that Tanzania was about to discard a similar system at 
the time Zambia was legislating for the same did have 
some influence in Zambia on son.e members of the general 
public who were made to believe that if a similar system 
failed in Tanzania, there were no reasons why it should 
succeed in Zambia. This thinking was not shared by the 
Party and its Government who weathered some very 
vehement backbench opposition in Parliament to push through 
certain provisions of the Local Administration Bill.
It must be emphasised that the concept of decentralisation 
was fully supported both outside and inside Parliament.
What might be referred to as opposition to the Bill in 
Parliament was in respect of certain clauses relating 
to the Chairmanship of District Councils and financial 
arrangements between central Government and District§fCo*4A**k. 
So the impending abolition of a similar system in 
Tanzania did not have a decisive negative impact on
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prf the introduction of the decentralised local 
administration system in Zambia.
The introduction of a one-Party system in 
Zambia, coming as it did before the decentralised 
local administration system on 13th December, 197^L, 
paved the way for decentralisation in Zambia. It 
would have been more difficult to push through in 
a divided Parliament the Local Administration Act.
The inclusion of the District Political Secretary, 
the District Chairmen of the Youth and Women*s Leagues 
as ex-officio Councillors on the District Council 
would not have been possible without a One-Party 
system framework. The prior introduction of the 
One-Party system certainly made the introduction of 
the decentralised local administration system in 
Zambia much easier.
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2. "TRIBAL” DISTRICT COUNCIL ADMINISTRATION
Has the introduction of local administration conso­
lidated localization of tribal manpower in District 
Councils?
ANSWER
Prior to the introduction of the decentralised local 
administration system in Zambia, on 1st January, 1981, 
the appointment of staff to local Authorities was the 
responsobility of the Local Government Service Commi­
ssion. Local Authorities were responsible for the 
appointment of the category of staff referred to as 
National Joint Council (NJC). In general, local 
government service staff occupied posts on the permanent 
establishment of the Local Authorities, including 
of course, top management posts*, while NJC staff occu­
pied posts relating to seasonal or contractual work 
done by Local Authorities. The bulk of Local Autho­
rities staff at the middle and junior management and 
administrative structures of Local Authorities has 
always been largely local. The Local Government 
Service Commission after the introduction of the trans­
ferable local government service in 1975, transferred 
many senior management staff from their original or local 
councils to other local authorities in order to streng­
then Zambia's motto of "One Zambia One Nation". The 
Local Government Service Commission, together with the 
local government service were abolished by the Local 
Administration Act of 1980, and the functions of the 
Local Government Service Commission transferred to the
Public Service Commission. Local Government Service
2/....
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Commission —^ Local Government Gorvico personnel 
were seconded to the Public Service.
The first appointments made by the Public 
Service Commission to District Council Secretariats 
at the Secretary level appeared to have been based 
on the need for secretaries to serve in the Districts 
where they could combine the advantages of knowing 
the local language and areas well. Although this 
was a general pattern at this level, there were 
several other Secretaries appointed to Districts 
which could not answer the description of being their 
"tribal" Districts. The general public reaction 
however was to regret the building ap of "tribal empires" 
in District Councils and a committment was made by the 
Public Service Commission to reverse the trend.
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3. PARTY MEMBERS ONLY ELECTORATE
Has the introduction of the "Party members only 
electorate" improved quality of Councillors or 
not?
ANSWER
It is not all Councillors who are elected to the 
Council by a "Party members only electorate". This 
provision applies only to the election of Chairmen 
of Ward Committees who, once elected as such, auto­
matically become Distict Councillors by the operation 
of Section 10(1) (d) of the Local Administration Act.
In fact there is no District Councillor who is elected 
directly to any District Council as such. All 
Councillors qualify for seats on the District Council 
as a result of th£ operation of section 10(1) of the 
Local Administration Act. The election of Ward Committee 
Chairman must therefore be seen first and foremost as 
an internal matter for the United National Independence 
Party (UNIP), in exactly the same way as other designated 
institutions given seats on the District Council are 
left to decide on the method they will adopt for nomi­
nating persons to represent them on the District Council. 
For example, the Councillor representing all other chiefs 
in the District is elected by a "Chiefsonly electorate".
The question of restricting the electorate for 
Ward Committee Chairman to members of the Party only 
lias nothing to do with, nor was it ever intended to 
be used as a tool to improve, the quality of Councillors 
representting the Wards or any other institution.
4. NO MAYOR
WHAT IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN BROUGHT BY THE RE­
PLACEMENT OF THE MAYOR BY THE DISTRICT GOVERNOR 
AS CHAIRMAN OF DISTRICT COUNCILS?
ANSWER
The Mayor never presided o v e r  the District Council 
as the District Governor does nowl It is not correct 
therefore to state that the District Governor has 
replaced the Mayor as Chairman of the District Council. 
Before Decentralisation, the Mayor chaired council 
meetings of local authorities charged with the admini­
stration of civic matters within the boundaries of a 
local authority. The District Governor was responsible 
for the co-ordination of the administration of Central 
Government departments operating within the District, 
as well as general supervision of the Party in the 
District. The District Council created by the local 
Administration Act of 1980 is a new administrative 
unit which did not exist before 1980.
The mayor, as Chairman of local authority council 
meetings did not have any executive powers, and the 
implementation of local authority council decisions 
was vested in the Town Clerk. This position has not 
changed much with the Distrit Governor becoming 
Chairman of District Council meetings. The powers of 
the District Council are vested in the Council when 
it sits as Council and not in the District Governor 
as Chairman. The District Governor however, unlike
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the mayor, is answerable to the District Council for 
the implementation of Council decisions and resolutions. 
The Local Administration Act makes the District 
Governor overall supervisor of the Council's administra­
tion. As Chief Administrator of the Council, the District 
Governor brings to the Chair, a better personal and 
detailed knowledge of the general administration of the 
Council as well as background information on issues 
coming before the council for decisions, than was the 
case of the part-time Mayor when he chaired local 
authority council meetings. This advantage can how­
ever become a disadvantage in cases where members of the 
District Council try to reverse an administrative deci­
sion made by the Council's administration in which the 
District Governor played a decisive role.
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5. ROLE OF CHIEFS IN LOCAL ADMINISTRATION
HAVE CHIEFS BEEN GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO PLAY AN 
EFFECTIVE ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR AREAS 
UNDER THE DECENTRALISED SYSTEM IN VIEW OF THE 
PRESENCE OF DISTRICT GOVERNOR, MEMBERS OF PARLIA­
MENT, DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEES IN DISTRICTS?
ANSWER
The Statutory functions of Chiefs are well tabu­
lated in the Chiefs Act and the Village Registration 
Act. The functions stated in these two Acts are 
perfomed in the Chief's area. Although the District 
Governor is in-charge of the whole District area, he
cannot replace the Chief in his area in the perfomance
pas
of the duties assigned to be ^ formed by the Chief.
A
Similary, a Member of Parliament will normally have 
several Chiefs in his or her Constituency. A Member 
of Parliament who wishes to succeed in fostering deve­
lopment in his Constituency, that is, in the various 
Chief's areas in his Consittuency, will enlist the 
active support and co-operation of chiefs in his 
constituency.
With the coming into effect of the Local Admini­
stration Act, 1980 the functions of the former District 
Development Committee have been vested in the Deve­
lopment Planning Committee of District Councils. This 
Committee makes recommendations to the District Council 
on th<7 development and development plans of sections, 
branches, wards and the District area as a whole.
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The presence therefore of Ward Councillors, 
Members of Parliament and District Governors does not 
in any way inhibit Chiefs from playing an effective 
role in the development of their areas under the 
decentralised system. If anything, their presence 
is supposed to compliment the chief's efforts in 
bringing about development in his area.
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6. TRADE UNIONS
IN MOST DISTRICT COUNCILS, TRADE UNION REPRESENTA­
TION IS LARGE. HAS THIS TRADE UNION DOMINANCE 
AFFECTED DECISION-MAKING IN DISTRICT COUNCILS?
ANSWER
Although a large number of Councillors in most 
District Councils are nominated by trade unions, once 
they becon.e Councillors, they sit as District Counci­
llors, they- cit w  Diotriot -Councillor-s and must make 
decisions in the interest of all the residents of the 
District Council area.
Decisions of the Council are made when the Council 
sits as a Council, that is^all the Councillors sitting 
as a District Council. Committees of the District are 
advisory to the Council; that is, they make recommenda­
tions only; to the Council. Trade Union Councillors 
do not have an in-built majority in the decision-making 
machinery of the District Council. There is therefore 
no trade union dominance in decision-making in District 
Councils.
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7. FINANCES
WHAT HAS BEEN THE FINANCIAL POSITION OF DISTRICT 
COUNCILS SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE DECENTRALISED 
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION?
ANSWER
The serious financial problems facing District 
Councils did not start with the introduction of the 
decentralised local administration system. District 
councils inherited serious financial problems which 
can be traced to the early 70s. Let me elaborate on 
some of them.
(a) Low Cost Housing
Prior to 1973, Government used to pay Unit Grants 
to local authorities to keep the rents of low cost 
housing down. But in 1973/74 Government withdrew 
the Unit crrants because of the worsenincr position 
of Central Government finances. It was hoped at 
the time of the withdrawal of the Unit Grants that 
local authorities would raise the rent levels 
of their low-cost housing upwards to balance their 
housing accounts. Local Authorities were however 
reluctant to do so until 1980, almost late in the 
day when costs had piled up. The result is th.*t 
the accumulated housing defecit by the and of 1983 
reached K50M. Party and Government policy is to 
reduce and remove completely grants and subsidies 
for consumption. District Councils must take action 
to liquidate this defecit.
2/
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(b) RATES
Rates are a tax on property. All property owners 
are subject to this tax. The Government is not 
exempt from paying rates. Wha** the Government does 
however is to pay a grant in lieu of rates on 
Government properties. Prior to 1975 the Govern­
ment used to pay its rates in full. After 1975, 
due to a fall in Government revenue, the Government 
has not been meeting its liability in full. For 
example, Governments actual liability for 1984 
was estimated at K11m and only K4.23m was contri­
buted leaving a short fall of K6.77m in local 
Government revenue. The trend now is for Govern­
ment to pay about 40% of its liability on rates 
to District Councils. Revenue from rates contri 
butes about one-third of the total income of 
District Councils with valuation rolls.
(c) PERSONAL LEVY
Apart from rates, personal levy is the only 
other direct ta& that District Councils are em- 
pwered to levy. Unfortunately, personal levy 
rates have remained unrevised since 1981. Attempts 
to have these rates revised upwards have beea rvpt
turned do*m by Central Government.
(d) RETAIL PRICE OF OPAQUE BEER
The intention for giving District Councils the 
monopoly to retail opaque beer was that profits
3/
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generated from the undertaking would be utilised 
to improve services in the low cost housing areas. 
What has since happened from 1964 is that the 
rental gross profit margin on opaque beer has 
decreased from 44% to 10%. The result is that most 
District Councils liquor establishments do not 
make any effective contributions to the Councils 
revenue. In fact most Councils are making net 
losses on running liquor undertakings. The answer 
lies in revising the retail price of opaque beer.
(e) SALARIES GRANT
The Government agreed in principle to finance the 
additional cost of salaries and wages resulting fron. 
the Government and ZULAWU decision to revise the salaries 
wages and housing allowances of local governmentservice 
officers and employees with effect from 1st August, 1980. 
to In 1984, however, the provision for this grant
was reduced by K5.3m. The salaries grant for 1985 is the 
same as f o r -1985 ia--fchc. same, as for 1984 . District 
Councils must find this shortfall from other sources or 
reduce staff.
The resources of District Councils revenue have, in 
general, remained unchanged before and after decentra­
lisation. District Councils have therefore not been 
able to keep pace with increased costs in the provision 
of existing services during the same period,While costs 
have been going up, and -down--and the sources of revenue 
have remained static. It is clear that the whole
3/.....
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financial relationship that exists between Central 
and Local Government must be looked at afresh and 
urgently. The case for local government f-inance inLomZ 
tax, independent of Central Government tax^has 
never been stronger.
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8. AS MINISTER OF STATE FOR DECENTRALISATION, OFFICE 
OF THE PRIME MINISTER, WHAT ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROBLEMS DID YOU ENCOUNTER?_________________________
ANSWER
The administrative problems emanated firstly, within 
the Division itself. The Provincial and Local Government 
Administrative Division as it was called^had no orienta­
tion on its new role or functions over Decentralisation. 
There was no clear-cut understanding of what decentralisa­
tion meant for the Division. As a result, the Division 
was not in a position to guide District Councils on the 
programme, priorities and strategy for the implementation 
of decentralisation.
Outside the Division the Central Committee and Cabinet 
had not agreed on a vertical and horizontal strategy 
for a programme dealing with the transfer of Central 
Government Ministry functions from Lusaka to District 
Councils since the passing of the Local Administration 
Act 1980. Although the name of the Division was re­
ferred to as Provincial and Local Adminiot^atifrfr Govern-
A  cl
ment Administration Division, it was made clear to me 
that I had nothing to do with Provincial Administration 
as Provinces were separate Ministries which fell under 
the responsibility of Members of the Central Committee 
in-charge of Provinces. The supervising officer for staff 
in District Council Secretariats is the Permanent 
Secretary of each Province and the Permanent Secretary 
at the Division has no direct responsibility over District 
Council staff. Central Government Departments operating 
in District Council areas continue to be answerable
2 / ......
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directly to their Permanent Secretaries in Lusaka 
via their Provincial Heads based at the Provincial 
Headquarters.
It is my hope that the new Ministry of Decentra­
lisation will not face the same situation and that 
the Standing Commission on Decentralisation will make 
early recommendations to the Party and its Government 
for a clear strategy on the implementation of dece­
ntralisation .
9. ANY OTHER OBSERVATIONS REGARDING LOCAL ADMINI­
STRATION IN ZAMBIA?
ANSWER
The distinguishing characteristic of local 
government or local administration from Central 
Government is its localness. Local administration 
is about local decisions, local responsiveness to 
local situations and above all local accountability 
and answerability to local people or their elected 
representatives. This localness must be preserved 
at all costs. There is need in Zambia to take early 
steps to ensure that Party and Government personnel 
appointed to District Councils are answerable and 
accountable to the people of the District through 
their elected representatives and the various decision 
making institutions set-up by the Party and Government 
the District level.
